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Facsimile of draft of Sir Edward [Lord] Grev's telegram (No. 367) to 
Sir E. Goschen, October 18, 19 13, pp. 36-?- 



D 




British Documents on the 
Origins of the War 

1 898-1914 

Edited by G. P. GOOCH, D.Litt., F.B.A., and 
HAROLD TEMPERLEY, Litt.D., F.B.A. 

Vol. X 

PART I 

THE NEAR AND ^MIDDLE EAST 
ON THE EVE OF WAR 



LONDON : 
1936 

{Crown Copyright Reserved) 

Reprinted with the permission of 
the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty's Stationer)' Office 

JOHXSON REPRINT CORPORATION JOHNSON REPRINT COMPANY LTD 

1 1 1 Fifth Avenue, New York. N.Y. 10003 Berkeley Square House, London. W.l 



Reprinted from a copy in the collections of 
The New York Public Library 
Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations 



First reprinting, 1967, Johnson Reprint Corporation 
Printed in the United States of America 



PROVO, ^xxi.H 



Volume X 

PART I 

THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 
ON THE EVE OF WAR 



Edited by 

G. P. GOOCH, D.Litt., and HAROLD TEMPERLEY, Litt.D. 

with the assistance of 
LILLIAN M. PENSON, Ph.D. 



Table of Contents. 

Page 

Foreword by the Editors ... ... ... ... ... ... vi 

Note on the Arrangement of Documents ... ... ... ... .-• ... viii 

Plan of Volume X (Part I) x 

List of Editorial Notes xii 

List of Abbreviations ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xv 

Names of Writers of Minutes... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xvi 

List of Documents ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ••• ... xviii 

Foreign Office and other Documents ... ... ... ... ... ■■■ 1-902 

Chapter LXXXIV.— Albania, 1913-14 

T. — Servia and Albania to the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum of 

October 18, 1913 1 

II.— The Prince of Wied, October 1913 to July 1914 55 

Chapter LXXXV.— The ^gean Islands 130 

Chapter LXXXVL— General Balkan Politics, 1913-14 279 

Chapter LXXXVIL— Liman von Sanders' Mission, 1913-14 338 

Chapter LXXXVIII.— Armenian Keforms, 1913-14 424 

Chapter LXXXIX.— The Potsdam Meeting 549 

Chapter XC. — Anglo-Russian Friction in Persia 

I.— The Situation in Persia, 1908-10 724 

II. — The Appointment of Mr. Shuster 746 

III. — The Appointment of Major Stokes 762 

IV. — The Dismissal of Mr. Shuster 812 

Appendix. — Overture of Turkey to Great Britain, June 1913 ... ... 901 

Index of persons showing the writers of despatches and the principal persons 

mentioned in the text ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 903 

Subject Index ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 931 



vi 



Foreword to Volume X (Part I). 

The decision to publish a selection from the British Documents dealing with 
the origins of the War was taken by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Prime Minister and 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the summer of 1924. It was confirmed 
and announced by Mr. (now Sir) Austen Chamberlain in a letter of the 
28th November, 1924 (published in "The Times" on the 3rd December), addressed 
to Dr. B. W. Seton-Watson. Some extracts from this letter were published by the 
Editors in the Foreword to Volume XI, and it need only be said here that the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to "impartiality and accuracy" as 
being the necessary qualifications for any work which the Editors were to publish. 

The topics of the present volume are all outgrowths of the Balkan Wars, except 
for the Potsdam ^Meeting of the German and Russian Emperors, and the Anglo- 
Russian friction in Persia. In spite of these exceptions, the volume has an underlying 
unity in a common concern with the action of the Great Powers. The Potsdam 
Meeting caused England to doubt Russia, and the Persian problem revived the 
uncertainty ; and every other question treated in this volume affected the relation of 
the Triple Entente to the Triple Alliance. The ^gean Islands and Albania are 
subjects on which the British documents throw relatively little light, as the ground 
has already been well covered in the publications of foreign governments. But there 
is much that is new about the Potsdam INIeeting and the problem of Armenian Reform : 
and for the first time the British side of the Persian question, more particularly that 
relating to the dismissal of the American Mr. Shuster, is fully revealed. Better known 
are the incidents attending the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia of October 1913 
and the dangerous question of the Liman von Sanders Mission (Chapter LXXXVII). 
In both cases peace was secured. These incidents are a kind of rehearsal of the quarrel 
between Austria-Hungary and Germany on one side, and Servia and Russia on the 
other, which found so fatal a termination in 1914. In the case of the ultimatum to 
Servia of 1913 the views of Sir E. Goschen and Sir Edward Grey and the minute of 
Sir Eyre Crowe will be read with interest {v. infra, pp 3,5-8). It is also of unusual 
importance that, on this occasion, M. de Hartwig, the celebrated Russian Minister at 
Belgrade, asserts that he put pressure on Servia to secure her surrender (v. infra, 
pp. 45-6). 

The questions of a European guarantee of the ^gean isles and of an Entente 
between Greece and England are discussed by M. Venizelos (pp. 95-6, 194-5), and an 
interesting tribute to this statesman's policy in Epirus is paid by Sir F. Elliot 
(pp. 107-8). On the Straits question Sir Edward Grey's views are unusually important 
in view of his resolve to keep them open to commerce if necessary by force (p. 262). 
His realization that a threat to every Power interested in Turkey was made by the 
position offered to Liman von Sanders in Turkey (p. 347) is also striking. Sir Eyre 
Crowe's suggestion of finding a way out for Germany and Sir Edward Grey's approval 
and summing up of the whole question throw new light on British policy (pp. 400-2, 
423), and exhibit some suspicion of M. Sazonov. A letter by Mr. Shuster is printed 
(pp. 788-9) and Sir Edward Grey's utterances on that ' singleminded ' man fpp. 795, 
815-6, 83&-9, 862-3) liave a mournful interest. Sir Edward Grey's letter to 
Dr. Hodgkin as a statement of his Persian poHcy has great value (pp. 898-9). In the 
volume as a whole conversations with Russian statesmen are not of great importance, 
but the interview with M. Neratov (pp. 846-52) is worth careful study. 



vii 



It is important to understand that Russia's policy in Asia was a factor affecting 
British pre-war policy to a much greater extent than is usually perceived. It is hoped 
that the publication of these documents, together with much new material on the 
Armenian Keforms, will be useful. In connection with Asia Elinor it is well to notice 
that the whole question of Armenian reform was discussed by tlie British Government 
on the assumption that the Cyprus Convention of 1878 was still in force. Throughout 
this volume Sir Edward Grey appears in the light of a pacificator, but the part he 
played in such questions as Epirus, Albania, Armenia and Persia during these years 
has, hitherto, been little recognized. 

The documents printed in the Appendix (pp. 901-2) refer to the renewal in June 
1913 of the proposal of Turkey for an alliance, previously made at the time of the 
Tripoli War (Vol. IX (I), pp. 779-81). The incident is interesting mainly because of 
the reply it elicited from Sir Edward Grey — a reiteration of his belief that the safety 
of Turkey lay in co-operation with all the Great Powers and not in alliance with one 
of them. 

Once again the private papers of Sir Edward Grey and Lord Carnock have proved 
of invaluable assistance, not only in interpreting the attitude of the Secretary of 
State and his principal adviser, but in revealing the inmost thoughts of the British 
representatives abroad as expressed in their confidential correspondence. It is as 
well to mention again the statement of Lord Grey (already quoted in Volume VI, 
p. ix) : "I did not, however, regard anything except my own letters and ofl&cial papers 
as deciding policy." 

In accordance with the practice observed in the preceding volumes the documents 
in the present volume containing information supplied or opinions expressed by certain 
Foreign Governments have been communicated to them for their agreement. The 
response has been satisfactory. The Editors can therefore assert, as in all previous 
volumes, that they have omitted nothing which they consider essential to the under- 
standing of the history of the period. In this connexion they beg to draw attention to 
their statement made in previous volumes " that they would feel compelled to resign 
if any attempt were made to insist on the omission of any document which is, in their 
view, vital or essential." 

In addition to despatches and telegrams, there are memoranda and minutes which 
are properly official documents. No objection has been raised by His Majesty's 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the publication in this volume of any 
documents of the above kind, nor to the publication of certain similar papers or of 
private letters, which are not properly official documents, but which are preserved in 
the Foreign Office. 

His late Majesty King George V had graciously consented to the publication of 
two letters expressing his views (pp. 588, 595). The Editors have again to acknowledge 
the friendly assistance and advice of various officials at the Foreign Office, among 
whom they would like to mention the Librarian, Sir Stephen Gaselee, K.C.M.G., and 
Mr. A. F. Orchard. They wish also to thank the officials of the Public Record Office in 
London and Mr. Wright, who is in charge of the Diplomatic and Embassy Archives 
formerly at Cambridge and now at Canterbury. Miss E. M. Keate, M.B.E., has assisted 
throughout in the preparation of the volume'for Press. Miss D. M. Griffith, M.A., and 
Miss I. B. Johnston, B.A., have also given help in this part of the work. 



G. P. GOOCH. 
HAROLD TEMPERLEY. 



viii 



Note on the Arrangement of Documents, &c. 

The technical arrangement and details of this volume are very similar to those of 
"\ olumes III, IV, VI, VII, and IX. The material deals with two main themes, the 
problems of the Near East in 1913-14, and those of the Middle East in 1908-11. 

Within the chapters the papers are placed in chronological order, as in previous 
volumes, and, as before, chronological order means the date of despatch, whether to 
or from London, not the date of receipt. The latter date is added wherever possible, 
and readers should be careful to note it. 

In this volume, as in Volume IX (II), none of the documents date from the period 
before 1906, and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat the note on the classification 
of the papers before that date, for which reference may be made to Volume I (p. ix). 

The note prefaced to Volume III (pp. ix-xi described further the arrangement 
inaugurated at the beginning of 1906 : — 

" A new system was inaugurated at the beginning of the year 1906. From that 
date all papers, irrespective of country, are first divided into certain general 
categories, ' Political ' (the former ' diplomatic '), Commercial, Consular, Treaty, &c. 
The papers are, however, not removed from their original files, the contents of each 
file being treated as one document. The files of papers are classified within the 
general categories according to the country to which their subject most properly 
belongs. The volumes containing papers relating to any country are therefore in a 
sub-section of the main series, and these sub-sections are arranged in alphabetical 
order (e.g., Political, Abyssinia, &c.). Previously the correspondence with, say, the 
British Ambassador at Paris was kept distinct from the communications of the French 
Ambassador in London, the latter being termed ' Domestic' This distinction is now 
abolished, and all papers relating to a subject are placed together in one file or in a 
series of files. The historian finds many difficulties in this arrangement, as the files 
are not arranged in the volumes in chronological order or alphabetical sequence. 
The Foreign Office overcomes these difficulties by compiling a manuscript register 
of the contents, but this method cannot be used so satisfactorily by the historian. It 
is to be feared that the new arrangement makes it more difficult for the historian to 
be sure he has found all the papers relating to a given incident." 

For the period covered by the first half of the present volume the documents are 
still at the Foreign Office, in the original loose jackets. A combination of three 
methods has again been used in the survey of the available material : — 

(1) A comprehensive study has been made of the Confidential Print, which 
contains, as the period develops, an increasingly large proportion of the papers. 
Documents traced in this way have, as before, been checked by the originals in the 
Foreign Office files, and notes and minutes added. In a few cases in this, as in 
previous volumes, a note at the foot of a document has been inserted to show that 
no original can be traced. In the majority of these instances, however, this does not 
mean that there is no registered jacket for the paper, but that the jacket contains a 
printed copy as the official record. 

(2) Application has been made to the Foreign Office library staff for papers and 
files of papers to which reference has been found. 



ix 

(S The Foreign Office registers of despatches and telegrams sent to or received 
from British Embassies or Legations have been searched. In a few cases this has 
revealed documents which were not included in the Confidential Print, either because 
thev were not considered at the time of sufficient importance or because they were 
regarded as especially confidential. 

In the note prefaced to the previous volume (Volume IX iIL, pp. x-xii) an 
analysis was given, based on the e\'idence provided by the documents themselves, of 
the practice followed in the circulation of papers to the Cabinet. Reference was made 
there to the formation of a Cabinet Committee in 1911 for the discussion of Anglo- 
German negotiations (p. xii). The papers printed in the present volume throw some 
further light on its origin and working. It will be remembered that Sir Arthm- 
Nicolson stated in a letter of March 2, 1911, that it had "been quite recently 
constituted" (Vol. YI, p. 590. No. 440i to deal with ""the larger questions which 
we have to discuss with the German Government." It now appears that certain 
documents dealing with the Eusso-German negotiations resulting from the Potsdam 
meeting were referred to this Committee. The first reference is given infra, p. 629, 
No. 659. note (M. On this occasion Sir Edward Grey merely endorsed the despatch, 
which was received on January 30, 1911, for circulation to the Cabinet Committee. 
The next instance, p. 639, No. 666, note Ck is an out-despatch originally dated 
January 27 and ultimately January 31. In this case Sir Edward Grey wrote in 
the margin of the draft directions for circulation to the King and the Cabinet 
Committee, and added a definition of this body. The personnel is identical with that 
given by Sir Arthur Nicolson in his letter of March 2. It would appear therefore 
that the Committee was formed immediately upon the resumption of the Anglo- 
German negotiations at the beginning of 1911. For subsequent references to the 
circulation of papers to this body r. infra, p. 672. No. 698, note (^i; p. 693, No. 717, 
note p. 698, No. 721, note (M ; p. 701, No. 723. note C): p. 705, No. 727, note C). 

The Editors have recorded in pre\-ious volumes their regret that the Embassy 
archives for the period after 1905 are not generally available. With the exception of 
Japan (to 1910 and Russia, the Embassies and Legations have not yet sent their 
later papers to England. The Editors can, however, confirm the judgment previously 
expressed that the records are more exact and complete after 1906. There are a 
few cases in the present volume in which the original texts of documents occurring 
in the Confidential Print have proved impossible to trace. In the large number of 
cases where opportunities for comparison exist such copies have been found to be 
verbally exact, though the punctuation and capitalisation are standardised. 

The private collections available at the Foreign Office continue to be of great 
value. Many letters have been printed from the private correspondence of Sir Edward 
(Lord) Grey, and Sir Arthur Nicolson (Lord Camock). The papers of Lord 
Lansdowne are also now available for use. Some of these were found too late to be 
published in the earlier volumes of this series, but selections will be published in a 
later volume. The value of such material is e^^dent, but it is, generally speaking, 
more complete in respect of in-letters than out-letters. 



LLLLIAN M. PENSON. 



z 



Plan of Volume X (Part I). 

Chapter LXXXIV is devoted to the fortunes of the independent state of Albania 
created by the Powers after the defeat of Turkey in the Balkan wars. The first section 
describes the efforts of the Austro-Hungarian Government, culminating in the 
ultimatum of October 18, 1913, to secure the withdrawal of Servian troops from 
Albanian territory — a demand promptly obeyed by Servia and quietly accepted by 
Eussia. The second section deals with the choice by the Powers of Prince Wilhelm 
of Wied as the ruler of Albania, his arrival at Durazzo in March, 1914, the grave 
internal difficulties w-hich he encountered, and the termination of his brief reign by 
the outbreak of the world war. 

The story of the discussion of the ownership of the ^gean Islands begun at the 
Conference of Ambassadors in London is continued in Chapter LXXXV. The main 
problem is the reconciliation of the conflicting claims of Greece and Turkey ; for the 
attitude of the latter, though defeated in the Balkan war, had stiffened since she was 
no longer faced by a united Balkan front. A second, though less dangerous, aspect 
of the question was the delay of Italy in fulfilling her conditional promise under the 
Treaty of Lausanne to evacuate the Dodecanese. No solution of either problem had 
been reached at the outbreak of war in 1914. 

A number of documents are gi'ouped together in Chapter LXXXYI which illustrate 
the relations of the Balkan states to one another and to the Great Powers between the 
Treaty of Bucharest and the outbreak of the world war. The most significant are 
those wliich indicate the trend of Bulgaria towards the Central Powers and of 
Rumania towards Russia. 

Chapter LXXXVII describes the consternation in Russia aroused by the appoint- 
ment in November 1913 of General Liman von Sanders to superintend the 
reorganisation of the Turkish army and to command the First Army Corps in 
Constantinople. While sympathising with Russian anxieties as to the increase of 
German influence. Sir Edward Grey believed the importance of the Military Mission 
to be exaggerated. He declined to join in pressure on Turkey and favoured discussions 
between St. Petersburg and Berlin. That a British Admiral was in command of the 
Turkish fleet in time of peace was an additional argument for caution. The crisis, 
which caused more alarm than any other matter during the last year of peace, was 
terminated by a German concession, General Liman being appointed Inspector-General 
of the Turkish army instead of Commander of the First Army Corps. 

The little known story of the last attempt to introduce reforms in the Armenian 
provinces of Asia Minor forms the subject of Chapter LXXXVIII. Since the defeat 
of Turkey by the Balkan States seemed likely to involve the danger of a general 
scramble for her Asiatic territories, the Turkish Government invited the British 
Government to supply experts, both military and civil, for the Armenian vilayets. 
Such unilateral assistance being ruled out by the determination of Russia to share in 
the task of reform, plans were elaborated between Turkey and the Powers. Two 
Inspectors-General of the Armenian vilayets were selected from the minor Powers in 
April 1914 ; but the reform machinery had not begun to work when the world war 
broke out. 



zi 

Chapter LXXXIX describes in detail the temporary Russo-German rapprochement 
inaugurated by tlie visit of the Emperor Nicholas to Potsdam in November 1910, when 
Russia withdrew her objections to the Bagdad Railway, and the plan of a junction of 
the Bagdad-Khanikin extension with a future Persian line under Russian auspices 
was amicably discussed. The fears of French statesmen that Russia might drift back 
into the German orbit were not fully shared in London. Yet it was felt in British 
official circles that Sazonov, in his first enterprise as Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, had gone too far in his conversations at Potsdam and had shown too little 
consideration for his partners in the Triple Entente. The Russo-German Agreement 
signed on August 19, 1911, recognised Russia's predominance in Nortliern Persia, 
and envisaged the construction of a line from Teheran to Khanikin when the Bagdad 
Railway was sufficiently advanced for a junction to be effected. 

The friction between Great Britain and Russia in Persia after the signing of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907 is illustrated in Chapter XC. The first section 
consists of summaries of the situation in Persia taken from the Annual Reports on 
Russia for the years 1908, 1909 and 1910 by the British Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg}!. The second deals with the appointment of Mr. Shuster, an 
American expert, as Treasurer-General of the Persian Empire, and his arrival in 
Tehran in May 1911. The third is devoted to the sharp conflict between ]Mr. Shuster 
and the Russian Government arising out of his appointment of Major Stokes, a 
Persian-speaking officer in the Indian army, to command a Treasury gendarmerie 
designed to secure the collection of the taxes. The veto of the Russian Government 
on a British officer operating in the Russian zone was endorsed by Sir Edward Grey, 
by whose instructions the appointment was cancelled. The fourth and final section 
records the subsequent conflicts of the Treasurer-General with the Russian authorities 
in Tehran, the occupation of portions of Northern Persia by Russian troops, and the 
successful demand for the expulsion of Mr. Shuster. While agreeing with the Russian 
Government that he had misused his position, Sir Edward Grey was nevertheless 
alarmed lest the Russian forces should march to Tehran. For the first and last time, 
though only for a brief space, the Anglo-Russian entente hung by a thread. 

The Appendix supplements the materials given in Chapter LXXXVI for studying 
the foreign relations of the Balkan Powers by documents recording the overture of 
Turkey to Great Britain in the summer of 1913 and the reply made by Sir Edward 
Grey. 



Errata. 

Page 294, No. 326, note (2), line 2. For "Bulgarian"' read "Servian." 

Page 361, No. 406, note e). For " G.P., XXXVIII, pp. 208-11 " read " G.P., XXXVIII, 
pp. 239-40." 



xii 



List of Principal Editorial Notes. 

Page 

Appointment of International Commission for Control of Albania. 

[Citing Gooch cfc Temperley, Vol. IX (II), G.P., Stickney : Southern Albania and 

Northern Epirus in European International Affairs, and Swire: Albania] ... 1 

Servian evacuation of Oroshi. 

[Citing communication from Count Trauttman.sdorflF and giving reference to 

6.-U.A.] 6 

Albanian Boundary Commissions. 

[Appointment and personnel; giving reference to Gooch <Ss Temperley, Vol. IX (11), 

and 7 

[Referring to delay in sending instructions to the French delegate on the Southern 

Frontier Commission; giving references to British reports and to D.D.F.] ... 70-1 

The Admirals' Commission at Scutari. 

[Summarizing British information on diflBculties arising between the Austro- 

Hungarian and Italian members; and on circumstances leading to dissolution 

of commission] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 17-8, 29 

Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia. 

[Referring to communication of text by Baron Gautsch ; minute by Sir Eyre Crowe 

recording conversation; giving references to G.P. and O.-U.A.] ... ... ... 38 

[Giving reference to O.-U.A., for Servian reply] ... ... ... ... ... ... 43 

Sir Edward Grey's circular telegram of December 12, 1913. 

[Giving minutes by Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir A. Nicolson on first draft of telegram] ' 77 

Identic communication by Triple Alliance Powers on December 31, 1913, in reply to 
above. 

[Referring to G.P. and O.-U.A., and citing minutes by Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir 

Edward Grey on the Italian communication] ... ... ... ... ... ... 86-7 

The Prince of Wied and throne of Albania. 

[Referring to despatch from Sir E. Goschen and to G.P. for conditions of Prince of 

Wied's acceptance] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 88 

[Arrival of Prince of Wied at Durazzo] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 107 

Essad Pasha. 

[Describing situation created by advance of Essad Pasha's adherents; men of war 

required at Albanian ports; referring to British accounts and to G.P.] ... 89 

[Summarizing Consul-General Lamb's account of events leading to arrest of Essad 

Pasha and of situation following the arrest] ... ... ... ... ... ... 115-6 

Formation of Turkhan Pasha's Cabinet. 

[Giving composition of first Cabinet] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Ill 

[Referring to formation of new Cabinet] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 117 

Siege of Durazzo by insurgents. 

[Referring to despatch of ships by Powers and describing situation at Durazzo] ... 120-1 
[Referring to letter sent to representatives of Powers by Shiak insurgents ; situa- 
tion at outbreak of war] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 127 

The ^gean Islands. 

[Referring to G.P. and Imperialismus] 130 

Visit of King and Queen of Greece to England and Paris. 

[Referring to D.D.F.] 136 



xiii 



Page 

Reference by Grand Vizier to British initiative in proposing Naval Demonstration. 

[Giving references for Italian and Austro-Hungarian replies to Sir Edward Grey's 

enquiries] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 219 

Sir Edward Grey's circular despatch of January 23, 1914. 

[Giving text of telegram to Sir F. Bertie and Sir G. Buchanan instructing communi- 
cation of Austro-Hungarian views] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 221 

Identic communication by Powers to Greece of April 24, 1914. 

[Referring to M. Sazonov's acceptance of amended text] 248 

Alliances and negotiations between Balkan Powers. 

[Citing Gooch d; Temperley, Vol. IX (II\ 0.-U..i. and Imperialismus] 279 

[Reporting agreement between Montenegro and Servia and citing Imperialismus 

and Siebert~Benckendorff'\ ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 320 

Treaties of Bucharest, .ithens and London. 

[Recording communication to Sir F. Elliot on December 10, 1913, and annexation 

decree issued by King of Servia on September 12] ... ... ... ... ... 287-8 

[Quoting Sir E. Grey's views on Greek and Servian communications] ... ... 292-3 

The Straits. 

[Quoting Sir E. Grey's statement of June 25, 1914, adhering to his attitude of 

October 15, 1903]' 337 

Mission of General Liman von Sanders. 

[Referring to G.P., Siebert, Imperialismus, Die Europa'ischen Machte und die 

Tiirkei wahrend des Weltkrieges, and article bv Herzfeld in Berliner 

Monatshefte] ' 338 

[Citing telegram from M. Sazonov of December 7, 1913, giving proposed draft note 

to the Porte] 362 

[Citing telegram from M. de Giers of December 10, 1913] ... ... ... ... 369 

[Recording conversation between Sir E. Grey and Count Mensdorff of December 16, 

1913, reported in O.-U.A.] 387 

[Recording conversation between Sir Eyre Crowe and M. de Etter on December 31, 

1913, regarding Russian communication of December 29, and referring to 

French "preliminary reply" given in Stieve] ... ... ... ... ... 402 

[Referring to French assurances of support of Russia on December 30, 1913, and 

citing Siebert and Stieve] 404 

Proposed re-organisation of Ottoman Navy by British officers and men. 

[Citing correspondence between Admiralty and Foreign Office] ... ... ... 370 

T'leirs of Emperor William II. 

[Citing O.-U.A., G.P., Siebert] 392 



^'lews of Emperor Nicholas II. 

[Citing 0.-U.A.-\ 399 

Armenian reforms. 

[Citing G.P., Sazonov: Fateful Years, Ritter von Steinitz : Bings um Sazonov, and 

Imperialismus] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 424 

Memorandum on reforms communicated by Tewfik Pasha on June 28, 1913. 

[Citing The Times, G.P., D.D.F.] 466 

Note verbale communicated by Porte to the Powers on July 5, 1913. 

[Giving text] 485 



Appointment of Belgian and Dutch officers. 
[Citing Imperialismus, G.P., Sec] 



548 



siv 

Page 

The Potsdam Meeting of November 4—5, 1910. 

[Citing G.r., SazoDov : Fateful Years, Buchanan: My Mission to Iiussia'\ ... ... 549 

[Summarizing Mr. O'Beirne's despatch of October 30, 1910, and minutes by Sir E. 

Grey] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 555 

[Giving date of meeting, and references to conversations] ... ... ... ... 556 

Comments of King George V on Article I. 

[Giving references] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 580 

German participation in Tehran-Khanikin Line. 

[Quoting minute by Sir L. Mallet of January 16, 1911] 623 

The port of Koiveit and the Bagdad liailway. 

[Quoting minutes showing origin of amendments in Sir Edward Grey's despatch to 

Sir F. Bertie of January 18, 1911] 624 

Conversation between King George V and Count Benckendorff on January 26, 1911. 

[Citing Siebert] 636 

Conversation between King Ferdinand and M. Tcharykov. 

[Quoting despatch from Mr. Lindley of February 1, 1911] ... ... ... ... 643 

Illness of M. Sazonov. 

[Referring to appointment of M. Neratov as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs] 677 

British application for concession of Persian railway line, April 1911. 

[Citing telegrams recording application and its refusal] ... ... ... ... 692 

International aspect of Persian question. 

[Citing G.P., Browne: The Persian Revolution, Sykes : The History of Persia] ... 724 

Appointment of Mr. Shuster. 

[Citing A. & P., Shuster : The Strangling of Persia, Buchanan : My Mission to 

Russia, Grey: Twenty-Five Years] ... ... ... ... ... ... .. 746 

Fighting at Tabreez. 

[Citing telegram from Sir G. Barclay of December 22, 1911, and Siebert] 893 

Turkish overture to Great Britain, 1913. 

[Referring to Gooch db Temperley, Vol. IX (I)] 901 



XV 



List of Abbreviations. 

.4. ({■ p British Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers. 

B.F.S.P British and Foreign State Papers. 

UD.F Documents Diplomatiques Franfais (1871-1914). 

Q p Die Grosse PoUtik der Europaischen Kabinette. 

Imperialismus ... ... Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus. 

0.-U..A. ... ... ... Osterreich-Ungarns Aiissenpolitik (1908-14). 

Pari. Deb. ... ... Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords or House of Commons). 

Pribram ... ... ... A. F. Pribram: Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary (Harvard Uni- 
versity Press, 1920-1). 

Siehert ... ... ... B. de Siebert : Entente Diplomacy and the World, edited, arranged 

and annotated by G. A. Schreiner (New York and London, 1921V. 
[This is an English translation with the addition of a chrono- 
logical list of documents bj' the American Editor of Diplo- 
matische .■iktenstiicke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der 
Vorkriegsjahre (Berlin and Leipzig, 1921).] 

Siebert-Benckendorff ... This refers to a new German edition of the above by Herr von 

Siebert, containing a number of additions. It is entitled Graf 
Benckendorffs Diplomatischer Schriftwechsel (Berlin and Leipzig, 
1928). 



Stieve 

Twenty-Five Years 



Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Isvolskis (1911-4) (Berlin, 1924). 



Lord Grey: Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (2 vols., 1925). 



xvi 



Names of Writers of Minutes. 

F. D. A. = Mr. F. D. Acland Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 

Foreign Affairs, 1911-5. 



E. A. C. = Mr. (later Sir) Eyre Crowe Senior Clerk in Foreign OfiBce, 1906-12; 

Assistant Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 1912-20 ; Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 1920-5. 

G. R. C. = Mr. (later Sir) George R. Clerk ... Clerk in Foreign Office, 1907-10; 1912-3; 

Acting First Secretary at Constantinople, 
1910-2; Senior Clerk in Foreign Office, 
1913-9; Private Secretary to Lord Curzon, 
1919; Minister at Prague, 1919-26; Am- 
bassador at Angora, 1926-33; at Brussels, 
1933-4; at Paris, 1934- 



D. = The 10th Earl of Drogheda 

E. G. = Sir Edward (later Viscount) Grey 

(of Fallodon) 

J. D. G. = Mr. J. D. Gregory 



Clerk in the Foreign Office, 1907-14. 

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
December 11, 1905-December 11, 1916. 

Clerk in Foreign Office, 1902-7 ; 2nd Secre- 
tary at Vienna, 1907-9 ; at Buchai-est, 1909 ; 
at Foreign Office, 1909; Assistant Clerk, 
1913-20; Assistant Secretary, 1920-5; 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 192&-8. 



R. C. L. = The Hon. (later Sir) Ronald C. Clerk in Foreign Office, 1908-11 ; Assistant 
Lindsay Private Secretary to Sir E. Grey, 1908-9; 

2nd Secretary (later 1st) at the Hague, 
1911-2 (sometimes Charge d'Affairef); 
Under-Secretary in Egyptian Ministry of 
Finance, 1913-9; Counsellor of Embassy at 
Washington, 1919-20; at Paris, 1920; 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 1921-4; Minister (later 
Ambassador) at Constantinople, 1924-5; 
Ambassador at Berlin, 1926-8; Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 1928-30 ; Ambassador at Washing- 
ton, 1930- 



M. = Mr. (later First Viscount) Morley Secretary of State for India, 1905-10, and 

(of Blackburn) March-May, 1911 ; Lord President of the 

Council, 1910-4; in charge of Foreign 
Office, July 1911, April 1913. 



L. M. = Mr. (later Sir) Louis Mallet Assistant Clerk in Foreign Office, 1902-5; 

Private Secretary to Sir E. Grey, 
1905-6 ; Senior Clerk, 1906-7 ; Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 1907-13; Ambassador at Constanti- 
nople, 1913-4. 



zvii 

U. p. M. = ^fr. R. P Maxwell 

A. N. = Sir Arthur Nicolson (later First 
Baron Carnock) 

H. N. = Mr. H. C. Norman 

L. O. = Mr. (later Sir) Lancelot Oliphant ... 

A. P. = Mr. A. Parker 

R. G. V. = Mr. (later Sir) Robert G.Vansittart... 



Private Secretary to Sir T. H. Sanderson, 
1894-6; Assistant Clerk in Foreign Office, 
1896-1902; Senior Clerk, 1902-13. 

Ambassador at Madrid, 1905-6; at St. 
Petersburgh, 1906-10; British Represen- 
tative at the Algeciras Conference on 
Affairs of Morocco, 1906; Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 1910-6. 

2nd Secretary at St. Petersburgh, 1903-6; 
employed in Foreign Office, 1906-14; 1st 
Secretary, 1907; Counsellor of Embassy at 
Buenos Aires, 1914-5 (sometimes Charge 
d'. iff aires); at T6ki6, 1915-9. 

Clerk in Foreign Office, 1911-28; Acting 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 1928-9; Assistant Under- 
Secretary, 1929- 

Clerk in Foreign Office, 1906-12; Assistant 
Clerk, 1912-7; Librarian, 1918-9. 

2nd Secretary at Foreign Office, 1908; at 
Cairo, 1909-11: at Foreign Office, 1911-3; 
Junior Clerk, 1913-4; Assistant Clerk, 
1914-20; Counsellor of Embassy, 1920; 
Assistant Secretarj', 1920-8 ; Private Secre- 
tary to Lord Curzon, 1920-4; Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State, 1928-30; Per- 
manent Under-Secretary, 1930- 



[8959] 



b 



xviii 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS. 



Chapter LXXXIV. 
Albania, 1913-14. 

I— SERVIA AND ALBANIA TO THE AUSTRO-HUNGAR[AN ULTIMATUM OF 







OCTOBER 


18, 1913. 




No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


1 


To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 


1913. 
7 Sept. 


Urgency of meeting of Commission for 
Control of Albania; British attitude... 


I 


2 


(Tel.) 


7 Sept. 


Austro-Hungarian tendency not to realize 
risk of trouble in Albania 


2 


3 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 


7 Sept. 
(7;ecd. i5 Sept.) 


M. Pasi6 and Austro-Hungarian-Servian 
relations. Situation in Albania 


2 


4 


„ (Tel.) 


9 Sept. 


Evacuation of Oroshi by Servian troops... 


3 


5 


» )t 


9 Sept. 
{Reed. 15 Sept.) 


Deadlock in frontier negotiations between 
Montenegro and Servia ; Servian 
terms; proposed arbitration by Kings 
of Greece and Rumania. {Altn.) 


4 


6 


»• » 


10 Sept. 
{Reed. 15 Sept.) 


Servian policy in Albania. Reports from 
British Vice-Consul at Uscub ... 


5 


7 


To Mr. Crackanthorpe 

(Tel.) 


12 Sept. 


Instructions to join in urging Servia to 
withdraw troops 


6 


8 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 


12 Sept. 

{Reed. 15 Sept.) 


Conversation with M. Spalaikovi6 : Italian 
military escort for North Albanian 
Boundary Commission. (Min.)... 


6 


9 


„ (Tel.) 


13 Sept. 


Evacuation of Albania; Servian attitude 
to Austria-Hungary 


8 


10 


„ (Tel.) 


16 Sept. 


Conversation with M. Spalaikovic: orders 
for partial withdrawal of Servian 
troops 


8 


11 


(Tel.) 


19 Sept. 
{Reed. 20 Sept.) 


Further Conversation : Servian repre- 
sentatives instructed to explain situa- 
tion in Albania 


8 


12 


Communication from M. 
Gruid 


19 Sept. 


Beginning of withdrawal of remainder of 
Servian troops from Albania ; explana- 
tion of conditions. {Min.) 


9 


13 


From Mr. ■ Crackanthorpe 

(Tel.) 


21 Sept. 


Movements of Servian troops; points 
re-occupied; frontier questions... 


10 


14 


To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 


22 Sept. 


Instability in Albania; complications 
caused by delay of Austria-Hungary; 
question of Scutari 


10 


15 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


' 23 Sept. 


Movements of Albanian and Servian 
troops; situation becoming serious 


11 


16 


From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 


23 Sept. 


Conversation with M. Neratov : suspicious 
attitude of Austria-Hungary ; deferred 
appointment of delegate on Commission 
of Control. {Min.) 


• 11 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


17 


From Sir F. Cartwright 

(Tel.) 


1 iyi3. 
24 Sept. 


Conversation with Count Berchtold; 
Servian complaint of Albanians on 
frontier 


12 


18 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


24 Sept. 


Mobilisation of Servian troops; move- 
1 nients of Greek troops; Albanians 
marching on frontier 


13 


19 


„ (Tel.) 


24 Sept. 


Interview between M. de Strandtmann 
and M. Spalaikovic. Servia's advan- 
tageous position 


1 Q 


20 




25 Sept. 
{Becd. 29 Sept.) 


Albanian attack on Servian territory : 
suspected Austro-Hungarian influence 


14 


21 


From Lord Granville 


26 Sept. 
(Becd. 29 Sept.) 


Conversation with Herr von Jagow : 
withdrawal of forces from Scutari ; 
Serbo- Albanian quarrel ... 


io 


22 


From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 


27 Sept. 


M. Neratov informed of proposed Servian 
action in Albania ... 


18 


23 


From Sir F. Cartwright to 


27 Sept. 


Albanian rising on Servian frontier ; 

\^UUIiL X^ciCIlLUlU o VitfVVa ... ... ... 




24 


Memorandum by Sir A. 
Xicolson 


27 Sept. 


Communication from Prince Borghese : 
same subject; Italian anxiety. (Min.) 


20 


25 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


28 Sept. 


Italian counsel of prudence to Servia ... 


21 


26 


To Mr. Crackanthorpe 

(Tel.) 


29 Sept. 


Instruction to join in proposed warning 
by aU Powers to Servia ... 


21 


27 


To Sir F. Elliot (Tel.) 


29 Sept. 


Instruction to join in request to Greece 
to discourage demonstration at Koritza 


22 


2^^ 


From Sir F. Cartwright 

(Tel.) 


30 Sept. 


Pourparlers between Vienna and Rome 
on Albanian invasion of Servia 


22 


29 


From Lord Granville 


30 Sept. 
{Becd. 2 Oct.) 


Conversation with Herr von Jagow: same 
subject 


22 


30 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


2 Oct. 


Conversation with M. Spalaikovic: same 
subject. {Min.) 


23 


31 


From Mr. O'Beirne to Sir 
A. Nicolson (Private) 


2 Oct. 


Same subject ; M. Neratov's wish to 
support Servia 


24 


32 


From Sir F. Cartwright 

(Tel.) 


6 Oct. 


Conversation with Count Berchtold: his 
interview with M. Pasic... 


25 


33 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 1 


8 Oct. 
{Becd. IS Oct.) 


Outward moderation of Servian attitude 
towards Albania ; anxiety concerning 
Greco-Turkish relations ... 


26 


34 


>j j> ••• 


8 Oct. 
{Becd. 13 Oct.) 


Austro-Serviau Treaty of Commerce; 
Albanian frontier difiBculty. {Min.) ... 


28 




HjU. xfUCC ... ... ... 


li uci. 


between Sir Eyre Crowe and Count 
Mensdorff : Count Berchtold's proposal 
for procedure in Albania 


29 


35 


From Mr. Dering... 


14 Oct. 
{Berd. 18 Oct.) j 


Conversation with Marquis di San 
Giuliano : proposed dissolution of Com- 
mission of Admirals at Scutari on 
assembly of Commission of Control 


30 



[8959] 



XX 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


36 


2'o Mr. Crackanthorpe ... 


1913. 
15 Oct. 


Conversation between Sir E. Crowe and 
Prince Borghese : Serbo-Albanian fron- 

blCi l^tlcoUlUIl ... • • • • • ■ • • • 


31 


37 


From, Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


15 Oct. 

(Reed. IG Oct.) 


Conversation with Herr von Storck : 
same subject. (Min.) 


31 


38 


Frorn Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 


16 Oct. 


Conversation with Herr Zinimermann: 
same subject; Austro-Hungarian note 

VKJ OfcJl V Id. \lrj. 111.) ... ... ... ... 


32 


39 


From Consul-General Lamb 
^Tel ^ 


16 Oct. 


First meeting of Commission of Control 

ii V n 1 n n a 

t*,\J \ <Xl\JlkCb ... ... ... ... ... 


34 


40 


Communicatioti from M. 
Gruid 


16 Oct. 


Serbo-Albanian frontier : position of 
Servian army 


34 


41 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


17 Oct. 


Conversation with Herr von Storck : 
Servian replj' to Austro-Hungarian 


35 


42 


Sir E. Goschen to Sir A. 


17 Oct. 


Conversation with Herr Zimmermann : 

bet lilt; SU UJcC-L J ctLUlbUUt; \JL iv Uool <l . . . 


35 


43 


To Sir E. Goschen 


18 Oct. 


Same subject : Sir E. Grey's opinion. 
(Min.)... 


36 


44 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


18 Oct. 


Conversation with M. de Hartwig : same 
subject 


37 






18 Oct. 


Af'inni'P V»v Sir Fvrf* Crowp oti Count 

Berchtold's circular telegram giving 
text of ultimatum communicated at 
Belgrade on October 18 ... 


38 


45 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


19 Oct. 


Conversation with M. Stefanovic: same 
subject. Servian answer under con- 

•21 fl prji t, I riTl 

OlV^l^lClUlVJli ... ... ... ... ... 


39 


46 


From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 


19 Oct. 


Conversation with Herr Zimmermann : 
same subject 


39 


47 


From Sir F. Cartwright 

(Tel ^ 


20 Oct. 


Conversation v/ith Count Berchtold : same 

O U U 1 K^X./ U ... ... ... ... ... 


40 


48 


To Sir E. Goschen 


20 Oct. 


Conversation with Herr von Kiihlmann : 
same subject; British attitude... 


41 


49 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 


20 Oct. 
(Reed. 28 Oct.) 


Conversations with M. Stefanovic : same 
subject ; Servian answer under con- 
sideration 


41 


50 


.'J >> 


21 Oct. 
{Becd. 28 Oct.) 


Decision of Council of Ministers on 
October 19 ; Servian view of Austro- 
Hungarian policy. (Min.) 


43 


ox 


To Sir F CnrtwricrVit 


22 Oct. 


Kj/ \J IV i/ \j 1 OUl'tL/fC' W lull Vy \_/ \X 11 \J llouv/lll. . odlllO 

subject ; provisional government in 
Albania and urgency of appointing a 
Prince 


44 


52 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 


22 Oct. 
(Becd. 28 Oct.) 


Conversation with M. de Hartwig: 
approval of Servian surrender to 

A n ci"Tn— rTn n trn ti n ri pm n n n q 

xX tio L/l U i± Llll^clillall LltrlIl<*IH-lo ... ... 


45 


53 




23 Oct. 
(Becd. 28 Oct.) 


Servian Press approval of withdrawal of 
Servian troops from Albania 


46 


54 


From Sir E. Goschen 


24 Oct. 
(Becd. 27 Oct.) 


Visit of M. Sazonov to Berlin : his dis- 
cussions with Herr Zimmermann. 

(Min.) 


46 



zzi 



No 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 




55 


Communication from M. 
Gruic 


1913. 
27 Oct. 


Servian decision to withdraw troops from 
frontier 


48 


56 


From Mr. O'Beirue 


28 Oct. 
(Reed. 3 Nov.) 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : Servian 
imprudence and the crisis 


49 


57 


From Sir F. Cartwright 

(Tel.) 


29 Oct. 


Emperor William II's reported approval 
of Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. (Min.) 


49 


58 


To Sir F. Bertie 


29 Oct. 


Conversation with M. Paul Cambon : 
Austro-Hungarian policy in Albania ... 


50 


59 


Sir A. Xicolson to Sir C. 
Hardinge (Private) 


29 Oct. 


Conferences of Ambassadors; institution 
of Albanian State; .lEgean Islands 


50 


60 


To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 


30 Oct. 


Servian communication : danger of 
Albanian attack. Enquiry as to atti- 
tude of Powers 


51 


61 


From Mr. O'Beirne 


30 Oct. 
(Seed. 3 Nov.) 


Change in Russian attitude to Balkan 
questions. (Min.) ... 


52 


62 


Mr. O'Beirne to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 


30 Oct. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : his meet- 
ing with Herr von Bethmann HoUweg ; 
Russo-German relations ... 


53 


63 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 


3 Nov. 

{Reed. 10 Nov.) 


Speech by M. Pasic in Skupshtina ; 
review of recent events in Near East ... 


54 



II.— THE PRINCE OF WIED, OCTOBER 1913 TO JULY 1914. 



64 


I 

From Sir 


Gr. Barclay 


(Tel.) 


1913. 
30 Oct. 


Conversation with M. Marghiloman: 
candidature of the Prince of Wied. 
(Min.) 


55 


65 


From Mr 


Bering 


(Tel.) 


30 Oct. 
{Reed. 81 Oct.) 


Conversation with Marquis di San 
Giuliano : southern boundary of 
Albania; Greek obstruction 


56 


66 


yy 


» 


(Tel.) 


30 Oct. 
(Reed. 31 Oct.) 


Same conversation: Albanian frontiers; 
attitude of Italy ... 


57 


67 


>y 






30 Oct. 
{Reed. 3 Nov.) 


Same conversation: choice of Prince of 
Wied 


58 


68 


From Sir 


F. Cartwright 
(Tel.) 


31 Oct. 


Conversation with Count Berchtold : same 
subject ; reported danger to Servia from 
Albania (r. No. 60) 


58 


69 


From Mr. 


O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


2 Nov. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: Greek 
obstruction to Southern Albanian 
Delimitation Commission ; Austro- 
Hungarian and Italian communication 
at Athens on October 30 ... 


59 


70 




II • • ■ 




2 Nov. 
(Reed. 17 Nov.) 


Saine conversation : attempted control of 
Albania by Austria-Hungary and Italy; 
Mediterranean questions... 


60 


71 


To Sir F. 


Bertie 


(Tel.) 


3 Nov. 


Selection of Prince of Wied : enquiry as 
to French attitude... 


60 


72 


To Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 

I 


4 Nov. 

1 


Suggested withdrawal of Great Britain 
and France from Albanian Commissions 


60 



[8959] 



No. 
73 

74 

75 
76 
77 

78 

79 

80 
81 

82 

83 

84 

85 

86 
87 

88 
89 
90 
91 



xxu 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



To Mr. Dering 

From Mr. O'Beiriie 
To Sir F. Bertie 
To Mr. T. Russell ... 
From Mr. O'Beirne 



(Tel.) 
(Tel.) 



1913. 
4 Nov. 



5 Nov. 
7 Nov. 
7 Nov. 



From Sir F. Bertie 

(Private) i 



To Sir F. Bertie (Private) 
From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 



Minutes by Sir A. Nicol- 
son, Sir E. Crowe, Sir 
Edward Grey 



To Mr. Dering (Tel.) 



To Sir F. Elliot 



Sir E. Crowe to Count 
Trauttmansdorff 



From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 

From Sir M. de Bun.sen ... I 

1 

To Sir M. de Bunsen 
From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



(Tel.) 



10 Nov. 

(Becd.UNov.) 



11 Nov. 
{Becd.17 Nov.) 



11 Nov. 

12 Nov. 
20 Nov. 

24 Nov. 

25 Nov. 
25 Nov. 
2o Nov. 

2 Dec. 



5 Dec. 
(Feed. 8 Dec.) 



8 Dec 
10 Dec. 



10 Dec. 
(Reed. 16 Dec.) 

12 Dec. 



Conversation with Marquis Tmperiali: 
Albanian question ; international con- j 
trol I 

Conversation with M. Neratov : same | 
subject; views of M. Sazonov. (Min.) , 

Southern Albania Delimitation Commis- 
sion: views of British delegate... 

Cortversation with Count MensdorfiE: 
Prince of Wied as Prince of Albania... 

Conversation with M. Neratov: Austro- 
Hungarian and Itnlian action at 
Athens on October 30; M. Sazonov's 
policy in Albania ... 

Conversation with M. Neratov : German 
attitude to action of Austria-Hungary 
and Italy at Belgrade and Athens 

Conversation with M. Kokovtsov : pro- 
posed resumption of Ambassadors' con- 
ference in London... 

Same subject ... 

Question of Prince of Wied's candidature 
referred to Emperor William II 

Conversations with Count MensdorfT, 
Count Trauttmansdorff and Marquis 
Imperiali : proposal that Sir Edward 
Grey should inform the Prince of Wied 
of the Powers' approval ... 

Same subject : i)roposal that Herr von 1 
Jagow should inform the Prince of I 
Wied I 

Conversation with M. Gennadius : Greek' 
protest against frontier line south of 
Albania proposed by Commission ... 

j Proposal that Herr von Jagow should 
I inform the Prince of Wied of the 
I Powers' approval of his candidature ... 

Same subject. Herr von Jagow to inform 
the Prince on December 4 

Parliamentary attack on Count Berch- 
told's foreign policy. Conversations 
with Herr von Tschirschky and Count 
Berchtold : question of South Albanian 
frontier 



Conversation with 
same subject 



Count Mensdorff ; 



Conversation with M. Venizelos : same 
subject; discontent in Epirus ... 

Conversations with M. Venizelos and 
Count Bosdari : same subject 

Circular telegram to the Powers: 
expected decision of Southern Albanian 
Delimitation Commission ; suggested 
allotment of iEgean Islands 



61 

62 
63 
64 

64 

66 

66 
67 

67 

68 

69 

69 

70 
71 

71 
73 
73 
74 

76 



xxiii 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 

1 


Maiu Subject. 


Pago 





Ed. Note 


1913. 
1 11 Dec. 


Minutes on draft for above telegram 


77 


92 


To Sir E. Goschen 


12 Dec. 


Conversation between Sir E. Crowe and 
Herr von Kiihlmann : same subject ... 


78 


93 


From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 


14 Dec. 


Conversations with Herr von Bethmann 
Hollweg and Herr von Jagow : same 
subject 


79 


94 


(Tel.) 


16 Dec. 

! 


Conversation with Prince of Wied : still 
awaiting replies of Austria-Hungary 
and Italy; proposed naval escort 


79 


95 


To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 


18 Dec. 

i 


Prince of Wied : advice to communicate 
1 with all the Powers on condition of 
acceptance ... 


80 


96 


From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 


20 Dec. 


Conversation with Prince of Wied : same 
j subject. (Min.) 


80 


97 


From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.) 


22 Dec. 
, (Itecd. 23 Bee.) 


' Conversations with Marquis di San 
Giuliano : South Albanian frontier ; 
^gean Islands 


81 


98 


From Sir M. de Bunsen 
(Tel.) 


' 23 Dec. 

I 


Conversation with Count Berchtold ; same 
subject ; conclusions with Allied Powers 
not yet reached 


82 


99 


To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 


' 24 Dec. 


Prince of Wied : conditions of acceptance 


83 


100 


From Sir M. de Bunsen... 


24 Dec. 
{Becd. 29 Dec.) 


Conversation with Count Berchtold : con- 
ditions in Albania; financial questions. 
{Min.) 


84 


101 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


26 Dec. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: conditions 
of Prince of Wied's acceptance ; loan 
question 


86 


102 


To Sir M. de Bunsen (Tel.) 


27 Dec. 


South Albanian frontier : .iEgean Islands 


86 




Ed. Note 


31 Dec. 


Minutes on Italian communication in 
reply to Sir E. Grey's proposals 

(V. INC. al) 


OD 


103 


From Prince Lichnowsky 


31 Dec. 


German reply to Sir E. Grey's proposals 
{v. No. 91) 


87 


104 


Memorandum for the 
Cabinet 


1914. 
6 Jan. 


Conditions proposed by Prince of Wied... 


88 




Ed. Note 


10 Jan. 


Telegram from Consul-General Lamb; 
request for men-of-war at Albanian 
ports... 


89 


105 


From Sir R. Rodd 


15 Jan. 
{Itecd. 20 Jan.) 

1 


Conversation with Marquis di San 
Giuliano: Italian reply to Sir E. Grey's 
proposals 


89 


106 


Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir 
A. Nicolson (Private) 


16 Jan. , 


Reply of Triple Alliance Powers. Con- 
versation with Herr von Tschirschky... 


90 


107 


Consul-General Lamb to 
Sir E. Crowe (Private) 


17 Jan. 
(Reed. 23 Jan.) 


Same subjects. Austro-Hungarian atti- 
tude ; Prince of Wied and his advisers 


92 


108 


To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 


20 Jan. 


Albanian Loan. Proposed British parti- 
cipation in guarantee 


94 


109 

1 


)) )> 
[8959] 


20 Jan. 


Conversation with M. Paul Cambon : 
warships for Albanian coast 

c* 2 


94 



xxiv 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



To Sir F. Elliot 

From Cousul-General Lamb 
To Sir M. de Bunsen 

From Consul-General Lamb 

To Sir E. Goschen 

To Sir F. Bertie 

To Sir E. Goschen 

From Mr. Grahame 
From Sir F. Elliot 

From Consul-General Lamb 

To Sir F. Elliot 

To Sir F. Bertie 

From Sir F. Elliot 

(Tel.) 

To Sir M. de Bunsen (Tel.) 
To Sir F. Elliot 



From Sir M. de Bunsen 

(Tel.) 

From Sir R. Redd 



To Sir F. Bertie ... 



To Colonel Granet (Tel.) 



1914. 
21 Jan. 



22 Jan. 

{Reed. 31 Jan.) 

10 Feb. 



'12 Feb. 
(Eecrf. 18 Feb.) 

18 Feb. 



19 Feb. 



19 Feb. 



20 Feb. 
{Becd. 21 Feb.) 

22 Feb. 
(Becd. 28 Feb.) 

28 Feb. 
(Becd. 4 Mar.) 

2 Mar. 



4 Mar. 

5 Mar. 
(Becd. 12 Mar.) 

8 Mar. 
10 Mar. 
23 Mar. 
4 Apr. 



21 Apr. 
(Becd. 25 Apr.) 



5 May 
11 May 



Conversation with M. Venizelos : 
southern frontier of Albania ; question 
of European guarantee of ^gean 
Islands 

Albania and Essad Pasha ; visit of Inter- 
national Commission of Control to 
Ismail Kemal Bey. (End.) 

Conversation with Count MensdorfiF : 
Albanian Bank ; Austro-Hungarian 
reply to France. (End.)... 

Departure of Essad Pasha and deputa- 
tion to offer throne to Prince of Wied 



Conversation with 
Albanian finance 



Prince of Wied : 



Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and 
Count Benckendorff : International 
Commission of Control and Albanian 
Bank... 

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky : 
Prince of Wied 

Visit of Prince of Wied to Paris : his 
conversation with M. Doumergue 

Conversation with M. Venizelos : Greek 
reply to collective note of February 13 
(v. Nos. 252 and 255) 

Proclamation of autonomy in Epirus; 
connivance of Greek authorities 

Conversation with M. Gennadius : same 
subject 

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and 
Count Benckendorff : Albanian Bank. 
Enclosing memoranda communicated 
by Count Benckendorff. (Text.) 

M. Venizelos's policy with regard to 
Epirus 

Communication made by Triple Alliance 
at Athens. (Min.)... 

Conversation with Count Mensdorff : same 
subject 



Conversation with M. Gennadius ; 
tion in Epirus 



situa- 



Conversation with Count Berchtold: same 
subject 

Conversation with Marquis di San 
Giuliano on his return from Vienna: 
Albanian question 

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and 
Count Benckendorff : Albanian frontier 

M. Paul Cambon and Count Benckendorff 
informed of suggested modifications of 
frontier 



114 



114 



MV 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


130 


' From Consul-General Lamb 
(Tel.) 


1914. 
19 May 
{Eecd. 20 May) 


Arrest of Essad Pasha at Durazzo. 
Palace guarded by Italian and Austro- 
Hungarian troops... 


115 


131 


„ (Tel.) 


19 Mav 
{Reed. 20 May) 


Arrest of Essad Pasha by Austro- 
Hungarian advice. Conditions in 
Albania 


115 




Ed. Note 


19-20 May 


Summary of Consul-General Lamb's 
reports. {Min.) 


115 


132 


To Consul-General Lamb 
(Tel.) 


20 May 


Criticism of action of Prince of Wied; 
further information required ... 


116 


133 


1 From Consul-General Lamb 


22 May 
{Reed. 27 May) 


Same subject. Action of Austria- 
Hungary and Italy. {Min.) 


116 


134 


To Sir R. Rodd (Tel.) 


4 June 


Refusal to send British troops to 
Durazzo : one ship to protect Prince if 
necessary 


118 


135 


To Sir G. Buchanan 


4 June 


Conversation with M. de Etter : Servia 
and Albania 


118 


136 


To Sir R. Rodd 


4 June 


Conversation with Marquis Imperiali : 
situation in Albania ; attitude of 
Powers 


118 


137 


From Sir E. Goschen 


5 June 

{Reed. 8 June) 


Conversation with Emperor William II : 
refusal to send troops to Albania ; 
criticism of the Prince 


120 


138 


To Consul-General Lamb... 


17 June 


Crisis at Durazzo : question of inter- 
national action ; Commission of Con- 
trol; troops at Scutari ... 


121 


139 


From Sir R. Rodd 


23 June 
{Reed. 29 June) 


Conversation with Marquis di San 
Giuliano : alleged Italian intrigues in 
Albania. {Min.) 


122 


140 


From Sir M. de Bunsen... 


26 June 
{Reed. 6 July) 


Conversations with M. Yovanovid and M. 
Dumaine : Balkan ' affairs : develop- 
ments in Albania ... 


124 


141 


r rom Consul-General Lamb 


11 Julv 
{Reed. 16 July) 


Interview between Prince of Albania and 
representatives of Powers ; their finan- 
cial and military support requested. 
{Enel.) 


136 


142 


To Mr. Akers-Douglas 


21 July 


Conversation with M. Take Jonescu: 
Rumania and Albania ; position of 
Austria-Hungary and Servia after 
murder of the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand ... 


127 


143 


To f/OnRiil-fi-pnpral Tjflmb 




A n ci" T*n— rill n CTSi f*i n n plnT'Q't'.irin nt tfsit" nvt 

Servia : British ships and delegates of 
International Commission authorized 
to leave Durazzo ... 


128 



xxvi 



Chapter LXXXV. 
The ^gean Islands. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



To Sir F. Bertie 

To Sir R. Rodd 

From Sir R. Rodd 

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 
Fr. /n Sir F. Bertie 

To Sir F. Elliot 

From Mr. Dering (Tel.) 

To Sir F. Bertie 

To Mr. Dering 



To Sir F. Bertie 



To Mr. Dering 



To Sir F. Bertie ... 



From Sir F. Bertie 



To Mr. Dering 



From Sir L. Mallet 



1913. 
12 Aug. 



12 Aug. 



8 Sept. 
(Reed. 13 Sept: 



9 Sept. 



13 Sept. 

17 Sept. 
(Becd. 19 Sept 

27 Sept. 



15 Oct. 
(Reed. 16 Oct 

22 Oct. 



29 Oct. 



29 Oct. 



31 Oct. 



4 Nov. 



5 Nov. 



6 Nov. 
(Reed. 7 Nov.) 



7 Nov. 



15 Nov. 
(Recd.Si Nov.) 



Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and 
Marquis Imperiali : formula of agree- 
ment on JEgean Islands... ... ... 

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali : 
^gean Islands ; intentions of Italy ; 
British views ... 

Conversations with Marquis di San 
Giuliano and Signer Giolitti : same 
subject. (Min.) 

Conversation with. M. Pichou : same sub- 
ject ; enquiry as to British attitude if 
Italy failed to withdraw. (Min.) 



Sir E. Grey's reply ... 

Conversation with M. Pichon : 
.) ject. (Min.) 



same sub- 



Conversation with King George I of 
Greece : Greek relations with Turkey ; 
question of ^gean Islands ... ... 

Conversation with Marquis di San } 
) I Giuliano : Mediterranean questions. | 
j (Min.) I 



Conversation between M. de Fleuriau and 
Sir E. Crowe : .^Egean Islands ; pro- 
posed Anglo-Italian understanding 

Conversation between Prince Borghese 
and Sir E. Crowe on October 14 : same 
subject. Turkey and Greece ... 

Further Conversation on October 20: 
British view respecting islands assigned 
to Greece 

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon : 
Albania and .^gean Islands; British 
and French attitudes in case of dead- 
lock ... 

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali: 
Italian pledges to evacuate islands; 
Turkish attitude in Tripoli 

Conversation between M. de Fleuriau and 
Sir A. Nicolson on November 1 : Italian 
negotiations with Germany 

Conversation with M. Pichon : Balkan 
situation ; .^gean Islands ; French 
distrust of Italy. (Min.) 

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali : 
Sir E. Grey's speech at Newcastle ; 
Italian pledges re .^Egean Islands 

Conversation with M. Take Jonescu : his 
conversation with M. Venizelos; Greece 
and .iEgean Islands 



130 



130 



131 



133 
134 



135 



135 



136 



138 



139 



140 



141 



141 



142 



143 



144 



144 



xxvii 



No. 


Name. 




Date. 


Main Subject. 


P«ge 


161 


From Mr. Dering 


(Tel.) 


1913. 
22 Nov. 


Conversation with Mehmed Nabj' Bey: 
Italian assurances to Turkey re ^gean 
Islands ; rumour of loan contradicted. 
(Min.) 


145 


162 


From Mr. Dering ... 




23 Nov. 
{Becd.29 Nov.) 


French and Italian Press comments on 
position in .Egean Islands ; attitude of 
Marquis di San Giuliano. Conversation 
with Mehmed Xaby Bey. (Min.) 


147 


163 


From Mr. O'Beirne 




24 Nov. 
(Reed. 1 Dec.) 


Russian attitude to Rumanian mediation 
between Turkey and Greece 


149 


164 


To Sir F. Elliot ... 




25 Nc . 


Conversation with M. Gennadius: 
rumoured proposal for Confederation 
of Islands apart from Greece ... 


150 


165 


From Sir L. Mallet 

(Private) 


25 Nov. 


..Egean Islands : Italy and Turkey ; 
attitude of member of diplomatic corps 


150 


166 


To Sir F. Bertie ... 




26 Nov. 


Conversation with M. Paul Cambon : 
same subject ; question of Koritza and 
Stylos 


151 


167 


From Sir R. Redd 


(Tel.) 


6 Dec. 


Conversation with Marquis di San 
Giuliano : Italian readiness to support 
repudiation of territorial gains ; need 
for economic outlet in Turkish 
dominions 


152 


168 


To Sir R. Rodd 


(Tel.) 


11 Dec. 


Italian expansion in Asiatic Turkey not 
to be connected with evacuation of 
islands 


153 


169 


To Sir E. Goschen 


(Tel.) 


12 Dec. 


Appeal to Herr von Bethmann Hollweg 
to help to secure settlement of question 
of islands (v. No. 91) 


153 


170 


From Sir R. Rodd 


(Tel.) 


13 Dec. 


Conversation with Marquis di San 
Giuliano : economic concessions and 
evacuation of islands. (Min.) ... 


154 


171 


To Sir L. Mallet ... 




16 Dec. 


Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson 
and Tewfik Pasha : British proposal for 
solution of question of islands ... 


155 


172 


From Sir L. Mallet 




16 Dec. 
(Reed. 22 Bee.) 


■Conversation with Marquis Garroni: 
.^gean Islands. (Min.) ... 


156 


173 


)> >j •■• 




17 Dec. 
(Reed. 22 Dee.) 


Rumours of British proposal for solution 
of question of islands : unfavourable 
reception. (Min.) ... 


157 




„ „ (Private) 


1/ Dec. 


Same subject j diflBculties of position at 
Constantinople 


158 


175 




(Tel.) 


19 Dec. 


Ignorance of British proposals ; un- 
favourable press comments ... ... 


lo9 


176 


From Sir M. de Bunsen... 


19 Dec. 
(Reed. 22 Dec.) 


Conversations with colleagues on .^Egean 
islands : Count Berchtold's speech on 
foreign affairs to the Delegations ... 


159 


177 


To Sir L. Mallet 


(Tel.) 


20 Dec. 


British proposals ; publication in the 
Temps; instructions as to e:^lanations 
to Turkey ... 


161 


178 


From Sir L. Mallet 


(Tel.) 


22 Dec. 
(Reed. 23 Dec.) 


Conversation with Said Halim Pasha: 
same subject ; explanation of British 
attitude. (Min.) ... 


162 



xxviii 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



179 From Sir R. Rodd 

180 ' To Sir L. Mallet (Private) 

181 ! „ „ (Tel. Private) ^ 

182 To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) ! 

183 From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.) 

I 

i 

184 I From Sir M. de Bunsen 

(Tel.) 



185 From Sir L. Mallet 



186 



187 



Communication from Tew- 
fik Pasha 



To Sir L. Mallet 



188- From Sir M. de Bunsen... 



189 
190 

191 



M. Gennadius to Sir E. 
Crowe 

From Sir R. Rodd 



(Tel.) 



192 Communication from M. 
de Etter 



193 
194 

195 

196 
197 



From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 
To Sir F. Bertie 

From Sir M. de Bunsen 
(Tel.) 

To Sir E. Goschen 

To Sir R. Rodd 



1913. 

22 Dec. 
(Reed. 29 Dec.) 

23 Dec. 



24 Dec. 

27 Dec. 

27 Dec. 

28 Dec. 



29 Dec. 
(Reed. 5 Jan.. 
1914.) 



30 Dec. 
{Reed. 31 Dec.) 

1914. 
1 Jan. 



1 Jan. 
(Reed, o Jan.) 



1 Jan. 
(Reed. 2 Jan.) 

2 Jan. 
(Reed. 9 Jan.) 



4 Jan. 

5 Jan. 

6 Jan. 

6 Jan. 

7 Jan. 

7 Jan. 
7 Jan. 



Conversation with Marquis di San 
Giuliano: same subject ... ... ... 163 

Same subject : attitude of Powers 
generally towards Turkey ; explanation 
of British action ... ... ... ... 164 



Same subject 



Conversation with Hilmi Pasha: his 
views on British proposals. {Min.) 

Conversation with Djemal Bey : railway 
and other concessions ; suggestion of 
autonomy for islands; question of 
Turkish navy. (Min.) 



165 



Italian communication to Turkey : 
Evacuation of islands. Representation 
regarding Italian attitude ; South 
Albanian frontier question. (Min.) ... 166 

Conversation with Mehmed Naby Bey:! 
his observations on Italian attitude ... I 167 



167 



168 



Protest against annexation of Islands by 
Greece. (Min.) j 171 



Conversation between Tewfik Pasha and i 
Sir E. Crowe on December 23 : request I 
for reply of the Powers to British pro- 
posal i v. No. 91) 173 

JEgean Islands: attitude of Turkey the! 
•main difficulty in attaining agreement 
between the Powers; views of Hilmi 
Pasha... ... ... .. ■■• •■ 173 

Same subject : enclosing telegram from 
M. Panas. (Min.) 175 

Conversation with M. Kroupenski : his j 
account of views of Marquis di San | 
Giuliano : Southern Albania and 
/Egean Islands. (Min.) 177 

Conversation with Herr von Flotow : 
reply to British proposal (v. No. 91) 
under consideration at Berlin ... ... 178 

Commenting on Turkish counter-proposal 
re Islands ... ... ... •• ... 178 

Appointment of Enver Bey as Minister 
for War. (Min.) 179 

Conversation with M. Paul Canibon : 
reply from Triple Alliance about 
Southern Albania (v. No. 103) ; question 
of ^gean Islands... ... ... ... 180 

Conversation with Count Berchtold : 
probabilitj' of early reply about JEgea.!! I 
Islands ... ... ... ... ... 181 

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky: 
' same subject ... ... ... ... 181 

I 

Conversation with M. Martino and 
Marquis Imperiali : Italian views on 
>Egean Islands; desire for concessions 
in Asia Minor ... ... ... ... 1 182 



xxix 



No. 



Name. 



198 
199 

2()0 
201 

202 

203 
204 

206 
206 

207 

208 
209 

210 

211 

212 
213 



To Sir G. Buchanan 



From Sir R. Rodd 



From Sir F. Elliot 



From Sir R. Rodd... 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Pag« 



1914. 
8 Jan. 



(Tel.) ; 9 Jan. 

{Becd. 10 Jan.) 



9 Jan. 
{Becd. 15 Jan.) 



11 Jan. 
(Becd. 16 Jan.) 



From Sir M. de Bunsen.. 



Communication from Herri 
von Schubert 

From Sir L. Mallet | 
(.Private) 



12 Jan. 
(Becd. 19 Jan.) 



To Sir F. Bertie 
To Sir R. Rodd 



(Tel.) 



To Sir F. Elliot (Private) 

From Sir L. Mallet 

(Private) 

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.) 
To Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 

To Prince Lichnowsky ... 



214 
215 



From Sir L. Mallet 
To Sir L. Mallet ... 



(Tel.) 



From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 
From Sir M. de Bunsen... 



14 Jan. 
14 Jan. 

19 Jan. 
19 Jan. 

21 Jan. 

21 Jan. 
23 Jan. 
23 Jan. 

23 Jan. 

26 Jan. 

26 Jan. 

27 Jan. 



27 Jan. 
(Becd. 31 Jan.) 



Conversation between M. de Etter and 
Sir E. Crowe: Turkish counter-pro- 
posal 183 

Conversation with M. Venizelos : his 
account of discussion with Marquis di 
San Giuliano; Albania and .^gean 
Islands 184 

Conversation with M. Streit : same sub- 
ject ; Greek desire for guarantees. 
(Min.) 185 

Conversation with Marquis di San 
Giuliano : his reply to request for 
answer to British proposal concerning 
^gean Islands. (Min.) 186 

Conversation with Hilmi Pasha : .iEgean 
Islands; ultimate inevitability of 
Greco-Turkish war and its results; 
Enver Pasha; position in Albania ... 188 

German reply to British proposal con- 
cerning Mgean Islands. (Min.) ... 190 

Conversation with Djevad Bey : ^Egean 
Islands; proposal to consult Turkish 
Government... ... ... ... ... 191 

Commenting on reply of Triple Alliance 
Powers to British proposal ... ... 193 

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali : 
same subject : proposed communica- 
tions to Turkey and Greece ... ... 193 

Conversation with M. Venizelos: pro- 
posal for an entente between England 
and Greece ... ... ... ... ... 194 

Conversation with Admiral Limpus : 
^gean Islands ; his advice to Turkey... 195 

Conversation between Ghalib Bey and M. 
Streit: same subject ... ... ... 196 

Forwarding texts of British note to Triple 
Alliance Powers re Southern Albania 
and 3igea.n Islands, and of proposed 
declaration at Constantinople 196 

Commenting on reply of Triple Alliance 
Powers (v. No. 203) ; enclosing proposed 
declarations at Constantinople and 
Athens. Texts 196 

Methods suggested for making the 
decision of the Powers respected. (Min.) 199 

Conversation between Tewfik Pasha and 
Sir A. Nicolson on Januarv 15 : reply 
of Triple Alliance Powers (r. No. 203); 
Turkish attitude 200 



Proposed declaration at Constantinople ; 
instructions requested 200 

Conversation with Hilmi Pasha : protests 
of Turkey against attitude of the 
Powers 201 



XXX 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



216 
217 

218 

219 

220 
221 

222 
223 

224 
225 

226 



To Sir R. Rodd 
To Sir R. Rodd 



From Sir L. Mallet 

(Private) 

To Sir L. Mallet 



From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.) 

From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 
From. Sir E. Goschen 

To Sir R. Rodd (Tel.) 
To Sir E G.-scbeii (Tel.) 

From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.i 



227 To Sir L. Mallet 



228 
229 

230 

231 

232 
233 



(Tel.) 

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 

From Sir R. Rodd 

To Sir F. Bertie 

From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 
Note by Sir A. Nicolsou... 



1914. 
28 Jan. 



28 Jan. 

28 Jan. 

29 Jan. 



30 Jan. 
(Reed. 31 Jan.) 



30 Jan. 
{Uecd. 7 Feb.) 



31 Jan. 



31 Jan. 
(Itecd. 2 Feb.) 



2 Feb. 
•J Ffb. 

2 Feb. 

2 Feb. 

3 Feb. 
3 Feb. 



Conversation with Marquis Imperiali : 
Greek evacuation of Epirus 

Conversation continued with Marquis 
Imperiali : Italy and Turkey ; proposed 
note; Italian desire for compensation... 

Turkish Press and political situation ; 
French warning about loan 

Conversation between Tewfik Pasha and 
Sir A. Nicolson on January 22: 
suggested Greek entente with Turkey... 

Conversation with Marquis di San 
Giuliano : British reply to Triple 
Alliance Powers: opinion in Italy 

Conversation . with Marquis di San 
Giuliano : same subject : interpellation 
in Italian Chamber on interests of 
Italy. (Min.) 

Conversation with Herr von Jagow: same 
subject; German opinion 

Conversation with M. Venizelos: his 
suggestions to Herr von Jagow ; atti- 
tude of Germany. (Min.) 

.Mgean Islands : British position ; Italian 
application for cr>ncession at Adalia ... 

British reply to Triple Alliance Powers: 
discussion of measures to i-nforce 
decisions 

Conversation with Said Halim Pasha: 
alleged British proposal for naval 
demonstration against Turkey ; com- 
plaint of change in British policy. 

(Min.) 

Conversation with Tewfik Pasha : British 
proposal to Powers : proposed com- 
munications at Constantinople and 
Athens 



Same subject ... 

Turkish representation (v. No. 
comment to be made to Germany 



226); 



3 Feb. Conversation with Signer Martino: 
(Reed. 7 Feb.) evacuation of Islands by Italy ... 

4 Feb. Conversation with M. Paul Cambon : 

German refusal to co-operate in 
coercive measures against Turkey 

5 Feb. Conversation with Herr von Jagow: 

Turkish fears of naval demonstration 
due to Press ; German action perfectly 
loyal ... 

6 Feb. Conversations with Count MensdorfF, 

Prince Lichnowsky and Marquis 
Imperiali : terms of declarations to be 
made at Constantinople and Athens. 
Text 



No. 



Name. 



234 



235 



From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 



To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 



Date. 



236 To Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 

237 To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 



238 
239 

240 
241 

242 

243 

244 

245 



(Tel.) 
(Tel.) 



To Sir L. Mallet (Private) 



From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 



From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 1 
(Tel.) 



1914. 
7 Feb. 



9 Feb. 



9 Feb. 



9 Feb. 



9 Feb. 



9 Feb. 



9 Feb. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



Conversation with Talaat Bey : ^gean 
Islands : Turkish suggestion of treaty 
with Greece on basis of exchange. 
(Mtn.) 

Replj' to German explanation concerning 
naval demonstration (v. No. 232) ; 
request that Germany will make 
position clear at Constantinople 

Same subject : denial of Triple Alliance | 
Powers 

Communication from Triple Alliance 
Powers : their acceptance of declara- 
tions to be made at Constantinople and 
Athens 

Same subject : questions to be decided 
before measures can be taken ... 

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon : same 
subject ; French and Russian desire for 
I prompt action 

Position in Turkey : financial situation ; 
danger of a chauvinist policy ... 



10 Feb. Conversation with Djemal Bey : proposed 
(Reed. 11 Feb.) [ direct understanding between Turkey 
and Greece. (Min.) 



10 Feb. 



10 Feb. 



From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 10 Feb. 



From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 



246 To Sir G. Buchanan 



247 : From Sir L. Mallet 

(Private) 



248 

249 

250 
251 



(Tel.) 



To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 

To Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 

(Tel.) 



(Becd. 11 Feb.) 



Herr von Jagow's instructions to Baron 
Wangenheim to make explanations at 
Constantinople (v. No. 235) 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : coercive 
measures ; refusal to join in any 
against Greece 

Conversation with M. Doumergue : same 
subject ; desire of the Powers for 
immediate communication to Greece 
and Turkey. (Min.) 



10 Feb. Conversation with Herr von Jagow: same 
(Seed. 11 Feb.) subject; coercive measures against 
either Greece or Turkey considered 
unnecessary... 

10 Feb. Conversation with Count Benckendorff : 
same subject; Russian view 

10 Feb. I Advice to Turkish Government to pre- 

serve peace ... 

11 Feb. : Conversation with Said Halim Pasha: 

decision of Powers re Albania and 
JEgean Islands; explanation of British 
j attitude 

12 Feb. Instructions sent to British Representa- 

tives at Constantinople and Athens to 
j join in collective communications 

12 Feb. Same subject (repeated to Athens) 

12 Feb. Same subject : desire to secure agreement 
between Powers 



220 

221 
222 

222 
223 

223 
224 

224 

225 
226 

226 

227 
228 
228 

229 

230 
231 

231 



No. 

1 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


P»ge 


252 


From Sir F. Elliot 




1914. 
13 Feb. 
CRprfl 79 Feh 


Enclosing copy of Collective Note of six 
Powers addressed to M. Streit. Text... 


231 


253 


From Sir L. Mallet 




16 Feb. 
(TtecA Zfi Feh ^ 


Enclosing copies of Collective Note 
addressed to Porte and of reply. Texts 


232 


254 


„ „ (Private) 


18 Feb. 


Conversation with Talaat Bey : Turkish 

Ministers? * arranffements about Islands 
ministers, arrangements aoout isianas 


234 


255 


From Sir F. Elliot 




21 Feb. 
(Becd. 28 Feh.) 


Enclosing copies of Greek reply to 
Collective Note. Text ... 


235 


256 


From Sir G. Barclay 




4 Mar. 
(Reed. 16 Mar.) 


Conversation with M. Bratianu : his 
correspondence with M. Venizelos on 
evacuation of Islands 


238 


257 


From Sir L. Mallet 
(Pr 


ivate) 


10 Mar. 


Improvement in Turkish position ; diflS- 
culties of finance. Views of members 
of diplomatic corps 


238 


2-58 


From Sir F. Elliot 

(Private) 


10 Mar. 


Conversation with M. Demidov : proposal 


239 


259 


To Sir E. Goschen... 




12 Mar. 


Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky: 
communication from M. Gennadius ... 


240 


260 


To Sir F. Bertie ... 




13 Mar. 


Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and 
Count Benckendorff : question of 
guarantee for Greece 


241 


261 


To Sir E. Goschen 




16 Mar. 


Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky: 
reply to Greece proposed by Germany. 

Text 


242 


262 


To Sir L. Mallet 

(Private) 


18 Mar. 


Question of guarantee for Greece ; its 
impracticability unless all Powers 
agreed 


243 


263 


To Sir R. Rodd ... 




30 Mar. 


Conversation with Marquis Imperiali: 
same subject 


243 


264 


From Sir F. Elliot 




3 Apr. 
(Reed. 9 Apr.) 


Conversation with M. Streit : proposed 
direct understanding between Greece 
and Turkey. (Min.) 


244 


265 


To Sir G. Buchanan 


(Tel.) 


21 Apr. 


Communication from M. de Etter : M. 
Sazonov's refusal to accept amendments 
in reply of Powers to Greek note ... 


245 


266 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


22 Apr. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: same 
subject. (Min.) 


246 


267 


To Sir L. Mallet ... 




23 Apr. 


Conversation between Tewfik Pasha and 
Sir A. Nicolson on April 14 : proposed 
amendment to note of the Powers to 
Greece. Text 


247 


268 


Sir F. Elliot to M. 
zelos 


Veni- 


24 Apr. 


Identic note presented by Powers to 
M. Venizelos. Text 


248 


269 


To Sir G. Buchanan 




27 Apr. 


Conversation at Paris with M. Isvolski : 
same subject ; modifications suggested 
by Triple Alliance... 


250 


270 


From Sir R. Rodd... 




28 Apr. 
(Reed. 2 May) 


Italian anxiety to see question of .^gean 
Islands settled 


251 


271 


To Sir R. Rodd ... 




6 May 


Conversation with Marquis Imperiali: 
Italian expenses in Islands; Turkish 
attitude 


251 



xxxin 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



From Sir R. Rodd.. 



From Sir L. Mallet 



From Sir F. Elliot 



From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



1914. 
11 May 
(liecd. 18 May) 



21 May 
{Becd. 25 May) 



28 May 
{Itecd. 4 June) 



30 Mav 



30 Mav 



From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 1 June 



From Sir M. de Bunsen... 

From, Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 

From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 
To Sir F. Bertie 

To Sir E. Goschen 



(Tel.) 



To Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 
From Mr. Erskine... 



2 June 
(Reed. 8 June) 



4 June 
(Reed. 8 June) 



15 June 



15 June 
(Reed. 16 June) 

15 June 



From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 



Landing of the Emperor William II at 
Genoa ; report of Hcrr von Flotow ; 
policy of Italj- and Greece ... ... 251 

Conversation with Djemal Pasha: danger! 
of war between Turkev and Greece ; I 
Turkish fleet ... ' 252 

Conversation with M. Venizelos: supposed 
warlike attitude of Turkev ; Turkish 
fleet. (Min.) ' 253 

Conversation with M. Bratianu : Ru- 
mania's counsels of moderation to 
Turkey 255 

Conversation with M. Porumbaru: same 
subject ; counsels of moderation to 
Greece ; question of Turkish naval 
superiority ... ... ... ... ... 255 

Same subject : M. Porumbaru's counsels 256 

Same subject : Turco-Greek relations : 
opinions of Italian and Greek repre- 
sentatives ... ... ... ... ... I 256 

Same subject : views of Hilmi Pasha ; 
difficulty of maintaining status quo in j 
Mediterranean ... ... ... ... i 258 

Conversation with Herr von Jagow: 
Rumanian Government urged to act as ' 
mediator [259 

No improvement in situation ; stiff note 
delivered hy M. Panas ... ... ... I 259 

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and 
Count Benckendorff : prospect of war 
between Greece and Turkev : question 
of the Straits ' 260 



it i» 



15 June 

16 June 

16 June 

16 June 
(Reed. 29 June) 

16 June 
(Reed. 29 June) 

18 June 

18 June 



Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky: 
distribution of Islands ... ... ... 261 

Same subject: attitude of Great Powers; 
Sir E. Grey on necessity of forcing 
Turkey to keep Straits open ] 262 



Same subject ... 

Conversations with M. 
Greek negotiations; 
countries 



Streit : Turco- 
fleets of both 



262 



262 



290 From Mr. Erskine (Tel.) 24 June 



Conversations with Ghalib Bey and M. | 
Streit : circular telegram from Turkey 
in answer to Greek note... ... ... 264 

Conversation with M. Poklevski-Koziell : 
I Turco-Greek tension ... ... ... 265 

\ Conversation with M. Porumbaru: | 
reports from Servia on effect of ' 
Rumanian counsels in Greece ... ... 1 265 

Conversation with M. Streit; question of 
issue of royal decree about Islands ; I 
strength of fleets in Turkey and Greece. I 
(Min.) 265 



XXXIV 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


291 


From Mr. Erskine 


(Tel.) 


1914. 
26 June 


Conversation with M. Venizelos : same 
subject 


266 


292 


From Sir L. Mallet 


(Tel.) 


29 June 


Conversation with Talaat Bey: Greek 
change of attitude ; Dr. Dillon as inter- 
mediary 


266 


293 


>) » 


(Tel.) 


30 June 


Conversation with Talaat Bey and 
Dr. Dillon : negotiations proceeding 
secretly 


267 


294 


ji J) 


(Tel.) 


5 July 
(Becd. 6 July) 


Conversation with Talaat Bey : Dr. Dillon 
leaving for Athens with Turkish pro- 
posal ... 


267 


295 


From Mr. Erskine 


(Tel) 


8 July 


Conversation between Dr. Dillon and M. 
Venizelos : Turkish proposals to be dis- 
cussed 


268 


296 


J) )> 


(Tel.) 


8 July 


Conversation with M. Streit; same sub- 
jeet ; M. Venizelos and lalaat Bey to 
meet ... 


269 


297 


>) >j 


(Tel.) 


9 July 


Dr. Dillon leaving for Constantinople 
with draft basis of negotiations. {Min.) 


269 


298 


From Sir L. Mallet 


(Tel.) 


12 July 


Conversation with Talaat Bey and Dr. 
Dillon: Greek counter-proposal 


270 


299 


)j >> 


(Tel.) 


13 July 


Greek proposals for defensive treaty 
accepted by Turkish Cabinet. (Min.)... 


270 


300 


From Mr. Erskine 


(Tel.) 


14 July 
{Becd. 15 July) 


Conversation with M. Venizelos : same 

I.* J- TIC TT ■ 1 J. J m 1 1 

subject ; M. Venizelos to meet Turkish 
plenipotentiary on July 20. Conversa- 
tion with M. Streit : request for com- 
munication to Turkey re untoward 
incidents 


271 


301 


From Mr. Beaumont 


(Tel.) 


15 July 


Same subject : attitude of Turkish 
Ministers 


272 


302 


From Mr. Erskine... 




15 July 
(Jieca. 27 July) 


Conversation with M. Venizelos : same 
subject ; his meeting with Sir L. Mallet 
at Athens on his way to England 


272 


303 


To Mr. Beaumont 


(Tel.) 


16 July 


Proposed communication to Turkey {v. 
No. 300) 


274 


304 


From Mr. Beaumont 


(Tel.) 


16 July 


Turco-Greek negotiations: decision of 
Council of Ministers unfavourable to 
Dr. Dillon's proposals 


274 


305 


From Mr. Erskine 


(Tel.) 


17 July 


Conversation with M. Streit ; same sub- 
ject; negotiations broken oft by Dr. 
Dillon 


274 


306 




(Tel.) 


18 July 


Further Conversation : possibility of 
renewed negotiations 


275 


307 


To Sir H. Rumbold 




20 July 


Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky : 
Turco-Greek agreement and defensive 
alliance 


275 


308 


From Mr. Beaumont 


(Tel.) 


22 July 


Proposed meeting between Said Halim 
Pasha and M. Venizelos ... 


276 


309 


From Mr. Erskine 




25 July 
{Becd. H Aug.) 


Position of Turco-Greek negotiations. 
(Min.) 


276 



XXXV 

Chapter LXXXVI. 
General Balkan Politics, 1913-14. 



No. i 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



310 From Mr. O'Beirne 



1913 
1 Oct. 
(Becd. 6 Oct.) 

311 From Mr. Crackanthorpe ' 23 Oct. 

I {Eecd. 28 Oct.) 



312 i Sir A. Nicolson to Mr. 
Russell (Private) 



313 From Sir F. Elliot 

i 

314 From Sir L. Mallet 

315 From Sir G. Barclay 



316 Mr. Russell to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 



317 From 

318 From 

319 From 

320 From 

321 From 

322 From 



Sir L. Mallet 
Mr. Crackanthorpe 
Sir L. Mallet 

Mr. Crackanthorpe 
Mr. O'Beirne 
Sir L. Mallet 



323 From Sir M. de Bunsen... 



324 From Sir G. Buchanan 



10 Nov. 



17 Nov. 
(Reed. 24 Nov.) \ 

18 Nov. 
{Eecd. 24 Nov.) 

21 Nov. 
(Reed. 8 Dec.) 

21 Nov. 



30 Nov. 
(Reed. 8 Dec.) 

2 Dec. 
{Reed. 8 Dec.) 

' 9 Dec. 
(Reed. 15 Dee.) 



9 Dec. 
{Reed. 12 Dee.) 

11 Dec. 
{Reed. 15 Dee.) 

16 Dec. 
{Reed. 22 Dec.) 

1914. 
1 Jan. 
{Reed. 5 Jan.) 



Ed. Note ... 



325 From Mr. O'Reilly 



326 , From Mr. Crackanthorpe 



6 Jan. 
{Reed. 12 Jan.) 

9 Jan. 



13 Jan. 
{Reed. 19 Jan.) 

17 Jan. 
{Reed. 20 Jan.) 



Russian attitude to Montenegro ... 



German and Austro-Hungarian support 
of demands of Oriental Railway Com- ' 
pany in Servia ... ... ... ... [ 280 

Conversations between King Ferdinand, | 
the Emperor Franz Josef and Count j 
Berchtold 280 



Signature of Treaty of Peace between 
Greece and Turkey. (Min.) 

Treaty of Athens: effect of mediation of 
M. Take Jonescu 

Conversation with M. Take Jonescu : his 
reception at Athens ; success of his 
mediation 

Conversations between King Ferdinand, 
the Emperor Franz Josef and Count 
Berchtold ; no agreement between 
Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Count 
Berchtold's policy. {Min.) 

Conversations with M. Tosev : Bulgarian 
opinion of Treaty of Bucharest... 

Servian negotiations with Oriental Rail- 
way Company 

Proposed alliance between Turkey and 
Bulgaria : meeting between M. 
Gennadiev and Talaat Bey 

Active negotiations in Servia for loan 
from Germany. {Min.) ... 

Russo-Bulgarian relations : elections in 
Bulgaria. {Min.) ... 



Conversation with M. 
Balkan situation ... 



Tosev : general 



Conversation with M. Yovanovic: lines of 
Oriental Railway Company in Servian 
and Greek territory 



Conversation with General Dimitriev: 
Bulgarian relations with Austria- 
Hungary and Russia. {Min.) ... ... 291 

Extract from telegraphic instructions 
to British embassies : Sir E. Grey's 
views regarding annexations under ■ 
treaties of 1913 ; 292 

Treaty of Bucharest : resumption of 
direct diplomatic relations between 
Servia and Bulgaria ... ... ... 293 



Internal politics of Servia ; 
Hand " 



the "Black 



294 



xxxvi 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


327 


From Sir R. Rodd 


1914. 
22 Jan. 

(Becd. 31 Jan.) 


Conversation with M. Rizov : Rumania, 
Russia and Bulgaria ; Secret Russo- 
Bulgar treaty of 1902. {Min.) 


295 


328 


From Sir M. de Bunsen 

(Tel.) 


23 Jan. 


Conversation with M. Salabacev : official 
denial of Bulgarian military conven- 
tion with Turkey ... 


296 


329 


From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 


24 Jan. 


Conversation with M. Tosev : danger of 
situation. {Min.) ... 


297 


330 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


25 Jan. 


Departure of Crown Prince Alexander 
and M. Pasic for St. Petersburgh. 
Possibility of understanding between 
Greece, Servia, Montenegro and 
Rumania 


298 


331 


„ (Tel.) 


27 Jan. 


Relations among Balkan States : pre- 
carious position of Bulgaria ; Servian 
estimate of position 


298 


332 


From Mr. O'Reilly (Tel.) 


29 Jan. 


Conversation with M. Radoslavov: detente 
between Bulgaria and Greece ; relations 
between Russia and Austria-Hungary... 


298 


333 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 


29 Jan. 
{Tlecd. 2 Feb.) 


Conversation with M. Stefanovic: Austro- 
Hungarian and Italian enquiries about 
Serbo-Greek military convention 


299 


334 




29 Jan. 
(Becd. 2 Feb.) 


Convention of January 16 between Greece 
and Rumania 


300 


335 


(Tel.) 


30 Jan. 


Same subject : status quo in Macedonia 


300 


336 


From Sir R. Rodd 


31 Jan. 

(Reed. 7 Feb.) 


Conversation with M. Mihailovic: Servian 
anxiety concerning position of Albania 


301 


337 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


1 Feb. 


Servian and Rumanian policy towards 
Albania: suspicion as to attitude of 
Austria-Hungary and Italy ... ... 




338 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


1 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian 
attitude towards King Ferdinand 


302 


339 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


3 Feb. 


Denial by M. Stefanovic and M. de 
Hartwig of Greco-Rumanian conven- 
tion ; reported agreement between 
Rumania, Greece, Servia and Mon- 
tenegro 


303 


340 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


4 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : Greco- 
Servian alliance to maintain status quo 
in Balkans ... 




341 


From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.) 


5 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Streit : denial of 
arrangement with Rumania 


304 


342 


From Mr. Akers-Douglas... 


6 Feb. 
(Becd. 7 Mar.) 


Improvement in relations between Russia 
and Montenegro ; visit of Montenegrin 
officers to St. Petersburgh 


304 


343 


From Sir H. Bax-Ironside 
(Tel.) 


8 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Dobrovic : Bul- 
garian desire for good terms with 

n f»i o"!"! Hon n n o" cf.fi 

'^^b & o vCl Lt^o ... ... ... 


OUD 


344 


From Mr. Crackanthorpe 
(Tel.) 


10 Feb. 


November 5 reported as date of conclu- 
sion of Serbo-Rumanian Treaty 


306 


345 


J) ;> 


11 Feb. 

(TtprH If! Weh ^ 


Servian interest in conferences at St. 

Pptpr<ibii rtrb nnd vi^it of AT Pa^io 

St. Petersburgh and Bucharest ; 
rumoured alliances and ententes; 
Servian policy 


307 



xxzvu 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



' 1914. 
346 From Sir M. de Bunsen... 13 Feb. 

(Reed. ir> Feb.) 



347 



Frotn Sir G. Barclay 



13 Feb. 
(Uecd. 2 Mar.) 



348 From Mr. Crackanthorpe 16 Feb. 

(Tel.) , 



349 „ „ (Tel.) 20 Feb. 



350 From Sir H. Bax-Ironside 20 Feb. 

(liecd. 2 Mar. 



351 From Mr. Crackanthorpe 21 Feb. 

(Uecd. 2 Mar.) 



352 From Sir H. Bax-lroiiside 24 Feb. 

(Reed. 2 Mar.) 

353 From Mr. Crackanthorpe 26 Feb. 

{Reed. 2 Mar.) 

354 Fiom Sir M. de Bunsen... 12 Mar. , 

(Reed. 16 Mar.) \ 



355 From Sir H. Ba.x-Ironside 14 Mar. 

I (Reed. SO Mar.) \ 



356 To Sir G. Barclav. 



357 



From Sir M. de Bunsen.. 



23 Mar. 



9 Apr. 
(Reed. U Apr.) 



a58 Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir A. 24 Apr. 
Nicolson (Private) ' 



359 To Sir F. Bertie 



6 M£ 



360 I To Sir H. Bax-Ironside 9 Mav 

(Tel.) 



361 ,From Sir H. Bax-Ironside 10 Mav 

(Tel.) (Reed. 11 May) 



Alarmist rumours of tension between 
Russia and Austria-Hungary ; views of 
^epresentativea^ of Balkan States. 
(Min.) 310 

Arrival of M. Veiiizelos and M. Pasic at 
Bucliarest ; departure for Belgrade on 
March 10; vo fresh engagement signed 312 

Conversation with M. Sainovic : under- 
standings reached at St. Petersburgh 
and Bucharest ... ... ... ... 312 

Reported eonversation between M. 
Sazonov and M. Pasic : spread of 
republicanism in Servia ... ... ... 313 

Conversation with M. Radoslavov : newly 
created territorial districts; political 
situation in Bulgaria ... ... ... 313 



Conversation with M. Sainovic: general 
results from recent conferences; rela- 
tions between Rumania, Servia and 
Greece 

Russo-Bulgar relations ; political situa- 
tion in Bulgaria ... 



M. Sazonov's statement to M. 
same subject. (Min.) 



Pasic : 



Conversation with M. Yovanovic: renewed 
negotiations with Austria-Hungarj- 
concerning Oriental Railway Company! 

Conversation with M. Savinski : his | 
instructions to be conciliatory with 
King Ferdinand ; political situation in 
Bulgaria 

Conversation with M. Misu : recognition 
of territorial changes; application of 
Treaty of Berlin ... ... ... ... | 

Effects of Count Berchtold's policy during | 
Balkan Wars: position of Rumania ... i 

(jreneral political position in Austria- 
Hungary and in the Balkans; views of' 
members of the diplomatic corps 

Replies from the five Powers to British 
enquiry concerning annexed territorie.s 
in the Balkans; British view ... 



314 
315 
316 

317 

318 

319 
320 

321 

323 



362 



» J) 



(Tel.) 11 Ma 



363 From Count de Salis 



11 Mav 

(Reed. 15 May) 



Bulgarian foreign loan ; Russian anxiety 
for British support in opposing loan by 
German syndicate ... ... ... ... 325 

Same subject : Bulgarian Government 
favourable to Austria-Hungary and 
anti-Russian ... ... ... ... 325 

Conversations with M. Panafieu : Bui- ^ 
garian loan ... ... ... ... ... 326 

Negotiations with Austria-Hungary for 
rectification of frontier near Cattaro ; 
Press reports ... ... ... ... 326 



xxxviii 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



[Page 



To Sir H. Bax-lronside ... 

(Tel.) 

From, Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



From Sir H. Bax-lronside 



From Sir G. Barclav 



(Tel.) 



To Sir G. Barclay 

From Sir L. Mallet 

To Sir F. Bertie 

From Sir G. Barclay 
From, Mr. Akers-Douglas... 



Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 

Ed. Note 



1914. 
12 May 



17 Mav 



20 May 
{Becd. 25 May) 



20 Mav 
{Itecd. 28 May) 

24 May 



2 June 



2 June 
{Reed. 8 June) 

15 June 



17 June 
{Becd. 2S June) 

22 June 

{Becd. 6 July) 

22 June 
25 June 



From Mr. Crackanthori)o 10 Julv 

{Becd. 20 July) 



Bulgarian loan : 
Great Britain 



no intervention by 



327 



Conversation with M. Sazonov : his i 
satisfactory assurances from Talaat ! 
Bey. (Mm.) ; 328 

Bulgarian loan : views of Russian and ' 
other Governments ; progress of nego- 
tiations. {Min.) 328 



Relations of Rumania with Austria- 
Hungary, Russia and Germany 



330 



Conversation with M. Poklevski-Koziell : 
his criticism of Sir G. Barclay's atti- i 
tude towards Triple Entente i 332 



Same subject : instructions to give 
general support to France and Russia, 
but not to take decided action without 
definite instructions 

Change of Russian attitude towards 
Turkey ; German influence ; question of 
the Straits ... 

Request for attention of French Govern- 
ment to British note on territorial 
changes in the Balkans {v. No. 359) 

Conversation with M. Poklevski-Koziell: 
Russian Imperial visit to Rumania ... 

Same subject : opinions of Rumanian 
Press ... 



332 

333 

334 
334 
335 



Conversations with M. Gryparis and M. 
Yovanovic : Turco-Greek dispute ... j 336 

Extract from Sir E. Grey's despatch con- i 
firming his attitude on the Straits } 
question in 1908 337 

Progress towards union of Montenegro 
and Servia under agis of Russia; 
announcement deferred on account of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassina- 
tion 337 



Chapter LXXXVII. 
Liman von Sanders' Mission, 1913-14. 



376 

377 
378 



From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 

From Sir E. Goschen 

To Sir F. Bertie 



1913. 
30 Oct. 



Conversation with Baron von Wangen- 
heim : new German Military Mission to 
Turkey 



24 Nov. \ Communication from M. Paul Cambon : 
J same subject; conversations between 
I M. Jules Cambon and M. Kokovtsov ... 



338 



1 Nov. I Enclosing report of Colonel Russell : same 
{Becd. S Nov.)\ subject 338 



339 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Ip«ge 



379 .From Mr. O Beirne (Tel.) 

383 „ „ 

3S1 To Mr. O'Beirne 

3S-2 Mr. O'Beirne to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 

383 From Mr. O'Beirne (.Tel.) 

3g4 From Lord Granville 

i 

3S5 From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 

\ 

3S<3 To Mr. O'Beirne ... 

387 To Sir L. Mallet (.Tel.) 

! 

! 

388 To Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 

389 From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 

390 To Lord Granville 

391 From Sir L. Mallet 

392 I To Sir L. Mallet ^Private) 
393 
394 
395 
396 



1913. 
25 Nov. 



Conversation with M. Sazonov : same 
subject; Russian displeasure. {Min.)... 



26 Nov. Same conversation : same subject... 
(Becd. 1 Dec.) 



Nov. 



Nov. 



29 Nov. 



29 Nov. 
{Reed. 1 Dec.) 



1 Dec. 

1 Dec. 

2 Dec. 

2 Dec 
2 Dec. 
2 Dec. 



Same subject : British view to be com- 
municated to M. Sazonov 

Conversation with M. Sazonov: same sub- 
ject ; M. Sazonov's annoyance but lack 
of decision ... 

Conversation with M. Sazonov: grave 
dangers of situation ; suggested trans- 
fer of German (Jeneral from Constan- 
tinople to Adrianople. {Min.) ... 

Conversation with M. Pichon : delimita- 
tion of Southern Albania ; German 
Military Mission to Turkey. (Min.) ... 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same | 
subject ; test of the value of Triple 
Entente 

Conversation between M. Paul Cambon | 
and Sir A. Nicolson : telegram from M. 
Delcasse ; strained relations of 
(jermany and Russia 

Instructions to make representations to 
Porte ; unprecedented position of : 
German General at Constantinople;! 
matter of grave concern to Turkey and 
to every Power interested in Turkey ... 

Reporting action given above. British 
position; greater concern of Russia ... 

DiflBculiy of ascertaining exact powers of 
Military Mission; Russian objections... 

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon:, 
instruction from M. Pichon suggesting 
joint communication at Constantinople 



Sir A. Nicolson to Mr. 
O'Beirne (Private) 

From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 
From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.> 



(Tel.) 



397 



To Sir R. Rodd 
[8959] 



2 Dec. Enclosing report from Lieut. -Colonel 
(Reed. 8 Dec.) Tyrrell on (German Military Mission ... 

2 Dec. Advice to Turkey on exposure to demands 
from other Powers 

2 Dec. Difficulty of decision with regard to 

appointment of (Jerman General 

3 Dec. Conversation with M. Neratov : his 

information concerning German Mission 

3 Dec. Some Turkish military opposition to 
(Jerman command ... 

3 Dec. Conversation with M. Bompard : his lack 
of instructions ; General von Sanders 
to be member of Military Council 

3 Dec. Conversation with Marquis Imperiali : 
same subject ; control of the Straits ; 
1 Russian attitude ... 



.•i40 
341 

342 

342 

343 
344 
345 

346 

347 
347 
348 

348 
349 
352 
352 
353 
353 

a54 

354 



xl 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


398 


To Sir L. Mallet 


(Tel.) 


1913. 
4 Dec. 


Same subject : objection limited to effec- 
tive command of Constantinople Army 
Corps 


355 


399 




(Tel.) 


4 Dec 


Request for delay from Russian Govern- 
ment; instructions suspended ... 


355 


400 


From Sir L. Mallet 


(Tel.) 


4 Dec. 


M. de Giers instructed to defer action 
pending communication being made in 
Berlin J form of communication. (Min.) 


355 


401 


From. Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


4 Dec. 

{Eecd. 5 Dec.) 


Conversation witb M. Neratov : same 
subject 


356 


402 


c rom bir Li. JMaiiet 




4 Dec. 

(Reed. 9 Dec) 


Enclosing despatch from Lieut.-Colonel 
Tyrrell: German General to be member 
of Military Council 


356 


403 




(Tel.) 


5 Dec. 


Conversation with M. de Giers : hopes 
for friendly settlement : Admiral 
Limpus' position. (Min.) 


358 


404 


From Sir M. de Bunsen... 


5 Dec. 
(Eecd. 8 Dec.) 


Conversation with Hilmi Pasha : same 
subject 


359 


405 


From Sir L. Mallet 

(Private) 


0 Dec. 


Conversations with M. de Giers and M. 
Bompard : same subject ... 


360 


406 


From Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


7 Dec. 


Issue of irade appointing General von 
Sanders : Russian communication to 
Berlin 


361 


407 


From Sir L. Mallet 




8 Dec. 
(Becd. 13 Dec.) 


Article in La Turquie on work accom- 
plished by Admiral Limpus for Turkish 
Navy. Question of successor for 
Admiral Limpus. (Min.) 


361 


408 


To Sir L. Mallet 


(Tel.) 


9 Dec. 


M. Sazonov's desire for identic communi- 
cation at Constantinople, by each 
Ambassador separately ... 


363 


409 






9 Dec. 


Statement by Herr von Kiihlmann : 
German Military Command in Turkey 
compared with that of Admiral Limpus 


363 


410 


To Sir E. Goschen... 




9 Dec. 


Gonversation with Herr von Kiihlmann : 
same subject 


363 


411 


To Sir F. Bertie ... 




9 Dec. 


Conversation with M. Paul Cambon : pro- 
posed identic note in Constantinople ; 
enquiry and observations preferred 


364 


412 


From Mr. O'Beirne 




9 Dec. 
(Reed. 15 Dec.) 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: appoint- 
ment of General von Sanders : question 
a test of value of Triple Entente. 
(Min.) 


365 


413 


J) 5> 




9 Dec. 

(Reed. 15 Dec.) 


Conversation with Count Pourtales: same 
subject: analogy of Admiral Limpus ... 


367 


414 


F7-0OT Sir L. Mallet 


(Tel.) 


10 Dec. 


Same subject : position of Admiral 
Limpus ; British action and that pro- 
posed by France and Russia. (Min.) ... 


367 


415 


From Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


10 Dec. 


Conversation with M. Neratov : Sir F. 
Grey's proposed action at Constan- 
tinople 


369- 


416 


From Sir L. Mallet 


(Tel.) 


11 Dec. 


Admiral Limpus consulted on powers of 
1 British Admiral 


1 369' 



xU 



No. 


Name. 


1 Date. 


Main Subject. 


I Page 

1 


417 


To Mr. O'Beirne 


1913. 
11 Dec. 

i 

i 

1 


Conversation, with Count Benckendorff. 
Position of General Liman von Sanders 
and of Admiral Limpus. Sir E. Grey's 
view that separate enquiry be made 
of Porte 


371 


41S 


Mr. O'Beirne to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 


11 Dec. 

i 

1 


German Mission considered of great 
importance by M. Sazonov ; test of 
j Triple Entente 


371 


419 


From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 


12 Dec. 


Suggestion by M. de Giers for change in 
position of German (Jeneral ; proposal 
to change that of British Admiral 


372 


420 


To Sir L. Mallet ^Tel.) 


12 Dec. 


Same subject : suggestions made by Count 
Benckendorff 


373 


4_'l 


(Tel.) 


12 Dec. 


Instructions to make verbal enquiry 


373 


422 


From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 


12 Dec 
(Becd. IS Dec.) 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: his com- 
plaint of change in British attitude ... 


374 


423 


From Sir E. GJoschen 


12 Dec. 
(Becd. 15 Dec.) 


German press criticisms of Great Britain. 
{Min.) 


374 


424 


Sir E. Goschen to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 


12 Dec. 


Conversation with M. Sverbeiev : Russian 
negotiations with Germany 


376 


425 


From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 


13 Dec. 
{Becd. i4 Dec.) 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: British 
decision to make verbal enquiry onlv. 
(Min.) 


378 


426 


From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 


13 Dec. 
{Becd. 14 Dec.) 


Verbal enquiry made by Ambassadors of 
Triple Entente. Conversation with 
Said Halim Pasha... 


379 


427 


From Sir E. Goschen 


13 Dec. 
{Becd. 13 Dec.) 


Enclosing report on scope of duties of 
German Military Mission by Lieut.- 
Colonel Russell 


379 


428 


From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.1 


14 Dec. 


Confidential views of Admiral Limpus on 
proposed change in his position. (Min.) 


380 


429 


From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 


14 Dec. 


M. Sazonov's views on British attitude in 
Turkey 


381 


430 


From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.^ 


15 Dec. 


Partial reply from Said Halim Pasha to 
verbal enquiry of three Powers. {Min.) 


382 


431 


To Sir E. Goschen 


15 Dec. 


Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky: 
position of German General; Russian 
diflBculties ... 


383 


432 


Ili Mr. O'Beirne ... 


15 Dec. 


Conversation between Count Bencken- 
dorff and Sir A. Nicolson on Decem- : 
ber S : correspondence between St. ' 
Petersburgh and Berlin ; proposed 
communication to the Porte 


otSl 


433 

t 


From Sir L. Mallet ... | 


15 Dec. 
{Keca. z2 Dec.) 


Enclosing memorandum of verbal enquiry 
made to Said Halim Pasha by three 
Ambassadors. Text. 


385 


4,^4 


I- Mr. O Beirne (Tel.) 


16 Dec. 


Discussion at Berlin to follow after 

T1+' f\r 1^11 rlri c ri toti 1 ^ 
ICt^l U u \Jl A. ill R-laLl 1 Kz^iy ... ... ... 


^)88 


435 


From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 


16 Dec. 


Conversation with Said Halim Pasha: 
position at Constantinople during state 
of siege. ... ... ... ... 


387 


436 


To Sir F. Bertie 

[8959] 


16 Dec 


Conversation with M. Paul Cambon: pro- 
posed discussion at Berlin 

d 2 


387 



xlii 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 



438 From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 



From Mr. O'Beirne 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



From Sir E. Goschen 

(Private) 

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchahan 

(Tel.) 



From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 
From Sir G. Buchanan ... 



From Sir M. de Bunsen 

(Tel.) 



From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



Minute by Sir E. Crowe. 



453 From Sir E. Goschen 



1913. 
17 Dec. 



17 Dec. 
(Reed. 18 Dec.) 



18 Dec. 
(Eecd. 29 Dec.) 



19 Dec. 

19 Dec. 

20 Dec. 

21 Dec. 

23 Dec. 
23 Dec. 



23 Dec. 
(Reed. 29 Bee.) 



24 Dec. 



25 Dec. 
{Reed. 29 Dec.) 

26 Dec. 



27 Dec. 



29 Dec. 



29 Dec. 



30 Dec. 
(Reed. 5 Jan., 
19U.) 



Conversation with M. Sazonov : no objec- j 
tion to discussion proposed at Berlin. 
(Min.) 

Conversation with M. Doumergue : 
necessity for acting cautiously at 
Constantinople; M. Isvolski's com- 
plaints of attitude of France and 
Britain 

Conversations with M. Sazonov : German 
Military Mission; its effects on Russian 
interests; importance in maintaining 
Triple Entente 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same 
subject : three possible courses 
suggested. (Min.)... 

Same subject: position in Germany 



Justification of M. Doumergue's replv to 
M. Isvolski (r. No. 438) ' ... 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : sugges- 
tion made by Count Pourtales for 
direct consultation between Berlin and 
St. Petersburgh. {Min.) 

Same subject : solution to be discussed by 
M. de Giers and Baron von Wangen- 
heim ... 

Message from M. Sazonov : his gratitude 
for British efforts at Berlin 

Conversation with M. Sazonov on Decem- 
ber 19 : his serious view of situation. 
Further conversation on December 21 : 
direct Russo-German consultation at 
Constantinople 

Favourable impression in Russia caused 
by German readiness to seek solution... 

Russian Press comments 



Conversation with Herr von Tschirschky : 
diplomatic situation in Balkans ; 
Russian excitement over Military 
Mission deplored ... 

Conversation with Herr von Jagow : diflB- 
culty of making amicable arrangement. 
{Min.) 

Conversation between M. Sazonov and 
Count Pourtales : failure of German 
and Russian military attaches at 
Constantinople to come to an agree- 
ment ... 

Conversation with M. de Etter : failure 
of M. Sazonov and Herr von Jagow to 
find solution. {Min.) 

Conversation with Herr von Jagow on 
December 27 : explanation of German 
position ; surprise at attitude of 
Russia. {Min.) 



396 
397 



398 



398 



399 



400 



402 



xliii 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Ed. yote 



454 To Sir G. Buchanan 



1914. 
10 Jan. 



1913. 
31 Dec. 



455 From Sir E. Goschen 31 Dec. 

(Private) 



45S 



1914. 
1 Jan. 



457 To Sir E. Groschen 2 Jan. 

(Private) 

458 I From Sir G. Buchanan i 5 Jan. 
I (Tel.) I 



459 



460 



(Tel) 6 Jan. 



» » 



461 To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 



6 Jan. 
(Seed. 13 Jan.) 

7 Jan. 



462 To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 7 J 



463 From Sir G. Buchanan ... 7 Jan 

j (Feed. 12 Jan.) 

I 

464 ■ From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) g Jan. 



465 From Sir G. Buchanan 8 Jan 

1 (Tel.) 



Conversation between M. de Etter and; 
Sir E. Crowe on December 31 : post- 1 
ponement of further representation* at 
Berlin '402 



Conversation between M. de Etter and ) 
Sir E. Crowe on December 22 : Russo- ! 
German consultation ... ... ... ] 404 

Conversations with Herr von Jagow: 
possibilities of solution ; difficulty said 
to be chiefly with Turkey ... ... 405 



Conversation with Herr von Jagow: 
his satisfaction with British recom- 
mendation of patience ... ... ... 406 

Sir E. Grey's refusal of M. Sazonov's | 
request for demarche by Triple Entente 
at Berlin 407 



Conversation with M. Sazonov : failure I 
of attempts to reach solution ; report ! 
of previous consultation of Emperor 
Nicholas II by Emperor William II; 
report of conversation also with King 
George T in Mav 1913 



Conversation with M. Sazonov: same 
subject : committee of four Ministers 
to propose eventual action. (Min.) ... 

Russian Press criticism 



407 

408 

410 



466 From Sir F. Bertie 



11 Jan. 
(Eecd. IS Jan.) 



467 Sir A. Xicolson to Sir G. 13 Jan. 

Buchanan (Private) 

468 From Sir G. Buchanan ... 20 Jan. 

(Becd. 26 Jan.) 

469 Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 21 Jan. 
Xicolson (Private) 



Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky: 
Sir E. Grey's anxiety; possibilities of 
solution ... ... ... ... ... 411 

Conversation with M. de Etter: enquiries 
to be made as to report of conversation 
between King George Y and Emperor , 

WiUiam II at Berlin 411 

I 

Conversations with M. Sazonov: progress 
of negotiations ; situation becoming ' 
critical ... ... ... ... ... 412 

Issue of Imperial Trade: important 
announcements ; General von Sanders' 
appointment confirmed ... ... ... 414 

Conversation with M. Sazonov and M. 
Delcasse : Russia on the eve of signing 1 
economic agreement with Turkev. I 
(Min.) 415 

Conversation with M. Doumergue : M. 
I Delcasse's report of M. Sazonov's views: 

Russo-Turkish agreement ... ... 416 

Anxiety for German agreement with 
Russia 418 

Enclosing copy of letter from M. Sazonov 
to Count Pourtales : details of proposed 
arrangement... ... ... ... ... 418 

Conversation with the Emperor Nicholas 
II, and his conversation with Count 
Pourtales; settlement expected shortly 420 



xliv 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


470 


From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 


1914. 
24 Jan. 


Question of Scutari command : Triple 
Entente said to have been successful. 
(Min.) 


421 


471 


To Sir L. Mallet 


26 Jan. 


Information from Herr von Schubert : 
rank of General of Cavalry conferred 
on General von Sanders ... 


421 


472 


From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 


31 Jan. 


Conversation with M. Gulkevich : ques- 
tion of German command at Scutari ... 


422 


473 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


4 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : same 
subject 


422 


474 


To Sir G. Buchanan 

(Private) 


11 Feb. 


Importance of incident much exaggera- 
ted ; general impression a diplomatic 
set-back for Germany 


423 






Chapter LXXXVIII. 


— 




Armenian Reforms, 1913-14. 




475 


To Sir F. Bertie 


1913. 
23 Jan. 


Conversation with M. Paul Cambon: 
postponement of Armenian reform 
question until conclusion of peace 


424 


476 


To Sir E. Goschen 


27 Jan. 


Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky: 
integrity of Asia Minor ; position of 
Russia, France and Germany ... 


424 


477 


Sir E. Goschen to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 


17 Apr. 


Conversations with Herr von Jagow: 
same subject 


425 


478 


L 1 U ilv Oil VJT. J_JtJ W uUt>X . . * 


24 Apr. 
{Becd. 28 Apr.) 


Tn f r^T*m n + inn frr»TTi IVTy ATni'.'f.npw^: • OT^^,^o^\ 

situation at Adana: rumours of German 
attitude in Cilicia... 


426 


479 


Communication from Tew- 
fik Pasha 


24 Apr. 
{Eecd. 26 Apr.) 


Administrative reforms desired in 
Ottoman Empire ; proposal to appoint 
British Inspectors-General and other 
officials in Eastern Anatolia. Texts. 

{Min.) 


427 


480 


To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.) 


6 May 


Application of Turkish Government for 
loan of British officials under new law 
on vilayets : proposal to include 
nationals of other Powers 


430 


481 


From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.) 


9 May 


New law on vilayets not yet sanctioned 
by Chamber ; question of foreign 
officials. {Min.) 


431 


482 


To Sir G. Lowther 


15 May 


Enclosing communication from Tewfik 
Pasha, as to British officials for Asia 
Minor. Text 


431 


483 




19 May 


Same subject. Conversations between Sir 
A. Nicolson and Tewfik Pasha and M. 
de Etter 


432 


484 


From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 


21 May 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : organiza- 
tion of gendarmerie in Asiatic 
provinces 


433 


485 


To Sir F. Bertie 


21 May 


Conversation with Sir A. Nicolson, M. 
Paul Cambon and Count Benckendorff : 
same subject; urgency of reforms 


434 



No.i 



Xame. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



P»ge 



486 Communication from 
Count Benckendorff 



457 Communication from Tew- 

fik Pasha 

458 From Sir F. Bertie 



1913. 
21 Mav 



Right of participation of Russia, France 
and Britain in projects of reform in 
Asia Elinor ; suggestion for elaboration 
of scheme ... ... •■• • • •■• 



21 Mav Question of vilayets to be included in the 

\ (Reed. 22 May) third section of Asia Minor. (Min.) ... 43o 

22 May Conversation with M. Pichon : M. . 
{Reed. 2^ May) Sazonov's suggestion for reforms in| 

Asia Minor to be discussed by Russia, 
France and Britain 435 



489 To Mr, O'Beirne (Tel.) 23 Mav 



490 Communication from Tew- 

fik Pasha 

491 To Tewfik Pasha 

492 From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 



493 Communication from 

Count Benckendorff 

494 From Mr. O'Beirne 



495 To Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 



496 To Sir F. Bertie 



23 Mav 
Reed. 24 May) 

24 Mav 



26 Mav 
(Reed. 27 May) 



Mav 



British reply to Turkish request for 
British officers; Russian proposal for 
elaboration of scheme of reforms ... 436 

Same subject : engagement of British 
officers. (Min.) 436 

Sir E. Grey's reply to Turkish request for 
British oflBcers. Text 437 

Conversation with M. Sazonoy: his objec- 
tion to employment of British ofiBcers in 
Armenia ; special position of Russia ; 
desirability of discussion by Ambassa- 
dors at Constantinople. (Min.)... ... j 438 

Memorandum from M. Sazonov on the j 
Armenian question ... ... ... 440 



27 May Conversation with M. Sazonov: his, 
(Reed. 2 June) reasons for refusal to withdraw objec- 
tions to appointment of British ofiBcers 
in Armenia... ... ... ... .■■ 441 



28 May 
2S Mav 



Suggestion that M. Sazonov should take 
the initiative in scheme of reforms ... 442 



Conversation with M. Paul Cambon: 
explanation to Count Benckendorff 
of British responsibility concerning 
gendarmerie in Asia Minor : suggestion 
for reviving scheme of reforms drawn 
up in 1895 ... 



497 



498 Communication from 
Count Benckendorff 



499 To Sir E. Goschen... 



500 From Mr. O'Beirne (TeL) 



501 To Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 



29 Mav 



31 Mav 



2 June 



4 June 



5 June 



Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson 
and M. Paul Cambon on May 22 : same 
subject. (Min.) 



443 



443 



Memorandum from M. Sazonov: same 
subject ; proposal to adopt scheme of 
1S95 for basis of reforms... ... ... 444 

' 'onversation with Prince Lichnowsky: 
German anxiety concerning reforms in | 
Asiatic Turkey ; British reply to 
Turkish request ... ... ... ... 444 

< onversation with M. Neratov : Russian 
desire for preliminarj- exchange of 
views of three Ambassadors at 
Constantinople ... ... ... ... ' 445 

Proposal that M. Sazonov should place 
, his views before the five Powers at , 
i once ; assent to preliminary discussion I 
I at Constantinople... ... ... ... 446 



xlvi 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



502 

503 

504 
505 

506 
507 



To Sir G. Lowther 



From Sir G. Lowther 



To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.) 



Communication from 
Count Benckendorff 



To Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 
From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 



508 To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



509 

510 

511 
512 

513 

514 
515 

516 

517 
518 



Communication from 
Count Benckendorff 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 

From Sir G. Lowther 



To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.) 



To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



1913. 
6 June 



6 June 
(Reed. 11 June) 

7 June 
7 June 



9 June 

11 June 

{Becd. 12 J line) 



13 June 

14 June 

16 June 

16 June 
16 June 

16 June 

17 June 



17 June 
{Itecd. 23 June) 



19 June 



20 June 



20 June 



Conversation between Tewfik Pasha and ! 
Sir A. Nicolson : British readiness to i 
lend provisionally a few ofiBcers to 
organise gendarmerie if urgently 
required 



446 



Turkish proposals ; danger of involving 
international complications; reference 
to Cj'prus Convention of 1878 ... ... 447 



Instructions to act according to proposal 
sent to Mr. O'Beirne {v. No. 501) 



448 



Confidential circular from M. Sazonov 
proposing to leave study of Armenian 
reforms to Ambassadors of Powers at 
Constantinople on basis of 1895 project 449 

Acceptance of M. Sazonov's proposal ... 449 

Acceptance of M. Sazonov's proposal by 
Germany and Austria-Hungary on con- 
dition that Turkey should take part in 
deliberations. {Min.) ... ... ... 449 

Sir E. Grey's proposal for communication 
to Turkey re discussion of reforms; 
invitation to her to submit her scheme 
for consideration by Ambassadors ... 450 

Note from M. Sazonov on danger of 
including Turkish representative in 
Ambassadors' Conference ... .... 451 

Circular telegram from M. Sazonov on 
procedure for study of Armenian 
reforms ... ... ... ... ... 451 



Conversation with 
subject. {Min.) 



M. Sazonov : same 



Explanation of Sir E. Grey's proposal for 
consideration of Porte's scheme of 
reform 

Forwarding copies of correspondence on 
employment of British oflScers to com- 
mand gendarmerie in Anatolia... 



452 



453 



453 



Conversation with M. Neratov : reference' 
of Sir E. Grey's proposal to M. Sazonov 454 



Enclosing outline of scheme of reforms 
drawn up by Mr. Fitzmaurice, M. 
Mandelstam and M. de St. Quentin. 
Text. {Min.) 



Conversation with M. Paul Cambon : 
French proposal that immediate steps 
be taken to secure appointment of 
Imperial High Commissioner to main- 
tain order in Armenia 

Russian Government to be informed of 
British attitude to proposal for 
Imperial High Commissioner 

Request to be made to M. Sazonov to 
instruct M. de Giers to invite his five 
colleagues to discuss project of 
Armenian reform ... 



454 



460 



460 



461 



xlvii 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject 



Page 



519 



Memorandum by Sir A. 
Nicolson 



1913. 
20 June 



520 j From Sir G. Buchanan 21 June 
! (Tel.) I 

521 Communication f rom ' 23 June 

Count Benckendorff 



522 From Mr. Carnegie 23 June 



523 To Sir E. Goschen ... 24 June 



524 . From Sir G. Buchanan 26 June 

(Tel.> 



525 To Mr. Carnegie 26 June 



526 To Sir E. Goschen ... 27 June 



527 To Sir G. Buchanan (Te\.) 2S June 



528 



529 : from Sir G. Low-ther (.Tel.1 30 June 



530 To Sir G. Buchanan (.Tel.i 1 Julv 



531 , From Sir G Buchanan 1 Julv 

(Tel.) 



532 From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 2 Julv 



533 From Mr. Marling (Tel.; 2 Julv 



534 



3) » 



(Tel.) 



535 From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



536 



537 To Sir E. Goschen. 



(Tel.) 



2 July 
2 July 

2 July 

3 Julv 



Conversation with Count Benckendorff: 
High Commissioner for Armenia ; pro- I 
posal for reference to three .\mbassa- i 
dors at Constantinople. (Min.)... ... 461 

Same subject : M. Sazonov's replv to M. 
Pichou ".. ... 462 

Explanation given to M. Sazonov of 
British proposal re representation of 
Turkey 462 

Enclosing memorandum from M. Pichon 
on project of Armenian reforms : iden- 
tity of French and British views ... 462 

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky : 
question of consultation of Turkey: 
scheme of 1395 '. \ 463 

Conversation with M. Sazonov: his objec- ^ 
tions to definite engagement to supply 
British officers for Armenia ... ... 464 



Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and 
M. Pichon : Germany's two policies 
about Asiatic Turkev 



464 



From Sir G. Buchanan ... 29 June 

{Becd. 30 June) 



Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky: 
spheres of interest in Asiatic Turkey : 
speeches by King George V and M. 
Poincare in London ... ... ... 465 

Instructions to inform M. Sazonov of 
limited and provisional character of 
supply of British ofiBcers... ... ... 466 

Conversation with M. Sazonov: military j 
objections to appointment of British 
officers. {Min.) ... ... ... ... 467 

First meeting of Ambassadors at 
Constantinople ; reference of scheme of 
reform to committee ... ... ... 468 

Impossibility of British refusal to lend 
officers at Turkish request ... ... 468 

Reporting note from M. Sazonov : special 
Russian interests in six frontier 
vilayets (Min.) ... ... ... ... 469 

Conversation with Herr von Jagow: 
objection to Russian proposal for 
making Armenia autonomous. (Min.)... 470 

Reporting receipt of Turkish scheme of 
reform ... ... ... ... ... 471 

Same subject: further details. {Min.) ... 471 

Same subject : German and Russian 
views. (.\fin.) ... ... ... ... 472 

Continuance of Russian opposition to 
appointment of British officers; sugges- 
tion of officers of Minor Power ... ... 473 



Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky: 
German view of Russian proposals 



474 



xlviii 



No. 



638 



539 



540 



541 



542 



543 



Name. 



544 



From Mr. Marling 



To Mr. Marling (Tel.) 



From Mr. Marling (Tel.) 



To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



To Lord Granville 



Ed. Note 



To Mr. Marling 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



545 From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



546 



From Lord Granville (Tel.) 



547 I To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



548 ; Sir A. Nicolson to Mr. 
Marling (Private) 



549 



550 



551 



552 



653 



To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 



From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



1913. 

3 July Enclosing text of circular telegram sent 
(Becd. 7 July) by Said Halim Pasha, and Turkish 

scheme for Armenian reform. Texts 

4 July Approval of Ambassadors' discussion of 
Turkish scheme ; opposition to any 
proposals involving partition 

4 July Imperial irade promulgating reforms 
opposition of German and Russian 
views. (Min 

A July Instructions to explain British attitude 
to M. Sazonov : decision not to supply 
oflScers ; necessity for agreement of the 
Powers on scheme of reform. (Min.) 

6 July Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian 
(Reed. 7 July) desire to prevent disintegration of 

Turkey ; distrust of German policy. 
(Min.)... 

7 July Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky : 
Turkish proposals for reform 

7 July Giving text of note verbale from Said 
Halim Pasha explaining Turkish pro- 
posals ... ... ... ... ... ' 485 



8 July Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson and 
Tewfik Pasha : suspension of appoint- 
ment of British officers during discus- 
sion of reform projects ... 

8 July Same subject : gratification of Russian 
(Reed. 9 July) Government ; circular telegram being 

sent by M. Sazonov explaining Russian 
views. (Min.) 

9 July Conversation with Herr von Jagow: 
Russian and Turkish schemes of reform 

9 July Instructions to inform M. Sazonov of 
British views ... ... 

9 July ! Proposed answer to M. Sazonov's obser- 
1 vations in regard to reforms 

10 July Instructions to ascertain views on M. 
Sazonov's circular telegram 

10 July Conversation with M. Pichon : French 
(Reed. 11 July) policy consolidation, not partition; 

concurrence with British view that pro- 
ject of reforms should be elaborated by 
all Powers in consultation with Porte... 

11 July Conversation with M. Pichon : Russian ' 
(Reed. 12 July) \ scheme of reforms not yet received in I 

Paris. (Min.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 



From Mr. Marling 



11 Julv 

(Reed. 16 July) 



liJnclosing copy of Russian aide-memoire 
on reforms. Text ... 



12 July Conversations with Baron von Wangen- 
(Recd. 2i July) j heim : danger of creation of privileged 
Armenian province under Russian aus- 
j pices. (Min.) 



491 
491 

493 



zlix 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



554 From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



555 From Mr. Marling (Tel.) 



556 From Sir F. Cartwright 
i (Tel.) 



657 From Lord Granville (Tel.) 



558 To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



559 To Lord Granville (Tel.) 



560 Fro »H Lord Granville (Tel.) 



1913. 
13 July 



13 Julv 

(Becd. 14 July) 

15 July 



561 

562 

563 
564 
565 
566 
567 

568 
569 

570 
571 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) ! 

To Lord Granville 



From Sir G. Buchanan ... 

Communication from M. 
de Prelle de la Nieppe 

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 
From Lord Granville (Tel.) 
From Mr. Marling 



(Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



16 July 

16 July 

17 July 

18 July 

18 July 
22 July 

22 Julv 
(Becd. 28 July) 

1 Aug. 

1 Aug. 

2 Aug. 

27 Aug. 
(Reed. 1 Sept.) 



Conversation with M. Sazonov : his view- 
that elaboration of reforms should not 
be left to Ambassadors at Constan- 
tinople; urgency of question. (Min.) ... 

Observations on reform proposals, and 
attitude of Powers. (Min.) 

Conversation with Count Berchtold: 
Russian proposal for Armenian reform 
not yet received, but probably not 
acceptable 

Conversation with Herr von Jagow: 
Russian aide-memoire not yet received 
at Berlin. (Min.) ... 

Conversation with Count Benckendorff : 
I agreement between Powers essential to 
any scheme of reforms in Turkey 

Instructions to inform Herr von Jagow 
of lines suggested for discussion ; need 
for unanimity among Powers and accep- 
tance of reforms without coercion 

I 

! Conversation with Herr von Jagow: same 
subject ; approval of conditions 

suggested 

Russian aide-memoire on Russian project 
of reforms. (Min.) 

Enclosing memorandum from Prince 
Lichnowsky on Grerman views about 
reforms. Text 

Enclosing Russian aide-memoire respect- 
ing reforms in Armenia. Text... 

Porte's request for Belgian ofiBcials to 
start reforms in Asiatic Turkev 



Same subject : 
views... 



instructions to ascertain 



Herr von Jagow's agreement to engage- 
ment of Belgian oflficers ... 

Enclosing memorandum by Mr. 
Fitzmaurice on meetings of committee 
appointed by Embassies of sis Powers 
to examine Russian draft scheme of 
reform. (Min.) 



To Mr. Marling (Tel.) 
To Mr. O'Beirne 



26 Sept. Formula of compromise proposed by 
Baron von Wangenheim and M. de 
Giers. (Min.) 



7 Oct. 
(Becd. 8 Oct.) 



14 Oct. 



27 Oct. 



Turkish offer of appointments to Sir R. 
Crawford and Mr. Graves ; reported 
suggestions by Baron von Wangenheim. 
(Min.) 

Same subject : refusal to agree to accept- 
ance of appointments by British officials 

Conversation with M. de Etter : six 
points in proposed reforms accepted by 
Ambassadors of Russia and Germany... 



1 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



From Mr. O'Beirne 

From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 

To Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 

From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 

From Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 

From Sir E. Gosohen (Tel.) 

To Sir L. Mallet (Tel.) 

From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 

From Sir L. Mallet 



1913. 

27 Oct. Conversation with M. Sazonov : his visit 
(Reed. 2 Nov.) to Berlin chieflj- concerned with 
Armenian reforms... 



>> )j 



» » 



588 i To Sir L. Mallet 



31 Oct. 

3 Nov. 
■4 Nov. 

5 Nov. 



5 Nov. 
(Reed. 6 Nov.) 

6 Nov. 



8 Nov. 



10 Nov. 



12 Nov. 
{Reed. 22 Nov.) 



\ Conversation with Sir R. Crawford: 
Talaat Bey's request that he should be 
president of informal commission. 
{Min.) 

Same subject : conditions governing 
British attitude 

Sir E. Grey's refusal to agree to new 
appointments of British officials with- 
out approval of all the Powers ; his 
hope that Russia and Germany will 
urge Porte to put forward its proposals 

Russian views on Turkish proposals. 
{Min.) 



Application by Colonel Hawker 
approval of appointment 



for 



Conversation with Herr Zimmermann: 
his representations to Djavid Bey 

Instructions for representations to Porte ; 
support of Russo-German proposals ... 

Conversation with Herr Zimmermann: 
Turkish scheme of reform ; pressure on 
Porte to accept Russo-German proposals 

Conversation with M. de Giers : Russo- 
German negotiations. Enclosing Said 
Halim Pasha's communication to M. de 
Giers on appointment of foreign 
officials. Text 



13 Nov. ) Conversation with Said Halim Pasha: 
{Reed. 22 Nov.)\ same subject 



18 Nov. 
{Reed. 21, Nov.) 



25 Nov. 
{Reed. 1 Dee.) 



27 Nov. 
{Reed. 2 Dec) 

1 Dec. 
(Reed. 8 Dec.) 

31 Dec. 
{Reed. 5 Jan., 
1914) 

1914. 
20 Jan. 



Conversation with M. de Giers : progress 
of negotiations with Porte. Enclosing 
revised text of Turkish communication 
{v. No. 581) 

Enclosing revised project of reforms 
drawn up by M. de Giers and Baron 
von Wangenheim. Text... 

Conversation with M. de Giers : no 
advance yet made on project of reform 

Conversation with Said Halim Pasha: 
progress of negotiations. {Min.) 

Conversation with Said Halim Pasha: 
same subject : favourable solution 
expected shortly 



Conversation between Sir W. Tyrrell and 
Herr von Schubert : German surprise 
at reopening of question at Constan- 
tinople. Enclosing letters from Tewfik 
Pa.sha to Sir A. Nicolson... 



No 


Name. 


Date. 


1 Main Subject. 

1 




589 


From Sir L. Mallet 




1 

1914. 
25 Jan. 
(Becd. 2 Feb.) 


Inaccuracy of German report of new 
Russian demands at Constantinople; 
state of negotiations ... ... ... 


! 

' 541 


590 


« » 




28 Jan. 
(Becd. 2 Feb.) 


Progress of negotiations. Enclosing draft 
of note from Ottoman Government 

^ CJiti ... ... ... ... 


542 


591 






9 Feb. 
{Becd. 16 Feb.) 


Enclosing note from Port« to representa- 
tives of Great Powers : amended 
formula of agreement on reforms. Text 


1 

1 

545 


592 




(Tel.) 


17 Feb. 


Bequest from Said Halim Pasha and 
Talaat Bey for British Official to act as 
Director-General of Inspectors of 
Vilayets. (Min.) 


547 


593 


To Sir L. Mallet 


(TeL) 


19 Feb. 


Same subject : desire for further informa- 
tion as to functions of Director-General 


547 


594 


To Sir F. Bertie ... 




11 Mar. 


Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and 
Count BenekeudorfF : German sugges- 
tion for choice of Inspectors-Cieneral 
for Armenia 


548 


595 


From Sir L. Mallet 


(Tel.) 


15 Apr. 


Appointment of Major HofF and Mr. 
Westenenk by Porte as Inspectors- 
General of the Eastern Vilayets 










Chapter LXXXIX. 










The Potsdam Meeting. 




596 


From Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


1910. 
10 Oct. 


M. Sazonov summoned to attend meeting 
of Emperors Nicholas II and William II 
at Potsdam in November ; Persian 
Railways question. {Min.) 


549 


597 


To Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 

1 


11 Oct. 


Instructions to find out from M. Sazonov 
whether matters of common interest to 
Russia and England would be discussed 
at Potsdam ... 


549 


598 


From Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


12 Oct. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: same 
subject 


550 


599 


" >» 


(Tel.) 

1 


17 Oct. 

1 


Further conversation: probable subjects 
of discussion at Potsdam. (Min.) 


550 


600 


>» » 


(Tel.) 


18 Oct. 


Further conversation: Russian concession 
to Germany as to junction of railways 
at Khanikin; assurances of consult'a-| 
tion of Great Britain before signature ' 
of any agreement. (Min.) 


552 


601 


i 0 jnr. \j ceirne 


(Tel.) 


20 Oct. 


Same subject: junction of railwavs; 
Anglo-Russian note of April 7, 1910. 
and neutral zone ... 


5-53 


602 


From Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


21 Oct. 
{Becd. 22 Oct.) \ 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: junction 
of railways ; no discussion of neutral , 
zone; joint note of Mav 20, 1910 ' 
(Min.) ' 


563 


603 


» >» 


(Tel.) 


30 Oct. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: same 
subjects. (Min.) ... 


554 



Hi 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



604 I From Mr. O'Beirne 



605 



606 



(Tel.) 
(Tel.) 



607 From Sir E. Goscheii (Tel.) 



608 From Mr. O'Beirne 



609 
610 



>> >» 



1910. i 
2 Nov. 
(Reed. 7 Nov.) \ 



8 Nov. 



9 Nov. 



9 Nov. 



9 Nov. 
(Eecd. 18 Nov.) 



9 Nov. 
{Eecd. 18 Nov.) 

13 Nov. 
1 (Reed. 18 Nov.) 



611 From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 16 Nov. 

i i 

612 . 



613 ; 



614 From Mr. O'Beirne 



615 



From Sir F. Bertie 



616 Sir F. Bertie to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 



16 Nov. 
{Reed. 17 Nov.) 

23 Nov. 
{Reed. 25 Nov.) 



24 Nov. 
{Reed. 29 Nov.) 



2 Dec 
{Reed. 3 bee.) 

o Dec. 



Conversation with M. Isvolski : Russian 
and German railwaj' projects; settled 
character of Russian foreign policy. ! 
{Mill.)... ... ... ... ... ... ' 555 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : discus- 
sions at Potsdam re Persia and Bagdad j 
Railway ... ... ... ... ... 556 



Interview with M. Sazonov reported in 
Novoe Vremya: same subject; no 
reference at Potsdam to any change in 
Russian foreign policy. (Min.)... 



Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen- 
Waochter : his friendly discussions with 
M. Sazonov at Potsdam. His state- 
ments to M. Jules Cambon ... ... 5-57 

Conversation with M. Sazonov: his 
account of Potsdam meeting; Persia 
and Bagdad Railway. {Min.) ... ... 

Same conversation: Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. {Min.) ... ... 560 

Conversations with M. Sazonov : report 
in Novoe Vremya. M. Louis' view of 
meeting at Potsdam. M. Sazonov's 
own views on Russo-German relations... 

Conversation with M. Pichon : his atti- 
tude to meeting at Potsdam. {Min.) ... [ 563 

Enclosing extract from the Figaro of j 
November 11 — " Apres Fotsdam" ... 563 



Conversation with M. Pichon : British 
and French information re interviews 
at Potsdam. {Min.) 

Summary of memorandum on " Russian 
and German railway interests in 
Persia." Conversation with M. 
Sazonov: same subject. {Min.) 



Conversation with M. Pichon : 
conversation with M. Nekludov... 



his 



617 



618 



From Sir G. Buchanan ... 9 Dec. 

{Reed. 13 Dec.) 



10 Dec. 

{Reed. 13 Dec.) 



Commenting on M. Sazonov's impressions 
of interviews; French attitude 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : desire 
for collaboration ; Bagdad and Persian 
Railways negotiations ; Persian loan. 
{Min.) 



619 Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. IQ Dec. 
I Nicolson (Private) 



Same conversation: M. Sazonov's nego- 
tiations with Count Pourtales. Article 
in Daily Chronicle ... ... ... 



620 From Sir G. Buchanan ... 13 Dec. 

{Eecd. 19 Dec.) 



572 



Same conversation. Enclosing draft j 
llusso-German agreement respecting 
Persian and Bagdad Railways. Text. 
(Min.) 574 



576 



Conversation with M. Sazonov: discussion 
of draft agreement ; speech by Herr 
von Bethmann Hollweg in Reichstag. 
(Mm.) I 577 



liii 



No.i 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



To Sir G. Buchanan 

From Mr. Carnegie 
From Sir G. Buchanan 



Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 



To Sir G. Buchanan 



Sir F. Cartwright to Sir 
A. Nicolson (Private) 



From Lord KnoUys 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



Lord Knollys to Sir A. 
Nicolson 



634 From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Private) 



635 Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



1910. 
15 Dec. 



15 Dec. 
(Reed. 16 Dee.) 

15 Dec. 
(Reed. 19 Dec.) 



16 Dec. 



20 Dec. 



21 Dec. 



23 Dec. 



25 Dec. 



26 Dec. 



26 Dec. 
(Reed. 2 Jan., 
1911.) 



26 Dec. 
(Reed. 2 Jan. 
1911.) 



Conversation with Count BenckendorfF : 
M. Sazonov's personal approval of 
Persian Railway scheme ; his position 
as regards Bagdad Railway 

French Press comments. (Min.) ... 



581 
582 



.iudience with Emperor Nicholas 11:! 
visit to Potsdam ; maintenance of ^ 
friendly relations with Great Britain 
and with Germany. (Min.) ... ... 583 

Russo-German draft Agreement ; Royal I 
visit to Potsdam ; Russian troops at 
Kazvin ... ... ... ... ... 585 



Approval of conversation with Emperor 
Nicholas II : possible junction of 
Bagdad and Persian Railways; British 
views ... 



Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson and 
Count Benckendorff : junction of rail- 
way lines; Russo-German position 

Conversations in Paris with M. Briand, 
M. Pichon and M. Delcasse : dissatis- 
faction in France with M. Sazonov's 
attitude in Berlin... 



586 



586 



587 



Desire of King George V to avoid mis- 
understanding of Article I of M. 
Sazonov's draft agreement. (Min.) ... I 588 



Conversation with M. Sazonov : draft 
agreement; wording of Article I. 
(Min.) 

Russian and German objections to Count 
Aehrenthal's policy; M. Sazonov's 
hasty proposals concerning Persian and 
Bagdad Railways. (Min.) 



588 



589 



Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russo- 
German draft agreement ; meaning of 
Article I. (Min^ 591 



26 Dec. Further conversation: M. Timiriazev's 
(Reed. 2 Jan., report on Persian Railway scheme; 



1911.) 



29 Dec. 



29 Dec. 



29 Dec. 



1911. 
1 Jan. 



strategical bearings; some opposition 
in Russia. (Min.) ' 593 



Expression of satisfaction from King 
George V concerning Article I of draft 
agreement 

Conversation with M. Sazonov: strategic 
point of view. Advantages of inter- 
national control 

Further conversation: draft agreement; 
objection to alteration of Article I. 
Political situation in Russia 

Further conversation: appointment of 
representative committee to examine 
Persian Railway scheme ... 



595 



596 



597 



598 



liv 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



637 

638 

639 
640 

641 
642 

643 

644 

645 
646 

647 

648 

649 

650 

651 
652 
653 



Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G. 
Buchanan (Private) 



Extract from the Evening 
Times 



To Sir G. Buchanan 

(Private) 

Sir E. Goschen to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 



From Sir F. Cartwright 

(Tel.) 

From Sir G. Buchanan 



Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



To Sir G. Buchanan 

(Private) 



From Mr. Marling (Tel.) 



To Sir R. Rodd 



From Mr. Marling 



To Sir G. Buchanan 



1911. 
3 Jan. 



6 Jan. 

7 Jan. 
7 Jan. 

9 Jan. 



10 Jan. 
(BeccJ. 16 Jan.) 



10 Jan. 
(Reed. 16 Jan.) 



12 Jan. 

13 Jan. 
13 Jan. 



14 Jan. 
(Becd. 15 Jan.) 



14 Jan. 

15 Jan. 

16 Jan. 



17 Jan. 

(Becd. 23 Jan.) 



17 Jan. 

{Becd. 23 Jan.) 



17 Jan. 



M. Sazonov and draft agreement ; German 
determination to alter nothing ; 
position of Count Aehrenthal ; German 
and Russian policy ; articles in Daily 
News and The Nation 

"Russia's deal with Germany": text of 
agreement; Turkey and the Bagdad 
Railway Company. (Min.) 

German relations with Russia and Great 
Britain 

M. Sazonov's interpretation of the Russo- 
German agreement ; attitudes of M. 
Jules Cambon and Signer Pansa 



Assurances given to M. 
Emi^eror Nicholas II 



Doumer bv 



Divergent statements in foreign Press ; 
negotiations still proceeding at St. 
Petersburgh ; M. Sazonov's explana- 
tions ... 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : enquiry 
as to source of text given in Evening 
Times; course of negotiations. Further 
conversation : reference to neutral zone 
in draft agreement. (Min.) 

Situation considered more favourable ; 
possibilities of Austro-Russian under- 
standing ; Press articles ; cordiality of 
Anglo-Russian relations. {Min.) 

Inclusion of reference to neutral zone 
in draft agreement. {Min.) 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same 
subject ; possible modification of text. 
{Min.) 

Conversation with Emperor Nicholas II : 
publication in Evening Times; 
cordiality of Emperor. {Min.) ... 

Connection between Persian line and 
Bagdad Railway ; possible international 
character for railway 

Communique in Tanin : Baron von 
Marschall's assurances. {Min.)... 

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali : 
Russo-German negotiations ; Press 
reports 

Conversation with Rifaat Pasha : Baron 
von Marschall's assurances ; trend of 
Turkish policy 

Views in Turkey on policy in Southern 
Mesopotamia : the Koweit question, the 
Bagdad Railway, and the Persian Gulf 

Conversation with Count Benckendorff : 
retrospect of Bagdad Railway and con- 
tingent questions ... 



599 



601 



604 



605 



606 



606 



607 



611 



614 



614 



616 



617 



617 



618 



619 



620 



622 



i 



Iv 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



P«ge 



Ed. Note ... 



Ed. Note 



654 To Sir F. Bertie ... 



655 From Sir F. Bertie 



656 Sir F. Cartwright to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



From. Sir F. Bertie 



661 From Sir G. Buchanan 
I (Private) 



Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 



From Sir F. Cartwright 

(Tel.) 

From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



665 To Sir G. Buchanan 



667 From Sir G. Buchanan 



From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 



1911. 
16 Jan. 



11 Feb. 



18 Jan. 



19 Jan. 
{Reed. SO Jan.) 



19 Jan. 



22 Jan. 



24 Jan. 



26 Jan. 
(Reed. 30 Jan.) 



26 Jan. 
(Reed. 28 Jan.) 



26 Jan. 



26 Jan. 



27 Jan. 



30 Jan. 



31 Jan. 



31 Jan. 



31 Jan. 

{Reed. IS Feb.) 



1 Feb. 



Minute by 
connected 
Railways 



Mr. 

with 



Mallet 
Persian 



on questions 
and Bagdad 



Minutes by Mr. Parker and Mr. Mallet 

on use of word " sovereigntj* " in con- 
nection with Koweit 

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon: 
Bagdad Railway and contingent ques- 
tions; Russo-German negotiations 



Conversations with M. Timiriazev and M. 
Sazonov : control of projected railways 
and constitution of Comite d' Etudes... 

Conversations with M. Sazonov during 
past fortnight : proposed concessions to 
Germany 

Growing uneasiness at Vienna concerning 
Russo-German negotiations. {Min.) ... 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian 
incapacity to undertake financial 
responsibility for Khanikin-Tehran 
line. {Min.) 

Expressing confidence in Russian refusal 
to support concessions to third parties 
in neutral region ... 

Conversation with Count Benckendorff : 
Khanikin railway question: importance 
attached by Great Britain to Bagdad 
Railway question and 4% customs 
increase 

Official communique published in the 
Press on January 28 ; suggested 
institution of special commission for 
study of proposed Indo-European 
transit railway. {Min.) 



[8959] 



Conversation with M. 
faction with trend 
negotiations. {Min.) 



Pichon : dissatis- 
of Russo-German 



623 



624 



624 



Conversation with M. Pichon : failure of 
M. Sazonov to communicate with 
French and British Governments in 
regard to Bagdad Railway question ... 625 

Potsdam interview ; discussion in Press, i 
Conversation with Dr. Szeps | 626 

Conversation with M. Sazonov: 4% 
customs increase ; neutral zone and t 
other questions. {Min.) ... ... ... | 627 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : control 
of Khanikin-Tehran line. {Min.) ... 628 

Conversations during past fortnight with! 
M. Sazonov : impossibility of pre- 
dicting final outcome of Russo-German i 
negotiations. {Min.) j 629 



Conversation with M. Pichon : French 
concurrence with British views : opposi 
tion to German control of Khanikin- 
Tehran line. {Min.) 



632 



633 



634 



636 



637 



639 



639 



640 



641 



Ivi 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


669 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


1911. 
1 Feb. 


Suggestion to internationalize Khanikin- 
Tehran line... 


642 


670 


From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 


2 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Pichon: concessions 
in northern Persia ; possibility of 
internationalizing Khanikin-Tehran 
line. (Min.)... 


643 


671 


Sir F. Cartwright to Sir 
A. Nicolson (Private) 


3 Feb. 


Austro-Hungarian anxiety as to delay in 
Russo-German negotiations ; reported 
extension of programme. M. Sazonov's 
proposed visit to London and Paris ... 


644 


672 


From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 


4 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Pichon : possibility 
of internationalizing line. (Min.) 


645 


673 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


4 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian 
inability to veto German construction 
of line ; possibility of internationaliza- 
tion ... 


646 


674 


From Sir F. Bertie 


5 Feb. 
(Becd. 7 Feb.) 


Enclosing memorandum on extension of 
trans-Persian railways, presented to 
M. Pichon. Text 


646 


675 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


6 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : revised 
text of draft agreement with Germany 
shortly to be communicated 


648 


676 




6 Feb. 

(Becd. 13 Feb.) 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian 
assurance not to support requests of 
third parties in neutral zone 


649 


677 


To Sir G. Buchanan 


6 Feb. 


Conversation between Count Benckendorff 
and Sir A. Nicolson : British financial 
participation in Khanikin-Tehran line 


649 


678 


Sir A. Nicolson to Sir F. 
Cartwright (Private) 


6 Feb. 


Puzzling actions and attitude of M. 
Sazonov ; unfortunate situation created 
by concessions to Germany with regard 
to Persian railwaj-s 


650 


679 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


7 Feb. 


Approval of formula for financing 
Khanikin-Tehran line 


651 


680 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


8 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : same 
subject, salutary effect of recent tele- 
grams from London and Paris; formula 
proposed. (Min.) ... 


651 


681 


Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 


8 Feb. 


Vacillations of M. Sazonov ; modifications 
to be introduced into draft agreement 
between Russia and Germany ... 


653 


682 


From, Sir G. Buchanan 


9 Feb. 
(Becd. IS Feb.) 


Conversations with M. Sazonov : pro- 
posed internationalization of railway; 
revisions in text of draft agreement. 
(Min.) 


655 


683 


(Tel.) 


10 Feb. 


Revisions in text of Russo-German agree- 
ment 


660 


684 


(Tel.) 


11 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: same 
subject ; British wishes to be considered. 
{Min.) 


660 


685 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


11 Feb. 


Appreciation of M. Sazonov's communica- 
tion ... ... . ■ ■ . ■ • ... . . ■ 




686 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


13 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : further 
difiiculties concerning Russian economic 
interests. (Min.) ... 


662 



Ivii 



No 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 




687 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 

1 


1911. 
1 14 Feb. 

1 


tion of Persian railways ... 


' 664 


688 


1 „ „ (Tel.) 


15 Feb. 


Conversation with Count Benckendorff : 
1 same subject 


664 


6S9 


Sir A. Xicolson to Sir G. 
Barclay (Private) 


15 Feb. 

1 
1 


Russian troops to be withdrawn from 
Kazvin ; M. Sazonov's continued con- 

Tll^ioii • finnnoiil nccicmnr^o t*c>/iiiiT"<if1 frv*. 

railway concessions 


665 


690 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


16 Feb. 


\^ V* c c f OU tr ((//» n 1 bil Od^CI IIU > , 11.11 cl IlCiai 

questions. (Min.) ... 


666 


691 


To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 


16 Feb. 


M. Sazonov's request for financial assist- 
tiiluc lUL jiiiizdi — xenran raiiwav 


ODO 


692 


To Sir G. Buchanan {Tel.) 


17 Feb. 


Categorical statement of views con- 
cerning Persian railways in reply to 
^I. Snzonov 


ODO 


693 


From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 


17 Feb. 


Conrersafio/i with M. Pichon : question as 
to secret agreement pos.sibly concluded 
at Potsdam. (J/in.) ... 


669 


694 


(Tel.) 


17 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Pichon: question of 
French financial assistance for Enzeli- 

n Tfl Tl R 51 1 1 WaV TCI ■fVlrtlTf T? 11 cei o n 

guarantee. (J/in.K.. 


670 


695 


To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.) 


IS Feb. 


No suspicions entertained about secret 
agreement at Potsdam 


670 


693 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


18 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: virtual 
acceptance by Council of Ministers of 

ment ... 


671 


697 


„ „ (Tel.1 


IS Feb. 


* onversation with M. Sazonor: suggested 


Oi 1 


698 


To Sir G. Buchanan 


13 Feb. 


Conversation with Count Benckendorff: 
proposed international guarantee for 
Khanikin-Tehrau line 


672 


699 


From Sir G. Buchanan ... 

i 
1 


21 Feb. 
(Eecd 27 Feb.) 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: advance 
of Russo-German negotiations; re- 
modelled draft agreement : discussion 

on T*JlllW!JT*C • TdrTn r\'( i r^■»*^!»J:in^^l»l^- 
^" * uiiw ay 3 J lui ill ui ti^rtreiiien tr 


bid 


700 1 


(Tel.) 

1 


22 Feb. 


Proposed survey of Julfa-Mohammerah 
Railway ; advisability of consulting 
^J. Sazonov ... ... 


678 


701 


Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 


23 Feb. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov: his 
changes of outlook and anxiety as to 
British attitude ... ... .'. 


678 


702 


Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G. 
Buchanan (Private) 1 


23 Feb. 


British position with regard to Persian 
and Bagdad Railway negotiations 


680 


703 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) ' 


9 Mar. 


Desire for Russian concurrence in British 
project for Mohammerah-Khoremabad 1 
Railway 


681 


704 

! 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


10 Mar. 


Same subject : to be discussed with M. 
Sazonov on recoverv from his illness. 

Olin.) : 


681 


705 ! 


To Sir G. Buchanan 

1 

[8959] 


14 Mar. 


Conversation with Count Benckendorff: 
proposed Russian Comite d'Etudes to 
examine trans-Persian Railway project 

e 2 


682 



Iviii 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 



To Sir G. Buchanan 



(Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



To Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 



Sir A. Nicolson to Sir E. 
Grey (Private) 



To Sir F. Bertie 



To Sir G. Buchanan 



From Sir G. Buchanan ... 



To Sir G. Buchanan 



From Sir G. Buchanan ... 



Foreign Office to War 
Office 

From Sir G. Buchanan ... 



1911. 
19 Mar. 



20 Mar. 



20 Mar. 
(Reed. 27 Mar.) 



22 Mar. 
22 Mar. 

24 Mar. 

26 Mar. 

29 Mar. 



29 Mar. 
(Reed. 8 Apr.) 



Conversation with M. 
Mohammerah-Khoremabad 
(3/in.) 

Same subject ... 



Stolypin : 
Railway. 



Conversations with M. Neratov and M. 
Stolypin : same subject. Enclosing 
aide-memoire communicated to M. 
Stolypin. Text. 



Conversation with M. Neratov: 
subject: Russian suggestions 



same 



6 Apr. 



6 Apr. 



10 Apr. 



18 Apr. 
(Reed. 2i Apr.) 



18 Apr. 
{Reed. 2]t Apr.) 



10 May 



Conversation with Count Benckendorff: 
same subject; Bagdad Railway con- 
cession; British trading interests 

Enquiry as to Russian attitude to British 
application for railway option : ques- 
tion of terminus ... 

Conversation with M. Neratov : same 
subject : Russian objections not yet 
withdrawn. (Min.) 

Instruction to apply for concession of 
port at Khor Musa and railway to 
Khoremabad and Mohammerah... 

Same subject : enclosing copy of aide- 
memoire from M. Neratov. Text. 

Considerations against refusal of Russian 
proposal to participate in Gulf section 
of Bagdad Railway 

Conversation with Sir A. Nicolson and 
M. Paul Cambon : same subject : M. 
Sazonov's difficulties at Potsdam 



Conversation with Count BenckendorflF : 
suggested co-operation of Russia and 
France in Gulf section ; Turkish pro- 
posals 

Conversation with M. Neratov : Russian 
press and Potsdam interview ; possi- 
bility of French and Russian co-opera- 
tion in Gulf section ; Russian project 
for Sadijeh-Khanikin branch. (A/in.)... 

Conversation with M. Khomiakov and 
M. Zveguintzov : trans-Persian Rail- 
way ; Russian group awaiting answers 
of British and Indian Governments ... 

Same subject : assent of British Govern- 
ment to Russian proposal on certain 
conditions (v. No. 737) 

11 May [ Conversation with M. Neratov : Russo- 
{Recd. 15 May) German negotiations; Persian and 
Bagdad Railway projects. {Min.) 



15 May 



Reasons for examining 
Railway project 



Trans-Persian 



16 May Conversation with M. Neratov : same 
{Reed. 22 May) subject ; British and IndfSin interests ; 

further projects. (Min.) 1 701 



lix 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



724 



725 



726 

727 
728 

729 

730 

731 
732 



Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 



To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



To Sir F. Bertie 

From Sir G. Buchanan ... 

To Sir F. Bertie (Private) 
From Sir G. Buchanan ... 

From Mr. O'Beirne 



733 [From Sir G. Buchanan .. 

734 To Sir.G. Buchanan (Tel. 

735 From Sir G. Buchanan .. 

736 To Sir G. Buchanan 
737 



7.38 



739 



Communication from M. 
Sevastopulo 

Communication to M. 
Sevastopulo 

From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



1911. 
17 May 



23 May 



24 Mav 



29 Mav 



31 May 



1 June 



Resumption of Russo-German negotia- 
tions : German objections to proposed 
alteration in text. Conversations with 
M. Neratov, M. Khomiakov and M. 
Zveguintzov: trans-Persian Railway 
projects 

Conversation with Count Benckendorff : 
Franco-British-Russian understanding 
to postpone final arrangement about 
Bagdad Railway until all were satis- 
fied; M. Sazcnov's explanations; 
importance of Turkish customs question 

Conversation with M. Neratov : same 
subject ; proposed use of term Konia- 
Bagdad Railway in Russo-German 
agreement ... 

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon: 
Turkish customs question ; importance 
of Russian retention of liberty of action 

Conversation with M. Neratov on 
May 24 : Russo-German negotiations ; 
use of terra Konia-Bagdad ; Turkish 
customs increase. (Min.) 

Meaning of the term Bagdad Railway; 
Turkish customs increase... 



4 June 1 Conversation with M. Neratov : same 
{Reed. 8 June) subject; further discussion of draft 
agreement ... 



27 June 
(Tlecd. 3 July) 



28 June 
{Reed. 3 July) 



12 Julv 

{Reed. 17 July) 

13 July 



14 Julv 
{Reed. 31 July) 



19 July 

20 July 
26 July 
10 Aug. 



Conversation with M. Neratov: same 
subject : clause in agreement concern- 
ing Khanikin-Tehran railway ; finan- 
cial aspect. {Min.) 

Conversation with M. Neratov: enquiry 
as to Russian views on conditions for 
British assent to trans-Persian Railway 
project {v. No. 720). {Min.) 

Conversation with M. Neratov: amended 
text of Russo-German agreement 

Russo-German agreement: wording of 
Article III ; importance of Turkish 
customs question ... 

Conversation with M. Neratov: same 
subject : amended text handed to 
Count Pourtales; verbal reservations; 
doubtful acceptance by Germany 

Trans-Persian Railway project ; British 
and Russian reservations 



Russian reply to British communication ! 
of May 15 {v. No. 720) j 715 

British reply to above 



Acceptance of amended text of Russo- 
German agreement by Germany, with 
slight modification. {Min.) i 716 



Ix 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


740 


From 


Sir G 


Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


1911. 
19 Aug. 


Conversation with M. Neratov : cate- 
gorical assurances concerning railways 
given by Germanj". (il/in.) 


716 


741 










2.3 Aug. 
(Becd.28 Aug.) 


Enclosing text of Russo-German Agree- 
ment as signed on August 19 in St. 
I'etersDurgn. lext. (Min.) 


717 


742 






» 




23 Aug. 

ylxRCd. XtS AUy.) 


Conversation with M. Neratov : publica- 
tion of text of Russo-German Agree- 
ment in Eossia, with discussion of terms 


721 


743 




)> 






23 Aug. 
(Eecd. 28 Aug.) 


Reception of Agreement by St. Peters- 
burgh Press... 


721 


744 


Sir G. Buchanan 
Nioolson 


to Sir A. 
(Private) 


24 Aug. 


Commentary re Agreement. Conversa- 
tions with M. Louis and M. Neratov ... 


723 



Chapter XC. 
Anglo-Russian Friction in Persia. 

I.— THE SITUATION IX PERSIA, 1908-10. 



745 j Extract from Annual 
Beport for Russia for 
1908 



1909. I 

8 Feb. j Review of Persian affairs ; situation at 
{Eecd. 15 Feb.) \ Tabriz; pressure on Shah to grant a 
Constitution ; Russian attitude in 
regaid to Persia 



Extract from Anmial 30 Dec. 
Etport for Russia for (Eecd. 3 Jan., 



1909 



Extract from AnnvMl 
Eeport for Russia for 
1910 



1910.) 



Advice to Shah ; money advance ; dis- 
turbances in Persia ; deposition of 
Shah ; employment of Russian officers ; 
Turkish action in Persia ; telegraph 
negotiations... 



724 



729 



1911. I 

22 Mar. : Persian affairs; Trans-Persian Railway... 740 
{Eecd. 27 Mar.) 



II.— THE APPOINTMENT OF Mr. SHUSTER. 



748 i From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



750 



751 



1911. 
1 Jan. 



749 I To Sir G. Buchanan (Ted.) 16 Jan. 



(Tel.) , 16 Jan. 



From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) ; 17 Jan 



I Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian 
conversion scheme ; possible withdrawal 
of troops from Kazvin ; Turkish fron- 

I tier question. {Min.) ... ... .... 746 

Enquiry as to Russian view on foreign j 

advisers for Persia : attitude of i 

Germany towards proposed French 
I ogicials ... ... ... ... ... j 747 

^ Satisfaction at conclusion of Russian j 
conversion scheme : desirability of recall ' 
of troops from Kazvin ... ... ... ! 747 



Conversation with M. du Halgouet: 
I P'rench refusal to lend advisers to 
I Persia 



748 



Izi 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



1911. 

752 From Sir G. Buchanan 17 Jan 

(Tel.) 



753 

754 To Sir G. Buchanan 

755 To Sir F. Bertie ... 

756 To Sir E. Goschen... 



(Tel.) 17 Jan. 

17 Jan. 

18 Jan. 

18 Jan. 



757 From Mr. Bryce (Tel.) 26 Jan. 



758 



Frotn Sir G. Barclav 



26 Jan. 
{Becd. IS Feb.) 



759 From Count Benckendorff 29 Jan. 

(Peed. 1 Feb.) 



Conversation with M. Sazonov : proposed 
appointment of French and German 
oflBcials in Persia ... ... ... ... 748 

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian 
conversion scheme; withdrawal of 
troops from Kazvin 749 

Conversation with Count BenckendorflF : 
same subjects 749 

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon: 
French refusal to lend advisers to 
Persia 750 

Conversation with Count Metternich : 
French, German and other advisers for 
Persia ; British advice to Persia to 
choose subjects of minor Powers ... 750 

Persian request for five financial advisers 
from United States. (Min.) 751 

Conversation with Mohtashem-es-Sal- 
taneh : foreign advisers ; no further 
applications to European Great Powers. ! 
{Min.) 751 

il. Sazonov's objections to appointment ! 
of American advisers to Persia. (Min.) 752 



760 From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel. I 



30 Jan. 

761 To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 31 Jan. 



Conversation with M. Sazonov: proba- 
bility of German claim 



754 



Appointment of American advisers 
already approved in preceding autumn 754 



762 From Sir G. Buchanan 1 Feb. 

I (Tel.) i 



763 To Count Benckendorfi' 1 Feb. 

(Private) | 

7d4 From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 3 Feb. 



765 To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 4 Feb. 

766 From Sir G. Buchanan 6 Feb. 

(Tel.) 

767 1 From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 7 Feb. 



768 From Sir G. Buchanan 7 Feb. 

(Tel.) (Rccd 13 Feb.) 



Conversation with M. Sazonov: proposed; 
unofficial enquiry at 'VTashington ; 
German complications 



British attitude to engagement 
American financial advisers 



of 



"55 



755 



769 



7 Feb. 
(Becd. 17 Feb.) 



770 From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 8 Feb. 



Persian authorisation to conclude con- 
tracts with American advisers ... ... 756 

Enquiry at Washington strongly depre- 
cated by Mr. Bryce 756 

Conversation with M. Sazonov: agree- 
ment about American advisers in Persia. 
(Min.) 757 

Proposed immediate withdrawal of 
Kazvin force ; M. Poklevski-Koziell's 
views ; desirability of early announce- 
ment. (Min.) 757 

Conversations with M. Sazonov: with- 
drawal of troops from Kazvin ; Turkish 
frontier question. (Min.) ... ... 753 

Same conversations: objections to 
American advisers in Persia ; fear of 
complications with Germany. (Min.) ... 76O 

Conversation with M. Poklevski-Koziell: ! 
advice to Russian Government to 
announce withdrawal of Kazvin troops 761 



Isii 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


771 


From Mr. Bryce 


1911. 
14 Feb. 
(Becd. 23 Feb.) 


Announcement of appointment of Mr. W. 
Morgan Shuster as Treasurer-General 
or X ersitin Hjiiipiit;. \^mih.) ... ... 


761 


772 


To Sir G. Buchanan 


15 Feb. 


Satisfaction at the withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Kazvin 


762 




III— THE 


APPOINTMENT OF MAJOR STOKES. 




773 


From Sir G. Barclaj' 


1 

1911. 1 
13 June 
{Reed. 3 July) 


Bill submitted to the Mejliss defining Mr. 
Shuster's functions and powers in the 
Ministry of Finance 


762 


774 


Sir G. Barclay to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 


15 Jixne 


Independence of foreign influence 
assumed by Mr. Shuster ; absolute con- 
fusion in finances of Persia 


763 


775 


From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 


5 Juh' 


Conflict between Mr. Shuster and M. 
Mornard concerning customs receipts j 
Russian and British interests not 
involved. (Min.) 


764 


776 


(Tel) 


6 July 


Same subject ; customs accounts at 
Imperial Bank of Persia 


765 


777 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


D July 


L nuesiraDility or opposing ivir. onusuer s 
proposals 


766 


778 


From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 


7 July 


Mr. Shuster authorised by Mejliss to offer 
post to organise Treasury gendarmerie 
to Major Stokes. (Min.) 


766 


779 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


iU July 


Hope expressed for instructions to M. 
Poklevski-Koziell to maintain neutral 
attitude in dispute between M. Mornard 
and Persian Government... 


767 


780 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel ) 


11 Julv 
(Reed. 12 July) 


Conversation with M. Neratov : impossi- 
bility of sending desired instructions; 
gravity of situation. (Min.) 


767 


781 


From Sir G. Barclay 


11 July 

(Reed. SI July) 


Mr. Shuster's influence at Tehran 


769 


782 


To Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 


13 July 


Belgian annoyance at Mr Shuster's 
action with regard to M. Mornard; 
position of Russian Government 


770 


783 


Communication from 
1 Count Benckendorff 


14 July 


Telegram from M. Poklevski-Koziell: 
difficulties between M. Mornard and 
Mr. Shuster 


770 


784 


From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 


15 July 


Belgian attitude; improvement in situa- 
tion. (Min.) 


772 


785 


From, Sir F. Cartwright 
(Tel.) 


20 July 


Rumoured departure of ex-Shah from 
Vienna 


773 


786 


From Sir G. Barclav (Tel.) 

1 


21 July 


Conversation with Mohtashem-es-Sul- 
taneh : possible return of ex-Shah to 
Persia ; Russian attitude 


i 
! 

773 


787 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


22 July 


Same subject : British attitude 


774 


788 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


23 July 


Same subject : reports in press resented 
in Russia 


774 



Ixiii 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



i P«ge 



789 From Sir G. Buchanan ... 

790 ^ To Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 

791 To Sir G. Buchanan 

792 From Sir G. Buchanan ... 



793 I Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 
I Nicolson (Private) 



794 From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 

795 To Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 



796 



(Tel.) 



797 From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



r99 



(Tel.) 



800 To Sir G. Barclay (Tel) 



801 



(Tel.) 



802 To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



803 From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



804 



From Sir G. Barclay 



805 From Sir G. Buchanan ... 



806 Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 
( Nicolson (Private) 

807 From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 

808 To Sir G. Barclay 



1911. 

24 July Conversation with M. Neratov : same 
(Reed. SI July) ^ subject; grave situation in Persia; 

1 suggested action by Great Britain and I 
Russia ... ... ... ... ... 775 

26 July Proposal by Russia for joint Anglo- 
Russian declaration of strict neutrality 
in Persian difficulty ... ... ... 777 

I 

26 July Conversation with Count BenckendorfiF : 

question of Major Stokes's appointment 778 

27 July Conversation with M. Neratov : ex-Shah's 
(Reed. 31 July) return ; responsibilities of Russia and \ 

Britain to present regime ; false reports 
I in press ... ... ... ... ... 778 

27 July Return of ex-Shah ; Shuster-Mornard 

I controversv ; appointment of Major 
Stokes " 780 

28 July Declaration of strict neutrality proposed 

by Russia. (Min.)... ... ... ... 781 

28 July Major Stokes to resign commission in 

I Army before accepting service in Persia 782 

1 Aug. Same subject : Persian Government to be 

informed 782 

2 Aug. Conversation with M. Neratov: same sub- 

ject; Russian demands. (Min.) ... 783 

4 Aug. Conversation with M. Neratov : same sub- 
ject ; dangers involved in appointment 
of Major Stokes. (Min.) 783 

5 Aug. Conversation with M. Neratov : proposed 
(Reed. 6 Aug.)' Russian note to Persia ... ... ... 784 

7 Aug. Proposed British warning to Persia ... 785 

7 Aug. Major Stokes to be informed of warning 
to Persia ; possibility of refusing to 
accept his resignation from Army ... 786 

7 Aug. Reasons why objections to Major Stokes's j 
employment must be restricted to North 
Persia ... ... ... ... ... 786 

8 Aug. Conversation with M. Neratov : expected 
Persian reply ; public opinion in 
Russia. (Min.) 786 

9 Aug. Unclosing letter from Mr. Shuster : em- 
(Recd. 28 Aug.) • ploymeut of Major Stokes 788 

9 Aug. I Russian press comments. Summary of | 
(Rccd.llf Au<7.) ' conversations with M. Neratov: draft 
of notes to be addressed to Persia, 
j (Min.) 789 

9 Aug. Conversations with M. Neratov : objec- 
tions to Major Stokes's employment ... 793 

11 Aug. Con versation with M Neratov : same sub- 
ject ; possibility of exercising pressure 
j on Major Stokes to resign. (Min.) ... j 794 

11 Aug. Mr. Shuster to be informed of objections 

to Major Stokes's employment ... ... 795 



Ixiv 



No. 



Name. 



Date. 



Main Subject. 



Page 



809 
810 

811 
812 

813 
814 

815 

816 

817 

818 



819 

820 
821 

822 
823 

824 



To Sir G. Barclay 



From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 



1911. 
11 Aug. 



12 Aug. 



13 Aug. 



15 Aug. 
(Becd.16 Aug.) 



16 Aug. 



17 Aug. 



Conversation with Mirza Mehdi Khan: 
same subject ; complaints about Russian 
action and British attitude 

Persian reply to British note on appoint- 
ment of Major Stokes. Conversation 
with Vosuk-ed-Dowleh : suggestion for 
limitation of appointment to three 
years... 



To Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) ! 18 Aug. 



From Sir G. Buchanan 19 Aug. 

(Tel.) 



From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 21 Aug. 



From Sir G. Buchanan ... 



From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 

To Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 
From Sir G. Buchanan ... 

From Sir G. Barclay 
From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 

To Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 



22 Aug. 
{Eecd.28 Aug.) 



7 Sept. 



8 Sept. 
13 Sept. 



4 Oct. 

(Reed. 23 Oct.) 

10 Oct. 



12 Oct. 



Communication concerning Major Stokes i 
made to M. Neratov : Sir E. Grey's 
statements in Parliament ... ... ; 



Conversations with M. Neratov : Major 
Stokes's appointment in abeyance ; 
question of return of ex-Shah ; British 
attitude. Enclosing letter sent to M. 
Neratov on August 17 : British action 
regarding Major Stokes ... 



Mr. Shuster's 
Legation 
Stokes 



proposals at Russian 
new contract for Major 



Same subject: British attitude ... 

Conversation with M. Neratov : negotia- 
tions between Mr. Shuster and M. 
Poklevski-Koziell ; organisation of 
gendarmerie. (Min:) 

Persian desire for better relations with 
Russia; Mr. Shuster's position... 

Conversation with M. Kokovtsov : work- 
ing of Anglo-Russian entente in Persia; 
Turkish designs on Persian territory. 
(Min.) 



796 



796 



Attitude of Major Stokes and Mr. 
Shuster. (Min.) 1 797 



798 



Further communication to be made to 
M. Neratov ... ^ 800 

Conversation with Vosuk-ed-Dowleh: his I 
suggestion for limited appointment of 
Major Stokes; possibility of recall by 
Government of India. (Min.) ... ... i 8(X) 

I 

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh's proposal unacceptable 
to Russia. Resignation of Major Stokes 
to be refused. Warning to be given to 
Persia to make another appointment ... 801 

Conversation with M. Neratov : apprecia- 
tion of British warning to Persia and 
refusal to accept Major Stokes's j 
resignation ... ... ... ... ... 801 



Conversation between M. Poklevski- 
Koziell and Mr. Shuster : his argu- 
ments regarding Major Stokes's 
appointment 



802 



803 



805 



806 



806 



807 



809 



Communication to be made to M. 
Kokovtsov : same subject ; British j 
loyalty to Anglo-Russian agreement ... 810 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


825 


To Sir G. Buchanan 




1911. 
12 Oct. 


Conversation with Count Benckendorff: 
same subject — — — ■ • • 


810 


826 


From Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.'* 


14 Oct. 


Communication made to M. Kokovtsov: 
working of Anglo-Russian entente: 
Turco-Persian frontier ... 


811 


827 


From Sir G. Barclay 


^Tel.^ 


15 Oct. 


M. Poklevski-Koziell's proposals to 
Persian Government : Russian instruc- 
tors for the army (Min.) 


812 






'.—THE DISMISSAL 


OF Mr. SHUSTER. 




828 


From Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


1911. 
19 Oct. 


Conversation with M. Neratov: necessity 
for strong measures in Persia 5 objec- 
tions to policy of Mr. Shuster. (Min.)... 


812 


829 




(Tel.) 


20 Oct. 


Same conversation : Russian attitude to 

oCXlClIltfo Ui FcluX ill ill X trl olct ... ... 


814 


830 


From Sir G. Barclay 


(Tel.) 


22 Oct. 


Situation in North Persia ; tension 
between Mr. Shuster and the Cabinet 

(A L JL *^ ' ' ' aUt y ^J. I H . / , , , ... ... ••• 


814 


831 


To Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


23 Oct. 


Conversation with Count BenckendorflE : 

Actiil\? oUUJCV^u J \^ UCo L l<_f 11 \J1. A. «noi<iu 

independence 


815 




From Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


24 Oct. 


subject; Seligman loan ... 


S16 


833 


To Mr. O Beirne 


(Tel.) 


26 Oct. 


Independence of Persia : Seligman loan : 


816 


8ai 


From Sir G. Barclay 


(Tel.) 


2 Xov. 


Demand by M. Poklevski-KozieU for with- 
drawal of Mr. Shuster's gendarmes 
from property of Shoa-es-Sultaneh ... 


S17 


835 


To Sir G. Barclay... 




2 Nov. 


Conversation with Mirza Mehdi Eiian: 
proposed movement of X^ussian troops 
in North Persia 


817 


R5V! 


From Sir G. Barclay 


(Tel.t 


5 Nov. 


f\ c 1 rtn s f\T T'oi'ci q ti Iv/^t"oi"ti ttioti 'i' '^lOiriiTinr 
-.tI \j oi^Ii^ \}i X cl old 11 VTw » tri unit; 11 L j icriuilig 

to Russian demands 


818 


co- 


)» J) 


(Tel.) 


6 Nov. 


T< n cc 1 1 Ti ri on q ti ri 0 * 1 m r^'Pn rko rMiitT" f\T xn 'i" ri — 
X\U.3ot<til UcTklicilluo > 1111^1 UUct Ull 1 1 \ Ui nlLll' 

drawal of Mr. Shuster's gendarmes 


818 


ooc 




(Tel.) 


6 Nov. 


seriousness of situation. (Min.) 


S19 




From Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


6 Nov. 


Russo-Persian relations ... 


819 


840 


To Sir G. Barclny 


(Tel.) 


G Nov. 


Appointment of Mr. Lecoffre : strong 

Ultra oU I tjo LUX LtrlLtrLl U « X\ Lloold . . . ... 


820 


841 




(Tel.) 


S Nov. 


Conversation between Mirza Mehdi Khan 

aItU olX J^. ...^ ILvlloUU . t.jUcroLltJU Ul oUUcL' 

es-Sultaneh ... 


S20 


&42 


From Mr. O'Beirne 


(Tel.) 


10 Nov. 


Russo-Persian incident : M. Neratov's 
explanation of Russian demands 


821 


&43 




(Tel.) 


13 Nov. 

i 


Conversation with M. Neratov : same 
subject : no reply from Persia to 
1 Russian note 


821 



Ixvi 



Name. 



Date. 



1911. 

From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) ^ 14 Nov. 
To Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) ^ 14 Nov. 

! 

From Mr O'Beirne (Tel.) [ 14 Nov. 

(Tel.) 15 Nov. 



858 



859 



860 



861 



(Tel.) 



J) JJ 



)) J) 



(Tel.) 



From Sir G. Buchanan ... 

(Tel.) 



(Tel.) 



To Sir G. Buchanan 



From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 



To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 



15 Nov. 



To Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.) 16 Nov. 



From Sir G. Barclay ... 17 Nov. 
To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 17 Nov. 



Communication from M. 17 Nov. 
de Etter ! 



From Sir G. Buchanan .... 18 Nov. 

(Tel.) 



(Tel.) 19 Nov. 



To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) ! 20 Nov 



20 Nov. 



20 Nov. 



■21 Nov. 



21 Nov. 



22 Nov. 



23 Nov. 



Main Subject. 



Same conversation: proposed loan of 
Swedish officers to Persia not approved 
by Russia 

Proposed action by Russia : Mr. Shuster's 
anti-Russian policy in North Persia ... 



Page 



Conversation 
subject 



with M. Neratov : same 



822 



823 



823 



Conversation with M. Neratov : resigna- 
tion of Persian Ministers ; immediate | 
action to be taken by Russia. (Min.) ... 824 



Same conversation: Russian troops to be 
sent to Tehran ; demand for Mr. 
Shuster's dismissal 

.Anxiety as to effect of proposed Russian 
action on Anglo-Russian Agreement ; 
proposal that Russia should promul- 
gate her demands in Persia and delay 
further action 



Possibility of removal of Mr. 
difficulties of situation ... 



Shuster : 



M. Neratov to be informed that Britain 
would not object to demand for dis- 
missal of Mr. Shuster 



824 



825 



825 



826 



Summary of position of Russia with 
regard to proceedings of Persian i 
Government; steps to be taken... ... 826 

Conversation with M. Neratov: Anglo- 
Russian understanding to be kept 
intact ; integrity of Persia to be main- 
tained ; proposed Russian action. (Min.) 827 

Conversation with M. Kokovtsov : same 
subject ; Russian troops to be with- 
drawn when demands are complied with 
by Persia. (Min.) I 829 

Appreciation of Russian assurances ... 831 

Conversation with Mirza Mehdi Khan : 
Russia's demands; merits of dispute; 
advice to Persia ... ... ... ... 831 

Conversation with M. Neratov: Mr. 
Shuster's dismissal ; withdrawal of ' 
Russian troops. (Min.) 832 

Conversation with M. Neratov : Persian 
i affairs ; recall of troops ; M. 
j Kokovtsov's assurances. (Min.) ... 832 

I Conversation between M. de Etter and 
j Sir A. Nicolson : telegram from M. 
I Neratov : communication from United 

States concerning Mr. Shuster ... ... 834 

! Conversation with M. Neratov : Russian 
policy ; disappointing delay in with- 
drawal of troops from Kazvin. (Min.) 834 

Sir E. Grey's reply to question in Parlia- 
ment; instructions to urge resumption 
I of diplomatic relations ... ... ... 1 836 



hvii 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Puje 


862 


From Sir 


G. Buchanan ... 


lyii. 

23 Not. 


Conversation with M. Neratov: formation 
of new" Persian Governnient ; Mr. 
Shuster's pamphlet and letter to The 
Times 


OOl 


863 


To Mr. Brvce 




23 Nov. 


Conversation with Mr. Whitelaw Reid : 
Mr. Shuster's action in Persia: British 
attitude 


o oo 

838 


S64 


To Sir G. 


Buchanan 


(Tel.) 


24 Nov. 


Impossibility of raising objections to 
formulation of Russian demands re 
Mr. Shuster... 


839 


865 


From Sir G. Barclay 


(Tel.) 


24 Not. 


Formal apology tendered by Vosuk-ed- 
Dowleh to M. PokleTski-Koziell ; diplo- 
matic relations resumed between Russia 
and Persia. (MinA 


B3y 


866 


From Sir 


G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


24 > ov. 
(Reed. 25 Nov.) 


Conversation with M jseratov: troops to 
be retained at Resht ; further Russian 
demands. (Min.) ... 


840 


867 


To Sir G. 


Buchanan 


(Tel.-* 


24 Nov. 


British attitude to Russian demands 


841 




From Sir 


G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


jo *> ov . 


Text of three demands to be made to 
Persian Government. (Min.) ... 


842 


869 


5) 


n 




27 Nov. 


Conversation with M. Neratov: same 
subject 


843 


870 


To Sir G. 


Barclay... 




27 Nov. 


Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson and 
Mirza Mehdi Khan : Russian demands ; 
Mr. Shuster s actions: Persian position 




871 


To Sir G. 


Buchanan 




28 Nov. 


Conversation with Count Benckendorff : 
Rus.so-Persian dispute; apprehensions 
of effect on Anglo-Russian Agreement... 


844 


872 




?> 


(Tel.) 


23 Not. 


Conversation with Mirza Mehdi Khan: 
Persian request for adTice. Represen- 
tations to be made to Russia re with- 
drawal of troops ... 


844 


873 


» 




(Tel.) 


29 Not. 


Further conversation: British adTice to 
Persia 


845 


874 




>■ 


(Tel.) 


29 Not. 


Conversation with Count Benckendorff: 
same subject 


^5 


S75 


From Sir 


G. Buchanan ... 


29 Not. 
(Eecd. 4 Dec.) 


Conversations with M. Neratov and M. 
Kokovtsov : summary of Russo-Persian 
question ; new demands ; appointment 
of foreign officials... 


846 


876 




» 




29 Not. 
{Becd. 4 Dec.) 


Enclosing memorandum from M. Neratov: 
despatch of Russian troops to Persia ; 
explanation of demands made by 
Russia. (Text) 


853 


877 


To Sir G. Barclay 


(Tel.) 


30 Not. 


Conrersatinn with Mirza Mehdi Khan: 
impossibility of Russian withdrawal of 
demands; danger to Persia in delaying 
compliance ... 


855 


878 


To Sir G. 


Buchanan 


(Tel.) 


30 Nov. 

1 


Sir E. Grey's statement in Parliament ; 
j question of foreign advisers and loan ... 


855 


879 


From Sir 

1 


G. Buchanan ... 


30 Nov. 
(Reed. 4 Dec.) 

1 


Conversations with M. Neratov and M. 

KokoTtsoT : change in situation ; 
1 Russia's second ultimatum ; British 
1 objectiops to time limit ... 


856 



Ixviii 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


880 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


1911. 
1 Dec. 


Message from M. Neratov : Russia's three 
demands 


858 


881 


(Tel.) 


1 Dec. 


Text of M. Neratov's reply to letter 
respecting recall of troops from Kazvin 


858 


882 


(Tel.) 


1 Dec. 


Conversation with M. Neratov : Russian 
intention concerning foreign advisers 
and loan ; movement of troops ; ques- 
tion of Bakhtiari Khans ... 


859 


883 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


1 Dec. 


Satisfactory instructions sent to M. 
Poklevski-Koziell ; statement to be 
made in Parliament 


860 


884 


To Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 


2 Dec. 


Impossibility of recognising ex-Shah ; 
intrigues with Bakhtiaris to be avoided 


860 


885 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


2 Dec. 


Question of new demands by Russia ; 
Persian question very acute 


861 


886 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


2 Dec. 


Sir E. Grey's proposed statement in 
Parliament; permission to quote 
Russian documents 


861 


887 


To Sir G. Buchanan 


2 Dec. 


Conversation with Count Benckendorff : 
Russian demands and withdrawal of 
troops; seriousness of issues at stake... 


862 


888 


From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 


3 Dec. 


Rumoured acts on behalf of ex-Shah 


863 


889 


(Tel.) 


3 Dec. 


Suggested public statement in sense of 
No. 884 


884 


890 




3 Dec. 
(Reed. 18 Dee.) 


Persian reply to Russian ultimatum ; 
refusal of demands 


865 


Qm 
oyl 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


4 Dec. 


Imoossibilitv of recognising ex-Shah ; 
enquiry as to agreement of Russia 


866 


892 


To Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 


4 Dec. 


Same subject : British attitude of non- 
intervention 


866 


893 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


4 Dec. 
(Becd. 5 Bee.) 


STiggestion that M. Neratov should be 
warned of serious consequences of 
return of ex-Shah; desirability of 
public statement of Russo-British policy 


866 


8Q4. 




4 Dec. 
{Beed. 7 Bee.) 


Enelosing letters from M. de Klemm and 
M. Neratov giving instructions to M. 
Poklevski-Koziell ; time-limit fixed for 
Persian compliance with Russian 
demands. {Texts)... 


867 


895 


„ (Private) 


4 Dec. 


Summary of communications to M. 
Neratov on situation in Persia... 


870 


896 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


5 Dec. 


Impossibility of recognising ex-Shah ; his 
flagrant breach of faith in returning to 
Persia 




897 


From, Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


5 Dec. 
{Reed. 6 Bee.) 


Conversation with M. Neratov : situation 
in Persia; Russian intentions; pro- 
posed public declaration, {]\Iin,) 


872 


898 


Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G. 
Buchanan (Private) 


5 Dec. 


Endeavours to moderate action of Russian 
Government; public opinion in 
England; seriousness of situation 


874 


899 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


6 Dec. 


Conversation with M. Neratov : possible 
return of ex-Shah : proposed formula 
for British and Russian agreement. 
(Min.) 


875 



Ixix 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 


900 


From Sir F. Bertie 


1911. 
8 Dec. 
(Reed. 9 Dec.) 


Conversations with M. Sazonov ; memo- 
randum communicated to him; situa- 
tion in Persia; interests of Great 
Britain and Russia. (Text) 


877 


901 


From Sir G. Buchanan 

(Tel.) 


9 Dec. 


Conversation with M. Neratov : same 
subject : his vindication of Russian 
action 


880 


902 




9 Dec. 
(Seed, li Dec.) 


Conversations with M. Neratov : inten- 
tions of Russian Government; warning 
to ex-Shah; British proposals. Aide- 
memoire communicated on December 8. 
{Text) 


881 


903 


)) » 


13 Dec. 
(Reed. IS Dec.) 


Conversation with M. Neratov : gravity 
of present situation ; letter and aide- 
memoire sent to Sir G. Buchanan. 
{Text) 


885 


904 


(Tel.) 


14 Dec. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian 
demands ; British anxiety ; formula 
proposed bv Persian Government. 
(Mm.)... 


889 


905 


To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 


16 Dec. 


Conversation with Mirza Mehdi Khan: 
second Russian demand to be kept 
private; Persian difficulties 


890 


906 


From Sir G. Buchanan ... 


19 Dec. 
(Reed. 23 Dec.) 


Convefiation between Mr. O'Beirne and 
M. Sazonov : Russian policy ; troops to 
remain at Kazvin ... 


890 


907 


Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G. 
Barclay (Private) 


19 Dec. 


Russian demands : uncertainty of Persian 
action ; responsibility of Mr. Shuster 
and Major Stokes ... 


891 


908 


From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 


22 Dec. 


Satisfactory response from Persian 
Government announced to Russian 
Legation. (Min.) ... 


893 


909 


From Sir G. Buchanan ... 


27 Dec. 
{Reed. 1 Jan., 
1912) 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : verbal 
assurance only from Persia ; troops to 
be recalled on receipt of written 
assurance 


893 


910 


(Tel.) 


30 Dec. 


Conversation with M. Sazonov : demands 
accepted in writing; troops to be with- 
drawn. (Min.) 


894 


911 

912 


From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.) 

To Sir G. Buchanan 

(Private) 


31 Dec. 

1912. 
2 Jan. 


Foreign advisers in Persia : discussion of 
available candidates from minor 
Powers. (Min.) 

Audience with Emperor Nicholas II 
advisable at a later date; Russian 
methods in Persia ... 


896 
896 


913 


From Sir G. Buchanan ... 


17 Jan. 
(Reed. 29 Jan.) 


-A.udience with Emperor Nicholas II ; 
Anglo-Russian understanding ; Persian 
afiFairs; no territory to be annexed ... 


897 


914 


To Dr. Hodgkin (Private) 


23 Jan. 


Explanation and history of Anglo- 
Russian Agreement 


898 


915 


Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 
Nicolson (Private) 


24 Jan. 


Continued co-operation of two Govern- 
ments in Persia : troops still at Kazvin ; 
force required to maintain order; pro- 
posed Persian loan... 


899 



Ixx 



Appendix. 

OVERTURE OF TURKEY TO GREAT BRITAIN, JUNE 1913. 



No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Main Subject. 


Page 




Note hy Sir Edward Grey 


1913. 
12 June 


Conversation with Tewfik Pasha: Turkish 
overture of 1911 ... 


901 




Memorandum hy Sir L. 
Mallet 


19 June 


Attitude of Great Britain in 1911 and at 
the present time. (Min.) 


901 




Communication to Tewfik 
Pasha 


2 July 


Same subject ... 


902 



CHAPTER LXXXIV. 
ALBANIA 1913 14. 



I.— SERVIA AND ALBANIA TO THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN 
ULTIMATUM OF OCTOBER 18, 1913. 

No. 1. 

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir F. Bertie.C) 
F.O. 41257 14809/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 3-27.1 Foreign Office. September 7. 1913. 3-30 p.m. 

My information is to the efiect that unless some form of government is set on 
foot soon there will be serious trouble in some parts of Albania, probablv in the 
districts around Scutari at any rare. 

Objection has been taken to any extended use of the international forces at 
Scutari, and H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov!"ernmen^t have no interest in pressing that; 
indeed, our desire is to withdraw Admiral Bumey and the British force as soon as the 
Powers agree that this can be done without causing inconvenience. 

But this being so it is essential that the Commission of Control should get to 
Albania as soon as possible. The matter is not one that specially concerns H[is] 
M[ajesty'5] Gov[ernmen]t, but as things seem to be drifting to a condition in which 
the Powers may be confronted with serious internal trouble in Albania and a very 
tiresome situation, I think in the general interest the proceedings of the Commission 
of Control and the establishment of a gendarmerie should be expedited as much as 
possible, and there should be a more definite understanding as to when and how the 
international forces are to be withdrawn, if they are not to be of use for more than 
the bare occupation of Scutari itself. 

I am ready to fall in with any pohcy that commends itself to other Powers or 
that they propose. 

You should communicate substance to MTinister for] F[oreign] A[£Eairs]. 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to St. Petersburgh (So. 651^ ; to Rome (^No. 259) ; to 
Berlin (No. 3'2o) ; to Vienna (No. 260). A copy was sent to the Admiralty, to be repeated to 
Tice-Admiral Burney marked " very confidential and for his own information only."] 



[ED. XOTE. — The appointment of an International Commission for the Control of Albania 
was discussed repeatedly at the Meetings of Ambassadors held in London from December 1912 
to August 1913. A full record of the proceedings at these meetings is given in Gooch dk 
Temperley. Vol. IX (II). The most important decisions on this matter were those of Julv 15, 
1913 {v. ibid., pp. 912-3. No. 1147), July 29 (pp. 942-3. Ed. note), and August 11 {p. 1068, 
App. Y). For other references, r. ibid., pp. 1113-6. Subject Ixdex. sub Ai^axia. 

Although the terms upon which the Commission was to act were agreed on July 29, the 
Commission did not meet until October 16 {v. infra, p. 34. No. 39). It met at Valona. The 
British representative was Consul-General H. H. Lamb. (F.O. 4S019 / 14309 / 13 / 44.) The work 
of the Commission is described in detail in the reports of the German representative, 
Consul-General Winckel. in G.P., XXXVI (I\ pp. 263-35S. Chapter 279. B. cp. also 
£. P. Stickney : Southern Albania and Xorthern Epirus in European International Affairx, 
1912-23 (Stanford University Press, California, 1926^ which contains useful maps and bibli- 
ography. Both these and a chronological table are to be found in J. Swire: .\lbania, The Bise 
0/ a Kingdom (Williams it Norgate. 1929), which uses some manuscript material supplied by 
Prince William of Wied and his circle, and fully summarizes published material.] 



[8959] 



B 



2 



No. 2. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. {'). 
F.O. 41257/14809/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 328.) Very Confidential. Foreign Office, September 7, 1913, 3-30 p.m. 
My telegram No. 327 to Paris. (^) 

There seems to be a tendency at Vienna not to realise the risk of internal trouble 
in Albania and a reluctance to expedite anything that is proposed to prevent it,(-'') 
and I fear things may drift into difficulties in consequence. 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Berlin (No. 326); to St. Petersburgh (No. 652).] 

(2) [v. immediately preceding document.] 

(3) [cp. infra, pp. 11-2, No. 16, and note (-).] 



No. 3. 

Mr. Crachanthorpe to Sir Edward Gre 
F.O. 42184/42184/13/39. 

(No. 155.) Belgrade, D. September 7, 1913. 

Sir, E. September 15, 1913. 

In my despatch No. 143 of the 15th ultimo,(') I had the honour to report that 
though public opinion here would generally welcome a betterment of Austro- Servian 
relations, it was considered that Austria's attitude both before and after the recent 
war did not hold out much hope in this direction. 

I have subsequently learned that Monsieur Pashitch, prior to his departure for 
Marienbad on the 1st instant, caused it to be generally understood in political and 
journalistic circles that any advances on the part of Austria would meet with a 
favourable reception here. 

At first sight this intimation of the Servian Premier gives the impression of 
constituting a continuation of the well worn Servian policy of oscillating between 
Austria and Russia, and of flirting with the one in order to make surer of the affection 
of the other ; but a more probable explanation is that it was intended as a " ballon 
d'essai " to prepare the ground for a new Commercial Treatv with Austria for which 
negotiations may shortly begin in Vienna. I have it direct from Monsieur Spalaikovitch 
that the S ervian Government is anxious that this Treatv should be negotiated. Since 
the conclusion of the recent war a growing spirit of independence is becoming 
noticeable in this country. Servia feels that she has, so to speak, attained her 
majority and that, having with the help of Eoumania and Greece secured a fair 
promise of stability in ]\Iacedonia. she can pursue a national policv of her own. She 
IS now passing through a phase of extreme self satisfaction ; her own successes in the 
field are contrasted with the general failure of Austrian diplomacy ; and the assurance 
that she has definitely asserted her right to due respect from the Hapsburg Monarchy 
makes her perhaps the more ready to negotiate with Austria, not as an inferior, but 
on equal terms. 

It is this attitude of independence on the part of Servia that makes it difficult to 
see at the present moment what course negotiations for a Treaty of Commerce will 
take, or what the attitude of Vienna will be. From conversations I have had at the 
Mimstry for Foreign Affairs, I gather the official standpoint here to be that Servia 
having secured outlets for her trade elsewhere, Austria has, economically speakin^ 
far more to gain from such a treaty than Serx-ia. On the other hand it is recognized 

O) [A copy of this despatch was sent to the Board of Trade on September 15, 1913 1 
(!*) [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 986-7, No. 1241.] 



8 



how important it is on political grounds and for the furtherance of the great work of 
internal reorganization, that at least neighbourly relations should be established with 
Austria. Not much hope is expressed that Austria will consent to facilitate Servian 
imports of live stock in the measure which this country is at present in the mood to 
demand, and it is expected that a Treaty which did not contain some tangible quid 
pro quo elsewhere or which implied any continuance of economic subjection to 
Austria, would be very unpopular here. 

I have be^n informed from a private source that M. Pashitch is meditating 
resigning his office on his return to Belgi-ade at the end of the present month, one 
reason given being that he feels he cannot consistently with his recent attitude father 
an Austro-phil policy, which would certainly arouse strong opposition in some 
quarters. Another reason given is that he wishes after the strain and stress of the 
last year to retire for a while from the turmoil of internal politics. In this event his 
place would probably be taken by a figurehead who would in turn retire when 
Monsieur Pashitch considered the time was ripe for him to return to office. A week 
ago there was already talk of a Ministerial crisis, but it took a minor form in the 
retirement of the Ministers of Agriculture and Justice. It is significant that one of the 
causes of the resignation of the former is said to have been his opposition to an 
Austro-phil policy. 

It now remains to be* seen whether Austria-Hungary will take advantage of the 
present psychologic moment to improve her relations with Sen-ia. or whether she will 
persist in the attitude towards her Slav pro%-inces which has hitherto made good 
relations impossible. One of the assurances given by Monsieur Pashitch prior to his 
departure was that it would not be part of Servia's policy to agitate in Bosnia. I 
imagine this assurance to have been quite genuine, as it is felt that any forward policy 
in this direction just now when the country is exhausted by war would be prejudicial 
to the chances of successful internal reorganisation. But the real difficulty seems to 
lie in the probability, to which allusion was made in my despatch No. 148 of the 
25th ultimo. i'^' that, in the absence of any concessions to their aspirations within the 
Dual Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs will be more and more irresistibly 
drawn towards a greater democratic Servia, and that the agitation which Austria 
apprehends will arise not from without but from within. 

Finally, in considering the prospects of a betterment of Austro- Servian relations 
the fact should not be lost sight of that the situation in Albania contains elements of 
very serious friction with which I am dealmg in a separate despatch. (^) 

I have. &c. 

DAYEELL CRACKANTHOEPE. 

(») [r. ibid., pp. 997-S, No. 1252.] 
(*) [v. infra, pp. 5-6, Xo. 6.] 



No. 4. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 

Belgrade, September 9, 1913. 
F.O. 41565 30271 '13 '44. D. 3 p.m. 

Tel. ^No. 203. E. 6-15 p.m. 

Your telegi'am No. 121 of Sept[ember] 5(-1 : Evacuation of Oroshi. 

I am told officially Servian troops have evacuated Oroshi. but are holding strategic 
heights to the immediate south and to the north-east of that town. 

0) [This telegram was sent to Consul-Geueral Lamb ] 

(-) [Sir Edward Grev's telegram (Xo. 121) of September 5, 1913. D. 6 p.m., repeated a report 
from Count MensdorfF on September 5. that Servian troops were still at Oroshi on August 30. 
and that Count Berchtold considered it advisable that the Powers should again demand their 
withdrawal. (F.Ol 41003, 30271/13/44.) cp. infra, p. 6, Xo. 7.] 

[8959] • B 2 



4 



Servian Government promises to withdraw troops across the frontier when 
deHmited, but it is noteworthy that the hne they now occupy is precisely that of 
watershed between the Black Drin and the Fandivogel, which has been claimed as a 
natural frontier. 

(Sent to British admiral at Scutari.) 



No. 5. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 
F.O. 42185/31950/13/44. 

(No. 156.) Confidential. Belgrade, D. September 9, 1913. 

SJr^ R. September 15, 1913. 

As I had the honour to report in my Telegram No. 201 of the 3rd instant, (') the 
frontier negotiations between Montenegro and Servia which have been conducted in 
Belgrade, have reached a deadlock. 

I have now been informed confidentially that the choice of two alternative offers 
was given by the Servian Government to the Montenegrin Delegates. 

These offers were : — 

1. A line including Plevlje, Ipek and Djakova, but excluding the rich Metoja 
plain which extends from Ipek to Prizrend and to the East of Djakova. 

2. Ipek, Djakova and half the Metoja plain, but excluding Plevlje. 

The Montenegrin Delegates had however instructions to claim Plevlje, Ipek and 
Djakova and the entire Metoja plain. Fence the deadlock. 

The Montenegrin Delegates have now all left Belgrade, but it is hoped that when 
they arrive at Cettinje and report personally to His Majesty the way may be paved for 
a renewal of negotiations. 

Under the Serbo-Montenegrin Treaty signed last year the frontier question was 
in the last resort reserved for the arbitration of the Kings of Greece and Bulgaria. (^) I 
am informed at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the arbitration of King 
Ferdinand being now inadmissible, the Servian Government would be willing to accept 
the King of Roumania as joint arbitrator, should Montenegro still desire two 
arbitrators. A strong current of opinion is however noticeable in the Belgrade press 
in favour of arbitration if ultimately resorted to, by delegates from the two 
Skupshtinas. The misunderstanding that has arisen on the frontier question between 
the two Kingdoms, following as it does immediately after the war with Bulgaria, is 
much deprecated, as calculated to prejudice Servia in the eyes of Europe. 

I gather that King Nikolas is directly responsible for the difficulties that have 
arisen, and I am informed in confidence that the excessive claims put forward by 
Montenegro are intended really as makeweight for a pecuniary compensation, which 
would presumably find its way into the Royal pockets. It appears that the Metoja 
plain is rich in minerals and natural resources, and that King Nikolas has staked out, 
so to speak, a claim which he is however ready to waive if it is made worth his while. 
Privately I hear on the highest authority that His Majesty is quite content with the 
Servian offer as satisfying Montenegrin, as distinct from the Royal, requirements. 

The official attitude here towards His Majesty is that a certain measure of 
complaisance must be shown him in view of the family ties that bind him with Italy 
and Russia, but the Royal demise is openly looked forward to as likely to facilitate a 
fusion of the two kingdoms. 

I have, &c. 

DAYRELL CRACKANTHORPE. 

C) [Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram (No. 201^ of September 3, 1913, D. 3-40 p.m., R. 6 p.m , is 
not reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 40719/31950/13/44)] 
(2) [cp. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), p. 1006, App. II.] 



5 

MINUTE. 

We have now been told that the King of Roumania will decline to be an arbiter.^) 

A. N. 

Sept [ember] 15. 1913. 
E. A. C 

Sept [ember] 16. 

(») [Mr. C. Barclay's telegram (No. 179) of September 9, 1913, D. 7 p.m., R. 9 p.m., gave this 
information. (F.O. 41566/31950/13/44.)] 



No. 6. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 
F.O. 42187 30271 18 44. 

CSo. 159. Belgrade. D. September 10, 1913. 

Sir, E. September 15, 1913. 

I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches'^ » as marked in 
the margin which I have received from His Majesty's Vice Consul at Uscnb relative 
to affairs in Albania. 

I transmit at the same time the telegrams(') ('reference to which is made in the 
above despatches exchanged between this Legation and His Majesty's Vice Consulate 
in regard to the rumoured attack on the Servians by Isa Bolatin. 

The situation is exceedingly involved and in order to understand the apparent 
contradictions in Ser\-ian policy towards Albania the following facts must be 
grasped : — < 1) that no unity of action exists among the Albanian tribes, (2) that they 
are open to bribes from any and all sources and (S) that while some of these tribes 
have been won over to Ser^-ia others have not. 

The basis of Servian policy is to establish the fact that the new Principality 
cannot possibly become ' " \'iable ' ' and to encourage centrifugal tendencies for this 
purpose. This policy is of necessity opportunist as to its methods, and these methods 
therefore differ according to individual local situations and to the attitude of different 
tribes. On the one hand a successful poUcy of conciliation has been adopted towards 
the Mirdites, as a consequence of which Ser\-ian troops are able to be retained on the 
strategic heights near Oroshi without arousing hostility. On the other hand it seems 
not unlikely that Servia is herself provoking incursions of other hostile tribes by a 
policy of pin pricks, and with a view to seeking, primarily an excuse for the retention 
of her troops within the limits of Albania, and perhaps ultimately justification for an 
advance in order to restore tranquility. Austrian propaganda is of course another 
element of disturbance and adds to the general confusion. I hear in this connection 
that modem Austrian rifles have been taken in considerable quantities from Albanian 
prisoners during recent encounters. 

At the same time the Servian Government is doubtless rigidly enforcing its system 
of administration within its own borders, and hence trouble such as is indicated in 
Mr. Peckham's despatches is bound to occur. 

I do not think that the Ser^-ian Government is quite so ignorant of the Albanian 
population as Mr. Peckham would suggest. 

I am sending copy of this despatch to HLs Majesty's Vice Consul at Uscub by safe 
opportunity. 

I have. ^-e. 

DAYEELL CRACKANTHORPE. 

P.S. — A somewhat significant article has appeared in the " Politica " ('a paper of 
independent views but which is often inspired by the Foreign Office) of to-day, which 
after pointing out that Europe, by creating an autonomous Albania, has succeeded in 
pro^•iding a fresh element of disturbance in the Balkans, states that Servia cannot 



(1) [These enclosures are not reproduced.] 



6 



possibly allow things to gc on as they are and must put a stop to continued Albanian 
incursions. It proceeds to point out that as it was Europe who created Albania it is 
her duty now to see that order is maintained and thus assure a peaceful life to the 
neighbouring States. If Europe however is not willing or prepared to do this, then 
Servia will be obhged to send a punitive expedition into the new PrincipaHty. It 
is the duty of the Servian Government to make representations in this sense to 
Europe. Should Europe succeed in quieting the Albanian brigands, and out of Albania 
creating a State, Servia will be only too willing to assist this State in her development. 

D. C. 



[ED. NOTE. — Count Trauttmansdorff, the Austro-Hungarian Charge d' Affaires, made a 
verbal communication to the British Foreign Office on September 12, referring to the Servian 
evacuation of Oroshi, and urging that Servia should be pressed further to transfer her 
forces elsewhere. (F.O. 42508/30271/13/44.) cp. O.-U.A., VII, p. 289, No. 8608. The imme- 
diatel}- succeeding telegram was the result of this communication.] 



No. 7. 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe. 
F.O. 42508/30271/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 123.) Foreign Office, September 12. 1913. 5-15 p..m. 

Your tel[egram] No 203(') 

You are authorized to associate yourself with your colleagues, if all are similarly 
instructed, in pressing Servian Gov[ernmen]t to order immediate withdrawal of 
Servian forces behind frontier as fixed at ambassadors' conference in London, which 
has been formally accepted in note recently communicated by Servian legation here 
notifying new Servian boundaries.(*) 

(1) [r. supra, pp. '.i-A, Xo. 4.] 

[This note was comnuinicated by M. Gruic on September 9. (F.O. 41775/31950/13/44 ) | 



No. 8. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 
F.O. 42190/24992/13/44. 

(No. 162.) Belgrade, D. September 12, 1913. 

R. September 15, 1913. 
When I saw Monsieur Spalaikovitch yesterday morning he appeared to he 
somewhat agitated at a despatch he had received from the Servian Minister in Rome 
reportmg that the Italian Government was proposing to send a detachment of soldiers 
to escort the North Albanian boundary Commission,(M and had approached the 
Austrian Government as to whether it would not send an equal number. The despatch 
said that It was not proposed to send a similar escort with the Southern Albanian 
l^oundary ComnussionC) as Greek troops were alreadv on the spot, but apparently it 
was lieid that there were no Servian troops in North Albania. 



V)[v. immediately succeeding Ed. note ] 



7 



The line M. Spalaikovitch took in mentioning this matter to me was that it was 
surely for all the Powers, and not for one or two of them separately, to send the 
necessary escort on an international basis. I told His Excellency that I had no doubt 
the Powers would themselves arrive at an entirely satisfactory understanding on this 
point. 

I have reported this conversation because M. Spalaikovitch evidently attached 
more importance to the matter than its face value appears to warrant. 

I can only suppose that he fears either collisions between an Austro-Italian escort 
and the Ser-vian troops still stationed in North Albania, or that influence may be 
brought to bear on the tribes prejudicial to Servian interests, or that Austro-Italian 
troops once in North Albania may not be withdrawn and may eventually be increased. 

I have, &c. 

DAYEELL CRACKANTHOEPE. 



MINUTE. 

We have heard of a proposal to send an Italian escort with the commission for the 
delimitation of the Southern Albanian frontier, but never with that for the Northern, and even 
that rumour was denied at Rome. 

H. N. 

Sept[ember] 1.5, 1913. 
E. A. C. 

Sept[ember] 16. 
E. G. 



[ED. NOTE. — The Commission for the Delimitation <J^the North and North-East frontier 
of Albania was appointed as the result of decisions taken at the Meetings of Ambassadors held 
in London on May 26, 1913 {v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), p. 815, No. 1002), and July 7 
(v. ibid., p. 892, No. 1120). For further references to the genesis of the Commission, v. ibid., 
p. 1116, Subject Index, sub Alb.vni.*. The British representative was Colonel E. J. Granet. 
It was originally intended that the Commission should meet on August 1, at latest, but the first 
meeting did not in fact take place until September 23, at Scutari. (F.O. 45763/24992/13/44.) 
The Commission moved to Lake Ochrida on October 14. (F.O. 46947/24992/13/ 44.) 

The appointment of the Southern Albanian Boundary Commission was also discussed on 
several occasions at the Meetings of Ambassadors in London, the most important Meetings 
from this standpoint being those of August 8 and 11 {v. Gooch d; Temperley, Vol. IX (II),' 
pp. 969-70, No. 1223; pp. 975-6, No. 1226; pp. 1065-6, App. V. For other references, v. ibid., 
p. 1116, Subject Index, sub Albani.^). This Commission held its first meeting on October 4, 
at Monastir, the British representative being Lieutenant-Colonel M. Doughtv-Wvlie (F.O. 47173/ 
13799/13/44). 

The German account of the working of the two frontier Commissions is given in G.F , 
XXXVI (I), pp. 131-260, Chapter 279, A ] 



No. 9. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 

Belgrade, September 13, 1913. 
F.O. 42116/30271/13/44. D. 4 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 207.) E. 8-40 p.j* 

Your telegram No. 123 of Sept[ember] 12(') : Evacuation of Albania. 

My Russian colleague has as yet only instructions to give advice to Servian 
Government, which he did yesterday. Eeply was usual one of fear of tribal incursions 
and necessity of guarding frontier. My Austrian and Italian colleagues wished, 
notwithstanding, to repeat representations immediately, but pending further instruc- 



(1) [v. supra, p. 6, No. 7.] 



8 



tions I disadvised this as prejudicial to harmony, and therefore possessing little value 
in present mood of Servian Government unless Russia were formally associated. 

Austrian Charge d'Affaires had a rather heated interview with Acting Minister for 
Foreign Affairs this morning. Latter accused Austria of stirring up Europe against 
Ser\'ia, and finally suggested that the best way out of difficulty would be for Austria 
to cede hinterland of Dibra and Djakova, and so guarantee content and economic 
welfare of the neighbouring tribes. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had previously 
denied to Italian Charge d'Affaires any political motive for retention of troops. 
Austrian Charge d'Affaires tells me that up to to-day Acting Minister for Foreign 
Affairs has appeared generally desirous of improving Austro- Servian relations. 

I found Acting Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs quite bellicose on the subject 
this morning. He said that if the Powers, after creating Albania, could not police her 
and prevent her attacking her neighbours Servia would have to do so (see my despatch 
No. 159 sent by bag).(-) Servia had not the slightest fear of Austria if the latter 
wanted to pick a quarrel. 

(-) [v. supra, pp. 5-6, No. 6.] 



No. 10. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edicard Grey. 

Belgrade, September 16, 1913. 
F.O. 42431/30271/13/44. D 8 am 

Tel. (No. 209.) ^[ g 

Actmg Mmister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that orders have been 
sent to withdraw troops to the east bank of the Black Drin River. Their retention 
there must, however, depend on attitude of tribes. 

Wiser counsels evidently prevail owing to desire not to flout opinion of Europe. 
Troops are still within frontier of Albania as drawn at the Ambassadors' Conference,' 
but I am assured that final delimitation will be respected. 

(Repeated to admiral at Scutari.) 



No. 11. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 

F.O. 42966/30271/13/44. Belgrade, D. September 19, 1913. 

Tel. (No. 213.) Very Confidential. R. September 20, 1913. 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me privately that the 
Servian representatives at various capitals have to-dav been instructed to explain fully 
the situation in Albania. They will state that the Servian troops are being gradually 
withdrawn to the frontier fixed at London, and the entire evacuation will be completed 
as soon as the safety of the frontier is assured. But it will be pointed out that the 
situation m Servian territory outside the frontier is very serious, and that an insurrec- 
tionary movement has started among the Arnauts, who are being incited by tribes 
across the Albanian border and are being supplied with arms. It has therefore 
become necessary to close entirely the Albanian frontier, and to reinforce the Servian 
garrisons along that frontier. Further, should circumstances and the protection of 

No s'i^'^^tn Vi'^'^"? ""^^ ^T' *° No. 248); to Berlin (as 

No. 333), to Vienna (as No. 2^) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 665).] 



y 

national interests render it necessary, the Servian Government will be compelled not 
only to reinforce their troops still within the Albanian frontier, but to push these troops 
forward in order to restore order. 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs proceeded to tell me in strict confidence that 
other news of a very serious character had reached him. First, that several Bulgarian 
staff officers were at Vallona and Durazzo with the mission to incite the Albanians 
against the Servians ; secondly, that Austria was facilitating for Bulgaria the purchase 
of guns and amnmnition by means of deferred payments; and thirdly, that two 
Bulgarian divisions had not yet been demobilised. He asked me to put these facts 
together, to add to them the forthcoming conclusion of the Turco-Bulgarian negotia- 
tions, and to find for myself the logical conclusion. I asked whether his Excellency 
seriously wished me to believe that Bulgaria in her present crippled condition might 
start on a fresh adventure. He said that he greatly feared that those now guiding 
Bulgarian politics, especially General Savof, were, in fact, adventurers of a very 
dangerous type. He said that it was his conviction that Austria and Bulgaria were 
bent on placing every obstacle in the way of Servia's ultimate consolidation. He hoped 
I would transmit to you the main points of our conversation. (-) 

(Eepeated to Sophia.) 

(-) jThe text given above is taken from the Confidential Print, as the original decypher 
cannot be traced.] 



No. 12. 

Communication from M. Gruic. 

Legation Royale de Serbie. Londres, 
F.O. 43076/30271/13/44. ' le 6/19 Scptemhre 1913. 

La Serbie avait commence a retirer de I'Albanie les restes des troupes qui y 
etaient encore restees uniquement pour empecher d'une maniere sure et eflficace les 
irruptions des Albanais sur le territoire serbe jusqu'a I'organisation en Albanie des 
autorites chargees de maintenir I'ordre. 

En attendant, des desordres tres graves se produisent tout le long de la frontiere. 
Les Albanais, en masses, attaquent I'armee et les autorites serbes. Le Gouvernement 
Eoyal est informe, de source certaine, qu'on prepare et organise une grande incursion 
de bandes albanaises sur le territoire serbe et que du cote albanais on fait tout son 
possible pour engager aussi dans ces desordres les Albanais qui vivent sur le territoire 
serbe et qui jusqu'a present etaient restes tranquilles. 

Le Gouvernement serbe ne pent tolerer cette anarchic qui augmente de jour en 
jour et est fermement resolu : a defendre aux Albanais de passer sur le territoire et 
les marches serbes — jusqu'au retablissement de I'etat normal et 1' abandon par les 
Albanais de leur attitude hostile envers les autorites serbes. 

En outre, la Serbie repoussera toute attaque par la force; et, si ces desordres 
prennent des proportions encore plus considerables, elle ordonnera a ses troupes de 
reoccuper certaincs positions strategiques, sur territoire albanais, qui sont 
indispensables pour garantir la frontiere serbe centre ces incursions. 

La Serbie demandera aussi a I'Albanie de I'indemniser pour les dommages causes 
et les frais occasionnes par un pareil etat de choses. 

MINUTES. 

The Servian Charge d'Affaires handed this memorandum to me yesterdaj' and asked 
whether I would give him any mes.sage to transmit to his government. 

I said I must refer this rather grave communication to Sir E. Grey. I could only express 
a personal opinion based on a first impression. 



10 



It seemed to me that the Servian government were assuming a serious responsibility (1) in 
refusing access to the markets which had been specially declared by the Powers to remain open 
to them and (2) in threatening an armed invasion of Albanian territory. It was not for me 
to express an opinion on the value of the evidence on which the Servian government declared' 
they were going to be attacked in force. But it would require the clearest evidence to convince 
the Powers that a pretext was not being sought for a Servian occupation of the Albanian 
frontier districts. I could therefore only hope that the Servian government would exercise the 
greatest prudence and moderation so as to avoid all risk of being charged with having 
contributed by precipitate action to bringing about a general state of disorder and disturbance 
in Albania. 

E. A. C. 

Sept[ember] 20. 

An excellent answer. 

E. G. 



No. 18. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 

Belgrade, September 21, 1913. 
F.O. 43143/30271/13/44. ' D. 3 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 214.) E. 5 p.m. 

I learn from a private source that the Servian troops withdrawn across Black 
Drin received orders on Friday to reoccupy points previously held, and that positions 
on east bank of the Drin have been in turn occupied by troops from Prisrend and Brod. 
All garrisons on Servian frontier have been reinforced. 

I am informed that an understanding exists between Servia and Montenegro by 
which joint efforts are to be made to acquire Black Drin frontier for Servia and an 
extended frontier for Montenegro, to include Klementi, Streli, and Kastrati, by 
working up the situation. 

Further information reaches me that Servian Government is treating with Essad 
Pasha for his support in frontier question. 

(Repeated to Cettinje and Scutari.) 



No. 14. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. (^) 
F.O. 43476/26171/18/44. 

Tel. (No. 340.) Foreign Office, September 22, 1913, 6 p.m. 

Indications all point to increasing instability in Albania that must lead to 
eventually and may at any moment precipitate serious troubles in Albania itself and 
complications on the frontier. No steps whatever are being taken to improve matters. 
There are signs that the local authorities are being disintegrated and the Commission 
whose function was to be to advise the Powers and pending a definitive Gov[ernmen]t 
to exercise control over the native authorities(') (as agreed in § 7 of the formula 
adopted by the Powers on July 29(') ) cannot get to work because the Austrian member 
of it has not yet been appointed ; objection is taken to any extended use of the 
Admirals and the international force at Scutari. The position of the latter under these 
circ[umstance]s is scarcely dignified; they are kept inactive and no preparation is 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Berlin (No. 335) ; to Vienna (No. 272) ; to St 
Petersburgh (No 666) ; to Rome (No. 269). A copy was sent to the Admiralty on September 23, 

to be telegraphed to Admiral Burney for his confidential information onlv."1 

(2) [v. supra, p. 1, Ed. note.] " ^ 
(■•>) [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), p. 943, Ed. note ] 



11 



being made to enable them to hand over their limited functions to any other authority. 
H[is] Mfajesty's] G[overnment] stated some time ago that they c[oul]d not keep 
Admrira]! Burney at Scutari indefinitely and unless there is some prospect of making 
progress with the Coram [issio]n they will feel obliged to withdraw Ad[miral] Burney 
and the whole of the British force without further delay.(^) 

You sh[oul]d impress upon M[inister for] F[oreignj A[fTairs] the serious view 
that we take of the situation. The Comm[ission], if on the spot w[oul]d be able to 
communicate with Albanian local authorities, to stimulate, to control and to advise 
them. At present there is no one who can even communicate with them, and it does 
not seem fair to the Admirals and the international force at Scutari to keep them there 
as spectators of increasing trouble, which they are not allowed to prevent even in the 
neighbourhood of Scutari and for which their presence can be no remedy. Such at 
any rate is the view we take as regards Admiral Burney and the British Force. 

(') [For Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney's position at Scutari, r. Gooch d; TemperJey, 
Vol. IX (11). p. 786, Ed. nofe.] 



No. 15. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 

Belgrade, September 23. 1913. 
F.O. 43538/30-271 13 '44. D. 1-30 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 218.) E. 3-30 p.m. 

My telegram Xo. 217 of Septrember] 22. 

I am informed at Ministry for Foreign Affairs that strong Albanian force has 
attacked and captured Dibra and is now moving in detachments towards Ki'ushewo. 
It is expected that Ser\-ian troops destined for offensive action will reach Albanian 
frontier in from 3 to 5 days. Servian force will then probably advance to consolidate 
position on strategical points within the frontier and claim desired hinterland as 
compensation for restoring tranquillity. 

(The above repeated to Admiral at Scutari.) 

It appears to me serious tension between Austria and Servia can only be avoided 
in one of two ways : either by the Powers, if bent on maintaining the frontier fixed at 
London sending international force numerically sufficient to protect that frontier until 
gendarmerie is organized, or by Austria consenting to meet Ser\-ian view that present 
frontier is inadequate. 

The situation is becoming serious and demands immediate consideration. 

(V) [Mr. Crackanthorpe"s telegram (Xo. 217) of September 22. D. 6 0S p.m.. R. 11-15 p.m., 
reported that the withdrawal of Servian troops across the Black Drin was followed by an 
Albanian attack, and that the Servian Government were contemplating extensive military 
operations. ^F.O. 43405/30271/13/44.)] 



No. 16. 

3/r. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey. 

St. Petershurgh, September 23. 1913. 
F.O. 43544/14809/13/44. D. 9-30 p.m. 

Tel. 'No. 340.^ E. 10 p..m. 

Your telegram No. 340 of Sept[ember] 22(M to Paris. 

Acting ^linister for Foreign Affairs entirely shares your view as to the gravity of 
situation. He considers attitude of Austria suspicious. While making constant 



(,1) [f. supra, pp. 10-1, Xo. 14.] 



12 



representations to Servia, with a view to withdrawal of Servian troops from Albanian 
territory, and while aflEecting to regard state of things in Albania as normal, Austrian 
Government have deliberately deferred appointment of their delegate on Commission 
of Control, (^) and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs believes that they desire to see 
increase of disorder in Albania. He does not believe that Austria actually wishes for 
pretext to send troops to Albania, but he suggested that she might use present 
opportunity to adopt more peremptory tone towards Servia in regard to various 
questions pending between them. 

He thought it might be desirable that different Powers should speak at Vienna as 
to the necessity of expediting the (? commencement of) work by Commission, and he 
stated that he was prepared to say something in that sense to Austrian Government. 
He was especially desirous of being informed of the reply which you received from 
Austrian Government to your present communication. 

As to the Russian commissioner, he could start very shortly if desired. 

MINUTES. 

§We have already spoken at Vienna in the sense of the passage marked as we have 
elsewhere. We might tell the Russian Gov[ernmen]t that we did so and *what the reply was. 

H. N. 

Sep[tembe]r 24, 1913. 

§ Tel. No. 266 to Vienna.(2) 
* Tel. No. 140 from Vienna.(2) 

R. P. M. 

Sept [ember] 24/13. 

The reply was only provisional, on the part of one of the ofBcials in the Vienna Foreign 
Office. We may hope to have Count Berchtold's own definite answer to our last' communication 
before long. That is what the Russian Gov[ernmen]t ask for. 

Qu[erv] : Wait for it. 

E. A. C. 

Sept [ember] 24. 
A. N. 
E. G. 

(2) [Repeated instructions were sent on September 13 to Sir F. Cartwright by telegram 
(No. 266), D. 4-15 p.m., pressing for a reply as to the delay in appointing an Austro-Hungarian 
representative (F.O. 41559/14809/13/44). Sir F. Cartwright's telegram (No. 140) of 
September 17, D. 11-50 a.m., R. 12-50 p.m., gave Count Berchtold's reply. There was no desire 
for delav in Albania, but there was diflficultv in finding a suitable representative. (F.O. 42690/ 
14809/13/44.)] 



No. 17. 

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey. 

Vienna, September 24, 1913. 
F.O. 43695/30271/13/44. D. 1-30 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 145.) R. 3-20 p.m. 

Servia and Albania. 

Count Berchtold has informed me that the Servian Minister here yesterday lodged 
a complaint with him with regard to Albanians along the frontier. The Servian 
Minister seems to have hinted that Servia might see herself compelled to restore order 
there by herself. M[inister for] F[oreign] A[fEairs] replied that his Consular Agents 
at Prisrend and elsewhere had not reported to him existence of any serious movement 
among the Albanians, but that much discontent existed among the frontier Albanians 
at being prevented from visiting the market-towns of Prisrend, Dibra and Djakova. 
This was the great grievance to them as they derived much of their material comforts 
from those centres. 



18 



H[is] E[xcellency] told me that he was convinced that Servia desired to raise 
trouble along the frontier with a view to intervention by her in Albania, and that, 
should this pro\;e to be the case very serious situation would arise, to which Austria- 
Hungary could not remain indifferent. H[is] E[xcellency] repeated to me what I 
reported in a previous telegram, (') that diplomatic representations to Belgi-ade would 
be ineffectual unless Eussia should be sincerely desirous of restraining Servia and gave 
categorical instructions to her Representative at Belgrade to speak in that sense. 

(1) [Sir F. Cartwright's telegram (No. 143) of September 22, 1913, D. 640 p.m., E. 10-30 p.m., 
is not reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 43408/30271/13/44.)] 



No. 18. 

Mr. Crackanthor'pc to Sir Edward Grey.{^} 

Belgrade, September 24, 1913. 
F.O. 43704/30271/18/44. D. 3-30 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 219.) E. 11 p.m. 

Following items of information reached me this morning from private sources : — 

Arrangements are being made with Greek Government not to demobilise until 
situation in Albania is clear. General mobilisation is being considered here. 
Mobilisation of one division will probably be announced to-day. Two further divisions 
are being secretly mobilised. Ten trains of infantry, with ammunition and provisions, 
left Belgrade yesterday. All officers on leave have received telegraphic orders to report 
for duty. Servian troops are to be sent to Bosnian and Bulgarian frontiers as 
measure of precaution in view of belief here that there is connivance between Austria 
and Bulgaria in Albanian uprising. 

Greek troops are to be moved to Bulgarian and Albanian frontiers ; arrangements 
are being made for their transport via Salonica and Monastir. Albanians are now- 
marching on Struga, Krushevo, Djakova, and Ipek. Servians have been' driven back 
all along frontier line. There is a report, at present unconfirmed, that Djakova has 
fallen. Constant telegraphic communication between Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
(group omitted : 7 and) Cettinje. 

Above reported to admiral at Scutari. 

(Secret.) 

I have reason to believe that Servian Government is approaching Roumania with 
a view to mobilisation of latter in case of Austrian mobilisation. 
(Sent to Athens, Bucharest, Cettinje, and Sophia.) 

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 342); to Rome (as No. 273); to Berlin (as 
No. 337) ; to Vienna (as No. 274) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 669).] 



No. 19. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.{'^) 

Belgrade, Septeviher 24, 1913. 
F.O. 43705/30271/13/44. D. 3-30 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 220.) R. 10 p.m. 

My immediately preceding telegram.(^) 

Eussian Charge d'Affaires had lengthy interview with Acting Minister for Foreign 
Affairs yesterday. He urged, under instructions, necessity of prudence. I gathered 

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 343) ; to Rome (as No. 274) ; to Berlin (as 
No. 338) ; to Vienna (as No. 275) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 670).] 

(2) [r. immediately preceding document.] 



14 



that Russian Charge's advice had little effect. He says he considers Servia is 
now in exceptionally advantageous position. Should Austria attack her, he thinks 
Eoumania would march into Transylvania. Bulgaria is helpless, and Greek and 
Servian interests in Albania are identical. 

He thinks that unless situation in Albania is taken actively in hand, Servians 
may not stop at Drin frontier, but will march to coast under pretext of restoring order. 

(Repeated to Bucharest.) 



No. 20. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 
F.O. 44249/30271/13/44. 

(No. 168.) Very Confidential. Belgrade, D. September 25, 1913. 

Sir, ' R. September 29, 1913. 

Since writing my despatches Nos. 159 and 162 of the 9th(=) and 12th instant(^) 
respectively, which were the last I had the honour to address to you on the subject of 
Albania, events have moved with great and indeed with somewhat alarming rapidity. 
I have endeavoured to keep you fully informed of developments by telegraph, for which 
purpose I have been utilizing private as well as official sources of information. 

It will probably be difficult ever to arrive at the exact truth concerning the specific 
causes w^iich led to the present Albanian attack on Servian territory. But the nearest 
approach to the truth seems to lie midway between the contradictory accounts 
em.anating from the Austrian and the Servian sides, and I will therefore outline briefly 
these very conflicting statements. 

According to the Austrian version the Servians have deliberately provoked an 
Albanian uprising and attack; (1) by not withdrawing their troops from Albania, 
(2) by massacring and maltreating in various waVs the Albanians wdthin Servian 
territory and (3) by closing their frontier and the access to the market towns, and thus 
practically reducing the tribes inside the Albanian frontier to starvation. 

The Servian answer to the above takes the following form : 

(1) That it was indispensable to retain Servian troops within Albania and in 
possession of the strategic positions, pending the delimitation of the frontier, in order 
to protect Servian territory from attacks on the part of the Albanians, and in the 
absence of any organized police force within Albania itself. The proof of this, the 
Servians say, lies in the fact that as soon as their troops were withdrawn across the 
Black Drin in compliance with the representations of the Powers, these attacks took 
place. 

(2) That the Albanians within Servian territory were deliberately incited to rebel 
by the tribes from across the frontier, acting on foreign instigation, and that repressive 
and precautionary measures accordingly became necessary ; and (3) that one of these 
precautionary measures naturally took the form of closing the frontier. 

A calm consideration of these contentions points to the conclusion which I 
indicated in my despatch No. 159 of September 9,(^) that, while Servia has been 
doubtless endeavouring to work up a situation which she calculates may assist her to 
obtain the frontier she desires, and which she feels is a necessity for her, Austrian 
mfluence has at the same time been at work to stir up the tribes against Servia, partly 
with a view to forcing her to evacuate Albania, and partly with a view to creating fcir 

(>) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet A copy 
was sent to the Director of Military Operations.] 

(2) [v. supra, pp. .5-6, No. 6.] 

(3) [v. supra, pp. 6-7, No. 8.] 



15 



her difficulties on her Albanian frontier and generally impeding her work of consolida- 
tion. This appears to be supported bv the fact that Mannhcher rifles of modem type 
have been recently taken in considerable quantities from the Albanians. Further I 
am informed at the Ministry of War that the organized and concerted attack made by 
the Albanians a few days ago and skilfully directed towards those points of the frontier 
where Servian detachments were the weakest, indicates that it must have been directed 
by trained foreign officers, who are indeed supposed to be Austrian and Bulgarian. I 
am privately informed that a price has been practically set on the heads of any 
Austrian and Bulgarian officers who may be taken prisoners, the desire being to obtain 
irrefutable proof of Austrian and Bulgarian connivance in the Albanian movement. 

The Servians evidently feel themselves just now in a particularly advantageous 
position for the pursuit of their Albanian policy. They can easily send down, and, in 
fact are sending down, a sufficiently powerful force to cope with the Albanians, drive 
them back across the frontier and retake and consolidate themselves on the strategic 
positions on the watershed between the Black Drin and the Fanivogel, to the 
immediate South East and North East of Oroshi. Unlike Bulgaria, before the recent 
war, Servia seems to have secured a reasonably safe position elsewhere. She has, as I 
had the honour to inform you in my Telegram Xo. 205 of September ll,(^'i obtained 
guarantees from Roumania against Bulgaria, though it is doubtful how far Roumania 
would be prepared to give effect to such guarantees in the event of a Servian adventure 
in Albania in which country Roumania has no direct interest : in her Albanian policy 
Sen-ia has a wholehearted ally in Greece with whom she has come to an understanding 
as to future spheres of influence in Albania, as reported in my despatch No. 160 
Confidential of September ll.(') She may count on Montenegro making a small but 
perhaps useful diversion in the North, and I have reason to believe that the two 
countries have in fact come to a mutual arrangement as to their future Albanian 
frontier, as reported in my telegram No. 2U of the ^Ist instant. Further, Sen-ia 
appears to believe that should she be attacked by Austria, Roumania would not remain' 
quiet, but would march into Transylvania, though how far this belief is justified I have 
no means of ascertaining. M. Spalaiko\-itch told me privately the day before vesterday 
that he had every reason to believe that Roumania's policy towards Austria had 
undergone a great alteration as a result of recent events in the Near East. Finally 
Servia always counts, rightly or wTongly, on the disaffection of the Austro-Hungarian 
Slavs in the event of a war with Austria, and, last but not elast [sic: least], on 
Russia's finally pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for her, should things go badly. 

Yis-a-\-is of the Powers, SerWa feels that, although she is running a serious risk 
of incurring their displeasure, her position is nevertheless a strong one. It is true that 
she is operfly flouting them and ignoring the decisions of the Ambassadors' Conference, 
but she does not regard these decisions as irrevocable, and she beheves that cogent 
proof is being now provided that the frontier fixed at London was, for her,° an 
impossible one. She has in fact taken the bit between her teeth and once the 
Albanians driven back, and the SerWan Army consoHdated within Albania, a very 
deUcate situation will arise and the danger of a second advance of the Ser\-ian Army 
to the Adriatic must not be lost sight of. As reported in my telegram No. -224 of 
today's date,('> I believe that the Ser\-ian Government is preparing a further note to 
the Powers stating that, in \-iew of the failure of the latter to prevent the invasion and 
devastation of Serbian territory by Albanians, of the extreme probability that these 
attacks will continue, and of the inadequacy of the frontier fixed at London to pro\-ide 
a proper safeguard against such attacks, the Sernan Government feels compelled to 

Gooch db Temperley, Vol. IX (II), p. 1001, Xo. 1257.] 

(5) [Mr. Crackanthorpe's despatch (Xo. 160). D.' September 11. 1913, R. September 15, 1913 
stated that the dividing line for the Greek and Servian spheres of influence in Albania should 
be the River Skumbi. (F.O. 42188/30271/13/44.)] 

(6) [v. supra, p. 10, Xo. 13.] 

(") [Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram (Xo. 224) of September 25, 1913. D. 12-30 p.m , 
R. 6-20 P.M., is not reproduced as the contents are sufiBcientlv indicated above (F O 4.38t4 / 
30271/13/44.)] • " ^ tooiw/ 



16 



occupy permanently those strategic points in Albanian territory which can alone 
guarantee peace and security to Servian subjects. The Powers will then probably be 
asked to sanction an equitable revision of the Eastern and North Eastern frontiers of 
Albania. 

Peace will then apparently depend on the attitude of Vienna. I believe the 
Servian view to be that the Austrian Government may possibly find itself forced to 
take action in view of the impossibility of defending a further diplomatic defeat before 
the Delegations, and tlie necessity of justifying the enormous mihtary expenditure 
already incurred. 

Faced with the contingency of Austrian action, the Servian Government is now 
considering the question of general mobilization. Orders have already been issued for 
the mobilization of the 1st Morava Division and I am told that the Drin and Danube 
Divisions are being mobilized. An official announcement confines itself to stating that 
the reserves have been called out for service within the old frontiers, and that for the 
defence of Servian territory against the Albanians the active Army will be employed. 
Finally a movement of troops is taking place towards both the Bosnian and Bulgarian 
frontiers. 

I have, &c. 

DAYRELL CEACKANTHOEPE. 

Copy sent to Vienna. 



No. 21. 

Lord Granville to Sir Edward Greij.C) 
F.O. 44195/26171/13/44. 

(No. 352.1 Confidential. Berlin, D. September 26, 1913. 

Sir, E. September 29, 1913. 

I had the honour to report in my Confidential Telegram No. 164 of the 
23rd instant, (^) on the subject of the intention of His Majesty's Government to 
withdraw shortly their Admiral and troops from Scutari, that Herr von Jagow 
remarked to me in conversation that he happened to know that the Austrian Govern- 
ment were very anxious for the withdrawal of the Admirals at the earliest possible 
moment, partly because of various cases of friction that had arisen between the 
Austrian Admiral and Admiral Burney.(^) I expressed surprise and said I had not 
known of such friction and Herr von Jagow said that the cases had been quite 
unimportant and that the Austrian Government had not complained of them, but only 
looked upon them as a special reason for not prolonging the Admirals' mandate longer 
than was absolutely necessary. I asked if he referred to the story that had been 
published about Admiral Burney's correspondence with Albanian chiefs and told him 
that I had seen the Admiral's report on the subject which showed that the colour given 
to the correspondence in the press was quite false. (*j I had intended offering to read 
him the report at my next visit, but he obviously took no interest in the matter, 
admitted that that was one of the cases he meant but was quite ready to believe in 
Admiral Burney's complete innocence. He said the most important case was some 
trouble that was now going on about a bridge, but I see in the telegram sections that, 
according to Admiral Burney's report, the Austrian Admiral's quarrel seems to be 
more with his Italian than with his British colleague. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. A 
copy was sent to Vienna.] 

(=) [Lord Granville's telegram (No. 164) of September 23, 1913, D. 740 p.m., R. 9-45 p.m., 
is not reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 43550/14809/13/44.)] 

(^) [v. immediately succeeding Ed. note.] 

(*) [The correspondence with the Albanian Chiefs, who had complained to Vice-Admiral 
Burney about the unsettled state of their country, was explained in his letter to the Admiralty 
of August 15, 1913, and the misunderstanding was apparently chiefly caused by a mistransla- 
tion afterwards repeated in the Press. (F.O. .39584/34425/13/44.)] 



17 



The announcement published in Paris that our troops were to be withdrawn 
immediately has been quoted in the German papers, some of whom have taken it as 
a sign of differences of opinion among the Powers and others as a proof that the 
Powers will not take any active steps to interfere in the Serbo- Albanian quarrel. The 
'■ Lokal-Anzeiger " last night published an article, which looked as 'f it had emanated 
from the Foreign Office, stating that the form in which tliat piece of news was 
published was apt to give a false impression. The British Government had merely 
announced " some time ago " that they did not intend to leave their troops in Scutari 
longer than was absolutely necessary. The publication of this intention by French 
sources at this particular moment gave one the impression of a desire to render more 
difficult a quiet judgment of a very complicated situation. The reasons which French 
papers gave for this alleged British step were untrue because there was not any dispute 
between the Powers on the question of the Serbo- Albanian conflict, and could not be, 
as the Cabinets had not yet entered into an exchange of views on the subject. For 
the present it can only be looked upon as certain that a permanent occupation of 
\lbanian territory by Servia will be as little permitted by the Powers as inroads of 
Albanian troops into Servian territory." 

There was a Berlin telegram in last night's Cologne Gazette denying in much the 
same language the existence of any dispute between the Powers, saying that when the 
Powers did exchange views they would doubtless do so on the basis of the London 
decisions, and adding that the idea of interfering with Ser\-ia so long as she did 
nothing but protect the territory confeiTed on her by the Powers could ob^iously not 
be entertained. 

This morning's "'Lokal-Anzeiger'" contained a further article, declaring that 
there was no ground for serious anxiety as the Albanian iiTegular forces could not be 
a match for Servian troops and Sen-ia need not at present be suspected of haWng 
actively caused the troubles or of intending to make use of them to upset the decisions 
of the Powers about Albania. Much would depend on the attitude of Austria- 
Hungary, and it was to be hoped, in the interests of European quiet, that she would 
not consider herself impelled to another costly mobilisation before it was absolutely 
necessary, and there could be no question of that as yet. 

I have, Sec. 

GRANVILLE. 



[ED. XOTE. — The following is a summary account, compiled from British sources, of an 
incident connected with the Admirals' Commission at Scutari, cp. also (t.F., XXXVI (I), 
pp. 26:3-9"2. passim. Count Trauttmansdorff informed Sir Eyre Crowe on September 19 
that he had a complaint to make about Vice-Admiral Burney's procedure regarding the 
allotment to an Italian firm of a contract to construct a bridge over the River Drin. The 
Austro-Hungarian Admiral had refused to vote without further instructions from his Govern- 
ment. (F.O. 447S0 26171 13 , 44.> The Italian Admiral left Scutari on September 19 without 
giving a date for his return (F.O. 43135/26171/13/44). though this fact was not mentioned to 
Count Trauttmansdorff. He returned in time for the next meeting of the Commission on 
September 27. (F.O. 4S606 26171 13/44.) 

The question at issue was stated to have been whether the Admirals' Commission could 
decide on action to be taken by a majority vote of the members, as a diplomatic commission 
could usually make only unanimous decisions, and it was reported that the Austro-Hungarian 
Admiral had been instructed to attend no further meetings. It was feared that there might 
not be any way out of the difficulty without bringing the Commission to an end. (F.O. 44780/ 
26171 13, 44.) " 

An Aide-Memoire on the subject was sent to Count Berchtold on October 9 by Sir F. 
Cartwright, under instructions from Sir Edward Grey, giving the reply of Vice-Admiral 
Burney (F.O. 47953 '26171 ' 13, 44) in which further difficulties between the Austro-Hungarian 
and Italian Admirals were mentioned, and explaining that it would be impossible to continue 
the work of the Commission unless a majority vote of the members could be accepted, as 
otherwise one member alone might obstruct every step that had to be taken. Sir F. Cart- 
wright was also instructed to inform Count Berchtold that His Majesty's Government 
considered that Vice-Admiral Burney's action in the circumstances was entirely justified. 
(F.O. 5S527 26171/13/44.) 

[S959] C 



18 



Vice-Admiral Burnev had suggested first in July, and again later, with the consent of 
other members of the Commission, that it was unnecessary to keep so many senior officers at 
Scutari as- affairs could be satisfactorily administered by one of the Admirals or by junior 
officers.' (F.O. 31532/20810/13/44; 31844/20810/13/44.) 

For reasons of space it is impossible to reproduce Admiral Burney's numerous reports on 
the condition of affairs at Scutari, or on the procedure adopted by the Austro-Hungarian 
Rear- Admiral Njegovan, and by his successor (on July 29) Rear-Admiral von Barry. There 
is a complete copy of the Minutes of the Meetings of the Commission administering Scutari 
from May 14-Octol)er 13, 1913. After September 15 Rear-Admiral von Barry did not attend 
the meetings, and after October 1 the German representative, Captain Biermann, did not sign 
the minutes, though it is noted in them that he was absent only from the last two meetings. 
From May 28 (inclusive), the 13th Meeting, the names of the officers who signed the minutes 
are reproduced, but not earlier. (F.O. 48606/26171/13/44.) The Commission was dissolved after 
the meeting of October 13. On October 16 Vice-Admiral Burney was informed that he should 
regard the Admirals' Commission as being dissolved, as soon as his colleagues had been 
similarly instructed. The reason given was that the Commission of Control had come into 
operation. (F.O. 47118/26171/13/44.)" cp. supra, p. 1, Ed. note. 

The various members of the Admirals' Commission left Scutari on October 15, 17, 19. 
(F.O. 46878/26171/13/44; 47264/26171/13/44; 47287/26171/13/44.) cp. infra, pp. 30-1, No. 35.] 



No. 22. 

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey. 

St. Petershurgh, September 27, 1913. 
F.O. 44141/30271/13/44. D. 8-15 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 342.) E- 9-45 p.m. 

Servda and Albania. 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is informed frora Belgrade that Servia intends 
to inflict a severe lesson on' Albania, for which purpose Servian troops will cross 
frontier. He understands that after the operations against the Albanian forces have 
been carried out Servia will continue to hold some positions within Albania, He has 
informed Servian Government that he appreciates good reasons which they have for 
proposed actions. At the same time he has recommended them to proceed with the 
same prudence that they have shown hitherto. 

He is aware that Servian action is likely to give rise to objections from Austrian 
Government, but he considers that she is justified in taking precautionary measures 
against the recurrence of recent incidents.(^) 

(1) [cp. infra, pp. 20-1, No. 24.] 



No. 23. 

Sir F. Carticright to Sir A. Nicolson.{^) 

Private. (2) 

My dear Nicolson, Vienna, September 27, 1913. 

The sudden uprising of the Albanian tribes along the Servian frontier(') is causing 
much anxiety at the " Ballplatz," but it has come with little surprise there, as it has 
always been said here that trouble would come from the artificial frontier-line accepted 
by the London Conference for the Northern Albanian frontier. This line was accepted 
by Austria-Hungary as a concession to Eussia, but Count Berchtold all along never 
hid from me his conviction that it was a political mistake, if the Powers really wished 
to restore peace in the Balkans, to cut off Dibra, Djakova, Ipek and Prisrend from the 

(') [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Prime Minister. 
The endorsement is initialled bv Sir Edward Grey ] 

(2) [Carnock MSS., Vol. IX of 1913.] 

(3) [v. supra, pp. 14-6, No. 20.] 



19 



new State of Albania. By doing so the rural Albanian population who live on the 
Albanian side of the new frontier, have been cut off from their commercial centres and 
are, in a way, exposed to being starved out. According to trustworthy reports received 
here the Servian authorities have behaved with unspeakable cruelty towards the 
Albanian population, and they have been doinij all in their power to prevent the 
Albanians in Albania from carrying on their trade with places now on Servian 
territory. Servia no doubt hopes that by making Hfe intolerable to these people, she 
will force them little by httle to start a movement for annexation to Servia. The 
pressure brought to bear by Servia on the Albanian population must have been very 
drastic, otherwise so extended an insurrectionary movement would not have taken 
place so suddenly. This movement seems to be of a spontaneous local character, and 
not to have been inspired by the Provisional Government at Yalona, or by Essad 
Pasha. 

The latest news from Belgrade sounds serious, and Servia seems determined to 
mobiHze her army again and probably to seize the opportunity to carry on a regular 
war against Albania. There are rumours however that the reservists are refusing 
wholesale to come out for a third Balkan war, and should this news prove true, it may 
have a restraining effect on the Servian Government. It is also said here in well- 
informed circles that Roumania is disincUned to take part in a new Balkan war, and 
tliat Germany will use her influence at Athens to keep Greece quiet. Austria-Hungary 
is, I see, accused by the Eussian Press of ha\-ing fomented the Albanian turmoil, but 
I think there is little justification for this accusation, and I feel sure that Count 
Berchtold desires nothing better for the present than that there should be peace and 
quiet in the Balkans, especially now that the Austrian reservists have been disbanded 
and the large bill for the mobihsation has to be met. The present flutter in Northern 
Albania has already had a depressing effect in Austrian financial circles, and I learn 
from the Director of the Laenderbant that it may upset the negotiations which he is 
carrying on with a group of French Banks for the piu-pose of obtaining their financial 
support for carrying out a vast undertaking here, the construction of the Vienna 
Underground Eailway System. Nevertheless it must be remembered that in spite of 
the desire for peace which exists here. Count Berchtold may see himself compelled to 
take action should Servia do more than push the Albanian insurgents back across the 
Albanian frontier. A Servian war, carried on on purely Albanian soil will, I think, be 
tolerated here with dif&culty. The thing to do therefore is to make use of all possible 
pressure at Belgrade to make Servia understand that she must not make war on 
Albania, while recognising her right to repress the Albanian rising within her 
territory. Count Berchtold has told me repeatedly that in his opinion no diplomatic 
pressure will carry much weight with the Senian Government unless Russia clearly 
makes it understood that she will stand no further trouble in the Balkans. 

Count Berchtold continues to be attacked in the press and in society on account 
of what is called his indolence and inclination to allow matters to drift. It is 
recognized that he allows them to drift into a peaceful channel, and that the Balkan 
crisis has ended without a European war, but that is said to be due to his good luck 
and not to his capacity. In spite of these attacks and of his well-known indifference 
to office, I think his position — at least for the present — is secure. At his recent 
farewell audience of the Emperor, the latter said to the Eussian Ambassador, 
Monsieur de Giers, that he — the Emperor — belonged to a generation of Monarchs w-ho 
did not allow themselves to be controlled in their guidance of foreign affairs by 
newspaper articles and by so-called public talk, and that although he knew that 
Cotmt Berchtold was attacked the latter had his complete support and approval for 
the policy he had pursued during the Balkan crisis. I also learn from a very 
confidential source that Monsieur de Bilinski. the Common Minister of Finance, who 
has been intricruing to upset Count Berchtold and to get his succession, had determined 
to seize the opportunity at a recent audience he had with the Emperor, to vigorously 
expose to His Majesty the current complaints against Cotint Berchtold, but when he 
entered the room the Emperor probably suspected what was in Monsieur de Bilinski' s 
[3959] C 2 



20 



mind and His Majesty at once began an eulogy of his Foreign Minister which 
prevented that Minister's opponent of getting in a word of disparagement against 
Count Berchtold. 

Througliout the Balkan crisis endless little frictions have occurred between V lenna 
and Berlin? but none so serious as that which was caused by the German Emperor's 
telegram to the King of Roumania, congratulating him on the conclusion of the 
Bucharest peace. C') Since that occurrence a real coolness has existed between the two 
Allies and when I enquired of Count Berchtold a few days ago whether there was any 
truth in the statement which had appeared in the German press that the Emperor 
William would pay a visit to the Emperor Francis Joseph at Schoenbrunn next month, 
he replied shortlv that he had seen it so stated in the press but that he knew nothing 
whatever about it. The Emperor William is coming to Austria next month to shoot 
with the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and he seems to be very desirous of coming to 
Schoenbrunn to pay the Emperor a visit, but I learn from a private source that the 
latter is just now not at all desirous of discussing the political situation in the Near 
East with his Ally, for it seems that Germany has been recommending Austria- 
Hungary to cultivate good relations with Greece, Servia and Eoumania and thereby 
to help "draw these three countries into the orbit of the Triple Alliance. Here, on the 
contrary, there is a marked friendship for Bulgaria and it is also asserted that in 
formulating the foreign policy to be pursued by the Triple Alliance in the Near East, it 
is an understood thing that the wishes of Austria-Hungary shall prevail over those of 
Germany. 

Yours truly 

FAIRFAX CARTWRIGHT. 

{*) [r. Gooch tfr Temperlexj, Vol. IX (II), p. 979, No. 1229, end 2.] 



No. 24. 

Memorandum hy Sir A. Nicolson. 

E.G. 44558/30271/13/44. 

Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Office. September 27, 1913. 

The Italian Charge d' Affaires communicated to me today three telegrams. 

1. As to meeting of Commission of Control M. di San GiuUano had tel[egraphe]d 
to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna to urge C[oun]t Berchtold to expedite meeting of 
Commission. I told P[rin]ce Borghese that at last an Austrian delegate had been 
appointed, and that our delegate was leaving London on the 30th instant for Vallona. 

2. M. di San Giuliano suggested that the Powers should warn the Servian 
Gov[ernmen]t that their troops should not pass beyond the limits of those districts 
which had been allotted to them by the Powers. I told P[rin]ce Borghese that if all 
the Powers concurred in taking that step I presumed we should not stand aside. I 
pointed out that at present the Servians were engaged in endeavouring to regain 
possession of localities allotted to them by the Powers but which the Albanians had 
captured. Q[uer]y Tel[egraph] to Belgrade in sense desired — adding that no steps 
should be taken till all colleagues had been similarly instructed.f'j 

3. Italian Government had heard that an imposing demonstration of " many 
thousands" was being organized at Koritza to impress the Commission of delimita- 
tion with the popularity of Greek aspirations. M. di San Giuliano hoped 
representations would be made at Athens asking the Greek Government to discourage 
any such manifestations. I told him our Rep[resentati]ve would not hold himself 
aloof if all his colleagues were instructed — but that the representations would probably 
have little or no results and I sh[oul]d have thought the nerves of the Commission 



(1) [v. infra, p. 21, No. 26.] 



21 



would not be affected by organized demonstrations. Q[uer]y telegraph as desired to 
Athens with usual reservation. (-) 

A. N. 
E. G. 

MIMTES. 

Sir E. C rowe. 

In view of what we have heard to-day as to the attitude of the Greek and Servian 
Govf ernnien]ts respectively(^) on these two points, do you think these two telegrams are still 
necessary. 

H. N. 

Sept [ember] 29. 1913. 

Sir A. N'icolson thinks Yes. 

E. A. C. 

Sept [ember] 29. 

(-) [v. infra, p. 22. No. 27.] 

(^) [On September 29 two notes were communicated by the Servian Legation complaining 
of Albanian action beyond the frontier. (P.O. 44369/30271/13/44 ; 44372/30271/13/44.) The 
reference to the information as to the Greek attitude cannot be identified.] 



No. 25. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 

Belgrade. September 28. 1913. 
F.O. 44149 '30271 '13 '44. D. 12 Noon. 

Tel (No. 230.) E. 6-30 p.m. 

My Italian colleague has just seen Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs for the 
purpose of counselling prudence, under instructions from his Government. 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs gave him assurances that Servian action was 
purely defensive in its object and that Servia would act with great prudence, and that 
there was no intention of occupying Albanian territory or disregarding decision of 
Powers. 

This remarkable change of tone may, in the opinion of my Italian colleague, be 
attributed to three causes: (1) To influence of Prime Minister, who has now been 
apprised fully of situation and who is expected back shortly : (2) financial pressure 
by French banks, who may have threatened refusal of payment of further instalments 
of loan (see my despatch Xo. IoTm'i: and iS> to Bulgarian menace on frontier. 

It remains to be seen whether Servian Government will be able to control military 
party and keep troops from following Albanian troops across frontier fixed at London. 

(^) [Mr. Crackanthorpe's despatch (No. 157). D. September 9, R. September 13, 1913, stated 
that arrangements for a loan of £10,000,000 had been made between the Servian Government 
and a consortium of French Banks. £5,000.000 of this was " to be issued at the end of October, 
and the remainder at a suitable opportunity." A preliminary advance for the immediate use 
of the Servian Government was made on September 9. and a further advance was to be made 
on October 8. (F.O. 419SS 41988/13/39.)] 



No. 2G. 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe. 
F.O. 44.558 '30271/13/44. 

Tel (^0. 129.) Foreign Office. September 29, 1913, 7-15 p.m. 

Italian Gov[ernmen]t suggest that all Powers should warn Servian Gov[ernmen]t 
that their troops should not pass beyond limits of districts allotted to Sers'ia by 
Powers. 

You may act accordingly if all your colleagues are similarly instructed. 



22 



No. 27. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot. 



Tel' (No 131 ) ' Foreign Office, Seftemher 29, 1913, 7-15 p.m. 

' Italian Go'vrernmen]t learn that demonstration is being organized at Kontza ro 
impress Commission of Delimitation with popularity of Greek aspirations, and sugges 
that all Powers should ask Greek Gov[ernmen]t to discourage such maniftstations.f ) 
You may act accordingly if all your colleagues are similarly instructed. 

(1) [f. suvra, pp. 20-1, No. 24.] 



No. 28. 

Sir F. Carticright to Sir Edward Grey.(') 

Vienna, September 30, 1913. 

F.O. 44606/30271/13/44. 5" ^'11 

Tel. (No. 147.) . J^- p 

I learn from a confidential source that pourparlers are going on between Vienna 
and Rome on the subject of Albanian invasion of Servia and of its possible 
consequences.(^) I am informed that the Austro-Hungarian Government desire that 
Austria and Italy should bring pressure to bear on Belgrade together, whereas for the 
present the Italian Government prefer that the step should be taken collectively by 
the Powers. I am informed that up to last night no agreement had been arrived at on 
this point. The Austro-Hungarian Government maintain that unless Austria and 
Italy show at Belgrade that they are united and determined not to allow any alteration 
of the north-eastern frontier of Albania representations will have no effect on the 
Servian Government. 

(1) [This telegram was sent to Rome (as No. 290) ; to Paris (as No. 350) ; to Berlin (as 
No. 344); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 677).] 

(2) [cp. O.-U.A., VII, pp. .383-4, No. 8760; p. 390, No. 8768.] 



No. 29. 

Lord Granville to Sir Edward Grey.O 
F.O. 44824/33220/13/44. 

(No. 353.) Confidential. Berlin. D. September 30, 1913. 

Sir, R. October 2, 1913. 

As I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 167 of yesterday,(-) 
Herr von Jagow takes a very gloomy view of the situation in the Balkans. He thinks 
there is very little doubt that the Albanian movement against Servia is being 
engineered and probably directed by Turkey, and he told me that Baron von 
Wangenheim had reported that the direction of affairs in Turkey seemed to be passing 
more and more from Constantinople to Adrianople, where, it must be noted, Izzet 
Pasha was an Albanian. I saw the Servian Charge d'Affaires last night just after he 
had had an interview with Herr von Jagow and he told me that Herr von Jagow had 
made the same remark to him about Izzet Pasha. Herr von Jagow argues that the 

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 
(2) [Lord Granville's telegram (No. 167) of September 29, 1913, D. 2-35 p.m., R. 4 p.m., is 
not reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 44435/33220/13/44.)] 



28 



obvious object of the Turks in stirring up tlie Albanians against Servia is to keep the 
latter country fully occupied and to prevent her coming to the assistance of her ally 
if Turkey attacks Greece. This His Excellency thinks is almost certain : Turkey was 
so encouraged by her success in recovering Adrianople and a good slice of Thrace that 
she might well think herself capable of inflicting a severe defeat on Greece. If she 
succeeded in doing so, she would presumably take Cavalla at least, if not Salonica, 
insist on favourable terms on the Vakoufs and nationality questions and no doubt 
recover some of the Islands. Whether having captured Cavalla Turkey would hand 
it over to Bulgaria in exchange for Dedeagatch remained to be seen. Baron von 
Wangenheim had mentioned the Islands to the Grand Vizier, who had replied with 
protestations of his innocence of any idea of interfering with what lay in the hands 
of the Powers, but had added ' ' souruoisement ' ' that if the Powers gave all the Islands 
to Greece " c'est la guerre." 

I have, &c. 

GRANVILLE. 



No. 30. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 

Belgrade, October 2, 1918. 
F.O. 44950/30271/13/44. D. 2-5 p.m. 

Tel (No. 238.) R. 6-15 p.m. 

Your telegram No. 118 of Aug[ust] 9.(') 

My Austrian colleague made indi\-idual representations yesterday under instruc- 
tions. My French and Russian colleagues are as yet without instructions to make joint 
representations. My Austrian colleague received assurances similar to those given to 
my Italian colleague (see my telegram No. 280 of Sept[ember] 28). (^) 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs explained to me at length this morning 
present attitude of Servian Government in regard to Albania. He affirmed Servian 
military action to be purely defensive and disclaimed any ulterior design of annexing 
any portion of Albania. With a view to final (group, undecypherable) of Albanian 
revolt, Servian troops would probably be compelled to cross frontier fixed at London, 
and even perhaps occupy strategic positions to west of Black Drin, but he assured me 
occupation would be only provisional pending the establishment of order within 
Albania, and, above all, conclusion of peace between Greece and Turkey, which would 
set at rest Sendan fears of Turkish propaganda in Albania. 

His Excellency spoke of Turkish danger with considerable apprehension, and 
alluded with tears in his eyes to the injustice of request made by my Austrian colleague 
yesterday, (^) with which he hoped Powers would not associate themselves, and which 
was tantamount to requiring Ser\aan forces to keep a large amount of her army 
occupied in defending a weak and unprotected frontier at a moment when danger was 
threatening her from the east. 

After reading me telegram from Servian Charge d'Affaires in London stating 
attitude of His Majesty's Government was one of non-intervention, his Excellency 
urged strongly necessity of Powers exercising" some form of restraining influence on 
Turkey. Would not England, France, Germany, and Russia combine for this purpose? 
Or, failing this, could not advice be given at Bucharest to intervene actively on behalf 

(') [Sir Edward Grey's telegram (No. 118) of August 9, 1913, repeated a note from Count 
Mensdorff stating that Servian troops still occupied territory which would prevent Albanian 
tribes from reaching Djakova market. When his colleagues had been similarly instructed, 
Mr. Crackanthorpe was to request the Servian Government "to withdraw troops and to allow 
Albanians free and unconditional access to Djakova." (F.O. 35810/30271/13/44.)] 

(-) [v. supra, p. 21, Xo. 25.] 

(3) [cp. O.-U.A., VII, pp. 388-90, No. 8766.] 



24 

of peace? He had telegraplied last night to Servian Minister at Bucharest asking him 

to P^j^^^^g^^'^^^.-j^^gj^,. ^j^^^ ^^tjn^ Minister for Foreign Affairs is so preoccupied with 
Grffco-Turkish relations that everything else is for the moment forgotten, and that 
Servian troops will receive orders to occupy as quickly as possible al strategical 
positions necessary for protection of frontier, ostensibly to free bulk of troops for 
possible operations elsewhere. 

MINUTES. 

T*lpise sec ulso 44951 ("*) . i ^ 

The Russian' Charge d' Affaires told me yesterday that Russia had told Austria that she 
would not join in this step at Belgrade though she was wHling to g,ve friendly and moderating 
advice The Powers were responsible for Albania and it was unreasonable to expect Servia to 
abstain from measures of defence which Albanian action rendered necessary. 
As M Etter was going to see Sir E. Crowe I did not record what he said. 

H. N. 

Oct[ober] 3, 1913. 

R. P. M. 

Oct[ober] 3/13. 

It is not clear what is the Austrian demand referred to. It might perhaps be well to 



find out. Qu[ery] telegraph. ( 



(En clair) 



" Your telLegram] No. 238. ■ , ^,o,„6^ 

"What exactly is Austrian request referred to in third paragraph.'' (•>) 

E. A. C. 

Oct[ober] 3. 

A. N. 

(^) [Mr Crackanthorpe's telegram (No. 239) of October 2, 3913, D. 6-30 p.m., R. 11 p M 
stated that Rumania had promised to exercise pressure at Sofia and Athens, but had also asked 
for an explanation of Servian intentions in Albania. (F.O. 44951/30271/13/44.)] 

(5) [This teleo-ram was sent to Belgrade (as No. 131) of October 3. 1913.] 

(6) [Mr. Craclvanthorpe's telegram (No. 244) of October 4, 1913, stated that "Austrian 
representations drew attention to serious consequences of a military action against Albania 
which might contravene decisions Conference London and place Servia in contradiction 
therewith and which Servian Gov[ernmen]t might easily avoid by respecting rigorously those 
decisions." (F.O. 45261/30271/13/44.)] 



No. 31. 

Mr. O'Behne to Sir A. Nicohon.C) 

Private.!'^) 

Dear Sir Arthur, St. Petersburgh, October 2, 1913. 

Thank you very much for your letter of the 22nd ultimo(') and for your kind 
congratulations. 

There has indeed been a change for the worse in the political weather since I 
wrote to you a fortnight ago.(') You will have seen from my telegrams that in the 
Serbo- Albanian question Neratow has shown himself disposed to support Servia rather 
far, at any rate in theory. He approves of the Servians penetrating into Albania inj 
order to chastise the Albanians, and of their retaining strategical points after the 
military operations are concluded, as a precautionary measure. He also considers' 

(1) [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; to' 
Lord Crewe; to Lord Morley. The endorsement is initialled by Sir Edward Grey.] 

(2) [Carnock MSS., Vol.'lX of 1913.]. 

(3) [Not reproduced. It congratulated Mr. O'Beirne on his recent promotion to the rank' 
of Minister Plenipotentiary in the Diplomatic Service. Carnock MSS., Vol. VIII of 1913.] 

{*) [Not reproduced. This letter, dated September 18. 1913, referred mainly to the Persian . 
railway question, but also mentioned that "a flat calm prevails here in the "^oherc of foreign |; 
politics." Carnock MSS., Vol, IX of 1913.] | 



25 



that the Servians are entitled to claim territorial compensation from Albania, and 
when I suggested that this would bring them into collision with the decisions of the 
London Conference he maintained that since the Powers were responsible for the 
existence of Albania as a neutral State under their guarantee they could not dispute 
the right of another State, which had been the object of unprovoked attack from 
Albania, to recover compensation for the losses thereby caused. Thus in theory he 
sides with the Ser\-ians and approves of their intentions, but how far he will support 
them in practice is of course a very different matter. All I would feel safe in saying 
is that Russia would be inclined to do more for Servia than for any other of her former 
proteges in the Balkans. Neratow spoke of course on the assumption that the Servians 
would have no ditticulty in dealing with the Albanian rising, which does not now seem 
to be altogether clear. I need hardly say that he is thoroughly suspicious of Austria's 
present policy. He thinks that her aim is to create embarrassments for Ser\-ia and to 
use those embarrassments to bring pressure on Servia in negotiating the various 

questions economic and other that remain open between them ( ') 

Yours verv sincerelv. 

HUGH d'BEIENE. 

(^) [The omitted paragraphs refer to the degree to which Greece could depend on the 
support of Russia. France, or Servia, in the event of a conflict with Turkey, and to the 
question of Armenian reforms; but they add nothing of importance to information given 
elsewhere.] 



No. 32. 

Sir F. Carticright to Sir Edicard Grey. 

Vienna. October 6, 1913. 

F.O. 45559/30271 13 44. D. 8-25 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 151.) E. 10-5 p.m. 

I asked Austrian ^finister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether he could give me 
any information with regard to his recent interview with Ser\"ian Prime Minister. (M 
He said it was satisfactory as far as it went, but he could not guarantee sincerity of 
Sernan Prime Minister. Latter had assured him of desire of the Servian Government 
to live on a friendly footing with Austria, observing that now sanjak question was dead 
there was no cause for quarrel between the two countries. They had talked a good 
deal about commercial and railway questions in friendly but vague terms. I asked 
Minister for Foreign Affairs if Sen'ian Prime Minister had given any assurances that 
Serena would not invade Albania. Sen'ian Prime Minister seems to have ridiculed 
the idea of invasion, but. I understand, gave no formal assurance on this point. He 
seems, however, to have hinted that Servia desired rectification of Albanian frontier 
for strategical reasons. 

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once declared that he could admit of no 
alteration of the frontier established in London, and pointed out that frontier was a 
bad one. and that Djakova and other places ought strategically to belong to Albania. 
With regard to Albanian rebellion, Servian Prime Minister thought that it would soon 
be suppressed. 

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me confidentially that he was informed 
that Essad Pasha had declared that, should Ser^■ia invade Albania, he would do his 
utmost to help Provisional Government in resisting such invasion. 

(*) [M. Pasic had an interview with Count Berchtold in Vienna on October 3. cp. infra, 
pp. 28-9, Xo. 34. He returned to Belgrade on the 4th.] 



26 



No. 33. 

Mr. Crackanthorpc to Sir Edward Grey.(^) 
F.O. 46573/80271/18/44. 

(No. 176.) Belgrade, D. October 8, 1913. 

Sir, R. October 13, 1913. 

Since writing my despatch No. 168 Confidential of the 25th ultimo, (^) develop- 
ments have occurred which have tended to moderate, outwardly at least, the very 
uncompromising attitude previously taken at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in regard 
to the frontiers of Northern Albania and the withdrawal of the Servian troops from 
within those frontiers. The present tone towards Austria on this question is very 
different to that adopted only three weeks ago, and both in the reply given by the 
acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to the individual representations made in Belgrade 
by the Austrian Government requesting that the frontier fixed at London should be 
respected, and in the assurances given by Monsieur Pashitch in Vienna, there is ample 
evidence that the Servian Government feels it was getting out of its depth, and wishes, 
with much splash and display of innocent intention, to retreat into safer waters. 

The causes of this change of attitude appear to me to be twofold. In the firpt 
place the Servian Government has been and still is suffering from a very bad attack of 
nerves over Greco-Turkish relations. As a proof of this two Divisions and th3 
mountain artillery have been officially mobilized, while the Minister of War has 
received full latitude in regard to further mobihzation of which he has already availed 
himself to the extent of calling out the 1st ban[d]s of the Danube and Schumadia 
Divisions. There are now approximately 123,000 Servian troops on a war-footing. 
Eightly or wrongly the Servian Government believes there is some sort of a secret 
understanding between Turkey and Bulgaria in regard to action against Greece ; it is 
convinced that both Turkey and Bulgaria have connived in the Albanian uprising, and 
that Austria is secretly encouraging the whole band of conspirators. The fear has 
been lest Turkey should attack Greece before the Albanian revolt were quelled, and 
before the portion of the army engaged with Albania could be set free ; lest Bulgaria 
should at the same time by threatening the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier line keep a 
further portion of the Servian Army occupied for purposes of defence; and lest the 
Greek Army, in which Servia has no confidence, should in the absence of sufficient 
assistance from the allied force, suffer a serious and irredeemable reverse at the hands 
of the Turks. 

Faced with this eventuality, Servia has, as I had the honour to inform you by 
telegraph, made fervid appeals to Roumania to intervene both at Sofia and at 
Constantinople in the interests of peace. I understand that although the Roumanian 
Government does not apparently take so alarmist a view of the situation and does not 
believe in a secret Turco-Bulgarian understanding, yet it has consented to speak at 
Constantinople, to give warning at Sofia that the Treaty of Bucharest must not be 
upset, and to give friendly advice at Athens that the Greek Government should 
moderate its pretentions. The Servian Government, believing that Bulgaria may be 
mciting Turkey to action in the conviction that whatever the result of a Greco-Turkish 
war she would reap some territorial advantages either East or West, is now pressing 
the Roumanian Government to point out at Constantinople that owing to the attitude 
adopted by Roumania towards Bulgaria, the latter's hands are practically tied, and 
that Turkey would do well not to listen to the voice of the Siren. Finally, I am told at 
the Mmistry for Foreign Affairs that Servia has obtained from Roumania the positive 
assurance that m the event of Turco-Bulgarian attack on Greece and Servia, Roumania 
would mobihze and throw in her lot with them. The Servian Government though 
greatly reassured by Roumania's attitude, does not consider that the danger point is 
yet passed, and has more than once expressed to the Representatives of the Triple 
ii^ntente Rowers m Belgrade its earnest wish for intervention at Constantinople. 



27 



In spite of the great anxiety evinced at the Servian Foreign Office in regard to the 
Turkish danger, I cannot help feeling that its continuance and especially the report of 
Turkish connivance in the Albanian uprising have been made the most of in Belgrade 
in order to cover and justify the extensive IMilitary operations which have been 
undertaken against the Albanians. x\.s i-eported in my telegram No. 238 of the 
2nd instant, (^) ^Monsieur Spalaikovitch, the Acting ^Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
alluded in the most pathetic language to what he termed the injustice of the represen- 
tations made individually by the Austrian Cliarge d'Affaires on the 1st instant, (^) in 
which he trusted the other Powers would not associate themselves. These 
representations drew the attention of the Servian Government to the serious 
consequences of a military action against Albania which might contravene the decision 
of the Conference of London and place Servia in contradiction therewith. These 
consequences Servia might easily avoid by respecting rigorously those decisions. 
Monsieur Spalaikovitch told me he considered this request tantamount to requiring 
Servia, at a moment when serious danger was threatening her from the East, to keep 
a large portion of her army engaged in defending a frontier which, it is claimed, is 
naturally weak and unprotected. It is evident that the more dangerous the Albanian 
uprising can be shown to be, the stronger from her point of %'iew becomes Servia's case 
for a rectification of her frontier. 

Be that as it may, the Servian troops after driving back the Albanians, which they 
found no difficulty in doing, have been hurried back to the strategic positions within 
Albania some of which lie to the West of the Black Drin. What Servia intends to do 
now it is difficult to say. For the moment at any rate she will probably lie as low as 
is compatible with the fact that her troops are again out of bounds, and I come here 
to the second cause of the more conciliatory tone recently adopted by the Servian 
Government tov.ards Austria in the Albanian question. Various instalments of the 
loan recently contracted with the French Banks are due this month (see my despatch 
No. 157 of September 9(^) ). £480,000 are due in fact today and approximately 
£4,100,000 at the end of this month. Some days ago Monsieur Patchu, the Minister 
of Finance, received an unpleasant morning call from the Director of the Credit Serbe 
who informed him that the fulfilment of the loan contract would have to depend on 
Servia's good behaviour in Albania, and that if she meant to go to war with Albania 
supplies would be stopped. It thus became a material necessity to make every 
protestation of good intentions, and of the desire to conform to the decisions of the 
Powers. Whether these protestations are genuine remains to be seen. 

Reviewing generally the situation, there appears on the one hand to be no doubt 
that Austria and Servia sincerely wish not to have a quarrel, yet awhile at any rate, 
over Albania. In Austria a large and influential section of the commercial community 
desires good economic relations with Servia, and a truce to the hostile policy which 
has deprived Austria of her best and nearest customer. To this community it would 
doubtless appear positively unnatural that Austria should get mixed up in a quarrel 
with Servia over Albania. Then again Austria must recognize that to execute her 
wishes in Albania by force of arms would involve mobilization and a gi'eat expense 
which she is at present little able to defray. Servia on her side has, as I have indicated 
in previous despatches, a sincere desire for peace and for better relations with Austria. 
She considers this to be essential to the success of her task of internal consolidation. 

As against this must be set the fact that Servia is at present bent on obtaining a 
better strategic frontier in Albania by every means at her disposal. She claims that 
the only natural frontier, on both strategic and economic grounds, is the watershed 
between the Black Drin and the Adriatic; on strategic grounds, because without this 
frontier she vdW be exposed to constant and renewed attacks ; on economic grounds, 
because the trend of trade lies East and West of the Watershed, and because by cutting 
off large districts of Albania from the market towns by means of an artificial frontier 

(■■') [v. supra, pp. 23-4, No. 30, and min., and notes (^) and {■^).] 
(') [cp. supra, p. 24, No. 30, note (s).] 
(5) [cp. suprn, p. 21, No. 25, note (')■] 



28 



like that fixed in London, a perennial source of disturbance and discontent is created 
Unfortunately I have not found Servians amenable to the obvious reply that Djakova. 
Prizrend and Dibra might upon this score and with equal fairness have been given to 
Albania. 

A short time since there was much talk of Servia's claiming compensation from 
Albania for the attack made upon her, and this claim would it was said take a 
territorial form. For the moment this matter of compensation has been allowed to 
drop in conformity with the desire to pour as much oil as possible on the troubled 
waters, and the Servian Government has been approaching the Austrian Government 
with an offer of economic concessions in return for a rectification of the frontier. With 
this subject I am dealing in a separate despatch. 

Finally I should say that Servia is still waiting for Austria to show definitely her 
hand over the question of the Albanian frontier. This she will presumably do when 
the Powers are placed in presence of the fait accompli of the occupation by Servian 
troops of certain strategic positions within Albania. Judging from past experience, 
Servia would be surprised at nothing and though she would welcome a conciliatory 
disposition on the part of Austria, she hardly dares as yet to expect it. Behind 
everything looms the nebulous form of Russian Pan Sla\asm and the danger is alwaj-s 
present of unofficial influences being brought to bear from that quarter to stiffen 
Servia's back against Austria, with a special view to nip in the bud any chance of a 
real Austro- Servian rapprochement. 

I have, &c. 

DAYEELL CEACKANTHOEPE. 

Copy sent to Vienna. 

(^) [v. immediately succeeding document.] 



No. 34. 

Mr. Crackajithorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 
F.O. 46.574/45426/13/39. 

(No. 177.) Confidential. Belgrade, D. October 8, 1913. 

Sir, E. October 13, 1913. 

I have received private, and, I have reason to believe, reliable information to the 
effect that during Monsieur Pashitch's recent visit to Vienna(') the following proposals 
were made on the Austrian and the Servian sides respectively with a view to arriving 
at a general basis of understanding preliminary to the revision of the Austro- Servian 
Treaty of Commerce. 

The following were I hear the Austrian proposals : 

1. That Servia should complete the railway lines connecting with the Bosnian 
frontier at three points, viz : 

(a.) MiTRoviTZA-UvAC. It is proposed as I understand that this line should 
make a detour via Eashka to Slavlya, so as to avoid the difficult country between the 
latter place and Mitrovitza. 

(b.) UziTCHE-VlSHEGRAD. 

(c.) Valyevo-Loznitza. 

Of these three proposed connections, the first two are, in Austrian estimation, the 
most important. I understand Monsieur Pashitch to have intim.ated that the Servian 
Government would be glad to meet the Austrian Government in this respect. 

(2) That a reservation should be made in favour of Austria of a considerable 
proportion of the tobacco produced in the new Servian territories, in view of the 
advantages enjoyed by Austria in this respect under the Turkish regime. To this 
Monsieur Pashitch is said to have made no objection. 

(1) [v. supra, p. 25, No. 32, note (').] 



29 



(3> The abolition of the restrictions imposed at the commencement of the Balkan 
war under which Austrian industrial products were placed at a disadvantage in the 
matter of tenders for Government contracts and deprived of free competition with the 
products of other countries. 

(4' Most-favoured nation treatment on a basis of reciprocity. 

I am informed that, on his side. Monsieur Pashitch made the following proposals : 

(V Rectification of the Bosnian- Sennan frontier along the river Drina which 
appears to have recently altered its course. 

('2' Rectification of the Albanian frontier from a strategic point of view. I am 
told that Count Berchtold did not show any willingness to discuss this point, but 
stated that the Austrian Delegate on the Commission of DeHmitation would be 
instructed to ascertain in conjunction with his colleagues, the feeling of the local 
tribes, and that should such feeling be favourable, the matter would be considered. 
This would appear to be practically equivalent to a polite refusal to consider the 
Serbian request. 

(3 The purchase by Senia of the Orient Railway lines traversing Servian 
territory. This was. I believe, -merely discussed in principle. 

(4> The abolition of the prohibition to transport Ser\-ian live stock to Italy and 
elsewhere through Austria-Hungaiy. Monsieur Pashitch did not. as I understand, ask 
for any increase in the limit of live stock importable into Austria-Hungary under the 
existing Treaty, and I gather that Count Berchtold was inclined to view favourably 
the demand for faciUties in the matter of transit. 

I conclude that no definite decisions were come to as a result of the meeting, but 
that the ground has in some measure been prepared for the Austrian and Servian 
Delegates who are, I hear, to meet in Vienna towards the end of the present month. 
At present it looks as if the question of the Albanian frontier will prove the chief 
obstacle to a satisfactory understanding. 

I have, &c. 

DAYRELL CRACKAXTHORPE. 

Copy sent to Vienna. 

MINTTE. 

The answer given by Berchtold to M. Pashitch respecting a possible rectification of the 
North Albanian frontier is in strange contradiction with the abrupt demand now made (see 
47129^-^ ^ for the definite withdrawal of the Servian troops from the strategical points now 
in their occupation inside the Albanian frontier. 

E. A. C. 

Oct[ober] 17. 
E G 

(2) [r. infra, pp. 32-3, No. 3S.] 



lED. yOTE. — On October 11. 1913. Sir Eyre Crowe reported a conversation which he had 
held on that date with Count Mensdorff. The latter had described the anxiety of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government "to put an end to the friction which had arisen at Scutari. . . . 
Count Berchtold"s proposal,"' he said, is that with the assembly of the Committee of Control 
at Vallona on the 15th. the Commission of Admirals should be held automatically to expire, 
and that the administration of Scutari should continue in the hands of the several smaller 
bodies referred to, under the supreme authority of the Committee of Control. This would be 
a strictly temporary and transitory arrangement, and be without prejudice to any recommenda- 
tion which the Committee of Control might eventually make as to the superior authority to be 
charged definitely with the administration of the town as a whole." 

Sir Eyre Crowe told Count Mensdorff that he " would at once report this to Sir E. Grey," 
but that the proposal did not, as entirely as Count Mensdorff thought, meet "the views 
of H[is] Mfajesty's] G[overnment] as to not leaving the administration in suspense pending 
the report of the Committee of Control." Finally, " Count Mensdorff, before leaving, once more 
accentuated the importance of accepting the most friendly compromise thus suggested by his 
government, and said its rejection would have a most deplorable effect." (F.O. 46795/26171/ 
13/44.) cp. infra, pp. 33-4, No. 38, min.] 



30 



No. 35. 



Mr. Bering to Sir Edward Grey. 



F.O. 47317/26171/13/44. 
(No. 283.) 
Sir, 



Rome, D. October 14, 1918. 
E. October 18. 1913. 



As I had the honour to telegraph to you to-day,(*) I saw the Italian Minister for 
Foreign AfEairs this morning in order to communicate to him the substance of your 
telegram to Paris No. 365. (') in regard to the proposal of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment that the Commission of Admirals at Scutari should be dissolved as soon as the 
International Commission of Control should have assembled at Yallona. 

Marquis Di San Giuliano said that he would of course be obliged to consult the 
Austro-Hungarian Government, which he would do at once by telegraph. Meanwhile 
he would state his personal opinion that, as regards the officer to command the inter- 
national military contingents, it would be far preferable that he should be of British 
nationality and added that he was ready to recommend this at Vienna, feeling that the 
British character was the most suitable for such an appointment, which required an 
officer with calm and unprejudiced judgment, a quality which was essentially possessed 
by the British race. He did not know, however, whether the Austro-Hungarian 
Government could be induced to consent. He must nevertheless make the necessary 
stipulation that the officer selected should have the necessary military seniority, which, 
he understood, the officer at present commanding the British contingent did not 
possess. I remarked that I supposed that he could be given the requisite rank, if 
necessary, to which he replied that he would in that case have to be raised two grades 
at once, in order to be qualified. 

Referring to your condition that a civilian Governor or some chief authority 
should be appointed immediately by the Commission of Control, or in consultation 
with them, His Excellency observed that the Commission is due to meet to-morrow, 
and that it would be hard, and in fact next to impossible to find a civilian Governor at 
a moment's notice. I asked him whether he considered it of moment whether the 
Governor or other such functionary were an Albanian or a national of other European 
countries. Marquis Di San Giuliano replied that in his opinion either one or the other 

would do (^) The chief thing was to find a solution for to-morrow which would 

prevent Austria from committing some " coup de tete," as he feared she might do, if 
some solution were not found. I asked what it was that he apprehended, and he 
answered that he would deplore Austria's withdrawal of her Admiral and military 
contingent, which would inevitably be accompanied by the withdrawal of the German 
Naval Captain and military force. This eventuality ought to be avoided at any cost, 
as it would have a lamentable effect in the Balkans and in Europe generally. 

He agreed when I took this opportunity of observing that it appeared to me a 
highly regrettable principle to adopt that an International Commission could be broken 
ap by any one Power represented on it by the method of arbitrarily withdrawing its 
representative from the deliberations of the Commission solely because there was a 
difference of opinion between the delegates upon any one point, but Plis Excellency 
added that Austria appeared to be growing rather less intractable, and had alread}' 
given way upon several points, upon which she had insisted formerly, such as the Drin 
River Bridge question. He hoped therefore that she would be induced to abandon 

(1) [Mr. Bering's telegram (No. 176) of October 14, 1913, D. 4 p.m., R. 9 p.m., is not 
reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 46828/26175/13/44.)] 

(2) [Sir Edward Grey's telegram (No. 365) to Sir F. Bertie of October 13, 1913, D. 3-30 p.m., 
stated that he was prepared to agree to the proposal of the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
on condition that a civil Governor should be appointed to be in authoritv at Scutari. 
(F.O. 46365/26171/13/44.) The telegram was repeated to Rome (No. 308); to Berlin (No. 359); 
to St. Petersburgh (No. 696); to Vienna (No. 292). A copy was sent to the Admiralty for 
transmission to the Admiral at Scutari, cp. supra, pp. 17-8, Ed. note.] 

(3) [Two lines of personal comment are omitted here.] 



SI 



her intransigeant attitude, but thought it ad\-isable that she should not be pressed too 
far, for fear of what he had already staled. It was important that a modus vivendi 
should be speedily arrived at. I said that this was of course equally the desire of His 
Majesty's Government. Incidentally he informed me that the Austro-Hungarian 
delegate on the Commission of Control was due to leave Brindisi for Yallona to-day. 

In the course of conversation, Marquis Di San Giuliano referred to his 
memorandum on the subject of the work of the Admirals' Commission, copy of which 
I had the honour to forward to you yesterday in my despatch Xo. 282.' and said that 
it was quite unreasonable, under the circumstances, to maintain that a unanimous 
vote was necessary for any decision of the Commission to have effect, and that he had 
stronglv argued the matter at Vienna. All immediate precedents were against the 
Austro-Hungarian contention. 

I have. ic. 

HEEBEEI G. BERING. 

(*) [Mr. Bering's despatch (.No. 282), D. October 13, R. October 16, 1913, is not reproduced 
as its contents are suflSciently indicated above. (F.O. 46988/26171/13/44.) cp. sxipra, pp. 17-8, 
Ed. note ] 



No. 36. 

Sir Edicard Grey to Mr. Crachanthorpe.{^) 

F.O. 46871 30271 13 44. 
■ No. 63. 

Sir, Foreign Office. October 15, 1913. 

The Italian Charge d' Affaires informed Sir E. Crowe on the 10th instant that 
the Itahan Representative at Belgrade had been instructed to make in the most 
friendlv manner a communication to the Servian Government begging them to make 
a declaration to the effect that if, in the course of the present frontier troubles, the 
Servian Government had to occupy portions of Albanian territory, they did so only 
pro\"isionally, and for strategical reasons. 

Don Livio Borghese added that the Italian Government hoped that you might be 
similarly instructed. 

You are authorised to make the proposed communication if all your colleagues 
receive similar instructions. 

I am, icQ. 

[E. GREY.] 

(1) The draft was signed by Sir Eyre Crowe for Sir Edward Grey. A minute initialled 
by Sir Edward Grey authorized its despatch. A note was sent to Prince Borghese to inform 
him of the above instruction.] 



No. 37. 

.Vr. Crackanthor-pe to Sir Edicard Grey. 

F.O. 47023 26171 13 44. Belgrade, D. October 15, 1913, 10 p.m. 

Tel. No. 255.' R- October 16, 1913, 8 

Albania. 

Austrian Charge d' Affaires tells me that he is now con\-inced that Servian 
Government intends by every means in its power to make occupation of strategical 
positions permanent. He apprehends that a situation very dangerous to future 
Austro- Servian relations will shortly arise and believes outside influences are 
supporting Servian Goverrmient in its pretensions. 



32 

Government organ publishes to-night a communique to the effect that Servian 
troops have received orders to advance no further in Albania but that they will 
continue to occupy strategical positions until security of frontier is guaranteed and 
question of delimitation is finally decided, and thinks, in the event of any further 
attacks on part of Albanians, the Servian troops received orders to act only on the 
defensive. 

(Last paragraph repeated to Admiral at Scutari.(')) 

MINUTES. 

The outside influences referred to are presumably Russian. 

H. N. 

Oct[ober] 16, 1913 
R. P. M. 

Oct[ober] 16/13. 

I fancy the Austrian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade is by force of tradition and circum- 
stances alwavs seeing evil designs. 

E. A. C. 

Oct[ober] 16. 
A. N. 

We cannot countenance any designs contrary to decisions at Ambassadors' Conference in 
London. 

E. G. 

(1) [cp. supra, pp. 17-8, Ed. note.'\ 



No. 38. 

SivE. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 

Berlin, October 16, 1913. 

F.O. 47129/30271/13/44. D. 3-40 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 180.) K. 4-45 p.m. 

Servia and Albania. 

Acting Secretary of State has just read me a telegram which he has received from 
Vienna containing a message from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the 
following effect : Austro-Hungarian Government had sent a strongly worded repre- 
sentation to the Servian Government pointing out that the decisions of the London 
Conference with regard to Albanian frontier must be respected and that Servian troops 
should be retired to beyond that frontier. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' 
message added that unless he received a speedy and satisfactory answer from the 
Servian Government he intended to follow up his representations by fixing a time for 
the retirement. He trusted that in this procedure he would receive support of German 
Government. He hoped that moral support would be all that would be required, but 
Austro-Hungarian Government was in this matter quite determined not to give way. 
This resolution on the part of Austro-Hungarian Government had the full approval of 
the Emperor of Austria. (^) 

Acting Secretary of State was much perturbed, and said that everything must be 
done to prevent Austria-Hungary, who, he feared, was only too anxious to settle scores 
with Servia, from taking separate action. If she did, Bulgaria would almost certainly 
attack Servia in the rear, and no one could foresee where matters would stop. 

He had at once telegraphed to Belgrade advising retirement of troops. 

He hoped that you would recognise the gravity of the situation, giving similar 
advice, and, moreover, do what you could to persuade others to do so. 

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 370) ; to Rome (as No. 312) ; to Vienna (as 
No. 295) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 705) ; to Belgrade (as No. 133). A conversation between 
M. de Fleuriau and Sir Eyre Crowe on this subject is recorded in D.D.F., 3"" Ser., Vol VIII 
pp. 436-8, No. 347.] ' 

(2) [cp. G.P., XXXVI (I), pp. 384-6.] 



83 



He gave me to understand that he was also addressing the French and Kussian 
Governments on the subject, but that he should not use quite such plain language as 
he had used to me. 

He is also sending you a message through the German Charge d'A£Eaire8.(^) 

MINUTES. 

Sir E. Grev. 

This only reaches me as your pouch is leaving. 

It seems to me quite wrong that Austria should address an ultimatum to Servia, without 
consulting or at least informing us, in order to enforce a decision arrived at by the 
Ambassadors' conference. This is tantamount to breaking up the concert without any warning. 

There is a good deal of force in the Servian contention that so long as the border tribes 
are restless, not to say on the actual war-path, and there is no Albanian authority to keep 
order among them or prevent them from raiding Servian territory, Servia cannot equitably 
be asked to withdraw her military posts from those strategical points which dominate the 
frontier. 

But whether this view be accepted or not, Austria does wrong to precipitate a conflict 
without even telling the other Powers. This is not straight-dealing. 

E. A. C. 

Oct[ober] 16. 

Herr von Kiihlmaun called to-day to speak in the sense foreshadowed in this telegram. 
He laid stress principally on Herr von Jagow's earnest desire to prevent the Austro-Servian 
relations reaching a crisis. He had therefore instructed the German Representative at 
Belgrade to urge upon the Servian government the necessity of meeting the Austrian demand 
by giving binding assurances that Servia, even if she could not withdraw her forces at once 
from the strategical position occupied in Albanian territory, definitely recognized the 
boundaries fixed by the Ambassadors' Conference, and that her troops would be withdrawn 
behind that frontier as soon as this was possible. Herr von Kiihlmann thought it ought not 
to be difficult by united pressure at Belgrade to obtain satisfactory assurances to this effect. 

I asked whether he was quite sure that this was what Herr von Jagow had in mind. 
Because, I told him, the telegraphic report we had received from Sir E. Goschen described the 
step taken by Herr von Jagow as an instruction to the German legation at Belgrade 
'■ advising retirement of troops." I had read this to mean that the Servians were to be 
requested to withdraw their troops from the strategical points referred to at once, and there 
seemed to me some force in the contention of the Servian gov[ernmen]t that, so long as there 
was no authority in Albania able to enforce peace and order on the border tribes and prevent 
such incursions into Servian territory as had been witnessed recently, it was not equitable to 
demand that Servia should abstain from keeping order herself by the only means in her power. 

Herr von Kiihlmann was positive that Herr von Jagow's instructions did not imply the 
immediate withdrawal of the Servian forces, but some really definite arrangement ensuring its 
ultimate withdrawal. I said this would in my opinion materially facilitate the position, and 
would probably enable Sir E. Grey to use his influence in the desired direction. For it was 
entirely conformable to our view that the boundaries as laid down by the Ambassadors' 
Conference should be integrally respected. 

Herr von Kiihlmann hoped Sir E. Grey would telegraph to Belgrade soon, as this would 
offer the only means of avoiding the presentation of an Austrian ultimatum with a time limit. 
I have drafted a telegram to Mr. Crackanthorpe, which I submit herewith. (^^ 
Soon after Herr von Kiihlmann had left me. Count Mensdorff called, merely, he said, to 
thank me for having clearly explained to Sir E. Grey his important communication made last 
Saturday (Oct[ober] 11) respecting the Admirals' imbroglio at Scutari. (^) He said he had no 
important news. I asked him what were his reports from Servia, and mentioned to him that 
the Servian Charge d'Affaires had told me with great satisfaction yesterday morning of the 
excellent result which Monsieur Pashitch's conversations with Count Berchtold had had at 
Vienna. According to the Servian Charge d'Affaires there had been a most welcome detente. 

Count Mensdorff replied that unfortunately the good impression made at Vienna by 
M. Pashitch's utterances there, had been a good deal counteracted by the foolish language he 
had since used in talking to the Austro-Hungarian Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade. He now- 
talked of the right of Servia, as of every State, to take advantage of favourable political 
opportunities to enlarge the national boundaries, and clearly intimated an intention to insist 
on a rectification of the Northern Albanian boundary. 

I asked Count Mensdorff whether this was not natural in view of what Count Berchtold 
had said to Mons[ieur] Pashitch in regard to the possibility of considering the question of a 
rectification of the frontier, should the feeling of the local tribes be favourable I read out 

(3) [cp. G.P., XXXVI (I), p. 3S9, p. 391, p. ;}94 ] 
(*) [cp. infra, pp. 3&-7, No. 43, and min., and note (i).] 
(^) [cp. iupra, p. 29, Ed. note.} 

I) 



[89591 



84 



the passage in Mr. Crackanthorpe's despatch No. 177 (46574) dealing with this point (the 
second of the proposals mnde by M. Pashitch).(^) 

Count Mciisdorff doubted whether Count Berchtold really intended to give any opening 
for a reconsideration of the frontier question, although he was apt to express himself so 
politely that perhaps M. Pashitch misunderstood him. 

1 suggested that it might be worth while to dissipate any possible misunderstanding by 
a more precise statement of the Austrian position. 

Count Mensdorff then said that he had really no instructions to discuss this matter at all, 
and all that he had said must be regarded as quite private and confidential. He might possibly 
receive instructions to speak to Sir Edward Grey on the subject in a few days time. 

In these circumstances I thought it better not to mention the fact that we had heard 
from Berlin of the Austrian representations at Belgrade and the threatened ultimatum. 

E. A. C. 

Oct[oberj 17. 

I am telegraphing about this.(') 

E. G. 

18.10.13. 

(6) [v. supra, pp. 28-9, No. 34.] 
(') [v. infra, pp. 36-7, No. 43.] 



No. 39. 

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 

VaJona, October 16, 1913. 
F.O. 47130/14809/13/44. D. 7 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 6.1 E. 10 p.m. 

Commission at its preliminary meeting to-day (-) discussed question of delegate 
of Albania, and decided to submit to their respective Governments following 
alternatives, viz. : either to invite existing local authorities at Yallona and Durazzo 
and Scutari to submit names of two competent persons, between whom it should draw 
lots, or simply leave nomination of Albanian delegate to Provisional Government 
here. 

The latter, which is Austrian proposal, would in my opinion damn the Commission 
in the eyes of two-thirds of Albania. I am strongly of opinion that we ought to have 
appearance of consulting the whole country. 

Please let me know your views. (^) 

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 375); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 710); to 
Berlin (as No. 370); to Vienna (as No. 301); to Rome (as No. 318); with the addition in a 
subsequetit telegram that His Majesty's Government preferred the first alternative for the 
reason given by Mr. Lamb.] 

(2) [cp. supra, p. 1, Ed. note.~\ 

(3) [Mr. Lamb's despatch (No. 2), D. October 16, R. October 22, 1913, gives further details, 
but is not reproduced for reason of space. (F.O. 48019/14809/13.)] 



No. 40. 

Communication from M. Gruic. 

Diclaration du Gouvernement Serhe. 

Legation Royale de Serbie, Londres, 
F.O. 47119/30271/13/44. le 16 octobre 1913. 

L'armee serbe — ayant chasse les bandes albanaises du territoire serbe et ayant 
occupe les positions strategiques indispensables pour la defense du territoire' du 
Eoyaume contre de nouvelles incursions — a recu I'ordre de s'arreter, et de ne plus 
penetrer dans le territoire albanais. Elle y restera, provisoirement, en attendent 
I'etablissement des conditions garantissant la paix sur la frontiere, et la demarcation 
definitive de la frontiere serbo-albanaise.(*) 

(1) [v. supra, pp. 31-2, No. 37, and infra, immediately succeeding document.] 



35 



Comme I'Albanie est toujonrs encore en proie a I'anarchie, et qu'il n'v a pas de 
pouvoir assez fort et respecto pour imposer la paix, laquelle pourrait facilement etre 
troubk'e par de nouvelles agressions, — I'armee serbe a recu I'ordre de se borner a 
refouler I'ennemi, le cas echeant. 



No. 41. 

Mr. Crackant'tiorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 

Belgrade, October 17, 1913. 
F.O. 47278/30271/13/44. D. 5 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 256.) Confidential. E. 7 -30 p.m. 

Albania. 

On 15th October Austrian Charge d'Affaires made, under instructions, strong 
representations to Servian Government requesting Servian troops to be outside frontier 
fixed at London within a brief .delay, failing which Austro-Hungarians would be 
eompelied to take such measures as may appear appropriate. German Minister has 
now received instructions to support these representations. (-) 

Austrian Charge d'Affaires, though showing diffidence in pronouncing on Ser\-ian 
reply, gave me to understand that he considered it unsatisfactory and evasive.(^) 

He tells me that Servian outposts are now at Oroshi, while troops have advanced 
into Albania in three columns, one being now consolidated in neighbourhood of Orosiii, 
another some 30 kilom. north of Elbassan, and thu'd approximately same distance east 
of latter town on Skumbi. 

He tells me that orders to cease advance (see my immediately preceding telegram 
of OctTober] 15(*) ) were issued in presence of fact that Servian troops were advancing 
on ? Elbassan. 

He believes that, failing unanimous pressure from Powers, which he fears may 
be difficult to obtain owing to attitude of Eussian Minister, Servia will only withdraw 
troops when confronted with Austrian mobilisation on Bosnian frontier, the desire 
being to make compliance with Austrian wishes as expensive as possible to monarchy 
(I gathered that he lias telegraphed this to his Government). (^j But he tells me that 
if Austria had to mobilise again it would not be for nothing. 

(>) [ip. supra, pp. 32-3. No. 38.] 

[v. G.F., XXXVI (I), p. 3SS.] 
(3) [u. immediatelj- preceding document.] 
(*)[f. supra, pp. 31-2, No. 37.] 

(5) [cp. 0.-U..-L., VII, pp. 435-6. No. 8328; pp. 442-5, Nos. 8834-6.] 



No. 42. 

Sir E. Goschcn to Sir A. Nicolson.{^) 

Private.(-) 

My dear Nicolson, Berlin, October 17, 1913. 

Thank you very much for your letter just received. (^) 

You take a brighter view of the situation than I do — but then when you wrote 
you had not got my telegram of yesterday. (^) A great deal depends now on the attitude 
of Russia — and Hartwig. For according to the telegram read to me yesterday by 

(') [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Prime Minister. The 
eudorseiiieut is initialled by Sir Edward Grey. J 
(^) [Carnock MSS., Vol. IX of 1913.] 

(') The reference is to Sir A. Nicolson's letter of October 14. It is not reproduced as it 
does not give any information on political questions other than that obtained elsewhere. 
Carnock MSS., Vol. IX of 1913. j 

{*) If. supra, pp. 32-3, No. 38, and 7iote (,-).] 

[8959] D 2 



36 



Zimmermann the Austrians appear not only to be very excited but to mean business. 
Zimmermann read the telegram to me in German very fast — and with so much 
gesticulation that it was not possible to hear it all. But what I did hear made an 
unpleasant impression on me particularly the words "In diesem Fall werden wir 
nicht nachgeben " and also those to the effect that unless they received a speedy and 
satisfactory answer they would fix a " Frist ' ' which in plain language means send an 
ultimatum. It struck me as rather emphatic that Berchtold should go out of his way 
to say that the procedure which he had indicated had the full approval of the Emperor 
Francis Joseph. 

Zimmermann was so excited that in reading the telegram to me, he forgot to 
omit a sentence in the telegram which said that " the Servians instigated probably by 
Russia and France had advanced into Albania." He half stopped but had gone too 
far — so he finished the sentence and said " This is between ourselves." 

He urged the necessity of all the Powers acting together and doing all they could 
to persuade Servia to withdraw her troops. " After all," he said, " the Powers fixed 
the frontier and it is all their business to see that their decisions are respected — so 
there should be no difficulty in their acting together in an endeavour to prevent the 
situation arriving at a point at which Austria might feel herself justified in 
interfering." He added that unless we all put our shoulders to the wheel in a 
determined effort to persuade Servia to withdraw her troops — we should be very much 
as we were before the Conference of Ambassadors in London. 

I don't feel that the danger of Bulgaria falling, in case of trouble, on Servia's 
rear, is so great as Zimmermann appears to think. Other people seem to think that it 
will be some years before Bulgaria can make any great military effort and that above 
all the Bulgarian peasants are sick and tired of fighting. 

The Servian question is serious but I can't help thinking that, unless she is 
encouraged from any quarter, it will not be so very difficult to induce her to retire 
from her advanced positions (^) 

Yours very sincerely, 

W. E. GOSCHEN. 

(*) [The omitted paragraphs refer to the Greco-Turkish negotiations, the Mgean Islands 
and other matters not relevant to the present chapter. They add nothing of importance to 
information given elsewhere.] 



No. 43. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.C) 
F.O. 47129/30271/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 367.) Foreign Office, October 18, 1913, 2-10 p.m. 

Your tel[egram] No. 180 of Oct[ober] 16.(') 

Separate action by Austria before even consulting other Powers makes things 
very difficult.(') The usual course would be not to take separate action till after some 

(>) [This telegram was repeated as follows in accordance with Sir Edward Grey's 
instructions :—" Repeat to Paris (No. 371) and to St. Petersburgh (No. 706)— saying 'In reply 
to a communication from German Gov[ernmen]t, which has I understand been addressed to 
French and Russian Gov[ernmen]ts I am replying in the terms of my tel[egram] No. 367 to 

Berlin which I am repeating to you. You should inform M[inister for] r[oreign] 

A[ffairs] and ask his views.' 

Repeat to Vienna (No. 296) ' for information only ' 

Repeat to Belgrade (No. 134), adding 'You should advise Servian Gov[ernmen]t 
accordingly. The instructions to inform Ministers for Foreign AflFairs in the various 
capitals were sent in separate telegrams, normally numbered in sequence In the case of 
iielgrade the instructions were in telegram (No 136) 1 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 32-3, No. 38.] ' 

(3) [cp. infra, p. 38, Ed. note.] 



87 



attempt and failure to obtain co-operation of other Powers. For Austria to present an 
ultimatum to Servia and then to demand the support of other Powers is in a sense to 
confront the Powers with an ultimatum. 

Apart from this I think Servia has some ground of complaint owing to delay of 
the Powers in establishing any settled Gov[ernmen]t in Albania. 

I am however prepared to support at Belgrade the decisions of the Ambassadors' 
Conference in London respecting frontier between Albania and Servia, and to advise 
Servian Gov[ernmen]t to give an assurance that Servia will respect that frontier and 
that her troops have only crossed it as an emergency measure and will be withdrawn 
at the earliest practicable moment. 

MINUTE. 

I have drafted this to save time in case of need.(*) But should there come further 
information or any new development that makes it desirable to reconsider this to-morrow 
Sir A. Nicolson or Sir E. Crowe can suspend action or modify or adapt my drafts in acting 
upon them. 

E. G. 
17.10.13. 

(*) [cp. supra, p. 33, No. 38, min.] 



No. 44. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 

Belgrade, October 18, 1913. 

F.O. 47498/30271/13/44. D. 3-30 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 258.) E. 6-15 p.m. 

Albanian frontier. 

Your despatch No. 63 of Oct[ober] 15.(M 

I asked Russian Minister this morning whether he had received similar instruc- 
tions. He said he had not, and seemed to think these representations unnecessary, 
since he considers reply to Austrian representations made on 15th October, 
emphasising the fact that military action was now purely defensive, and that 
occupation was provisional pending final settlement of frontier, as being entirely 
satisfactory, and disposing of any suspicion that Ser\ia wished to make occupation 
permanent. He read me a telegram he was sending to his Government in this sense. 
To my remark that Austrian Government did not apparently view Ser\nan reply with 
equal satisfaction, and was apparently unwilling to cede an inch of territory in 
Northern Albania, he replied that he believed that Austria was in reality ready to 
strike a bargain and to squeeze economic concessions out of Servia in return for 
rectification of frontier. He said, moreover, that some latitude must necessarily be 
given to frontier commissioners, who would be in position to judge on the spot 
adequacy of paper frontier drawn up in London. 

He assured me earnestly that Servian Government strongly desired peace, and 
was not out on an adventure. I believe these assurances of Russian Minister to be a 
genuine expression of his opinion so far as Servian Government is concerned ; but 
military party must be reckoned with, and danger lest Servian Government may be 
unable, in the face of public opinion and recent Albanian uprising, to withdraw troops 
from Albania until such indefinite time as internal order is established, and lest 
Austria may, in the meantime, lose patience. 



(1) [v. supra, p. 31, No. 36.] 



38 

MINUTE. 

Of course M. Hartwig w[oiil]d be without instructions and w[oul]d think them unneces- 
sary. But the matter has moved beyond this now, and more is required of the Servian 
Gov[ernmen]t than the rather anodyne Italian formula. 

R. G. V. 

Octfober] 20. 
R. P. M. 

Octrober] 20/13. 
E. A. C. 

Oct[ober] 20. 



[ED. NOTE. — On October 18. during Count MensdorfF's temporary absence through illness, 
a communication was handed to Sir Eyre Crowe by Baron Gautsch. It was a copy of a very 
long telegram from Count Borchtold to Count Mensdorff, sent also to the other Embassies in 
Europe. The text is given in O.-U.A., VII, pp. 455-7, No. 8854. The communication included 
the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia, which was communicated at Belgrade 
at noon on the 18th. cp. infra, p. 39, No. 45; pp. 41-3, No. 49; pp. 43-4, No. 50; cp. also G.P., 
XXXVI (I), pp. 397-8. 

The following minute records Sir Eyre Crowe's conversation with Baron Gautsch 
(F.O. 47474/30271/13/44): — 



MINUTE. 

This paper was handed to me by Baron Gautsch. who said Count Mensdorff was laid up 
with a chill, but hoped to see Sir E. Grey at this office as early as convenient on Monday to 
discuss the grave situation disclosed in the present communication. I said I would at once 
submit it to Sir E. Grey. I asked whether Baron Gautsch could give me any further 
information to explain this sudden threat of war on Austria's part. It seemed at first sight 
difficult to understand what were the particular circumstances that were considered to justify 
this breaking loose from the Concert of the Powers in order to seek a solution singlehanded 
of a question hitherto treated as concerning all the Powers. I also asked on what date the 
ultimatum was presented. Failing this information it was impossible to say whether 
it was not proposed to go to war to-morrow, or whether it was intended to give the British 
time even merely to consider the situation thus created or not. 

I further enquired whether the Austro-Hungarian government had considered the question 
what to do in case the Servian government after complj-ing with the Austrian ultimatum found 
their territory invaded by Albanian bands. Did Austria contemplate giving Servia a guarantee 
that the Albanians on their part would keep the peace and remain within their borders? 
And if so what were the means at Austria's disposal to enforce such a guarantee? 

To all these questions Baron Gautsch said, almost apologetically that neither he nor Count 
Mensdorff knew anything at all beyond what was in the telegram. 

He asked me in turn whether I would express any views. I said no, I could only refer 
the communication to Sir E. Grey, adding that Baron Gautsch was unable to give any further 
information or explanations. 

I asked him however to inform Count Mensdorff that as a result of his conversation with 
me yesterday, which I had reported to Sir E. Grey, Sir Edward has once more sent instruc- 
tions to Mr. Crackanthorpe to give good advice to the Servian Government; and I told him 
the substance of those instructions(i) (not of the explanations to be given at Berlin). 

E. A. C. 

October 18 

Sir Edward Grey added a note that he would see Count Mensdorff on the following Monday, 
i.e., the 22nd. {v. infra, pp. 44-5, No. 51.)] 



(1) [v. supra, pp. 36-7, No. 43, note (').] 



39 



No. 45. 



Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.{') 



F.O. 47493 '80271/13/44. 
Tel. (No. 260.) 



Belgrade, October 19, 1913. 

D. 3 P.M. 

E. 5-30 P.M. 



Albania. 

Your telegram No. 134 of October 18.(*) 

I am to see Servian Prime Minister to-morrow, and meanwhile spoke to Under- 
Secretary- of State for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your tel[egTam] No. 13G of 
October 18.(=) 

Under-Secretary of State repeated pre\-ious assurances that Servian Government 
would respect frontier when finally marked out, and said in this connection that 
instructions were being sent to Ser\-ian representatives to beg Powers to consider 
favourably slight rectification of frontier. Should this request, however, be refused, 
Servian Government would bow to wishes of Powers. 

Under-Secretary of State then told me that note had been received yesterday 
afternoon from Austrian Legation demanding complete evacuation of Albania within 
eight days, failing which Austria would take necessary measures to enforce demand. 
In reply to my enquiry as to what answer would be given to this note, Under-Secretary 
of State informed me that a Council of Ministers was at present considering it, but 
that in his personal opinion Servian Government would be obliged to yield. 

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as N'o. 374) ; to Rome (as No. 316) ; to Berlin (as 
No. 369); to Vienna (as No. 300); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 709); "for information."] 

(2) [i: supra, p. 36, No. 43, note (i).] 



Austria and Servia. 

I communicated to Acting Secretary of State substance of your telegram No. 367 
of OctTober] 18.(') He acknowledged that your point of view was quite correct. 
Austria had acted at Belgrade, both as regards her first representations(-) and now the 
ultimatum, (^) without even pre\"ious consultation with Germ.any. She had merely 
stated what she was going to do and had done it, but as the ultimatum had gone in it 
was now impossible for Germany to adWse her to give way, both because addce would 
not be followed, and because it was not in Germany's own interest that her ally should 
send in an ultimatum and then retreat from it. He had been surprised that the 
Emperor of Austria had endorsed a policy which, under certain circumstances, might 
lead to serious consequences, but he had done so, and that made it clearer still that 
restraining ad\-ice at Vienna on the part of Germany was out of the question. I said 
that Austria seemed to have deliberately shut her eyes to the possible consequences of 
her precipitate and inconsiderate action. Acting Secretary of State replied that she 
was evidently gambling for her position as Great Power, and on the chance that 
Eussia, where Pan-Slavist influence was on the wane, would discourage Ser%-ia from 
pitting herself against Austria. 



No. 4G. 



Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. 



F.O. 47492/30271/13/44. 
Tel. (No. 184. 



Berlin, October 19, 1913. 

D. 4-36 P.M. 

E. 5-30 P.M. 



(1) [r. supra, pp. 36-7, No. 43.] 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 32-4, No. 38, and min.] 
(') [r. supra, p. 38, Ed. note.} 



40 



He considered advice you proposed giving at Belgrade was now too late. He 
disliked the idea of separate action on the part of Austria as much as anyone; only 
hope of avoiding it was the immediate withdrawal of the Servian troops, which he 
thought could be secured if the Powers responsible for the London decisions spoke 
strongly enough at Belgrade. (^) 

(*) [v. supra, pp. 36-7, No. 43; infra, p. 41, No. 48.] 



No. 47. 

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey. 

Vienna, October 20, 1913. 
F.O. 47800/30271/13/44. D. 8-5 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 156.) E. 10-15 p.m. 

Count Berchtold told me to-day(') that step he had taken at Belgrade was forced 
upon him by evasive attitude of Servian Government. (-) He had given repeated 
warnings to Servian Government that they must not allow their army to cross 
frontier. They not only had done so, but were putting forward one reason after 
another in justification of their action. When Servian Prime Minister was recently in 
Vienna. (^) Count Berchtold had impressed upon him that Austria-Hungary would stand 
no trifling in matter of Albanian frontier. He had then made what appeared to be a 
reassuring declaration, but as soon as he got back to Belgrade he took no heed of it. 
Austria-Hungary was country nearest Albania, and one most interested in her fate, 
and it was therefore incumbent on Austria-Hungary to see that decisions taken by 
European Powers in London were upheld. Austria-Hungary had yielded with regard 
to Djakova and other places in order to maintain European concert unbroken, but she 
could not tolerate that such territory as she had saved for new State of Albania should 
be encroached upon by Servia. Count Berchtold' s action did not mean that he wished 
to break away from European concert, and he was merely trying by a categorical 
declaration to make the Servian Government understand that they must abide by 
decisions of London Conference. Count Berchtold told me that his action was 
supported at Belgrade by Italy and Germany, and he hoped it would be supported by 
other Powers. 

I pointed out to Count Berchtold that, though almost all Powers sympathised with 
aim of Austrian action, manner in which it was done without consulting other Powers 
seemed to me, however, to be too precipitate. He replied that it was only by Austria 
clearly indicating that she would stand no more evasive replies from Servian Govern- 
ment that she could induce them to give way to the will of Europe. 

Count Berchtold expressed himself to me as fairly confident that Servia will yield, 
and Italian Ambassador, whom I also saw, is of the same opinion. 

(1) [cp. O.-U.A., VII, pp. 486-7, No. 8899.] 

(2) [cp. supra, p. 38, Ed. note.] 

(3) \_v. supra, p. 25, No. 32, note (i) ; pp. 28-9, No. 34.] 



41 



No. 48. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.C) 

F.O. 48212/30271/13/44. 
(No. 312.) 

Sir, Foreign Office. October 20. 1913. 

I told Herr von Kiihlmann to-day (=) of the advice that we had given in Belgrade 
about respecting the Albanian frontier and withdrawing the Serdan troops from 
Albanian territory at the earliest practicable moment. The Austrian Government, 
however, had since dehvered an ultimatum.(*) On this, I had to observe that there 
was always a risk, when one Power took separate action without discussion with the 
others, that it might break up agreement between the Powers. 

Herr von Kiihlmann observed that he thought the Austrian Government had 
information to the effect that Servian troops were much further into Albanian territory 
that the Servian Government admitted, and that the latter intended to use the 
presence of troops as a lever to secure rectifications of the frontier agreed to at the 
Ambassadors' Conference in London. 

I said that, if the Servians approached me about a rectification of the frontier, I 
should reply that the frontier had been agreed to by the Powers after much discussion 
and difficulty, and that I could give no encouragement to any attempt to re-open the 
question. I was quite firm on the point that the frontier must be respected ; but there 
was this excuse for the Servians : that the Albanians had been the first to violate the 
frontier. When once the Powers had announced that there was to be an autonomous 
Albania, guaranteed by them, and had defined its frontiers, they came under an 
obhgation to see that the Albanians respected those frontiers. The Powers had taken 
no steps to discharge this obhgation: and, if Servia replied that she would withdraw 
her troops on recei%-ing an assurance from the Powers that, if she did so, the Albanians 
would not be allowed to \*iolate the frontier, I should like to know what answer Austria 
would give. 

Herr von Kiihlmann admitted that it would not be easy to answer this, unless 
perhaps Austria was prepared to give some assurance. 

He said that he feared the Servians had perpetrated some outrages in the territory 
occupied by them and I admitted that our reports showed this to be only too probable. 

[I am. &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

{}) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 

(») [cp. G.F.. XXXVI (D. p. 407.] 

(*) [r. supra, pp. 36-7, No. 43. and note (').] 

(*) [y. supra, p. 38, Ed. note.'] 



No. 49. 

}.lr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 
F.O. 48925/30271/13 44. 

(No. 1S9.1 Belgrade, D. October 20, 1913. 

Sir, E. October 28, 1913. 

On receipt of your telegram No. 136 of the ISth instant instructing me to 
advise the Sen-ian Government to give an assurance that the frontier drawn at London 
would be respected, that Servian troops had only crossed it as a measure of emergency, 
and would be ordered to withdraw at the earliest possible moment, I at once asked 
for an appointment ^vith the Servian Prime Minister. It being Sunday, I was unable 
to obtain this, so I called upon the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs to whom I spoke in the sense indicated by you, handing to him at the same 



(1) [r. supra, p. 36, No. 43, note (O ] 



42 



time a French translation of the language you instructed me to use, with the request 
that he would take the earliest opportunity of laying it before the Prime Minister. 

Monsieur Stefanovitch began by repeating to me previous assurances, found 
insufficient and evasive by the Austrian Government, namely that the Servian 
Government had every intention of respecting the frontier when finally demarcated by 
the International Commission. At the same time Monsieur Pashitch was, he said, 
hoping that the Powers might see their way to make a slight frontier rectification in 
favour of Servia, on strategic and economic grounds, and was issuing instructions to 
the Servian Eepresentatives to approach the Foreign Governments for this purpose. 
The Servian Government would however bow to the wishes of the Powers should they 
be unable to entertain this request. 

Monsieur Stefanovitch then proceeded to tell me that the Austrian Legation had 
the previous evening sent in an ultimatum in the form of a Note Verbale demanding 
the entire evacuation of Albanian territory by Servian troops within eight days, failing 
which the Austrian Government would take such measures as might be necessary to 
enforce this demand.(') I enquired of the Secretary-General whether he could give"^ me 
an indication of the answer which it was intended to give to this Note. He informed 
me that the answer was being discussed at a Council of Ministers, but that his personal 
opinion was that Servia would be obliged to yield. 

Today the Prime Minister being again occupied with urgent affairs of State, 
Monsieur Stefanovitch received me on his behalf and gave me His Excellency's reply 
to the advice you had instructed me to offer. This was to the effect that the Servian 
troops had already been ordered by telegraph to withdraw from Albania, and that 
instructions had been issued to the Servian Eepresentatives to inform the Powers in 
this sense,(') and to ask at the same time that measures should be concerted which 
would guarantee Servia from further attacks pending the estabHshment of order within 
Albania. The request for a rectification of the frontier would, I gathered, be dropped 
as useless in the circumstances. In reply to my enquiry, the Secretary General 
informed me that he believed it would be possible to withdraw the troops entirely 
within eight days by means of forced marches. He feared that the decision to withdraw 
the troops, imposed on Servia by Austria's sudden and arbitrary action, would, in face 
of the anarchical conditions at present prevailing in Albania and the serious danger of 
further attacks by the Albanians, create a great outcry against the Government in the 
country. 

I told the Secretary General that T was certain that this proof of moderation on 
the part of the Ser\'ian Government would be greatly appreciated by His Majesty's 
Government. 

Monsieur Stefanovitch proceeded to say that various accusations had recently been 
made against Servia in respect to Albania, some of which had been actuallv formulated 
m the room in which we were sitting. First, Servia had been accused of seeking the 
throne of Albania for the Servian Ci'own Prince ; then of scheming to bring about a 
personal union with Albania ; then again of aiming at definite annexation. All these 
charges were false. Servia was in need of peace, and it was in pursuit of peace that 
she had been compelled to take the necessary measures to defend her tcrritorv against 
the attacks of the Albanians. The Servian Government had every proof that these 
attacks had been instigated by Austria, who had brought about the creation of Albania 
with the express object of placing a thorn in the side of Servia, of impeding her 
consohdation, and of weakening her military resources. ° 

Servia, said Monsieur Stefanovitch, had already given the Powers on three 
occasions proof positive of her moderation and her subservience to their wishes — 
1) when she evacuated Durazzo and the Adriatic Uttoral, (2) when she withdrew from 
the siege of Scutari, (3) when she recently retired her troops from the strategic 
positions m Albania, as a consequence of which she was exposed to a serious invasion 



(2) [v. supra, p. 38, Ed. note.} 
(^) [v. infra, p. 48, No. 55.] 



43 



of her territory. In order to repel this invasion and ensure herself against its 
reoccurrence, Servia bad been compelled again to occupy these positions. In 
abandoning them a second time, and exposing the country to a second attack, the 
Servian Government believed it was offering the Powers the clearest evidence of its 
desire to conform to their wishes, and it therefore trusted to the Powers to concert such 
necessary measures as would guarantee Servia against a further invasion of her 
territory. 

I have. &c. 

DAYEELL CRACKANTHOEPE. 



[EP. NOTE. — ^The Serrian reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was made on 
October 21. cp. O.-UA., VII, p. 482, No. 88P3. Four days later M. Stefanovic informed the 
Austro-Hungarian Charge d'Afiaires at Belgrade that evacuation had taken place, r. ibid., 
pp. 501-2, No. 8920, and end.} 



No. 50. 

Mr. Craclanthorpe to Sir Edicard Grey. 
P.O. 4S927 '30271/13 44. 

(No. 191.) Belgrade, D. October 21, 1913. 

Sir. E. October 28, 1913. 

I heard to-day from a source which has hitherto proved trustworthy that at the 
Council of Ministers held on the day following the presentation of the Austrian 
Ultimatum (it may be interesting to record that this ultimatum was handed in at 
12 noon on October 18th , a decision was come to that in the event of a further 
invasion of Servian territory by the Albanians as a consequence of the withdrawal of 
Servian troops from the strategic positions, the latter would be at once reoccupied and 
the army mobilized on the Bosnian frontier. 

I am further informed at the Servian Ministry for Foreign Affairs that Austrian 
ships have recently conveyed three shiploads of arms and ammunition from Cattaro 
and disembarked them at Durazzo for distribution among the Albanians. 

There is a deep rooted behef here am.ong Ser\"ians that Austria is aiming at 
creating a chronic state of disorder within Albania. I have heard three reasons given 
for the policy thus ascribed to Austria. First, that she is endeavouring to find an 
excuse for occupying North Albania herself; Secondly that she wishes to create 
a constant source of trouble for Serena, so as to diminish her chances of internal con- 
solidation and keep as large a portion as possible of the Servian Army occupied on the 
Albanian frontier : and thirdly that she wishes to force Servia into a war in view of 
the latter' s present exhausted condition, and to put a final end to Serv-ian hopes and 
aspirations. Public opinion here finds additional ground for these suspicions in the 
fact that Austria did not wait to consult the Powers before presenting her ultimatum, 
wishing, it is supposed, to put the Powers in presence of a " fait accompli," and then 
justify her action on the ground that she was upholding an international decision. 

Should a second Albanian invasion occur as the result of compUance with the 
Austrian ultimatum, and entail re-occupation of certain strategic positions within 
Albania. I believe the feeling against Austria would become so bitter, that a general 
call to arms, however dangerous its consequences, would be acclaimed with enthusiasm. 

It appears therefore to become of increasing importance that effective measures 
should be tak^n to obviate the danger of further inroads of Albanians into Sertian 
territory, by the establishment, if possible, of provisional mihtary posts along the 
frontier. These inroads, if of a serious nature, would set public opinion in Senda 
ablaze, and create a very dangerous situation. 

I have. (tc. 

DAYEELL CEACKANTIIOEPE. 



44 



MINUTES. 

The Albanians have received a good hammering, and are not likely to make fresh incursions 
of their own initiative. If the Austrians stir them up again, the situation will be really 
dangerous. 

We have written to Vienna respect[in]g the traffic in arms in Albania under Austrian 
auspices.(i) We have also tel[egraphe]d resp[ectin]g guarantees against a fresh violation of 
the Servian frontier.(2) We have had no reply yet. 

R. G. V. 

Oct[ober] 29. 

See tel[egram] to H.M. Rep[resentati]ves at the capitals of the 5 Powers to-day (49262). (3) 

E. A. C. 

Octfober"! 30. 

(1) [This despatch cannot be identified.] 

{') [v. immediately succeeding document, and note (i).] 

(^) [v. infra, pp. 51-2, No. 60.] 



No. 51. 

Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.C) 

F.O. 48826/30271/13/44. 
(No. 191.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, October 22, 1913. 

Count MensdorfE read to me today(^) a long telegram that he had received from 
Vienna informing him of the explanation of the views of H[is] M[ajesty's] 
G[overnment] that had been given to Count Berchtold by your Excellency. The 
statement seemed to correspond with views that I had expressed at Berlin about the 
Austrian action and it had elicited from C^ount Berchtold the reply that Austria did 
not intend to separate from the Powers but that in this instance her action had been 
the only means of avoiding delay in giving effect to the decision of the Powers about 
the Serbo- Albanian frontier. 

I then observed to Count Mensdorff that there was always a risk in separate 
ultimatums or action by one Power of disturbing agreement between the Powders ; but 
that as in this case the risk had not materialized, and as the Sei-vians had accepted the 
ultimatum and as we had not ourselves contemplated disturbing the agreement of the 
Powers it was unnecessary for me to emphasize this point now. 

Argumentatively on the merits of the question the Servians could urge that it 
was the Albanians who had first violated what for the sake of convenience I would call 
the London frontier and the Servians might ask for assurances that when their troops 
were withdrawn the Albanians would not violate the frontier again. We ought all 
and the Austrian Gov[ernmen]t especially to consider what answer we should give to 
this request if it was made. 

(1) [This despatch was based upon a record in Sir Edward Grey's hand of his conversation 
with Count Mensdorff. It was put into the form of a despatch as a result of the following 
minute by Sir Eyre Crowe: — 

"Record in despatch to Sir F. Cartwright and telegraph summary of important points, 
repeating to Embassies. 

E. A. C. 

Oct[ober] 24." 

Sir Edward Grey, who was at Fallodon at the time, had directed that his record should go 
to Sir E. Crowe, and added "He can use any of it that he thinks necessary for telegram to 
Vienna, or to Mr. Lamb or elsewhere if any telegrams are required." In fact, the only alteration 
made in the record when it was transformed into a despatch was to alter " Sir F. Cartwright " 
to " Your Excellency " in the third line. Telegrams were sent as follows : —to Vienna (No. 307) 
of October 24, 1913, D. 8-20 p.m. ; repeated to Paris (No. 383) : to St. Petersburgh (No. 720) ; 
to Rome (No. 326) ; to Berlin (No. 377.)] 

(2) [For Count Mensdorff's report, v. O.-U.A., VII, p. 487, No. 8900. Count Berchtold's 
telegram is given ibid., pp. 486-7, No. 8899.] 



45 



I told Count Mensdorff what I had said to TTerr von Kuhlmann on Mondayf'^i about 
discouraging any demands on the part of Servia for a rectification of the frontier and 
said that on the merits of the case, the reports which had reached me of what to put 
it mildly I would call provocative treatment by the Servians of Albanians in territory 
occupied by Servia had made me personally feel rather lukewarm about Serbian 
complaints. 

Assuming the crisis of the Serbian frontier difl&culty to be over there were two 
points which I thought especially important. 

The first was that the Commission of Control should work smoothly : there was 
apparently some difference of opinion about recognition of the Provisional 
Gov[ernmen]t. Count Mensdorff said that his Gov[ernmen]t felt that considering all 
the circumstances it was surprising how little internal trouble there had been in 
Albania, and how well things have been worked ; we ought to recognize this and be 
careful not to upset it. 

I quite agreed and said this was exactly the point — let us recognize the 
Provisional Gov[emmen]t wherever its authority was already accepted in Albania, but 
where other local authorities were working well do not let us upset what was well by 
forcing the authority of the Provisional Gov[emmen]t upon districts that would resent 
it. I obsen-ed that the Provisional Gov[ernmen]t was apparently Ismail Kemal and 
all I had heard of this gentleman in recent years made me rather a lukewarm admirer 
of him. Nevertheless by all means let us recognize the Provisional [Government] 
where it was willingly accepted in Albania. But the resolution of the Reunion of 
Ambassadors agreeing to the Commission of Control had spoken of " autorites 
indigenes existantes " or some phrase in the plural and the Commission had better 
recognize any local authorities that were in existence and had proved acceptable in 
their districts. 

The other point to which I wished to draw attention was the importance of 
appointing a Prince quickly. Mr. Lamb, our representative on the Commission of 
Control, had pressed the importance of this point very strongly. I said to Count 
Mensdorff on this point what I had said to Herr von Kuhlmann on Mondav.(') 

[I am. &c'.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

(3) [v. supra, p. 41, Xo. 43, and note (=).] 



No. 52. 

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 
P.O. 48930/30271/13/44. 

(No. 194.) Belgrade, D. October 22, 1913. 

Sir, R. October 28, 1913. 

I called on the Russian Minister this morning and found him very jubilant over 
the strong position, which, he said, Servia had now secured for herself by her prudent 
and Statesmanlike surrender to Austrian threats, and over the odium incurred by 
Austria by reason of her highhanded action. 

Immediately on learning of the Austrian ultimatum(") he had hurried to 
Monsieur Pashitch and had urged him to give way at once and thus place on Austria's 
shoulders the entire responsibility for an arbitrary attitude which could not fail to 
damage her in the eyes of Europe. The ultimatum had however come as a great 
surprise to him. He had only recently received an account of the interview between 

(') [A copy of this despatch was sent to Vienna.] 
(2) [r. supra, p. 38, Ed. note.'} 



46 



Count Berchtold and Monsieur Pashitch from each of these statesmen in turn, and 
both had expressed themselves as very pleased with the results of their conversation, 
Count Berchtold, whom he saw the morning after Monsieur Pashitch's departure from 
Vienna, having been especially warm in his expressions of satisfaction at the assurances 
he had received. He (Monsieur de Plartwig) could only suppose that Austria had 
subsequently lost her head. 

I asked him what he thought would happen if the Albanians again invaded Servia. 
Monsieur de Hartwig assumed quite a Machiavellian expression and gave me to 
understand that Servia would then be justified in taking the law into her own hands. 

I have, Sec. 

DAYEELL CEACKANTHOEPE. 



No. 53. 

Mr. CrachantJtorpe to Sir Edward Grey. 
P.O. 48932/30271/13/44. 

(No. 196.) Belgrade, D. October 23, 1913. 

Sii". E. October 28, 1913. 

The Servian Press, contrary to general expectation, has accepted with great 
equanimity and in some cases with approval the attitude of the Sei-vian Government 
in bowing to the Austrian ultimatum and ordering the withdrawal of the Servian troops 
from Albania. The only paper whicli makes some scathing and adverse remarks is 
the "Pravda," the organ of the Progressist Party (Opposition), which qualifies the 
attitude of tiie Government as degrading to the dignity of Servia, and as a further 
proof of Monsieur Pashitch's mistaken policy. 

The general feeling, however, is that Servia has, by her prompt compliance with 
the demand of Austria, greatly strengthened her position vis-a-vis to Europe, by 
giving the latter a further proof of her goodwill and of her respect for the decisions 
of the Pov/ers. The sharp criticism of Austria's action bv the foreign Press in general 
is of course to a great extent responsible for the sensible attitude of the Servian Press. 
The Servian Government, it may be observed, onlv published the news of the 
ultimatum on the day following its presentation, and at\he same time issued telet^rams 
from oiher countries in which Austria's attitude was condemned, and ServiJ was 
applauded for her moderation. 

The Servian Press now demands that, after what has occurred, Austria should be 
refused all economic concessions as well as the revision of the Commercial Treatv. 

I have, &c. 

DAYEELL CEACKANTHOEPE. 



No. 54. 



Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edicard Greij.C) 
F.O. 48705/48705/13/44. 

^^^-^ Berlin, D. October 24, 1913. 

TK. T? • • ^r- . ^- October 27, 1913. 

,nn.i f T ^- 'P'"^^ Berlin(^') in the course of his return 

journey from Pans. Monsieur Sazonoff arrived here in the morning of October 21st 
?llCfr """"'.^ Embassy. Later he lunched with the Imperial 

Chancellor, while m the evening a dinner was given for him by the Eussian 

\^cn\^r''itxirn^^^^^ ^"^S ^"'i t° the Prime Minister.] 

infra pp 5^4 6> „^ r'/^v^ XXXVill, pp. 152-;3 ; Stieve, 111, pp. 329-31. cp. a so 

7 lis No 578 ] ' ' 4^0; P- No. 453;' pp. 521-2, No"^ 672; 



47 



Ambassador, to which the Chancellor and Herr Zimmermann, the Under Secretary of 
State of the Foreign Office, were invited. The same evening M. SazonofE left Berlin 
for Warsaw. 

No communique was issued to the press regarding the subjects discussed between 
the two Foreign Ministers and the newspapers have refi-ained in general from any 
speculations on the subject ; small notices, however, have appeared in various papers 
stating that M. SazonofE had expressed his delight in meeting once more the 
Chancellor, in whom he had the greatest confidence, while the Chancellor is stated to 
have expressed his great satisfaction at the friendly tone of the discussions, which are 
supposed to have touclied upon the Balkan situation and the Armenian question. 

During his short stay in Berlin. M. Sazonof? found time to give an interview to a 
representative of the " Lokal-Anzeiger," to whom he declared that though it was true 
that he had received a representative of the ' ' Novoe Vremya ' ' in Paris, the latter had 
grossly misrepresented what he had said to him, and that in particular the passage 
of the interview where his words might be read as implying that Russian policy was 
directed against Germany was a pure invention. 

You will doubtless hear from M. Sazonoflf all that really passed between him and 
the Directors of foreign policy in Berlin. Herr Zimmermann, in a short conversation 
which I had with him the other day only gave me a very rapid and somewhat sketchy 
account of his personal discussions with His Excellency. 

He told me that they had touched lightly upon the question of the Mgean Islands 
— indeed so lightly that they apparently did not go beyond the fringe of that difficult 
question. Herr Zimmermann had said that if the islands, with the exception of those 
at the entrance of the Dardanelles, were handed over to the Greeks, there appeared to 
him to be every likelihood of dangerous complications between Turkey and Greece, 
while M. Sazonoff had said that if Turkey were to retain possession of, for instance 
Mitilene and Scio, that would mean that Eui'ope would have had more Cretes on their 
hands. 

Herr Zimmermann seems to have spent some time in explaining to M. SazonofE 
that the repi-esentations made at Belgrade by the Powers of the Triple Alliance on the 
Albanian frontier question had not been the result of a previous arrangement between 
the three Powers and had not been either collective or identic. In fact in making his 
representation at Belgrade he had not consulted the Austro-Hungarian Government 
at all.(^) The Itahan Ambassador had in conversation with him pointed out that the 
Ser\nan advance into Albania was causing considerable excitement at Vienna, and had 
suggested that a word of warning and advice at Belgrade might perhaps be useful 
and prevent possible complications. This suggestion had appeared to him sound; 
he had therefore sent for the Servian Charge d' Affaires and, telling him in the most 
friendly manner that the decisions of the London Conference must be respected, had 
asked him to warn his Government against any further advance and to tell them that 
the best advice which the German Government could give them was that they should 
withdraw their troops from Albania as soon as possible. The Italian Government had 
given similar advice also on her own initiative. ( M The Austro-Hungarian Government 
had in the meantime also made representations at Belgrade couched in stronger terms, 
and their threat to send an ultimatum if their warnings were disregarded, and the 
sending of the ultimatum itself, had been merely communicated to the German 
Government and had not been the result of consultation between the two Governments. 

This was all Herr Zimmermann told me beyond saying that the conversations 
between M. SazonofE and the Chancellor and himself had been of a most friendly 
nature and that M. SazonofE' s visit had altogether left a very agreeable impression. 

I have, &c. 

W. E. GOSCHEN. 



(3) [cp. supra, p. 32, No. 38.] 
(*) [cp. supra, p. 31, No. 36.] 



48 



MINUTES. 

What was said about the ^gean islands did not apparently amount to much 

Herr Zimmermann's account of the German and Italian action at Belgrade seems 

substantially correct, except that the German demarche was taken at Austria s request. The 

Italian communication certainly seems to have been relatively mild. 

K. vj<- > • 

Oct[ober] 27. 

R. P. M. 

Oct[ober] 28/13. 

But it reveals the ineradicable habits of the German Foreign Office that Herr Zimmermann 
should have deliberately misled M. Sazonoff as to the 'friendly advice" given by Germany at 
Bel-rade having been given quite independently of any "arrangement with Austria and 
Italy Literally, this may be true. There may have been no " arrangement. But Germany 
acted because and after Austria had told her she would present an ultimatum at Belgrade. 

E. A. C. 

Oct[ober] 29. 

Herr Zimmermann's observations as to Scio and Mitylene are not very hopeful as to 
unanimity of views of the Powers as to the future of the islands. M. Sazonow's remarks were 

to the point. . 

A. N. 

E. G. 



No. 55. 

Communication from M. Gruic of October 27, 1913. 

F.O. 48828/80271/13/44. Legation Royale de Serbie.^ 

A la suite de I'ultimatum inattendu de I'Antriche-Hongrie la Serbie a ete obligee, 
avant meme le trace de la frontiere, de retirer ses troupes des points strategiques dont 
I'occupation lui permettait de proteger de la maniere la plus facile et la plus sure le 
territoire serbe contre les attaques des bandes albanaises venant de I'Albanie, contree 
ou regne une anarchie telle que les membres memes du gouvernement provisoire y 
organisent les hordes arraees et se mettent a leur tete. 

Le seul desir de la Serbie que, lors du trace de la frontiere par la commission 
Internationale, soient pris en consideration aussi les points strategiques qui 
protegeraient d'une maniere plus efi&cace la frontiere — desir que la Serbie n'a meme 
pas encore officiellement communique aux Grandes Puissances — a cause le mecontente- 
ment de rAutriche-Hongrie a ce point qu'il a provoque I'ultimatum austro-hongrois. 

Les troupes serbes ont repousse les Albanais, mais il existe des raisons de craindre 
que les incursions des Albanais se renouveleront, car Ton ne cesse d'importer en 
Albanie de nouvelles armes et munitions. II est possible que de nouvelles bandes 
soient organisees qui, a I'occasion propice et sous la direction d'ofl&ciers etrangers, 
entreront de nouveau en Serbie et y recommenceront leur oeuvre de devastation et de 
carnage. 

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Serbe, ayant a charge la securite de la frontiere 
et de la population du Royaume, se voit force d'attirer sur ces faits I'attention des 
Grandes Puissances, comme creatrices et protectrices de I'Albanie, et de_ les prier de 
vouloir bien, dans I'interet de la paix entre la Serbie et I'Albanie aussi bien que dans 
I'interet de leur propre tranquilhte, prendre des mesures efficaces pour garantir la 
frontiere contre de nouvelles attaques. Le moyen le plus pratique a cet efiet serait, 
dans I'opinion du Gouvernement Eoyal, I'occupation de I'Albanie par des troupes 
Internationales ainsi que 1' organisation d'une autorite reguliere responsable et d'une 
gendarmerie Internationale. 

En meme temps le Gouvernement Eoyal desirerait savoir a qui il doit s'adresser 
pour I'inderaniser des frais occasionnes par I'incursion albanaise. 

25 Octohre, 1913. 



49 



No. 56. 

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.(^) 
F.O. 4ftS20 '30271 13 44. 

(No. 324.^ Very Confidential. St. Petersburgh, D. October 28, 1913. 

Sir. R. November 3. 1913. 

Mr. Sazonow said to me in the strictest confidence on the 26th instant that Ser\-ia 
had been more to blame than was generally supposed in the events which had led up 
to the recent ultimatum from Austria. 

Mr. Spalaiko\-itch had held the most imprudent language with regard to the 
possibility of Servia's coming to an understanding with Essad Pasha and combining 
with him to crush the Albanian Government provisionally established at Yallona. The 
question of Servian access to the Adriatic would thus, Mr. Spalaikovitch had said, be 
satisfactorily settled. He had spoken in this strain to the Russian Charge d'AflFaires 
at Belgrade and Mr. Neratow had thereupon sent him a severe admonition, pointing 
out that imprudent language of the kind would render it impossible for Paissia to give 
Servia any support. Mr. Sazonow did not know whether Mr. Spalaikovitch' s remarks 
had come to the ears of the Austro-IIuugarian Government, but he thought that thev 
might have done so at least in part. 

I have. &c. 

HUGH O'BEIENE. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; 
to Lord Crewe ; to Lord Morley.] 



No. 57. 

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey. 

Vienna, October 29, 1913. 

F.O. 49254 '30271 13 44. D. 12-35 p.m. 

Tel (No. 158.) Most Confidential. R. 3 p.m. 

I learn from a confidential source that, when the German Emperor was told by 
the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the recent Austrian ultimatum 
had been launched against Servia, he immediately sent telegrams to the Emperor and 
Heir Apparent congratulating them on the step taken. When here, the German 
Emperor spoke very freely while driving with the Austrian general, attached to him, 
and expressed his satisfaction at the Austrian ultimatum and that for once Austria had 
shown her teeth and that he hoped she would continue to do so. I am informed that 
at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs it is regretted that the Emperor should have used 
such language to a general, as it is felt that such language is likely to encourage the 
military party to press for a forward pohcy in Balkan matters. 

Count Berchtold had over an hour's conversation with the German Emperor and 
I am informed that he laid very frankly before His Majesty the grievances of Austria 
at lack of loyal support given to her by Germany during recent crisis. 

I am informed also that the German Emperor by his language used here seems 
to have cooled down very considerably in his sympathies for Greece. 

MINUTES. 

This confirms the impression that Grermaiiy pretending to us that she altogether 
disapproved and regretted Austrian attitude, has throughout encouraged her allv. 

E. A. C. 

Oct[ober] 29. 
A. N. 



[89591 



E 



50 



On the other hand if the st.atement in the penultimate paragraph is true it proves that 
there were times when Germany was disapproving of Austrian action. 

I am disposed to think that this is merely a personal outburst on the part of the Emperor, 
who always wants to be on the crest of every wave. None the less it may influence Austrian 



No. 58. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.C) 

F.O. 49521/14809/13/44. 
(No. 660.) 

gir, Foreign Office, October 29, 1913. 

' I observed to M. Cambon to-day that the Austrian policy obviously was to turn 
the international control of Albania into an Austrian control. This policy might 
result in an absolute deadlock on the Commission of Control and the Commission for 
delimitating the southern frontier. We ought to consider what we should do in such 
an event. Had we any real interest in making an effort to prevent Austria from 
pushing her interests in Albania, or should we throw the whole thing up, and leave it 
to Austria and Italy to settle the Albanian question? An absolute deadlock might 
occur at any moment, and we ought to be prepared. 

M. Cambon said that he would put the question to M. Pichon.(^) 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; 
to Lord Crewe; to Lord Morley.] 

(=) [M. Paul Cambon's report on this subject is in D.D F., 3™"= Ser., Vol. VIII, pp. 502-3, 
No. 398. cp. also infra, p. 60, No. 72; p. 63, No. 74, min., and note {=); p. 141, No. 155.] 



No. 59. 

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir C. Hardinge. 

Private. (1) 

My dear Hardinge, Foreign Office, October ^19, 1913. 

I am afraid it is a long time since I have written to you, but something or other 
always turned up at the last moment which prevented me from doing so. 

We are certainly now in smoother waters than we were some months ago, 
though personally I do not myself consider that the situation is entirely satisfactory 
or that a long period will elapse before we find ourselves again surrounded with 
difficulties and embarrassments. The fact of the matter is that peace has only been 
patched up and we have still many questions unsettled. The Conferences of the 
Ambassadors were certainly of use so far as they kept the Powers together and 
prevented any serious friction arising between them. It can hardly be said however 
that the questions with which the Powers had to deal have been definitely and satis- 
factorily settled. It is true that we have agreed to the institution of an Albanian 
State, but I do not think that this somewhat artificial creation will have a very long 
life. Albania never has been a nation and there are too many diverse and antagonistic 
elements within it to afford hope that it will be possible to establish a stable state. 
There is little doubt that before long it will break to pieces and Austria and Italy will 
then take steps for establishing their respective spheres of influence or even go so far 
as to annex those portions which they may think necessary. We have further very 
great difficulty in delimitating the boundaries of this new State, especially in regard 



(ij [Carnock MSS., Vol. IX of 1913.] 



51 



to the southern frontier. It will not be an easy matter to clear the Greeks out of those 
localities in which they are at present in possession and which are to go to Albania. 
Furthermore the question of the islands is still in suspense. No formal decision has 
been come to by the Powers with regard to those islands in Greek occupation, though 
there was perhaps an understanding that the majority of them were to remain in 
Greek hands. Still 1 have seen signs that certain Powers are beginning to wobble as 
to maintaining this understanding, and I think that before long we shall find that 
Turkey will make an effort to obtain possession, either by diplomatic means through 
the Powers or even possibly by forcible measures, of Scio and Mitylene. It is no 
doubt true that to leave these two islands in the hands of the Greeks is rather hard 
on Turkey, as they are situated so close to the mainland. At the same time it would 
be I think ditificult to compel the Greeks to evacuate these islands, and I think this is 
a step in which we should certainly not join as we have always maintained that with 
the exception of Imbros and Tenedos all the islands should be left to Greece. 
Venizelos told us when he was here that he attached the greatest importance to 
retaining possession of Scio and Mitylene and that the rest of the islands were, as he 
expressed it, mere pebbles. Then there is also the question of the islands at present 
in the occupation of Italy. We have received the most positive and categorical 
assurances that Italy fully intends to restore them to Turkey as she is bound to do by 
the Treat}' of Lausanne, and that she would raise no difficulties in regard to the 
Powers taking any steps they might consider necessary for handing them over to 
Greece. At the same time there are many indications that the Italian occupation of 
Rhodes for instance is gradually assuming a permanent character, and I myself 
personally doubt if excuses will not be found to indefinitely postpone the transfer of 
these islands to Turkey. I have no unbounded confidence in the genuineness of Italian 
assurances. 

Bulgaria no doubt will now slowly prepare for eventually endeavouring to regain 
some of the territories which at the last moment she lost through her own folly. I 
expect that before many years have elapsed we shall find South-Eastern Europe 
plunged once again into the turmoil of hostilities. As to European affairs generally 
there seems little improvement in the relations between Russia and Austria, though 
fortunately the Sovereigns of both those countries are most pacifically disposed and 
so far as we can gatlier will do their utmost to prevent the relations entering into a 
really acute phase. Germany has of late been making great efforts to be on the best 
possible terms with us and she has to a certain extent succeeded. There is no doubt 
that the party in favour of intimate relations with Germany has increased and 
strengthened of late in this country. At the same time, however, our relations with 
Piussia and France have not been in any way impaired, though I fear that France is 
beginning to have some doubts as to whether in case of need she could really count 
upon us with absolute certainty, and even supposing that such was the case whether 

the assistance we might be disposed to render would be of any great benefit (^) 

[Yours &c., 

A. NICOLSON.] 

(2) [The omitted paragraphs refer briefly to a large number of topics, but add nothing of 
importance to information given elsewhere.] 



No. 00. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. {^) 
F.O. 49262/30271/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 388.) Foreign Office, October SO, 1913, 1-15 p.m. 

Servian government state they have information that Albanians within Albanian 

(') [This telegram was repeated to Rome (No. 327); to Berlin (No. 378); to Vienna 
(No. 308) ; to St. Petersburgh (No. 729).] 

[8959] E 2 



52 



territory are preparing fresh attack against Djakova and Prizrend to be delivered 
before arrival on the spot of the international delimitation commission. (^) 

I presume this communication has been made to all the Powers. 

I pointed out to Austro-Hungarian ambassador here a week ago(^) that the Powers 
ought to be prepared to consider what reply could be given if Servia asked them to 
ensure that withdrawal of Servian troops should not be followed by a renewed violation 
of frontier fixed by the Powers through conference of Ambassadors in London. 

I should be glad to know what answer should in the opinion of the gov[ernmen]t 
to which you are accredited be given to Servia. (^) 

(2) [This uote was communicated by M. Gruie' on October 29. (F.O. 49262/30271/13/44.)] 

(3) [v. supra, pp. 44-5, No. 51.] 

(*) [For the Austro-Hungarian reply, cp. infra, p. 58, No. 68.] 



No. 61. 

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.O 
F.O. 49828/49823/18/44. 

(No. 327.) St. Petershurgh, D. October 30, 1913. 

Sir, E. November 3, 1918. 

The latest ultimatum presented by Austria-Hungary to Servia, if it served no 
other useful purpose, has at any rate supplied a fresh and striking demonstration of 
the change which has come over the attitude of Eussia, official and un-official, towards 
Balkan questions. 

In conversations which I have had during the last few days with a good many 
people here of different classes and opinions, I have met, I may say without exception, 
with a perfect indifference to the interests of Servia : an attitude quite in keeping 
with the composure maintained in St. Petersburg a few weeks ago, when Turkey was 
engaged in despoiling Bulgaria of a part of her recent acquisitions, and with the 
coldness of the reception accorded to the Macedonian Delegates who came to urge 
their scheme for an Autonomous Macedonia. The St. Petersburg press has indeed 
indulged itself in criticism of Count Berchtold's methods of action, and in the 
customary expressions of resentment towards Austria-Hungary ; but not a single 
paper has seriously suggested that Eussia ought to take any action on behalf of the 
Serbs which could expose her to a conflict with the Dual Monarchy. As to the official 
attitude, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, when I saw him on the 19th instant 
took it as a matter of course that Servia must yield to the Austrian ultimatum, and 
devoted his ingenuity to finding means to enable her to do so without much loss of 
dignity. I asked Monsieur Neratow what he thought would occur if Servia did not 
give way. He said that Austria would certainly advance through the Sandjak to 
Diakova, which he said would be " tres mauvais," a very bad business. But I should 
doubt Monsieur Neratow's being absolutely clear in his own mind as to whether even 
that eventuality would have imposed on Russia the necessity of really decided action. 

It is curious to compare this state of things with the position previous to the first 
Balkan War. There can be no doubt that, at that time, the delivery of a quite 
uncalled-for 8 days' ultimatum by Austria to Servia would have led to a violent 
explosion of public sentiment here in favour of the Serbs. The change in the Govern- 
ment attitude, though not quite so obvious as that in public opinion, is also tangibh^ 
and well defined. When Monsieur Sazonow in the Summer of 1912 was refusing with 
indignation to subscribe to a pacte de desinteressement in Balkan affairs because it 
might seem to imply that Russia had resigned her historic mission as Protectress of 
the Balkan Slavs, he himself regarded it I believe as an axiom that any definite act of 



(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 



58 



aggression on the part of Austria-Hungary against a Slav State would of necessity 
bring Eussia into the field. That proposition has in the course of the past eighteen 
months lost a great part of the authority which it once possessed. In the interval 
Eussia has been brought two or three times face to face with the question whether she 
would risk a war in order to champion the Slav Cause : and on each occasion she has 
prudently declined to run the risk. This I believe to be the fact of main importance 
that has occurred in the past year as regards Eussian policy in the Near East. The 
various causes of dissatisfaction given to Eussia by her Balkan proteges are minor 
matters. They afford a convenient means of justifying and explaining the fact, of 
which educated Eussian public opinion is perfectly conscious, that Eussia is little 
disposed to run the risk of war in order to defend the interests of the Slav States in 
the Balkans. 

It does not of course follow that there ^^-ill be any ostensible change in Eussian 
policy in the Near East. The general lines of that policy wiU necessarily be much 
what they were before. It remains a cardinal principle for Eussia that Constantinople 
must continue to be Turkish or must become Eussian : and any State which seems to 
represent a possible menace to Constantinople, whether it be Austria as in the past, 
or Bulgaria or even Greece as more recently, will be jealously watched. Xow as before 
Eussia desires to see a combination of Balkan States strong enough to offer a serious 
counterpoise to the power of Austria. It is easy to foresee that Eussian diplomacy will 
before long be striving to put together again the pieces of the instrument which broke 
in Monsieur Sazonow's hands when the Balkan Allies fell on one another ; and Eussia 
will naturally be found giving her support as heretofore to the Slav States against 
Austria-Hungary whenever opportunity offers. There is however an all important 
difference between the kind of support for which those States may fairly have hoped 
in the past, and that on which they now know that they can count. 

I have. &c. 

HUGH O'BEIRNE. 

MINTTES. 

Tliis is interesting — I think the change in the Russian attitude is largely to be attributed to 
the Emperor of Russia's aversion from war. 

A. X. 

Something also is probably due to a temperamental reaction to lethargy after excitement. 

E. G. 



No. 62. 

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir A. yicolsoTi.{^} 

Private.(-i 

Dear Sir Arthur, St. Petershurgh, October 30, 1913. 

. . . . ^ I have only seen Sazonow once since his return.!-*! With his usual 
optimism he seems thoroughly satisfied with his conversation with Bethmann Hollweg. 
The latter gave him to understand that he thought Germany could induce the Turks 
to acquiesce in the Armenian Eeform Scheme becoming a reality, but that the 
German Government must be left to chose their o^n methods for the purpose — 
whatever that may mean. As regards Austria's general pohcy and its effect on Eusso- 
Gennan relations Sazonow spoke strongly to Bethmann Hollweg, saying that Germany 
and Eussia only desired to Uve on the friendhest terms but that Austria's conduct 

(') [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Prime Minister. 
The endorsement is initialled bv Sir Edward Grev.] 
(*) [Carnock M5S., Vol. X "of 1913.] 
(') [The first part of this letter refers to Persia.] 

(*) [M. Sazonov was absent from St. Petersburgh from September 1 to the end of October. 
He passed through Berlin on October 21 on his way from Paris, cp. supra, pp. -46-7, No. 54, 
and note (').l ' 



54 



threatened at any moment to land them both in war, and it was intolerable that 
Austria should thus be allowed to become the arbiter of Eusso-German relations and 
of the peace of Europe. Sazonow seemed pleased at having said all this, but I do not 
suppose it will produce the slightest effect. Bethmann Hollweg of course reciprocated 
his peaceful sentiments most cordially, but I do not gather that he said anything 
definite as to taking means to restrain Germany's quarrelsome ally in the future. 
Besides Germany must understand well enough by this time that there is little real 
danger of Eussia being provoked into war by Austria-Hungary. 

I was much struck by the perfect indifference displayed here on the occasion of 
Austria's latest ultimatum to Servia. Certainly there has been a remarkable change 
in Eussian public opinion towards the Balkan question. The truth is I think that 
people here have made up their minds to the fact that the Eussian Government is 
very little inclined to run the risk of war in order to defend the interests of the Slav 
States, and I must say that Eussian public opinion has reconciled itself to this fact 
readily enough. The refusal of the Balkan States to listen to the advice given to them 
from St. Petersburg affords Eussia a very good pretext for more or less disinteresting 
herself from them 

Yours verv sincerely, 

IIUGH O'BEIENE. 

(5) [The remaining paragraphs deal with internal affairs in Russia and are omitted as 
irrelevant.] 

No. 63. 

Mr. Crachanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

F.O. 50883/50883/13/39. 
(No. 205.) 

Sir, Belgrade, November 3. 1913. 

The " expose " delivered in the Skupshtina by the Servian Prime Minister on the 
29th ultimo consists for the most part of a historical review of recent events in the 
Near East, and of a justification of the Hne of policy pursued throughout by the 
Servian Government. I have the honour to transmit herewith, for purposes of record, 
a translation in French of Monsieur Pasliitch's speech. (-) 

Towards the conclusion of his expose, the Prime Minister dealt with the political 
situation in its present aspects. His Excellency, while pointedly omitting all mention 
of either Austria or Italy, laid emphasis on the debt of gratitude due from Servia to 
Eussia, France and England who had shewn a just appreciation of Servian 
aspirations and had lent them their support. Servia was also grateful to Germany 
who had striven to set bounds to the recent war and to bring about a speedy conclusion 
of peace between the Balkan States. Passing to the question of frontier delimitation 
between Servia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro respectively, Monsieur Pashitch said 
that the work in question was proceeding satisfactorily. With regard to the Albanian 
frontier, Servia was bound by the decisions of the Conference of London, and was now. 
awaiting the final demarcation by the International Commission. The Servian^ 
Government had frequently made known its resolution to do its utmost to facilitate 
the task of the Powers of constituting the new Principality, whose stability was indeed, 
of the first importance to Servia owing to the contiguity of the Servian and Albanian: 
frontiers. On the conclusion of the Peace of Bucharest, demobilization had taken 
place, and Servia had left on her Albanian frontier an indispensable minimum of 
troops. But the Government of Valona, subject to various outside influences, had' 
permitted the foruiation of powerful Albanian bands, armed with modern weapons 
purchased or received in gift, whose objective was to seize certain towns which had 
not been attributed to Albania by the Conference of London. The relatively feeble 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King.] 

(2) [Not reproduced.] 



55 



Servian outposts had at first been driven back by the suddenness of this attack, and it 
became necessary to mobilize and advance a portion of the Servian Army which finally 
occupied certain positions with the object of repelHng any further attacks. The 
Ser^^an Government had then proposed to submit to the Powers the expediency of a 
rectification of the Albanian frontier in the future interests of Senia and Albania 
alike, but had been taken by surprise by the Austrian ultimatum demanding the 
withdrawal of the Servian troops outside the frontier fixed at London within eight 
days. In \-iew of the fact that Ser^-ia had agreed to accept the decisions of the 
London Conference and that she had contented herself with repelling the Albanian 
invasion, without endeavouring to profit by circumstances and appropriate Albanian 
territory, the reply to the Austrian ultimatum took the form of compliance with 
Austrian demands and an order was issued to the Army to recross the frontier. At the 
same time the Sem'an Government begged the Powers either to guarantee Servia 
against further attacks, or to give her the necessary freedom to defend her frontier 
herself, it being incredible that the Powers should have created a State possessing 
rights to infringe with impunity those of its neighbours. 

Finally Monsieur Pashitch expressed the deep regi-et of his Government that in 
spite of its desire to reestabhsh confidence and good relations with Austria, some 
obstacle invariably had arisen to impede a mutual understanding. Nevertheless His 
Excellency believed that such occurrences would cease in the future, and that the past 
tension between the two countries would be eased. 

Reading between the lines, the general impression of Monsieur Pashitch's Speech 
is distinctly unhopeful as to the likelihood of a real improvement in Austro- Servian 
relations, and I have today been informed privately that instructions have been issued 
to the Ser^"ian Minister in Vienna within the last few days, to make no concessions 
of an economic or Commercial nature unless the return offered is of so substantial a 
kind as to absolve Servia from the charge of any semblance of yielding to Austria. 
Monsieur d'Ugron, the Austrian Minister, who has now returned to his post, spoke to 
me a few days ago with great regret of the failure of the policy of conciliation towards 
Servia which he had personally been endeavouring to pursue, but which he now saw- 
was doomed to failure. I understand Monsieur d'Ugron is shortly to leave Belgrade, 
one reason given for his departure being that he is not considered sufficiently strong 
or enei-getic in his methods. Certainly no fault on this score can be found with 
Monsieur de Storck who has been acting in Monsieur d'Ugron's absence, and whose 
chargeship has been marked by frequent and energetic administrations of the stick. 

I have, &c. 

DAYEELL CEACKANTHOKPE. 



II.— THE PRINCE OF WIED, OCTOBER 1913 TO JULY 1914. 

No. 64. 

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. 

Bucharest, October 30, 1913. 
P.O. 49386 '14809/13 '44. D. 4-10 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 188.) E. 5-45 p.m. 

My despatch No. 108. 

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs told my Eussian colleague and me on 
28th October that Prince of Wied, who is now staying at Sinaia, would be willing to 

(») [Sir G. Barclay's despatch (Xo. lOS), D. October 7, R. October 13, 1913. stated that he 
had been asked by M. Maiorescu what His Majesty's Government thought of the candidature of 
the Prince of Wied as Prince of Albania. (F.O. 4&566, 14809/13/ 44.)] 



56 



accept the position of Prince of Albania on certain conditions. These, as stated by 
his Excellency to the Kussian Minister, are : that all the Great Powers approve his 
candidature ; that certain Great Powers will assist Albania financially: that the organic 
statute is satisfactory (I understand that the Prince does not want a Parliament) ; and 
that the Powers guarantee Albanian frontiers. 

In imparting this information— doubtless by order of the King, whom Acting 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had seen the day before— his Excellency clearly hopes to 
elicit the views of Entente Powers regarding Prince's candidature. 

His Excellency told me that Austria-Hungary and Italy favoured it. 

MINUTES. 

It seems clear that Austria is engaged in a separate negotiation with the Prince in order 
to be sure of his being an instrument of Austrian policy before approving his choice^ 

If eventually H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] decide to wash their hands of Albania, they 
will be entitled to say that as regards the choice of a ruler, they will be content to accept 
whatever candidate is agreed upon by Austria and Italy. 

Should Hris] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] however decide to continue to assume any measure 
of responsibility in respect to Albania, I think they ought not to recognize, or accept the 
candidature of the Prince of Wied until the latter has disclosed to them the exact terms of 
any pact he may have made with Austria and Italy or any other Powers. Otherwise England 
will become responsible for the policy of a ruler whose attitude and action may be, under the 
terms of some secret pact, contrary to anything that England could uphold. 

E. A. C. 

Oct[ober] 31. 

We shall have the Comm[issio]n of Control to watch the Prince, and I hardly think we 
could ask the Prince to disclose a pact which we may suspect he has made with Austria or Italy. 

It is really a matter of indifference to us who is Prince— though we are anxious that no 
delay shroulld occur in the nomination of a Ruler. M. Mano asked yesterday if we had settled 



delay snLouija occur in xue iioiuiuiiLiuii ^ xiu.c. ^.i. ^^..^^ ^ ■• 

as to a Ruler— I said we had not yet been approached on the subject of any particular Prince— 
but I did not think we should raise objections to any Prince who was acceptable to the other 
ers. 

We must wait till the Prince of Wied is suggested to us. 



E. G. 



No. 65. 

Mr. Bering to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 49519/13799/13/44. Tlome, D. Octoher 30, 1913, 10-30 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 186.) Octoher 31, 1913, 12-15 p.m. 

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs today for information respecting Vienna 
press report reproduced here that Italy had agreed with Austria-Hungary to proceed 
independently and fix Southern boundary of Albania herself in case Boundary 
Commission did not succeed in terminating its labours before the end of November. (') 

His Excellency replied that it was inaccurate in a certain measure. Austria had 
certainly proposed and Italy had agreed that the term fixed by the Ambassadors' 
Conference for the evacuation of Albanian territory by Greek troops, namely 
December 31st, should on no account be prolonged. As the Boundary Commission was 
not proceeding, thanks to Greek obstruction, as fast as could be hoped it was to be 
foreseen that the survey would not be finished by November 30th, and that the Greeks 
would continue obstruction until they were convinced that it was of no avail. For this 
reason he welcomed the Austrian proposal, which had duly been communicated to the 
Powers, (") for it was timely and did not wait till the last moment, in which case it would 
have appeared to take the form of an ultimatum to Greece similar to the recent one 
to Servia.(^) 

(1) [cj). supra, p. 7, Ed. note.'] 

(2) [cj). infra, p. 59, No. 69, and note (>).] 

(3) [cp. supra, p. 38, Ed. note.] 



57 



His Excellency expressed the hope that the other Powers, apart from Italy and 
Austria-Hungary, whom the Greek Government knew to be interested, would all give 
strong advice and at once at Athens to cease obstruction on the frontier. It was clear 
to him that those localities where Greek machinations were at work were to the 
knowledge of the Greek Government Albanian and should be included in the new 
State. If they were purely Greek there would be no necessity for Greek intrigues 
there. Minister for Foreign Affairs denied accuracy of the report that Italy had the 
intention to fix southern Albanian boundary by herself. Only, he said, if Greece did 
not withdraw her troops by the date fixed in the London Conference, he feared that 
matters would take a grave turn, although he hoped to the contrary. In that case 
Italy and Austria would then be obliged to take some action, the precise nature of 
which I do not think His Excellency was in a position to define as yet. 



No. 66. 

Mr. Bering to Sir Edu-ard Grey.C) 

F.O. 49532/13799/13/44. Rome. D. October 30, 1913. 

Tel. (No. 187.) E. October 81, 1913. 

My immediately preceding telegram of 30th October. (-) 

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had caused explanation of Italy's 
attitude to be published in to-night's " Tribuna," although he was not certain that it 
would be very clear. 

It has now appeared. After pointing out localities definitely attributed to Albania 
by Conference of London on 8th August,/^) it states that not only Triple Alliance would 
never consent to modification of this decision, but that Triple Entente had loyally and 
firmly expressed similar views. Greece, and, if not Greek Government, at all events 
a Greek organisation working with its consent, is doing all in its power that could 
impede the work of the Southern Frontier Commission and delay accomplishment of 
its mission, hoping thus indefinitely to occupy Albanian territory and nullify decisions 
taken in London. 

The two most interested Powers, Italy and Austria-Hungary, can clearly not allow 
themselves to fall into this trap, nor can other Great Powers, in their loyalty and love 
of peace, countenance Greek action. It is logical to consider localities as Albanian 
wherever Greek element is endeavouring to obstruct contact of Frontier Commission 
with local population. Were they really Greek localities, Greece would offer all 
facilities of examination. It will be equally logical and natural that, should Greece not 
allow Frontier Commission to complete work, or not finish it by 30th November, no 
reason should exist why evacuation by her troops should be delayed beyond the date 
unanimously fixed at London. For reasons of peace all Powers should at once notify 
Greece of Italian and Austrian point of view that cessation from 9th November up to 
30th November of further obstruction of Commission would still afford time to complete 
labours. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs denied to me this afternoon any intention of active 
measures by Italy and Austria against Greece before 31st December, should they 
become necessary by non-evacuation of Albanian territory. 

(1) [The text given above is taken from the Confidential Print, as the original decypher 
cannot be traced.] 

(^) [v. immediately preceding document.] 

(») [cp. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 975-6, No. 1226.] 



58 



No. 67. 

Mr. Bering to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 49897/14809/13/44. 

(No. 300. ) Rome, D. October 30, 1913. 

Sir, E. November 3, 1913. 

The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day, in reply to my enquiry 
as to how the choice of a Prince for the throne of Albania was proceeding, that it 
appeared to him probable that the Prince of Wied would meet with the eventual 
approval of the Powers. Austria-Hungary had originally demurred to his selection 
and had expressed a preference for a Eoman Catholic candidate. The Italian Govern- 
ment had, however, opposed this idea and the Austrian Government had given way. 
His Excellency said that he was not sure whether the French Government would not 
raise an objection on account of the German nationality of the Prince of Wied. I 
gathered from the Marquis di San Giuliano that there is some foundation for the Press 
reports — i.e., in the " Neue Freie Presse " of October 28, that the Prince is making 
certain stipulations in regard to a Civil List(M from the resources of Albania and 
guarantees in the case of his withdrawal, voluntary or otherwise, after election. 

I llElVG &C 

HEEBEET. G. DEEING. 

(*) [cp. supra, pp. 55-6, No. 64.] 



No. 68. 

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 

Vienna, October 31, 1913. 
F.O. 49539/30271/18/44. D. 6-20 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 159.) E. 10-30 p.m. 

I saw Count Berchtold this morning and communicated to him substance of your 
telegram No. 308 of Oct[ober] 30.(-) He replied that his information did not lead 
him to believe that Albanians meditated any new invasion of Servian territory. 

With regard to reply which should be given to Servian Government, should they 
formulate demand for guarantees against a renewed invasion by Albanians, Count 
Berchtold wished me to draw your attention to three points : — 

1. That Servia is perfectly capable of protecting her own frontier herself, without 
crossing it. 

2. That Servia should be advised to treat Albanian population under her rule 
humanely, if she desires peace on her frontiers. 

He added that he had just received a trustworthy report giving details with 
regard to awful massacres committed by retu-ing Servian army. 

3. That if Powers desire pacification of Albania they should lose no time in 
selecting a Prince for that country. 

In his opinion Prince of Wied seemed to be the best candidate. He thought that 
only opposition might come from Eussia or France, and he hoped that you would use 
your good offices to remove such objection. (^) 

(1) [Sir F. Cartwright was succeeded by Sir M. de Bunsen as Ambassador at Vienna on 
November 1, 1913. Mr. T. Russell was Charge, d' Affaires between Sir F. Cartwright's departure 
on November 1, and the arrival of Sir M. de Bunsen on November 24.] 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 51-2, No. 60, and note (i).] 

(3) [v. infra, p. 60, No. 71.] 



59 



No. 69. 

Mr. O'Beirne io Sir Edicard Grey. 

St. Petershnrgh, Novernher 2, 1913. 

F. O. 497G7 13799 13 44. D. 8-15 p.m. 
Tel. (No. 376.^ E. 10-30 p.m. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me to-day to speak to me of a communica- 
tion made to him on Slst October by Austrian and Italian Charges d'Affaires to the 
effect that Greek bands were preventing members of the Southern Albanian 
Delimitation Commission from entering houses of local inhabitants in order to pursue 
their investigations. Austrian and Italian Governments proposed that all localities 
where such obstruction was offered to commissioners should be treated as not being 
Greek. Meanwhile, on 30th October two Powers had made a thi-eatening communica- 
tion at Athens, of which substance is doubtless known to His Majesty's Government. (^) 

Minister for Foreign Affairs is anxious to know what course you propose to adopt 
in view of attitude of the two Powers. He considers it grossly discourteous on their 
part to take separate action at Athens without previously consulting other Powers. 
Question arises whether Triple Entente Powers should intimate that if they are to be 
treated as negligible quantities they will withdraw entirely from the Commission. 
This might, however, lead to results very disadvantageous to Greece. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs thinks that the three Powers might at any rate express strong 
dissatisfaction at Vienna and Piome. 

(,>) [Sir F. Elliot's telegram (.No. 189) of November 2, D. 11 a.m., E. 4-30 p.m., reported that 
the Austro-Hungarian and Italian representatives had made a declaration to the Greek Govern- 
ment, holding them responsible for obstacles placed in the way of the Southern Albanian 
Frontier Commission. (F.O. 4976:3 ,'13799/ 13, 44.) Sir F. Elliot's despatch (No. 255), 
D. November 4. R. November 11. 1913, enclosed a copy of the note communicated by the Austro- 
Hungarian and Italian Ministers, and of the Greek reply. (F.O. 51158/13799/13/44.) On 
October 29 Count Mensdorff informed Sir A. Nicolson of the decision embodied in the 
communication at Athens. (F.O. 49446 13799 / 13 / 44.) The Greek Minister at London 
transmitted to Sir A. Nicolson on November 4 a summary of the Greek reply, which was 
considered unconvincing and unlikely to give satisfaction to Austria-Hungary and Italy. 
(F.O. 50050/13799, 13 44.) cp. 0.-r..4..' VII. p. 52?, No. 8950, and pp. 533-4, No. 8955. cp. also 

G. P.. XXXVI (I), pp. 184-5.] 



No. 70. 

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edicard Grey. 

F.O. 52089/14809/13, 44. 

(No. 333.' St. Petershurgh, D. Xovemher 2, 1913. 

Su-:— E. yovemher 17, 1913. 

In the course of a conversation which I had on the 31st ultimo with the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency referred to the course which he thought that events 
were likely to take in Albania. He spoke, as he always does on this subject, very 
pessimistically, saying that it was impossible to take this newly created State seriously, 
or to imagine that it would be feasible to make a regularly constituted State out of a 
collection of uncivilized tribesmen. 

Monsieur Sazonow then asked me to give him an answei to the following question. 
If it should appear that Austria and Italy were succeeding in getting the control of 
Albanian affairs entirely into their own hands, and were preparing to establish 
themselves as masters on the Albanian coast would Great Britain remain indifferent, 
or would she as a Mediterranean naval Power object to Italy acquiring a new and 
advantageous position in the Adriatic, in the same way as you had objected to her 
acquiring an island in the ^.gean? 



60 



I remarked that I could not conceive Austria-Hungary allowing Italy to establish 
a strong naval base at Valona and to bottle up the Austrian Fleet in the Adriatic. 
Monsieur Sazonow rejoined that he was absolutely convinced that in that matter Italy 
would be able to impose her wishes on Austria. He did not know whether he would be 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to see this development but he was sure that it would 
come. I told His Excellency that I supposed His Majesty's Government would object 
to any new acquisition by Italy which had the effect of substantially altering the 
present naval position in the Mediterranean, but that I had not seen any expression of 
your views on the point which he raised. jMonsieur Sazonow observed that the 
occupation by Italy of Valona certainly would affect the naval position, 

I have, &c. 

HUGH O'BEIRNE. 



No. 71. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.C) 
F.O. 49539/30271/13/44. 

Tel. fNo. 390.) Foreign Office. November 3, 1913, 4-15 p.m. 

British representative on Commission of Control has since his arrival emphasized 
importance of selection of a Prince for Albania as soon as possible. 

It seems probable that Austria will put forward Prince of Wied and as H[i8] 
M[ajesty's] G[overnment] have no candidate whom they particularly favour or can 
suggest they are disposed to agree to this selection if other Powers agree, but wish 

French 

first to know the view of pr^ggj^j^ Gov[ernmen]t. You should ask M[inister for] 
F[oreign] A[ffairs].(-) 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to St. Petersburgh (No. 730).] 

(2) [Sir F. Bertie's telegram (No. 147) of November 6, 1913, D. 6-10 p.m., R. 8-30 p.m., 
(F.O. 50468/14809/13/44), and Mr. O'Beirne's telegram (No. 380) of November 5, 1913, D. 8 p.m., 
R. 9-30 P.M., reported approval of the Prince. (F.O. 50338/14809/13/44.)] 



No. 72. 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Deirne. 

F.O. 49767/13799/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 732.) Foreign Office, November 4, 1913, 4 p.m. 

Your tel[egram] No. 376 of Nov[emberJ 2.(^) 

I have asked French Ambassador to consult French M[inister for] F[oreign] 
A[ffairs] as to whether we should withdraw from Albanian Commissions, if as seems 
probable a deadlock arises. (^) Till this point has been settled it seems undesirable to 
make any protest at Vienna and Eome. 

It seems to me that we have little interest in settlement of details about Albania 
concerning which Austria and Italy make so many difficulties. 

On the other hand we must maintain our active interest in settlement of iEgean 
Islands. 

(1) [v. supra, p. 59, No. 69.] 

(2) [cp. supra, p. 50, No. 58.] 



61 



No. 73. 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Denng.C) 

F.O. 50658/13799/13/44. 
(No. 270.) 

Sir, Foreign Office. November 4, 1913. 

The Italian Ambassador, on his return from his hoUday, spoke to me earnestly 
to-day(^) of the feeling in Italy in favour of good relations with England. Italy must 
remain a member of the Triple Alliance, but outside this her great desire was for 
friendly relations with us. 

He then proceeded to speak of the Albanian question. He said that Italy was 
most anxious that the international control should be maintained, and that the Triple 
Entente should not disinterest itself in Albania. It was true that Austria and Italy 
had greater interests in Albania than other Powers, and that it was not easy to manage 
things with Austria, but it was essential for Italy that the international control should 
be maintained. The Italian Charge d'Affaires had reported that Sir Eyre Crowe had 
deprecated the separate instructions that had been given to the Austrian and Italian 
representatives on the Frontier Commission. (^) The Ambassador wished to know what 
these separate instructions were, that the matter might be put right. 

Sir Eyre Crowe, who came in subsequently, explained that all he had referred to 
was the definite instruction, given without consultation with other Powers, to declare 
as Albanian all districts w'here the work of the Commission was obstructed. 

The second point that the Ambassador urged was that, in order to uphold the 
international control and to make it work, we should give conciliatory instructions to 
our Delegate on the Commission of Control. 

I said that we had been most conciliatory. We had, for instance, accepted Mufid 
Bey, the Italian and Austrian nominee, as the Albanian Representative on the 
Commission, though we did not think that he was the best man for the post, and 
though we heard that he was entirely in Austria's interest. In spite of this, as he 
seemed not to be a disreputable person, we had accepted him, in the interests of 
agreement. 

I pointed out that the Austrians had wished that Ismail Kemal's Provisional 
Government should be recognised for the whole of Albania. 

The Italian Ambassador spoke in any but complimentary terms of Ismail Kemal. 

I said that w^e had agreed to recognise his Government wherever it was willingly 
accepted in Albania, but we could not agree to force it on other districts where it would 
be resisted. 

I also said that the separate action taken by Italy and Austria publicly in Athens 
had made an unfavourable impression, as any action taken separately and publicly by 
two Powers was bound to do. I did not object to the substance of the action, if it 
was a protest against Greek obstruction of the work of the Delimitation Commission, 
but the natural course would have been for Italy and Austria to consult the other 
Powers about the obstruction of the work of the Commission, to propose representa- 
tions in Athens, and only to make them separately if the other Powers refused to join. 

The Ambassador admitted that this would have been the correct course. He made 
no secret of his own regret that separate action had been taken without adopting this 
course. 

With reference to the Austrian and Italian statement that, if the work of the 
Delimitation Commission was not concluded on the 30th of this month, the Greek 
Government must be summoned to evacuate all districts in dispute by the end of 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 
(^) [Herr von Kiihlmann gave an account of this conversation in his despatch to Herr von 
Bethmann Hollweg of November 5, 1913. G.P. XXXVI (I), pp. 193-4. M. Paul Cambon 
referred to it in his telegram to M. Pichon of November 7. D.D.F., 3""^ Ser., Vol. VIII, p. 563, 
No. 449.] 

(^) [cp. supra, p. 59, No. 69, and note (>).] 



62 



December, the Ambassador said that, if it would, in my opinion, meet the case, he 
would urge that the date for the work of the Commission should be prolonged, say 
for a month, to the end of December. 

It appeared in this part of our conversation that the Ambassador was very sensible 
of the awkward situation that would arise if Italy and Austria were confronted with 
the task of deciding alone when and by what means the Greek evacuation of the 
southern part of Albania should be enforced. 

I said that, when replying to Count Mensdorfi's communication about these dates, 
I had simply said that I must wait till nearer the time before coming to any decision. (^) 
It was possible that the work of the Commission would not continue in December, 
owing to the climate. -j 

E. G[EEY]. 

(*) [Sir Edward Grey's despatch (No. 196) to Mr. T. Russell of November 5, 1913, described 
a conversation between Sir A. Nicolson and Count Mensdorff on October 29. The latter had 
stated the decision of the Austro-Hungarian and Italian Governments that, if owing to Greek 
obstructive tactics the Commission had not finished its work by November 30, the Greeks should 
be compelled to evacuate by December .31. (F.O. 49446/13799/13/44.)] 



No. 74. 

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey. 

St. Petershurgh, November 5, 1913. 
F.O. 50836/14809/13/44. D. 8 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 378.) E. 9-30 p.m. 

Your telegram No. 732.(i) 

Minister for Foreign Affairs has left for the Crimea. Assistant Minister for 
Foreign Afiairs informs me that M. Sazonof, previous to his departure, had a 
conversation with him concerning Albanian question, of which following is the 
upshot : — 

Only questions connected with Albania which seriously interest Russia are 
delimitation of frontier with Servia and Montenegi'o and establishment of some 
Government capable of maintaining order. It is a matter of indifference to Russian 
Government whether Vallona Government is recognised or another and whether 
concessions which this Government have given are ratified : and Russia would be 
prepai-ed, if Great Britain and France concurred, to cease all opposition to Austro- 
Italian Commission of Control in such matters. 

Russian Government, however, wish to know if His IMajesty's Government and 
French Government would not have objections to Austria and Italy thus gaining entire 
control of Albania and establishing themselves as masters on Albanian coast. 

If it is decided not to allow Austria and Italy a free hand in Commission of 
Control, the three Powers must decide clearly what steps they will take to carry out 
their wishes on certain points. 

M. Sazonof enquired of me on 31st October whether Great Britain, as a 
Mediterranean naval Power, would object to Italy establishing a naval base at Vallona, 
a contingency which he thought extremely probable. I had reported this by 
despatch. (^) 

MINUTES. 

It seems that M. Sazonof rather misunderstands the position. The recognition of the 
Valona Gov[ernmen]t w[oul]d not only be impracticable; it w[oul]d compromise the 
Commission of Control in the eyes of such public opinion as manages to subsist in Albania, and 
w[oul]d stultify its future labours. It cannot work with an ineffective tool, that is also 
"made in Austria." Similarly the recognition of the jobbing concessions already made w[oul]d 
mean the recognition of the Valona Gov[ernmen]t. The French are already up against these 

(1) [v. supra, p. 60, No. 72.] 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 59-60, No. 70.] 



63 



concessions, and w[oul]d probably not associate themselves with this Russian view. But, apart 
from this, the very complaisance that M. Sazonof appears to contemplate seems to me to make 
it incompatible with the dignity of the Commission — or anyhow of the Triple Entente portion 
of it — to remain. It is a case of entweder, oder,'\^) and we cannot well have it both waj-s 
as M. Sazonof seems to think. It w[oul]d be better either to assert ourselves from the start 
— which involves refusal to recognise the concessions — or else to wash our hands early in the 
day. For if we give way to Aiistria and Italy in the green tree of the Commission, what shall 
be done in the dry. As to the delimitation, withdrawal from the Commission of Control w[oul]d 
not necessarily mean withdrawal from the frontier Commission. 

We have not yet rec[eive]d the desp[atch] resp[ectin]g the possible establishment of a 
naval base at Valona. When we do, we had better consult the Admir.alty. If we withdrew the 
Italians w[oul]d certainly have a freer hand for the execution of their designs; but if we 
were going to assent to everything the Austrians and Italians did, the result w[oul]d be the 
same if we staved. 

R. G. V. Nov[ember] 6. 

I agree that we ought to withdraw altogether, rather than allow ourselves to be dragged 
round Albania at the tail of the Austro-Italian chariot, but all this depends on the decision 
of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] as to what is to be their attitude as regards Albania. I 
think however that if we withdraw from the Commission of Control we cannot continue to work 
on the frontier commission. 

G. R. C. 
6.xi.l3. 

I have always understood that when we talk of withdrawal, we mean withdrawal from all 
these Commissions. In fact it is the proceedings of the delimitation commission which are 
likely to create the greater difficulties for us. For in the Commission of Control we have now 
assented to an arrangement — i.e., the appointment of Mufid — by which the Triple Alliance can, 
and will, dictate their own decisions in that body without our having any locus standi to 
oppose them. 

Against any Italian designs on Valona we should, even if we withdraw, retain an effective 
remedy if, as we propose, we couple our withdrawal with the reservation that the status and 
territorial integrity of Albania, as decided upon at the Ambassador's Conferences, must not 
in any way be altered without our being consulted. 

Qu[erv] Wait for expression of views of the French government. (^) 

E. A. C. 

Nov [ember] 6. 
A. X. 
E. G. 

(') [Marginal comment bv Sir Evre Crowe: " Anglice : 'one thing or the other' 
E. A. C."] 

(■*) [Marginal comment by Sir A. Xicolson : "So did I. A. N."'] 

(^) [Sir Edward Grey's despatch (No. 676) to Sir F. Bertie of November 8, 1913, described 
a conversation of that date in which M. Paul Cambon expressed M. Pichon's agreement with 
Sir Edward Grey's view "that if things were made impossible in Albania, we should 
withdraw." (F.O. 51255/14809/13/44.) M. Paul Cambon's account of this conversation is given 
in DJD.F., 3"" Sir., Vol. VIII, pp. 576-8, Xo. 458.] 



No. 75. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. O 
F.O. 49650 '13799/13/44. 

Tel. (Xo. 396.^ Foreign Office, Novemher 7, 1913, 9-45 p.m. 

British delegate on Southern Albania delimitation commission suggests that in 
view of difficulties which confront the Commission in applying language test and in 
drawing just conclusions from such test, the instructions ba=ed on decisions of 
Ambassadors' Conferences should be modified to meet the actual situation. He 
recommends that the Commission be authorized to visit the whole country under 
discussion studying not only what they can of nationality, but also the economic, 
strategical, and geographical features. At the close of such journey Commissioners 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Rome (No. 331) ; to Berlin (Xo. 382i ; to Vienna 
(No. 313) ; to St. Petersburgh (No. 737). For Sir F. Bertie's action on it, cp. D.D.F., 3"" Sir., 
Vol. VIII, pp. 569-70, No. 452.] 



64 



should submit joint recommendations as to suitable frontier for approval of the several 
Governments. f") 

British delegate is under impression after full discussions with his colleagues that 
an agreement on above lines would by no means be impossible, provided it is agreed 
that neither language test nor working of frontier by sections are insisted upon. 

You should communicate above to Gov[evnmen]t to which you are accredited, and 
say that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] see considerable merit in the suggestion 
as a practical way of getting out of a difficult situation and of making the best use of 
the time at the disposal of the Commission. They would therefore be prepared to 
accept it, if the other Powers do the same. 

(-) [The telegram was founded on a report (No. 7, Confidential) from Colonel Doughty- 
Wylie, dated October 26, Hersek (Colonia), R. November 1. Sir Edward Grey marked the 
paragraph in the original despatch which formed the basis of paragraph 1 of the above 
telegram, and minuted the document as follows: — 

" It is a good despatch and the suggestion in the 2nd paragraph on p. 4 [i.e., para. 1 
above] seems reasonable. 

Bring up when I return to-morrow. E. G. 6.11.18."] 



No. 76. 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. T. Russell. {^) 

F.O. 51241/14809/13/44. 
(No. 199.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, November 7, 1913. 

I asked the Austrian Ambassador to-day whether his Government were going to 
propose the Prince of Wied for the Throne of Albania. 

He replied that he had not heard any thing on the subject, and he asked me 
whether we would accept the Prince. 

I said that we would accept him, and I did not think that anyone would raise 
objection to him; but it was necessary that someone should take the step of 
proposing him. 

The Ambassador asked me if I thought that France and Eussia would accept the 
Prince. 

T answered that I thought they would not make any objection to him. 
The Ambassador said that this was very important, and was something that he 
would at once telegraph to his Government. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 



No. 77. 

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 52097/14809/13/44. 
(No. 312.) 

Sir : — St. Petershurgh, November 10, 1913. 

The separate action taken at Athens on the 30th ultimo by Austria-Hungary and 
Italy in connection with the Delimitation of the South Albanian Frontier(^) has led the 
Russian Government during the last few days seriously to consider the whole question 
of their policy in regard to Albania. Previous to his departure for the Crimea on the 
4th instant Monsieur Sazonow had a conversation on this subject with the Assistant 

(1) Iv. supra, p. 59, No. 69, and note (i).] 



65 



Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the conclusions arrived at, as communicated to me by 
Monsieur Neratow on the 5th instant, may be briefly resumed as follows : 

The position in which the Entente Powers at present found themselves in the 
Albanian Commissions was most unsatisfactory. They were supposed to take an equal 
part in the management of Albanian affairs, but as soon as a difference of opinion arose 
between the two groups of Powers the Austrian and Italian Governments took a strong 
line, and the Powers of the Triple Entente were fain to give way. The latter were thus 
placed in a position which was scarcely consonant with their prestige. 

Russia desired to see a Government established in Albania which should be 
capable of maintaining order, and which would otler some guarantee of tranquillity to 
Albania's neighbours; bnt apart from that the only question connected with Albania 
which seriously interested her was the delimitation of the Albanian frontier with Servia 
and Montenegro. On that point Eussia could not remain indifferent, but for the rest 
it was a matter of indifference to her whether for instance the Powers recognised 
Ismael Kemal Bey's Government or another, and whether the various concessions 
which had been negotiated by that Government were confirmed or not. Paissia for her 
part would therefore be inclined to make it plain that she left Austria-Hungary and 
Italy a free hand in the management of Albanian affairs, and that the Eepresentatives 
of the Three Powers on the Commissions would in future refrain from all opposition 
to their Austrian and Italian Colleagues, prodded of course that the general principles 
laid down by the Conference of Ambassadors in London were maintained. 

When Monsieur Neratow spoke to me in this sense on the 5th instant I remarked 
that if the Entente Powers took the course which he suggested the result would 
naturally be that Albania would fall entirely under Austro-Italian control, and I asked 
whether Piussia regarded that result with equanimity. Monsieur Neratow replied that 
the Eussian Government, so far as they were concerned, did so regard the matter, but 
they doubted whether Great Britain and France would do the same, and they were 
anxious to be informed on that point. A similar question had, as reported in my 
despatch No. 333 of the 2nd instant,(-) been previously suggested to me by 
Monsieur Sazonow, who asked whether Great Britain as a naval Power in the 
Mediterranean would be indifferent to Austria and Italy establishing themselves as 
masters on the Albanian coast, and to Italy eventually acquiring a naval base at 
Valona. Thus the Eussian Government evidently consider that if the Powers of the 
Triple Entente withdraw from the management of Albanian affairs to the extent which 
Russia for her part would be prepared to contemplate, their action may lead to 
very far-reaching consequences as regards the Albanian coast of the Adriatic, which 
would, they think, particularly affect the interests of Great Britain and France. 

As you will observe, the Eussian Government would content themselves with 
making it clear that, subject to certain reservations of principle, the Three Powers were 
willing henceforth to let the Austrian and Italian Eepresentatives on the Albanian 
Commissions take the lead, and that no further opposition v.ould be offered to them by 
the Delegates of the Triple Entente. They do not contemplate a complete withdrawal 
of the Three Powers from the Commissions, and from certain remarks let fall by 
Monsieur Neratow I gather that they would rather hesitate to take so decided a step. 
It is true that Monsieur Sazonow spoke to me on the 2nd instant, as reported in my 
telegram No. 376 of that date.(') as if he was thinking seriously of a withdrawal of the 
Three Powers from the Southern Delimitation Commission but it was evident that His 
Excellency had not at that time come to any definite conclusions on the whole subject. 

I have informed Monsieur Neratow that His Majesty's Government are in 
communication with the French Government regarding the question of policy in 
Albania and that you will doubtless shortly be in a position to inform him of the result 
of these consultations. j have &c. 

HUGH O'BEIENE. 

(2) [r. supra, pp. 59-60, No. 70.] 

(3) [i-. supra, p. 59, No. 69.] 



[8959] 



F 



66 



No. 78. 

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 
F.O. 52098/13799/13/44. 

(No. 343.) St. Petershurgh, D. November 11, 1913. 

Sir:— R. November 17, 1913. 

The Eussian AsBistant Minister of Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that he had 
information to the effect that after Monsieur Sazonow's passage through Berhn on the 
21st ultimo and his conversation with the German Chancellor(^) the German Govern- 
ment had taken means to convey to Vienna an intimation of their dissatisfaction 
(mecontentement) with the recent developments of Austrian policy in the Near East — 
referring, it may be presumed, to the Austrian ultimatum to oervia demanding the 
evacuation of Albanian territory. The information given to the Eussian Government 
compares curiously with the language reported by Sir F. Cartwright in his telegram 
No. 158 most confidential of the 29th ultimo, (^) to have been used by the German 
Emperor during his stay in Vienna, three or four days after Monsieur Sazonow passed 
through Berlin ; but of course His Majesty's remarks to an Austrian General may not 
have corresponded exactly with the official attitude of the German Government. At 
any rate the observations, whatever they were, which the German Government offered 
at Vienna did not avail to deter Austria from uniting shortly afterwards with Italy in 
the peremptory demarche which the two Powers made at Athens without consultation 
with the Powers of the Entente. 

On the other hand Monsieur Neratow told me that the Austrian Charge d'Affaires 
had called on him a day or two ago to express the hope of the Austrian Government 
that the Delegates of the two groups of Powers on the Albanian Commissions would in 
the future show themselves mutually conciliatory. Monsieur Neratow, while conscious 
of the humour of such a suggestion coming from the side of Austria, appeared 
nevertheless to see in it some indication of a disposition on the part of the Vienna 
Cabinet to show themselves easier to deal with than heretofore in regard to Albanian 
affairs. The Italian Government on their part had, His Excellency told me, sent him 
a message of a friendly and semi-apologetic character on the subject of the Austro- 
Italian demarche at Athens, saying that Italy's action had been taken solely because 
it was feared that Austria-Hungary would otherwise act alone. Monsieur Neratow 
appeared favourably impressed by this communication, which however seems scarcely 
convincing considering that Italy and not Austria is the Power most interested in the 
South Albanian Frontier question. 

I have, &c. 

HUGH O'BEIENE. 

(*) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King.] 
(2^ [rp. svpra, pp. 46-7, No. 54, and note (2).] 
(") [u. supra, p. 49, No. 57.] 



No. 79. 

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey. 

jPrivate.(*; 

My dear Grey, British Embassy, Paris, November 11, 1913. 

I met the Eussian Prime Minister at a party at the Eussian Embassy yesterday 
evening. He told me that he hoped that the reunions of Ambassadors in Londoii 
would be resumed. They had prevented acute differences between the Great Powers 

(>) [Grey MSS., Vol. 15.] 



67 



and he thought that they would be the best means of preventing isolated action such 
as that of Austria and Italy in the matter of Albania. He had he said spoken very 
frankly on the subject to M. Tittoni. 

Yours sincerely, 

FRANCIS BEETIE. 



No. 80. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. 

Private.(') 

My dear Bertie, London, November 12, 1913. 

I do not agree that it would be ad%-isable to renew the reunions of Ambassadors :{') 
they are not suitable for dealing with details. 

I believe that they are very useful in a time of real crisis and emergency. But 
when this time is over they are apt to become a dumping-ground for every question of 
detail. Indeed, they almost multiply questions for discussion, owing to the exceeding 
facility that they pro^•ide for raising any question; their usefulness diminishes; and 
the amount of time taken up by them increases. 

If some large difficulty arises, in connection with which it is the desire of all the 
Powers to have the reunions again, of course I will readily consent ; but I am not 
prepared to renew them for details about Albania. 

Yours sincerely, 

[E. GEEY.] 

(M [Grey MSS., Vol. 15.] 

(2) [A further letter from Sir F. Bertie of Xovember 12 stated that M. Pichon agreed with 
Sir Edward Grey that the Meetings of Ambassadors should not be renewed at present (Grey 
MSS., Vol. 15), and an official telegram (No. 765) was sent to Mr. O'Beirne, to the same eflFect, 
oil November 24, D. 1-45 p.m. (F.O. 52471/ 106/ 13/ 44.) On this question cp. also D.D.F., 
3"" Sir., Vol. VIII, p. 573, No. 456.] 



No. 81. 

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edicard Grey. 

Berlin, Novemher 20, 1913. 

F.O. 52780/14809/13/44. D. 7-35 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 198.) E. 10 p.m. 

Your telegram No. 419 of Nov[einbf'r] 19 to Paris.(*) 

Question of Prince of Wied's candidature has been referred to Emperor, who has 
not yet given his answer. 

(Confidential. "I 

Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the Emperor 
has all along been against Prince of Wied's acceptance of candidature, and that it is 
possible that His Majesty may still raise objections. He added that, although the 
Imperial Government share His Majesty's feelings on this subject, they could not 
possibly under the circumstances refuse their consent. If the Emperor still held to 
his opinion, it would have to be explained to him that, in view of the wishes of Austria 
and Italy, it might cause unpleasantness if Germany raised difficulties. 

(») [Sir Edward Grey's telegram (No. 419) to Sir F. Bertie of November 19, 1913, 
D. 7-15 P.M.. instructed him to " ask for views of gov[ernnien]t to which you are accredited " 
on the question of the selection of the Prince of Wied as Prince of Albania. He was to state 
further that His Majesty's Government had no objection. The telegram was repeated to Berlin 
(No. 398) ; to Rome (No.' 349) ; to St. Pctersburgh (No. 758); to Vienna (No. 323). (F.O. 52467/ 
14809/13/44.)] 



[?959] 



68 



No. 82. 

Minutes by Sir A. Nicolson, Sir Eyre Crowe, and Sir Edward Grey. 
F.O. 53517/14809/13/44. 

Sir Edward Grey, November 24, 1913. 

C[ouiV]t MensdorfE at Windsor mentioned to me that on Monday (to-day) we 
should receive a proposal from his Gov[ernmen]t that you should in the name of the 
Powers inform the P[rin]ce of Wied that he had been selected as Euler of Albania 
and that they hoped he would accept. C[oun]t Mensdorff asked me what I thought of 
the proposal I said (1) that I was not sure if all the Powers had as yet formally 
accepted the P[rin]ce of Wied's nomination, which indeed had not yet been formally 
proposed to them. (2) That I doubted if you would be very eager to be the spokesman 
of the Powers. (3) That as the Prince was a German subject and at present in 
Germany (he is it appears at Potsdam) it seemed to me more natural that the German 
Gov[ernmen]t should be the spokesman when the time arrived. M[arqu]is Imperiali 
spoke to me on the subject to-day, and I told him what I had said, as my personal 
opinion, to C[oun]t MensdorfE at Windsor. I believed C[oun]t TrauttmansdorfE was 1 
making the proposal officially to Sir Eyre Crowe — the latter would doubtless report it 
officially. (Sir Eyre Crowe is writing a record of his conversation with C[oun]t 
TrauttmansdorfE (which I annex) and also of what M[arqu]is Imperiali suggested 
to him.^ 

This question is being unnecessarily dragged out. The proper course would bo 
for Austria and Italy to propose the P[rin]ce of Wied formally. 

A. N. 
E. G. 

Prince of Wied. 

The Austro-Hungarian Charge d'AfEaires and the Italian ambassador made an 
identic communication to-day, putting forward two alternative courses for 
Sir E. Grey's consideration : 

(1) Sir E. Grey as spokesman of the 6 Powers, to notify to the Prince of Wied, 
their approval of his candidature. 

(2) All the Foreign Secretaries of the 6 Powers to telegraph to the Prince of Wied 
at Potsdam, on a date to be fixed by Sir E. Grey, notifying their approval of the 
candidature. 

The Italian ambassador added that the French were even now raising technical 
objections on points of form, such as that the Powers must still receive a formal 
proposal from Austria and Italy of the prince's candidature. H[is] E[xcellency] 
hoped, and Count TrauttmansdorfE expressed the same expectation, that some means 
could be found to tackle the matter really and drop all formalistic controversy. 

I said I felt sure Sir E. Grey would not like the first alternative. And I 
ventured, as coming from myself to make a suggestion which I thought would | 
overcome all their difficulties : 

Why not let each Power instruct its Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his 
4 colleagues and the German Minister for F[oreign] A[fEairs] with a view to an 
identic communication to be addressed by them to the Prince of Wied at Potsdam? 

Marquis Imperiali and Count TrauttmansdorfE both said they felt sure that if 
Sir E. Grey would put this forward, their governments would accept it. I promised 
to submit the suggestion to Sir E. Grey accordingly. 

The Italian Ambassador finally asked whether he could have a short interview 
with Sir E. Grey to-morrow, and obtain his decision both in regard to this 
matter, and also on the questions raised in the several Austrian communications 



69 



respecting Albanian matters, which he had instructions to support (53297) and (58275) 
(53279).(') ^ ^ ^ 

Nov [ember] 24. 

I will see the Italian Ambassador to-day and adopt Sir E. Crowe's proposal as 
regards the Prince of Wied. ^ ^ 

(■) [Not reproduced. Three communications were received from the Austro-Hungarian 
Embassy on November 24. One, dated November 21, contained a protest against the presence 
of Servian and Montenegrin troops beyond the frontier line whose details were not settled at 
London. (F.O. 53297/24992/13/44.) This communication was merely acknowledged. The 
second, also dated November 21, proposed a representation to the Servian and Greek Govern- 
ments reminding them of the decisions as to the Albanian frontier reached in the Meetings 
of Ambassadors and stating that the results of any duplication of the work would be null. 
(F.O. 53275/13799/13/44.) In this case copies were sent to Sir F. Elliot and Mr. Crackan- 
thorpe authorizing them to join in a representation if all their colleagues were similarly 
instructed. The third communication, dated November 22, referred to the question of 
Albanian refugees from Servian territory, and as to this similar instructions were sent. 
Sir Edward Grey refused hots^ever to accord help on other matters contained in this third 
communication : the question of access to Dibra and Djakova, and the protection of minorities. 
(F.O. 53279/3027/13/44.)] 



No. 83. 

Sir Edu-ard Grey to Mr. Bering. (^) 

F.O. 53517/14809/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 357.) Foreign Office, November 25, 1913. 

Italian and Austrian Gov[ernmen]ts have suggested that H[is] M[ajesty's] 
Gov[ernmen]t should propose Prince of Wied to the Powers. (^) 

I demurred to this procedure as we have no relations with the Prince of Wied 
and I have said that the natural course was for Italy and Austria to propose the Prince 
to the Powers. 

The Italian Ambassador urged that this would cause still further delay as it would 
still remain to communicate with the Prince of Wied. 

I suggested that the five Ambassadors at Berlin might at once be instructed to 
approach the German M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] and ask him to inform the 
Prince of Wied that the Powers wish to designate him as Prince of Albania and to ask 
if he will accept the position. 

In view of nationality of Prince of Wied and as he is believed to be at Potsdam 
now, this seems to be the most appropriate method of communicating with him. 

You should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A [fairs]. 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Paris (No. 423); to Berlin (No. 401); to St. Petersburgh 
(No. 762) ; to Vienna (No. 325).] 

(-) [v. immediately preceding document.] 



No. 84. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.^) 

F.O. 53771/13799/13/44. 
(No. 145.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, November 25, 1913. 

The Greek Minister read to me to-day a telegram protesting against the line that 
the Greek Government understood was being discussed by the Frontier Commission 
for the south of Albania. The line proposed would give numbers of Greeks to Albania, 
thereby putting them under a rule much less civilised than that of Greece, which they 
would resent and against which they would revolt. There would be all sorts of trouble 

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 



70 



if such a line was decided upon. He understood that we had proposed this line to the 
Powers. 

I said that a line had been suggested in the Commission, and we had asked the 
Powers to instruct their Delegates to continue the discussion on the basis of this line, 
in the hope of coming to an agreement. I could not discuss the line outside the 
Commission. Indeed, it was a matter of detail to be decided according to the merits 
on the spot by the Commissioners. No decision had yet been come to ; but I earnestly 
advised that, when the Commission did come to a^ agreement, the Greek Government 
should not dispute the decision of the Powers about Albania. 

The Greek Minister continued to deprecate the line. 

I continued to repeat the advice that Greece should accept whatever decisions the 
Powers came to. I added that if, five years ago, the Greeks had been told told they 
would get what they had now obtained and occupied, including such important things 
as Salonika, it would have seemed almost incredible. 

The Minister contended that tlie patriotism that had been displayed and the 
sacrifices that had been made by Greece were equally unforeseen. 

I said that I supposed every one expected his countrymen to be patriotic and to 
make sacrifices when the occasion demanded. 

As the Minister continued to press the question of Albania, saying that it was the 
interests of Italy and Austria that were being considered, I observed that even Great 
Powers must be allowed sometimes to have interests, as well as the smaller Powers. 
In this Balkan crisis, the Great Powers had claimed exceedingly little for themselves, 
and their moderation had been remarkable. 

The Minister urged that it had suited them to be moderate, because they had 
thereby kept the peace between themselves. 

I observed that I had not said that the moderation of the Powers was a great 
virtue, but that it had been remarkable. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[KEY]. 



No. 85. 

Sir Eyre Crou-e to Count Trauttmansdorff. 
F.O. 53517/14809/13/44. 

Dear Trauttmansdorff, Foreign Office, November 25, 1913. 

After our conversation yesterday, (^) I discussed the question of the Prince of 
Wied's candidature with Sir E. Grey, and I now write to tell you the result. 

Sir E. Grey has telegraphed to our Ambassadors that as the Prince of Wied is 
understood to be now at Potsdam, and in view of H[is] H[ighness]'s nationality, they 
should inform the Gov[ernraen]ts to which they are accredited that Sir E. Grey 
considers the most appropriate method of communicating with him would be, that the 
five Ambassadors at Berlin should be instructed at once to approach Herr von Jagow 
with a request that he would inform the Prince that it is the wish of the Powers to 
designate H[is] H[ighness] as Prince of Albania and they are therefore anxious to 
know if he is prepared to accept that position. 

I trust that this may afford a practical way out of the difficulty. Sir Edward told 
Imperiali what he intended to do yesterday. (^) 

[Yours, &c.] 

EYEE A. CEOWE. 

(0 [cp. supra, pp. 68-9, No. 82.] 

(2) [This letter was drafted by Mr. G. R. Clerk. The last paragraph was added in Sir Eyre 
Crowe's hand.] 

[ED. NOTE— On November 28, Sir Edward Grey received a telegram (No. 26) from 
Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie, dated November 27, 1913, to the effect that the French 
representative on the Southern Albanian Frontier Commission was still awaiting further 
instructions. (F.O. 53844/13799/13/44.) Sir Edward Grey thereupon sent a telegram (No. 427) 
to Sir F. Bertie, D. November 28, 1913, 5 p.m., directing him to ask M. Pichon to instruct the 



71 



French delegate " to proceed at once to discussion of the line in the Commission without 
interposing these delays." He added that he did not think that delaj' was " in the interest of 
Greece." (F.O. 53844/13799/13/44.) M. Pichou's instructions to the French delegate on 
Novemher 29 are given in D.D.F., 3"" Ser., Vol. VIII, p. 688, No. 547.] 



No. 86. 

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.(^) 
F.O. 54558/14809/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 205.1 Berlin, December 2, 1913. 

Your telegram No. 405 of 29th November. (-) 

Proposal respecting Prince of Wied made to German Minister for Foreign Affairs 
today by representatives of the five Powers. His Excellency will see Prince the day 
after to-morrow. 

(') [The text given above is taken from the Confidential Print, as the original decypher 
cannot be traced.] 

(2) jSir Edward Grey's telegram (No. 405) of November 29, 1913, authorized Sir E. Goschen 
to join his colleagues in the proposal respecting the Prince of Wied. (F.O. 53900/14809/13/44.) 
cp. supra, pp. 68-9, No. 82.] 

No. 87. 

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.O 
F.O. 55205/13799/13/44. 

(No. 190.) Vienna, D. December 5, 1918. 

Sir, E. December 8, 1918. 

With reference to my despatch No. 189 of December 3rd,(^l I have the honour to 
report that though the Parliamentary attack on Count Berchtold's foreign policy has 
been unusually severe, and has been supported by the most influential organs of the 
Press, there is as yet no reason to suppose that Ilis Excellency will feel obliged to 
resign his office. The German Ambassador tells me he thinks His Excellency will 
weather the storm, and that it is not so much Count Berchtold's conduct of the foreign 
affairs of the Empire as the unsatisfactory internal situation that will perhaps in the 
end, though not at present, bring him to the ground. My other colleagues to whom I 
have spoken on the subject incline to the belief that, though Count Berchtold would 
gladly retire into private life, he would probably retain office so long as the Emperor 
wishes to keep him. 

In the two conversations I have hitherto held wuth Count Berchtold, (^) he has 
displayed, as regards the South Albanian frontier, without any indication that he 
would yield to further Greek pressure, some apprehension lest the line to be eventually 
drawn should give rise to local resistance on the part of the Epirots of a character to 
endanger, at the very outset, the stability of the new state. On this point M. Strait, 
the Greek Minister, is very insistent. He has spoken earnestly to me on the subject, 
predicting serious difficulties from the moment of the withdrawal of the Greek troops, 
and enlarging on the independent spirit and warlike instincts of the Greek inhabitants 
of the region in dispute. Should this region be assigned to Albania even to the extent 
involved in the acceptance of Col[onel] Doughty Wylie's line, M. Streit states that out 
of a total population contained in it of 220,000, no less than 140,000 will be Greek. He 
admits, of course, the enormous difficulty of tracing any line that would not leave a 
large population dissatisfied. I am not in a position to judge the accuracy of the 
above figures but M. Streit confided to me on December 3rd that he had just laid them 
again before Count Berchtold, who was for the first time visibly impressed by the 

(■) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King.] 

(2) [Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch (No. 189), D. December 3, R. December 8, 1913, dealt with 
the meeting of the Austrian and Hungarian delegations on November 18 and their attitude to 
Count Berchtold's policy. (F.O. 55204/53131/13/44.)] 

(3) [Sir M. de Bunsen arrived at Vienna on November 24, cp. supra, p. 58, No. 68, note (i). 
His first oflBcial conversation with Count Berchtold was on December 3, cp. immediately 
succeeding note (■*).] 



72 



Greek Minister's arguments and went so far as to promise M. Streit at the end of a 
long interview, that he would again examine the frontier question, especially as 
regards to Koritza, this being the region where, according to M. Streit, Greek 
civilization, and Greek predominance generally, will in the most marked manner come 
in conflict with the new Albanian authority 

The French Ambassador, to whom Streit has also given an account of his 
conversation with Count Berchtold, told me yesterday that, though doubting whether 
the Foreign Minister would be strong enough to induce the Italians to give way on 
this point, he was not without a faint hope that M. Streit 's efforts might lead to some 
slight modification of the proposed line in favour of the Greeks. M. Dumaine regards 
the Doughty Wylie line as being too favourable to the Italian demands, as it stands 
now. I have already mentioned in my telegram No. 189 of December 3 that 
Count Berchtold had spoken to me of a certain nervousness which he hears is now 
felt in Italy with regard to the South Albanian frontier. (') He said that, in his opinion, 
it was the duty of the International Commission of Control to devise measures for the 
preservation of order in the frontier region. He did not contemplate suggesting 
intervention from the outside, as this might be a cure more dangerous than the 
disease. His Excellency did not tell me what means the control Commission possessed 
enabling them to take effective measures, and I thought his remarks interesting mainly 
as showing that he realizes the danger of possible local disturbances of a serious 
character, and is casting about for a way out of the difi&culty. 

I have told him that, in my opinion, if the Greeks are too hardly dealt with on 
the Albanian frontier, this will reinforce their claim to favourable treatment regarding 
the Islands. 

I may perhaps mention the principal points touched upon by the French and 
Turkish Ambassadors, in conversation with roe. 

M. Dumaine criticizes severely the mistakes made by this Government throughout 
the Balkan crisis. In their reliance first on Turke}-, and then on Bulgaria, they showed 
themselves lamentably blind to the true facts of the situation. They had now contrived 
to alienate Eoumania, through hesitation to accept as definite the conclusions of the 
Treaty of Bucharest, a point on which Eoumanian opinion was extremely sensitive. 
The embryo Albanian state could hardly be expected to show real vitality. The main 
faults of the new Albanian frontier lines lay in the severance which they have brought 
about between populous districts and the markets to which the latter have for centuries 
had undisputed access. The recent Albanian invasion of Servia was directly traceable 
to this cause, and similar complications were bound to ensue as the result of Koritza 
being made Albanian. M. Dumaine takes the Greek side very strongly. He read to 
me the other day a confidential despatch from M. Paul Cambon to M. Pichon 
expressing his conviction that the renewal of the Triple Alliance had been accompanied 
by engagements between the Allies affecting especially the Eastern portion of the 
Mediterranean, and that these arrangements would doubtless be reflected in the 
stiffening attitude of Italy as regards withdrawal from the Islands in her occupation, 
and possibly in Italian demands for a kind of sphere of influence in Asia Minor. His 
Excellency, in short, has been good enough to show me unreserved confidence from 
the day of our first meeting. 

Hussein Hilmi Pasha is inclined to believe that the population of Macedonia will 
soon have ample cause to regret the cessation of Turkish rule over them. He states 
that 700,000 IBulgarians inhabit the regions annexed by Servia as the result of the 
2nd Balkan war. ]\Iarauding bands will doubtless make their appearance as in the 

past, in order this time to make the country untenable for Servia (^) 

I have, &c. 

MAUEICE DE BUNSEN. 

(*) [Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram (No. 189) of December 3, 1913, D. 8 p.m., R. 11 p.m., is not 
reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 54675/13799/13/44.)] 

(5) [The remaining paragraphs of this despatch are printed infra, pp. 359-60, No. 404.] 



73 



No. 88. 

Sir Edward Grexj to Sir M. de Bunsen.{^) 

F.O. 55668/13799/13/44. 
(No. •2-20.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, December 8, 1918. 

The Austrian Ambassador, after I had informed him to-dayC- of Colonel Doughty- 
Wylie's report that an a^rreement was in sight about the southern frontier of Albania, 
told me that Count Berchtold favoured the idea of the creation of a local militia by 
the local Albanian authorities to keep order temporarily after the Greek evacuation. 
Count Berchtold did not like the idea of an international occupation, and Count 
Mensdorff understood that I was opposed to it. The best solution of all would be the 
establisliment of a strong Gendarmerie under Dutch Officers, but this could hardly be 
created in time to replace the Greeks by the appointed date. 

I said that, if an international occupation was proposed, I should not oppose it, 
though I thought that we should probably not take part in it by sending British troops. 
I should, however, infinitely prefer the organisation of a local militia, if that was 
feasible. The Commiss-on of Control would no doubt be able to advise us on that 
point. I regarded the establishment of a strong Gendarmerie as the best solution: but 
to work through local Albanian authorities in whatever way was possible was 
preferable to international occupation, and I welcomed the idea of a local militia, if it 
was practicable. 

[I am. il-c] 

E. GTEEY]. 

(') [This despatch was repeated to Rome (,Xo. 310) on December 9, and to the Commission 
of Control, Valona (So. 27), on December 10.] 

{-) [Herr von Kiihlmann sent a report of this conversation to Herr von Bethmann Hollweg 
on December 9. cp. G.P., XXXVI (I), pp. 247-8.] 



No. 89. 

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edicard Grey.C^ 

Athens, Decemher 10, 1913. 
F.O. 55760 13799 13 44. D. 1-30 p.m. 

Tel. CSo. 205.) E. 3-35 p.m. 

M. Venizelos tells me positively that the people of Epirus will resist by force 
incorporation in Albania. He has not encouraged them nor armed them but he has 
not prevented them arming themselves. He sees danger of defence leading to Italian 
intervention but cannot believe that European public opinion will allow forcible 
commission of an injustice worse than the Partition of Poland. He has not yet 
decided whether to withdraw the Greek troops at the bidding of Europe or to resign. 
He urges that the question of the islands should be settled simultaneously. If he 
could show that the sacrifice of modem [sic : northern] Epirus was part of a general 
settlement which allotted to Greece the islands in Greek occupation except Imbros and 
Tenedos and secured withdrawal of Italy from the other islands and the grant to them 
of a large autonomy under Turkish sov[e]reignty, he might obtain its acceptance here 
although nothing would prevent local resistance. But his position woiild not be 
tenable if after withdrawing from disputed zone he was confronted with demands for 
further concessions in the islands and with Italian occupation tending to become 
permanent. He begs you to have these questions settled simultaneously and at once. 

The determination of frontier populations is confirmed from all quarters. They 
will be largely reinforced by volunteers from Greece. The King told the Austrian 

0) [This telegram was sent to Vienna (as No. 337) ; to Berlin (as No. 416) ; to Rome (as 
No. 371); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 795).] 



74 



Charge d' Affaires that if M. Venizelos gave way he would dismiss him and even 
talked of abdicating and leading defence. (-) Would an international occupation of the 
contested zone by all Powers (not by mandatories) not be possible until it be seen how 
the Albanian experiment succeeds, in order to avoid certain bloodshed? 

(2) [cp. O.-U.A., Vol. VII, pp. 601-2, No. 9042; p. 606, Xo. 9046.] 



No. 90. 

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

F.O. 56641/13799/13/44. 

(No. 283.) Confidential. Athens, D. December 10, 1913. 

Sir, E. December 16, 1913. 

At the party given last week at the French Legation in honour of the combined 
fleets King Constantine was observed in long and animated conversation with the 
Austrian (Charge d'Affaires. Some days later His Majesty told a friend of mine who 
had the honour of an audience with him that he had spoken openly to Prince 
Fiirstenberg, and had said that the populations of northern Epirus were quite 
determined to resist to the uttermost their incorporation in Albania, that if 
Monsieur Venizelos did not support them he would dismiss him and summon another 
Minister, and that if the worst came to the worst he would abdicate his throne and 
put himself at the head of the defenders of their country. 

The last threat need not, perhaps, be taken too seriously, but there is no doubt of 
His Majesty's active sympathy with the Epirotes, nor of their determination to defend 
themselves to the last. In this they will be assisted by volunteers from all parts of 
Hellenism, and it is not improbable that officers of the Greek army will throw up their 
commissions to join them. 

This morning I called upon Monsieur Venizelos, and said I thought it a great 
pity that his Government had encouraged the Epirotes in their resistance to the will 
of Europe, and had supplied them with arms. He denied having given them either 
arms or encouragementj with the exception of 500 rifles he had given Major 
Spiromillios for Khimara. The rifles in the hands of the populations were Gras rifles, 
the discarded weapon of the Greek army, which could be bought in the market. He 
confessed frankly that he had taken no steps to prevent these arms from reaching the 
frontier districts, and said it would have been impossible for him to do so. But 
neither Greek Mannlichers nor captured Turkish Mausers had been sent there, and 
he was taking particular precautions to prevent any artillery from being abstracted. 

(Count Bosdari, the Italian Minister, came to see me shortly after I had returned 
from Monsieur Venizelos, and told me that he kept receiving reports from Consular 
officials of the transport of arms to the frontier districts ; his last report from Corfu 
even mentioned guns. Moreover at a party given by a rich Greek two nights before 
he had himself heard his host state openly that he had offered Monsieur Venizelos a 
battery for Epirus, and that it had been gratefully accepted. Therefore notwith- 
standing Monsieur A'enizelos' reputation for truthfulness, he could not accept his 
assurances. He thought the Greek Government were acting with extreme foolishness, 
for when two Governments like those of Austria and Italy had determined on such a 
policy, whether right or wrong, as the foundation of an Albanian State, it stood to 
reason that they would see it through.) 

Being myself convinced that Greece was putting herself into great danger by the 
course she was pursuing, I said to Monsieur Venizelos that it might be all very well 
to talk of resistance when it was only a question of repelling Albanian hordes, but had 
he considered the probability of foreign intervention? He replied that he was 
perfectly aware of it but his case was so strong that he could not believe that public 

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 



75 



opinion in Europe would allow the threat of war to be carried out against him. Here 
were people who for 500 years had been resisting not the power of the Turks but the 
tyranny of the Albanian Mussulmans : their liberation had been effected, and then 
Europe was to step in and order them to be placed again under the Mussulman yoke. 
It was inconceivable. 

He has not yet decided whether when the time comes, and he is called upon by 
the Powers to withdraw the Greek troops, he will do so or resign his office. He is 
surrounded by difficulties from above and from below, internal as well as external. He 
has a long and arduous programme to carry out. and he believes the Governments of 
Europe give him credit for moderation, and wish him to succeed. But if he were 
to accept the European solution of the Albanian frontier question without having 
secured a settlement of the other outstanding questions, how is he to defend himself 
against the accusation of not having provided against the danger of being called upon 
to make further concessions? He understood in London that the points which were 
left to the decision of the Powers were to be settled together as a connected whole. He 
therefore' earnestly begs that you. Sir, will see to it that the question of the islands, 
both those in Greek and those in Italian occupation is settled at the same time as that 
of the Albanian frontier. If he could come to the people and show that the islands 
occupied by Greece had been left to her. with the exception of Imbros and Tenedos, 
and that the islands occupied by Italy had been given a large autonomy, although 
remaining under the Turkish flag, he might be able to reconcile the nation to the 
abandonment of the Epirotes, although nothing could prevent local resistance. 

I reminded him that in a recent conversation with Monsieur Gennadius you had 
said you thought it unwise for Greece to raise the question of the islands of which 
she is in possession. (-) He replied that he might be satisfied with actual possession 
without formal recognition, if Italy were gone from the other islands, but her 
prolonged occupation, tending to becom.e permanent, was intolerable. He begged me, 
in conclusion, to report our conversation to you. 

Fighting between Greeks and Albanians, when once begun without Greek official 
assistance, is likely to be indefinitely prolonged, and the Italians would be tempted to 
terminate such a state of affairs by armed intervention, and this, in the present temper 
of the Greeks, would lead to war. The idea of the international occupation of the 
contested districts is no new one, and if I venture to recommend it with full 
consciousness of its many inconveniences, it is because I see no other means of 
averting more serious dangers. The troops must of course consist of contingents from 
all the six Powers : a mandate to Austrian and Italian troops or both would be worse 
than useless. The occupation would give an opportunity of ascertaining the real 
feeling of the populations, and need only last until the success or failure of the 
Albanian experiment had been proved. 

I have. &c. 

F. ELLIOT. 

P.S. — I informed Monsieur Venizelos confidentially of the statement made by 
the rich Greek in Count Bosdari's hearing, and have received from him an indignant 
denial of having been offered a battery by him, and having accepted it, or of haAing 
exchanged with him one word having anv relation to the question of Epirus. 

F. E. 



(-) [cp. infra, p. 150, No. 164 ] 



76 



No. 91. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.C) 
[By Post.] 

F.O. 55760/13799/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 449.) Foreign Office, December 12, 1913, 7*30 P.M. 

Sir F. Elliot's telegram No. 205 (55760 of Dec[ember] lO(') ). 

We may now expect any day to hear that South Albanian boundary commission 
has agreed upon a line and has thus terminated its labours. A serious situation will 
then arise in view of the evident determination of the Christian population in the 
border districts to resist incorporation in Albania. 

2. In these circumstances, it is essential that some force should be available on 
withdrawal of Greek troops and administration to prevent sanguinary disorder. H[is] 
M[ajesty's] G[overnment] share what they understand to be the general reluctance 
to employ international contingents for such a purpose. 

_ _ 3. The Austro-Hungarian government have put forward a suggestion that a local 
militia of sufficient strength might be rapidly formed, and according to reports 
received from the British delegate on Commission of Control, the Dutch officers appear 
to consider it possible to organize 1000 gendarmerie in three weeks at a cost estimated 
roughly at ^6000 a month. It is difficult to form an opinion as to the feasibihty 
and sufficiency of these plans on the scanty information to hand, but everything points 
to the necessity of allowing sufficient time to make suitable preparations before the 
date of Greek evacuation. 

4. According to the formal resolution of the Ambassadors' conference, such 
evacuation could not rightly be demanded until one month after termination of frontier 
commission's labours, that is, in any case not before the middle, or possibly the end, of 
January, and H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] consider the Powers are formally 
bound to allow not less than this one month's grace. 

5. When moment for evacuation does come, the Powers will be faced with the 
question of the islands, with which that of the South Albanian frontier was deliberately 
linked during discussions at the Ambassadors' Conference. It will be remembered 
that the inclusion in Albania of Koritza and Stylos was only agreed to on an under- 
standing between the Powers that the islands except Tenedos and Imbros should go 
to Greece. Apart from the justice of now giving effect to this honourable 
understanding, this course will afford the best means of obtaining the co-operation of 
the Greek Government in a general settlement which will, among other things, go a 
long way to dispose of the difficulties in Southern Albania. 

6. Failing such a settlement, there will clearly be trouble in Greece itself and the 
danger of further trouble between Greece and Turkey that may re-open larger 
questions. It is to the interest of all the Powers, including Turkey, that the peace 
now finally concluded in the Balkans should not now again be broken. A general 
settlement on the basis outlined by M. Venizelos seems both equitable and practical, 
and H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] hope that the six Powers will agree to 
co-operate for its immediate realization. 

7. With this \dew, the Powers should, as soon as possible after the South Albanian 
boundary is settled, communicate it to Greece with an intimation that it must be 
definitely accepted, and with the request for a definite pledge that in due course, all 
the districts incorporated in Albania will be evacuated by the Greek forces at the date 
named. At the same time, the Greek and Turkish Governments would have to be 
informed that the Powers have decided not to deprive the Greeks of the islands 
entirely mhabited by Greeks, which they conquered in the late war, except Tenedos 
and Imbros, which, for strategical reasons should be handed back to Turkey. 

(1) [This telegram is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet It 
was repeated to Berlin (No 417) ; to Vienna (No. 338); to Rome (No. 372); to St. Petersburgh 
(No. 99); to Athens (No 146); to Constantinople as despatch (No. 456), on December 18.] 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 73-4, No. 89.] 



77 



Satisfactory guarantees would have to be given by Greece to Turkey that the islands 
will not be fortified, or used for any naval or military purposes, and that effective 
measures will be taken for the prevention of smuggling between the islands and the 
Turkish mainland and the Powers should in fairness to Turkey undertake some 
responsibility to the extent of promising to use their influence with Greece to secure 
that these conditions are effectively carried out and maintained. 

8. In order to make this decision as easy and palatable as possible to Turkey, it 
is essential that definite arrangements should now be agreed upon by the Powers, 
and communicated to the Porte, respecting the fate of the islands in Italian 
occupation. Italy having given the most solemn and unqualified assurances of her 
determination to withdraw from the islands as soon as the conditions of the Treaty of 
Lausanne have been fulfilled, the Porte could now be informed, if the Powers were to 
accept this solution, that they have decided that all these islands should revert to 
Turkey, subject to the introduction of a suitable form of autonomous administration 
under the Sultan's sovereignty, and to provisions regarding fortifications &c. similar 
to those to be enforced in respect to the Greek islands. 

9. H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] trust the Powers will appreciate the 
conciliatory nature of this compromise, to which, contrary to their previously 
expressed strong preference for the allotting of all the ^Egean islands to Greece, they 
now assent in the interest of an amicable understanding between the Powers, and 
which J\I. Venizelos may be urged to accept. (^) 

10. I request that you will make a communication in the above sense to the 
government to which you are accredited, and urge upon them most earnestly the 
adoption of the course indicated, as the only one so far as H[is] M[ajesty's] 
G[overnment] can see that is likely to lead to a settlement of a question which, so 
long as it remains open, will be a standing menace to the peace of Europe, and may 
even precipitate untoward events. It is this apprehension that is the sole motive of 
H[i8] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t in making a suggestion to the Powers and urging it 
upon their consideration at this moment. (■*) 

(3) [cp. infra, p. 155, No. 171.] 

(*) [cp. D.D.F., S"** Ser., Vol. VIII, pp. 778-80, No. 621. Sir F. Bertie's telegram 
(No. 166), D. December 17, by post, R. December 18, 1913, informed Sir Edward Grey that 
" M. Doumergue concurs in the views expressed in your telegram No. 449 of 12th December." 
(F.O. 56938/13799/13/44.)] 



[ED. NOTE. — The above telegram was drafted by Sir Eyre Crowe and amended by Sir 
Edward Grey and Sir A. Nicolson. Sir Eyre Crowe wrote the following note on his draft : — 

" Note on draft circular tel[egram] 55760. 

I have laid very little stress on the proposal submitted by Mr. Lamb for the organizing 
of a small body of gendarmerie within 3 weeks, as a reperusal of his telegram (55913) and 
the receipt of his previous despatch (55798) seem to make it doubtful how far he himself 
considers the scheme practicable.(i) 

[E. A. C] 

I quite agree. I much doubt if 1,000 men w[oul]d be suflScient and still more doubt if in 
■J weeks they w[oul]d be efficient. We might be organising simply an Albanian "band " which 
w[oul]d if limited to 1,000 be easily wiped out. 

A. N. 

I have added a confidential telegram to Berlin, for Sir E. Grey's consideration. (-) I think 
myself that some appeal on the lines I suggest might well be made, and that it is really for 
Germany to bring Italy and Austria to reason. 

E. A. C. 

Dec[ember] 11."] 

(1) [Consul-General Lamb's telegram (No. 33) of December 11, D. 9-30 a.m., R. 5-15 p.m., 
and his despatch (No. 43), D. December 4, R. December 11, 1913, are not reproduced as the 
contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 55913/13799/13/44; F.O. 55798/13799/13/44.)] 

(2) [v. infra, pp. 153-4, No. 169. The draft was amended by Sir Edward Grey and 
Sir A. Nicolson.] 



78 



No. 92. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.Q) 

F.O. 55583/13799/13/44. 
(No. 3G2.) 

gir^ Foreign Office, December 12, 1913. 

The German Charge d' Affaires called on Dec [ember] 5 and stated to 
Sir E. Crowe that his Gov[ernmen]t supported the Austro-Hungarian proposal that 
if the South Albanian Delimitation Commission had unanimously agreed upon a 
frontier line, such line should be considered as definitely accepted by the Powers, and 
not be subject to furtlier modification at the instance of any of the several governments 
concerned. 

In reply Sir E. Crowe said that it seemed most unlikely that any Government 
would, given the actual situation, wish to alter a line on which all their delegates had 
agreed. On the other hand, he did not see what object could possibly be served by 
insistence on now laying down categorically in advance that whatever the delegates 
did must be automatically approved. 

Herr von Kiihlmann thought that Austria-Hungary's object was to secure that a 
definite frontier should be fixed at the earliest possible date, in order to hold Greece 
to the obligation, laid upon her Uy the Ambassadors' conference, to evacuate Albania 
by Dec[ember] 31st. On this point also the German Gov[ernmen]t supported 
the Austro-Hungarian demand. 

Sir E. Crowe told him of the dilemma in which the Powers were placed by the 
series of propositions made to-day by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to 
Sir A. Nicolson.(-) Herr von Kiihlmann expressed surprise on hearing that Austria- 
Hungary objected to the employment of an international force to keep order in 
Southern Albania. (^) 

Sir E. Crowe expressed it as his personal opinion that it was not wise to insist on 
the withdrawal of the only force which could and did keep order in the district before 
there was any other force to replace it, and said he could not at all understand this 
feverish anxiety for the withdrawal of the Greeks by Jan[uary] 1st whatever happened 
to the unfortunate natives, if, as both Austria-Hungary and Italy declared, and as 
Herr von Kiihlmann confirmed, those two Powers were quite determined to avoid, if 
possible, sending in their own troops. There could be no doubt that whenever the six 
Powers formally demanded the evacuation of Albania, the Greeks would withdraw. 
But whether this was on Dec [ember] 31 or some later date seemed to Sir E. Crowe 
really of minor importance from the Albanian point of view. 

Herr von Kiihlmann suggested that the Austro-Hungarian Government were 
adhering to the date of Dec [ember] 31st because that was the actual date fixed by 
the Ambassadors' conference. Sir E. Crowe however pointed out to him that what 
the Ambassadors decided was that the evacuation should take place within one month 
of the termination of the labours of the frontier commission. It was unnecessary 
again to go into the question as to who was to blame for the fact that the commission 
started a month later than had been arranged. It was anyhow certain that their 
labours had not terminated on Nov [ember] 30, and that some time must even 
now elapse before they were completed. Therefore it w-as altogether incorrect to say 
that it would be contrary to the Ambassadors' decision if evacuation were to take place 
later than Dec [ember] 31. 

(') [This despatch is based upon the note made by Sir Eyre Crowe of his conversation with 
Herr von Kiihlmann on December 5. For Herr von Kiihlmann's account of British views on 
this date, cp. G.P., XXXVI (I), pp. 244-5.] 

{-) [On December 5, Count Mensdorff read to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram from Count 
Berchtold laying down the conditions on which he would agree to the adoption of measures to 
maintain order. (F.O. 55562/13799/13/44.) cp. G.P., XXXVI (I), pp. 23&-7.] 

(3) [cp. supra, p. 73, No. 88.] 



79 



Sir E. Crowe made it clear, however, that his observations were quite personal, 
and said that he would submit Herr von Kiihlmann's communication to me and that 
I would of course bear it in mind in dealing with Count Mensdorff's declaration. 

I am, &€. 

E. GEEY. 



No. 93. 

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. 

Berlin, December 14, 1913. 
F.O. 56327/13799/13/44. D. 7-30 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 213.1 Confidential. R. 10-30 p.m. 

With reference to your telegram No. 449 of Dec [ember] 12(') to Paris and your 
telegram No. 418 of Dec[ember] 12(-) to me. 

I have seen the Chancellor and delivered your message. I also read and left with 
him an aide-memoire of your proposals. He begs me to tell you that as far as he can 
judge from a first reading he considers them to ofEer a satisfactory solution, but that 
of course before giving a definite answer he must consult Germany's allies, who were 
more interested in the question. I told him that your earnest hope was that he would 
not only speak about the proposals to Austrian and Italian Governments but also 
support them. His Excellency then promised that he would tell them that his opinion 
of the proposals was favourable. 

I have also seen Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who expressed the opinion 
that the proposals were just and equitable, and said that he would speak in that sense 
at Rome and Vienna. He seemed to think that the chief difficulty lay in the 
megalomania of Turkey, which has become very marked since their reacquisition of 
Adrianople. 

Both he and the Chancellor asked how it was proposed to deal with the opposition 
of the Epirus population. I pointed out that your hope was that if the Greeks were 
granted the stipulated time for evacuation after the conclusion of the labours of the 
Frontier Commission, there would be time to devise measures to prevent or overcome 
resistance. Moreover, the mere fact of the proposals being acceptable to the Greek 
Government would also contribute to the pacification of Epirus. 

(Secret.) 

Speaking privately, and not as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Herr von Jagow said that a dangerous factor in these questions was the hatred, 
amounting almost to mania, felt by Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs for Greeks. 
Notwithstanding all Italian assurances, he could not get rid of a feeling of doubt as 
to whether Italy really intended to evacuate the islands in her occupation. I said 
that the fact that under your proposals these islands would revert nominally to 
Turkey, and not go to Greece, might render the ItaUan Minister for Foreign Affairs 
favourably disposed to the solution you had proposed. He agreed that that might be 
the case. (i) ^v. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91.] 

(2) tv. infra, pp. 153-4, No. 169.] 

(3) [cp. G.P., XXXVI (II), pp. 425-8.] 

No. 94. 

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 

Berlin, December 16, 1913. 

F.O. 56773/14809/13/44. D. 12-45 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 214.) E. 2-15 p.m. 

Prince of Wied came to see me yesterday to express his thanks to His Majesty's 
Government for-their support of his candidature.(^) He said that he was unable as yet 

(1) [This telegram was sent to Rome (as No. 375) ; to Vienna (as No. 341) ; to Constantinople 
(as No. 584) ; to the Commission of Control, Valona (as No. 27).] 

(2) \y. supra, p. 71, No. 86.] 



80 



to make a formal statement to the Powers of his acceptance of the Albanian rulership 
as he was still waiting for an answer from Austria and Italy respecting the 
conditions which he had put forward as to a loan. He supposed that if all was satis- 
factorily arranged he would have to go to Albania some time next month, travelling 
from Trieste to Durazzo, where he would at first reside. As soon as he had given a 
formal answer to the Powers, an Albanian deputation would come here to offer him 
the throne; he had arranged for this in order to avoid the appearance of being 
imposed on Albania by the Powers. 

The real object of his visit to me was to express the hope that, as Austria 
proposed to send a man-of-war to escort him from Trieste to Durazzo, His Majesty's 
Government might, as representing the other group of Powers, see their way also to 
send a ship for that purpose. I venture to express the opinion that the idea is sound, 
as it would be a sign that he became Prince of Albania with the consent and approval 
of both groups, which would certainly strengthen his position in Albania. 



No. 95. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.{^) 
P.O. 56773/14809/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 424.) Foreign Office, December 18, 1918, 3-5 p.m. 

Your telegram No. 214 of Dec[ember] 16(^) : Prince of Wied. 

With regard to the Prince of Wied's statement that he was waiting for an answer 
from Austria and Italy resp[ectin]g conditions which he had put forward as to a 
loan, you should point out to H[is] H[ighness] the propriety of formulating his 
conditions in a communication to all the Powers who offered him the throne, and not 
merely to one or two of them. 

If all the Powers are not placed on the same footing there is danger of some of 
them being committed to uphold a prince who may, for all they know to the contrary, 
be bound to observe conditions which may not harmonize with their position and 
policy in Albania. 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to "Vienna (No. 342) ; to Rome (No. 376) ; to St. 
Petersburgh (No. 806) ; to Constantinople (No. 585) ; to the Commission of Control, Valona 
(No. 28). Figures by post to Paris (No. 756).] 

(-) [v. immediately preceding document.] 



No. 96. 

Sir E. Gosclien to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 

Berlin, December 20, 1913. 

P.O. 57359/14809/13/44. D. 8-30 pm 

Tel. (No. 217.) R. 9-30 p.m. 

Your telegram No. 424 of Dec[ember] 18 acted upon.(^) 

Prince of Wied does not quite understand, as he said that his conditions had 
been communicated before to all the Powers through Roumanian Government six 
weeks ago.(') He had told me that he was waiting for a communication from the 
Italian Government, because latter had promised to sound Governments of other 
Powers interested as to guarantee of loan and to let him know result of their 
enquiries. Austrian and Italian Governments had promised that, if other Powers 
refused to guarantee loan, they would do it alone, but he was personally anxious that 
all should guarantee for very reasons which you had pointed out and with which he 

(1) (This telegram was sent to Vienna (as No. 343) on December 24, D. 7-10 p.m.] 
(-) [c. immediately preceding document.] 
(3) [cp. supra, pp. 55-6, No. 64.' 



81 



was in full agreement. He was particularly anxious to have no engagements with 
Austria-Hungary and Italy that might place them in a different position from other 
Powers, who had been good enough to support his candidature. In the meantime, he 
did not quite see how in his present position he could make on his own account a 
formal communication to Powers which had already been officially made by 
Roumanian Government and on which Italian Government had promised to sound the 
Powers. 

MINUTE. 

I do uot waut 10 embark on au endless separate discussion with the Prince of Wied which 
may result in his throwing up his candidature and announcing that he has done so because we 
make so many diflBculties for him. I think it will be better for us to deal direct with the 
Powers who act on his behalf.('') 

E G 

(■•) [v. infra, p. 83, No. 99.] 
No. 97. 

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. 

P.O. 57762 13799 13 44. Rome, D. December 22, 1913, 8-35 p.m. 

Td. No. 23H R. December 23, 1913, 11 -30 a.m. 

Your Circular telegram of December 12th.(^) 

During the past week I have repeatedly asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
whether he had any reply to give me.(-i 

After various excuses for gaining time he this morning admitted that he had not 
hitherto been able to obtain allies' definite expression of view on which the decision of 
Italy must to some extent depend. 

I urged that there was one point on which the decision was urgent as the Austrian 
and Italian Governments had insisted on evacuation by Greece of temtories assigned 
to Albania by December 31st. Did he accept your proposal to extend the term to a 
month after the final decision of the frontier Commission? He agi-eed that the 
balance of advantage lay in so doing, although the longer the period the more time 
there would be to organize Greek resistance and he diafted a telegram to Vienna 
urging the Austro-Hungarian Government to agree to notification by the six Powers 
to Greece that she would be required to withdraw her forces by January ISth or 20th. 
I submitted that a notification of this character, without any counterbalancing 
prospect of advantage to Greece, might only precipitate the situation which your 
proposals were intended to mitigate. He then, after some discussion, added to his 
telegram to Vienna the suggestion that Greece be informed at the same time that, 
on her agreeing, the Powers would be prepared to consider benevolently certain 
proposals in her interest elsewhere. 

Further than this he was not ready to go yet, ha\"ing just received an official 
communication from the Turkish Ambassador, occasioned by the inopportune 
disclosures in Paris " Temps " announcing that the Turkish Government would not 
consent to the surrender of the islands near the coast of Asia Minor and would uphold 
right to regain them by war. He added that he learnt from Berlin that the German 
Government doubted the expediency of insisting on the transfer of the islands to 
Greece as a part of an immediate settlement, fearing that it might lead to war 
between Turkey and Greece, but were of the opinion that the result might be 
ultimately reached by negotiation. He thought himself that Lemnos offered the most 
serious difficulty as regards Turkey. There might be room for compromise here. He 
hoped to-morrow to submit an expression of view for the King's approval. 

But there is an evident tendency in the Press, which I regard as inspired, to urge, 
m commenting on your proposal, that Italy is entitled to some form of indemnification 
for the prolongation of the war in Cyrenaica and the occupation of the islands. 

[v. s>ipra. pp. 76-7. Xo. 91.] 
(«) [cp. D D F.. 3"« Sir., Vol. VIII, p. 829. No. 6-57.] 



L8959] 



G 



8'2 



No. 98. 

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. 

Vienna, December 23, 1913. 
F.O. 57855/13799/13/44. I). 8-50 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 202.) R. H p.m. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call this afternoon, but could only tell 
me that his conversations with allied Powers had not yet resulted in definite 
conclusion. 

As regards South Albanian frontier, he was personally disposed to agree to 
proposed postponement of Greek evacuation one month after fixing of frontier, as to 
which, he understood, agreement had already been reached by Frontier Commission 
at Florence. (M He could not, however, tell me this oflBcially, as he was not yet fully 
acquainted with the views of the Italian Government on the subject. He hopes that 
in a few days this point will be settled in accordance with your wishes. In this 
connection he expressed the belief that the Greek Government could stop the agitation 
amongst Epirotes, if they chose. There had been much exaggerated talk about this. 
New gendarmerie promised very well. He did not seem to apprehend serious 
disturbances. 

Island question was much more difficult, and he feared that it would not be 
possible to reply to your suggestions for some time. He could of course give no answer 
for himself apart from what might be determined as the result of the discussions vnth 
Rome and Berlin. I said that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs' recent speech(^) 
disclaimed any desire to derive territorial profit from Balkan troubles. He said that 
unfortunately neither Greece nor Turkey seemed disposed to accept the decision of the 
Powers concerning the islands unreservedly. Turkey certainly was most resolute in 
rejecting the idea of surrender of Mitylene and Chios to Greece. He did not think 
that Turkey would even accept nominal retention of the islands under Turkish 
suzerainty with Greek autonomy. Turkey was convinced of her power to expel Greeks 
from islands if necessary. He did not see how their obstinacy on this point could be 
overcome. 

I expressed the hope that his Excellency would assist in removing the difficulties 
as he had done during the Ambassadors' conferences, and would not merely present 
the decision of the Triple Alliance as a whole. 

He said that he could not separate himself in such question from his allies. (') 

(1) [The Southern Albanian Frontier Commission moved to Florence on December 13, 1913, 
to draw up its final report and print the maps of the frontier. The final meeting took place 
there on December 17, 1913. (F.O. 57755/13799/13/44.) Its findings were embodied in a 
document known as the Florence Protocol. (F.O. 6110/98/14/44.) For the earlier history of 
the Commission, v. supra, p. 7, Ed. note.'] 

(2) [The Marquis di San Giuliano made a speech in the Chamber on December 16, reported 
in The Times on December 17. cp. also the semi-official statement given ibid., on December 18.] 

(3) [cp. infra, pp. 86-7, No. 102, and Ed. note.] 



No. 99. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.{^) 
F.O. 57359/14809/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 429.) Foreign Office, December 24, 1913, 3-30 j-.m. 

Your tel[egram] No. 217.(=) 

It is true that 6 weeks ago the Rumanian M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] 
told H[is] M[ajesty's] Minister at Bucharest in very vague and general terms of 

(>) [This telegram was repeated to Rome (No. 377) ; to Vienna (No. 344) ; further telegrams 
(Nos. 378 and 345) stated that it was " for information only."] 
(2) [v. supra, pp. 80-1, No. 96.] 



83 



certain conditions on wliich Prince of Wied would accept Albanian throne, (^) but H[isj 
M[ajesty's] G[overnnient] clearly could not be expected to recognize Eumanian 
Gov[ernmen]t on that account as official channel of Prince's wishes. 

Italian Anib[assado]r has now communicated to me in greater detail proposals 
for a loan, stating that these proposals were put forward on behalf of the Prince of 
Wied. The British Gov[ernmen]t cannot however accept the position that in 
communications between them and the Prince, the Italian or any other 
Gov[ernmen]t should serve as an intermediary. We shall therefore discuss any 
proposals made through Italian Gov[ernmen]t as being put forward by that 
Gov[ernnien]t on its own responsibility. 

The Six Great Powers have done themselves the honour to make a formal offer of 
the Throne of Albania to the Prince of Wied('') and his reply and any conditions he 
may wish to attach to acceptance should be communicated direct by him to those 
Powers. 

It appears to H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] all the more necessary to 
emphasize this point of view as they understand the Austro-Hungarian and the 
Italian governments wish to make their participation in proposed loan depend 
among other things on the recognition or confirmation of a concession which Ismail 
Kemal has been induced to grant to an Austro-Italian group for a banking monopoly 
in Albania. The terms of that concession are now under discussion in the 
Commission of Control, where it has been subject to criticism, as being adapted to 
benefit concessionnaires at the expense of the Albanian State, and likely to create a 
kind of Austro-Italian mortgage over the country. (^) 

This being a matter in the settlement of which all the Powers represented in the 
Commission of Control have a right to be heard, it would not in the opinion of H[is] 
M[ajesty's] G[overnment] be proper to make it the subject of a bargain between the 
Prince and one or two of the Powers in connection with a loan which they are all 
asked to guarantee jointly. 

I do not want to get into a separate discussion with the Prince of Wied and shall 
therefore communicate these views to the Italian Gov[ernmen]t when necessary, but 
if Prince of Wied approaches you again you can inform him of substance of first 
paragraph of this telegram. You should explain our whole view to the German 
Gov[ernmen]t, when there is a suitable opportunity. 

(3) [v. supra, pp. 55-6, No. 64.] 
(*) [cp. supra, p. 71, No. 86.] 

(5) Further information on this subject was given by Sir M. de Bunsen in his telegram 
(No. 2) of January 7, 1914, D. 8-45 p.m., R. 10 p.m. He referred to notes from M. Isvolski to 
M. Doumergue on December 25 and 29 "proposing that Entente Powers should take decided 
stand against contention of Austro-Hungarian Government that constitution of Albanian State 
Bank is definitely fixed in accordance with concession so hastily granted by Provisional Govern- 
ment to Austrian and Italian financial groups." (F.O. 902/45/14/53.) For M. Doumergue's 
views, cp. Stieve, IV, pp. 11-3. Sir Edward Grey wrote the following minute on Sir M. de 
Bunsen's telegram : — 

The position is that we entirely agree that we cannot recognise this Austro-Italian 
concession as the State Bank of Albania is the proper institution to issue a loan guaranteed 
by Six Powers : should we decide to participate in such a loan we should be prepared to 
make this view a condition of our participation, but till the Cabinet has met in the week 
after next I cannot say whether under any conditions we shall participate. Any one whom 
it concerns may be told this. E. G.] 

(6) [cp. infra, pp. 88-9, No. 104.] 



[8959 1 



84 



No lOU 

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.C) 
F.O. 58239/13799/13/44. 

(No. 204.) Vienna, D. December 24, 1913. 

Sir/ ' E. December 29, 1913. 

In the course of the conversation which formed the subject of ray telegram 
No. 202 of yesterday(-) Count Berchtold spoke hopefully of the prospects of Albania. 
Though there would probably be no objection to the postponement of the withdrawal 
of the Greek troops from the neighbourhood of the new southern frontier line, a point 
on which he hoped to be able to speak more definitely in a few days, he thought that 
the agitation among the Epirots was to a great extent kept going by direct inspiration 
from Athens, and that if only . the Greek Government w^ould discountenance the 
movement, as he hoped it might be persuaded to do, there would be no insurmountable 
difficulty in maintaining order in the region in question. The new Gendarmerie was 
being rapidly recruited and organized. The Albanians were indeed ready-made 
gendarmes. The twelve Netherlands officers recently engaged were already on their 
way. The Netherlands Government had agreed to send more if needed. A force 
could, he believed, be got together in a few weeks sufficient to deal with any situation 
that was likely to arise. As for the " Sacred Legion," his Department had lately been 
inundated with telegrams purporting to emanate from members of that turbulent body, 
asserting in fervid language the determination of the Epirots to die rather than submit 
to Albanian rule. The tone of these messages was, however, so obviously exaggerated, 
and their very composition so forced and unnatural, that he gave very little credence 
to them. The German Ambassador holds similar language when speaking of Southern 
Albania. He said to me a few days ago that he was little moved by the Greek 
complaint that 140,000 Greeks would be forced by the adoption of the new frontier 
into subjection to the Albanians. (^) There were perhaps three or four hundred thousand 
Albanians and a still larger number of Bulgarians living within the limits of Servia 
as at present defined. The new Bulgaria contained a considerable Greek population 
and the new Greece a considerable Bulgarian population. It was impossible to 
partition the Balkans in entire conformity with race distribution. Albania, as now 
defined w'ould, he believed,, be able to keep her head above water. M. de Tsehirschky 
understood that about 15 millions of crowns a year (^£625,000) would be required to 
govern the country. Of this annual sum he did not think that at present Albania 
could herself find more than a third. The sum he had mentioned would not include 
interest on loans, except perhaps on the initial loan which the Prince of Wied would 
require to enable him to make a start. He was not able to suggest in what way the 
deficit should be made good. 

Count Berchtold also touched on the financial difficulty in Albania and said no 
doubt it was high time the Prince of Wied should make his demands known to all the 
Powers concerned, as this was a question not concerning only Austria-Hungary and 
Italy, to which Powers the Prince had already addressed himself. His Excellency 
mentioned 10 millions [crowns] (i64 16,000) a year as being probably sufficient to meet 
the cost of administering the country. He thought too much money should not be 
advanced for this purpose for fear of encouraging extravagance. The country had 
some resources, and there was the Customs revenue. In the course of time it ought to 
be able to pay its own way. The loan question was of course a difficulty. 

The Vienna Press has been for some time at pains to show that Albania is settling 
down quietly to the idea of being governed as a united country. Tribes hitherto 
independent of all control are said to be ginng their adhesion to the national Govern- 
ment at Valona. The speedy formation of the nucleus of a national gendarmerie is 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the Prime Minister ; to Lord Crewe ; 
to Lord Morley.] 

(2) [v. supra, p. 82, No. 98.] 

(3) [cp. supra, pp. 71-2, No. 87.] 



85 



favourably commented on. The agitation along the southern frontier is treated as 
being mainly artificial, and not to be taken seriously. The inference, perhaps, is 
intended to be drawn that the new southern frontier of Albania does not constitute a 
grievance for Greece of a character to justify Greece in demanding compensation 
elsewhere. 

I have, &c. 

MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 

MINUTES. 

It seems to me difficult to justify heavy financial sacrifices and liabilities on the part of 
the British government for the sake of a country like Albania in which we have no real direct 
interest. It is moreover almost certain that the provision of ways and means for the govern- 
ment of Albania will prove exceedingly difficult. We are likely in any case to find ourselves 
saddled with heavy expenditure on account of the gendarmerie. 

In these circumstances the question will before long arise and require consideration, 
whether H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] should not take the opportunity of this inevitable 
demand for financial assistance to a country practically devoid of assets, in order to withdraw 
altogether, leaving the field free to Austria and Italy. 

So long as we remain in Albania, we are bound to demand that our voice shall be heard 
in the settlement of important questions of government and administration. Great Britain 
cannot afford to do what Germany does in this and similar situations : share nominally and 
outwardly in the responsibility for purely Austro-ltalian measures and schemes which are not 
right and square nor in conformity with the real interests of an independent Albania, whilst 
really disapproving those measures and schemes. Our prestige and good name would be gravely 
affected if we played the part of blindly but actively supporting a purely selfish Austro-ltalian 
policy of aggression and absorption in Albania. The whole position of Great Britain in the 
world rests largely on the confidence she has earned that, at least with questions not touching 
her own vital interests, she deals strictly on their merits according to the generally accepted 
standards of right and wrong. 

To this principle it is important that we should adhere in Albania so long as we undertake 
any responsibility for the good government of that country by being represent-ed on the 
Committee of Control. This is however bound to bring us into constant opposition to Austria 
and Italy, whose policy is to make of Albania a private preserve of their own, and whose 
methods and dealings are strangely discordant with our views and practice. There will 
consequently always be friction between us and those two Powers — and therefore with Germany 
also — so long as we continue to take a hand in Albanian affairs. And this friction will become 
accentuated if we undertake to subsidize the Albanian government either by engaging our 
financial credit, or by making grants from the British exchequer. Our responsibility for 
securing an efficient and pure administration would be increased, and the necessity of asserting 
ourselves for this purpose in the direction of the internal affairs of Albania would become more 
imperative. 

The only policy that England can actively pursue in Albania is to work for the establish- 
ment of a good government whilst upholding its independence. The interest of Austria and 
Italy in good government in Albania is subordinate to the principle that there must be no 
real independence, but rather absolute and exclusive dependence upon themselves. This latter 
policy we could passively support by leaving Albania alone and then merely not opposing 
Austria and Italy in their schemes. But such passive support is not compatible with our 
remaining represented on the Committee of Control. 

The question of the proposed Albanian loan seems to me to raise in a very acute, but also 
a rather convenient, form the issue : whether we should continue to share in the actual 
government of the country or whether we should withdraw altogether. 

Is it worth our while, or is it good policy, for the sake of securing for an independent 
Albania a better and juster government than she could perhaps hope to get without us, to 
perpetuate causes of friction between us and the triple alliance, and indirectly to strengthen 
the ties which bind Italy to her two partners? Or would it be better to cease our altruistic 
efforts for the good of Albania, thereby diminishing the friction, whilst indirectly loosening 
those ties by leaving Austria and Italy to face each other alone in Albania and forcing Germany 
to take sides between them, intead of being able to back their joint aims." 

The question is not calling for an immediate decision, but deserves careful consideration 
when the pros and cons of an Albanian loan are discussed, which must be done before long. 

E. A. C. 

Dec[ember] 31. 

My own inclination is in accord with Sir E. Crowe's Minute and I would come to that 
decision and act upon it at once, if Kussia and France had not to be considered. 
The question of a loan will provide the opportunity for sounding them. 

E. G. 



86 



No. 101. 

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. 

St. Petershurgh, December 26, 1913. 
F.O. 57980/14809/13/44. ^ P-M. 

Tel. (No. 427.) ^ , ^- u u' I a a 

Mfinister for] F[oreign] A[fEairs] gave me to-day reply which he had returned 
to an aide-memoire from the Austrian Embassy, informing him that the Prince of 
Wied had expressed his readiness to accept Albanian throne on condition that Powers 
guaranteed loan of £3,000,000 of which the first instalment of £800,000 was to be 
advanced at once. 

Reply states that Paissian Gov[ernmen]t consider question of loan comes withm 
competence of Commission of Control in strict conformity with decision taken by the 
Powers in London. While ready to enter into an exchange of views with other 
cabinets with regard to amount of loan, Russian Gov[ernmen]t would point out that 
they have not yet received reply from the prince specifying conditions on which he 
would accept proposal made to him by the Powers. 

M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] told me that he had informed Austrian 
Ch[arge] d'AfE[aires] that Prince ought to address to all the Powers a declaration 
similar to that which he had made to the Austrian Gov[ernmen]t.(i) H[is] 
E[xcellency] hopes that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] will concur in the above 
views. He added that he did not think that the Minister of Finance would make 
difficulties about guaranteeing the loan and supposed that money would have to be 
found at Paris. 

(1) [Telegrams (No. 429) to Berlin and (No. 809) to St. Petersburgh were sent to say that 
the British Government entirely shared the view that the Prince of Wied should address 
himself direct to all the Powers concerned. (F.O. 57980/14809/13/44.) cp. supra, pp. 82-3, 
No. 99. cp. also O.-U.A., VII, p. 677, No. 9123; pp. 678-9, No. 9126; pp. 727-8, No. 918-5.] 



No. 102. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen. 
F.O. 57855/13799/18/44. 

Tel. (No. 346.) Foreign Office, December 27, 1913, 2-45 p.m. 

Your telegram No. 202 (57855 of Decfember] 23(i) ). 

Your Excellency should point out to Count Berchtold that our proposal was 
intended to settle two difficult questions together which it was understood during the 
ambassadors' conference were interdependent, and that agreement on one point will 
not be effective by itself. If therefore the question of the islands is to be shelved, for 
some time, the settlement of the South Albanian frontier will be imperilled ; for it was 
on the understanding that Greece would keep the islands in her occupation, except 
Tenedos and Imbros, that an agreement to assign Koritza and Stylos to Albania was 
reached. 

(1) [v. supra, p. 82, No. 98.] 



[ED. NOTE. — On December 31, Prince Lichnowsky, the Marquis Imperiali, and Count 
Trauttmansdorff made an identic communication (v. immediately succeeding document) in reply 
to Sir Edward Grey's proposals of December 12 {v. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91). The text is given 
in G.P., XXXVI (II), pp 454-6, and O.-U.A., VII, pp. 699-700, No. 9146. The substance of the 
communication was sent to Sir F. Bertie (telegram No. 3) and Sir G. Buchanan (telegram No. 4) 
on January 2, 1914, D. 4 p.m. * (F.O. 58804/13799/13/44.) The communication referred only to 
the Albanian frontier question, the reply concerning the ^gean Islands being reserved for a 
later date. {cp. infra, p. 190, No. 203.) 



87 



The following minut«s appear on the Italian communication (F.O. 58805/13799/13/44): — 

MINUTES. 

An identical communication was made to-day by the German Ambassador, and the Austro- 
Huiigarian Charge d' Affaires. 

They all added verbally that there was no desire on the part of their governments to defer 
nn answer respecting the islands to the Greek Kalends: in fact the 3 governments were iu 
active communication on the subject, and hoped to submit a " conciliatory answer ' before 
long. But meanwhile the question of Greek evacuation was so urgent that they had thought 
it best to communicate their views at once to H[is] M[aiesty's] G[overnment]. 

I pointed out in conversation with each of the 3 Representatives that Sir E. Grey had 
endeavoured in his proposal to explain quite clearly why he must insist on treating the two 
questions of the South Albanian frontier and of the Greek Islands as interdef)endent. I did 
not think it would be possible for him to join in any representation to Greece which whilst 
demanding evacuation, contained nothing but a promise of benevolent consideration of the 
linked question of the islands. If therefore the Triple Alliance governments attached such 
importance to immediate evacuation by Greece, it would be most desirable that their promised 
further communication respecting the islands should reach H[is] M[ajesty"s] G[overnment] 
in good time before the 18th. 

I also said that, whilst Sir E. Grey would no doubt be very glad to learn that the 
3 governments agreed to Janfuary] 13. as the date for Greek evacuation, H[is] M[aiesty's] 
GTovernment] could hardly regard this as a great " concession " on the part of the Triple 
Alliance, since, as he had pointed out in putting forward his proposal the adoption of the 
earlier date at first contemplated by them would not have been in accordance with the under- 
standing embodied in the resolutions of the ambassadors' conference. 

All the 3 Representatives professed complete ignorance as to what were the diflBculties in 
the way of our proposal respecting the islands being accepted, and said that speaking for 
themselves, they regarded the solution we had suggested as quite reasonable. They thought 
it possible that regard for the feelings of Turkey was influencing their governments. Prince 
Lichnowsky said it was only a question of finding a proper formula. 

M. de Fleuriau called and asked whether I could inform him of the answer given by the 
Triple Alliance, and I promised to let him have a copy, adding that I relied on its not finding 
its way into the public press. 

I also mentioned the substance to M. de Etter. 

Query : 

Send copies to our 6 Embassies. 

E. A. C. 

December 31. 
E. G. 

My answer wiU be that given by Sir E. Crowe. I will discuss it with him when I return 
on Mondav morning. 

E. G. 
1.1.14. 

In accordance with Sir Eyre Crowe's suggestion copies of the communication were sent, 
on January 5, 1914, to Constantinople ^as No. 1) : to Paris (as No. 7) ; to Berlin (as No. 5) ; 
to Rome (as No. 3) ; to Vienna (as No. 1) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 5).] 



No. 103. 

Cormnunication from Prince Lichnoicshy of December 31. 1913. 
F.O. 5S804 13799 13 44. 

Aide Me moire. 

Avant pris connaissance de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey datee du 
12 decembre c'"ou]rrante](\i le cabinet de Berlin, pour faire preuve de I'esprit de 
conciliation dont il est anime. se declare dispose a consentir a ce que le terme de 
I'evacuation du territoire albanais par les troupes grecques soit proroge au 18 janvier 
prochain, c'est a dire a trente jours apres la conclusion des travaux de la commission 
de delimit.ation de la frontiere meridionale. 

Toutefois le cabinet de Berlin ne saurait se dissimuler les dangers que pourrait 
entrainer cette prorogation du terme de I'evacuation vu que ce nouveau laps de temps 
pourrait facilit^r aux agitateurs I'organisation de troubles dangereux dans les contrees 
en question. 

0) [r. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91.] 



88 



Partant. le Gonvernement Imperial juge indispensable que les six Grandes 
Puissances adressent une communication au Gouvernement Eoyal Grec pour lui 
enjoindre I'evacuation du territoire albanais a la date susmentionnee et le rendre 
responsable des eventuels desordres qui pourraient s'y produire. Les Puissances 
pourraient, a cette occasion, faire savoir au Gouvernement Hellenique que, dans le 
cas ou celui-ci s'empresserait de se conformer a ces decisions, il sera tenu compte avec 
bienveillance de son attitude, dans I'examen des difEerentes questions, dans lesquelles 
des interets helleniques se trouvent engages. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial, vu I'urgence d'un accord sur le terme de I'evacuation, 
attache prix a faire connaitre des maintenant au cabinet de Londres son point de vue 
ci-dessus expose qui va a I'encontre de la proposition de Sir: Edward Grey et se reserve 
de revenir sur la question des iles.(-) 

{-) [The subsequent communication on the question of the .^Egean Islands is given infra. 
p. 190, Xo. 203.] 

[ED. NOTE. —Sir E. Goschen's despatch (No. 4), D. January 3, 1914, R. January 5, enclosed 
a copy of a letter from Herr von Jagow transmitting a communication from the Prince of 
Wied detailing the conditions on which he was ready to accept the throne of Albania 
(F.O. 480/146/14/43.) The full text is printed in G.P., XXXVI (I), pp. 325-6. On January 12, 
Sir Edward Grey sent a despatch (No. 13) to Sir F. Bertie, and (No. 11) to Sir G. Buchanan, 
commenting on "the conditions, and directing that French and Russian views should be 
requested. (F.O. 480/146/14/53.)] 



No. 104. 

Memorandum for circulation to the Cabinet. 

F.O. 58014/14809/13/44. January 6, 1914. 

Prince William of Wied has expressed his readiness to accept the offer of the 
throne of Albania on certain conditions, one of which is, that financial assistance 
shall be afforded to that country for the organisation of an efficient administration, 
and for economic purposes. It is suggested that the loan should be guaranteed by the 
six Great Powers, under whose a^gis the independent State of Albania has been 
created, and the amount required has been estimated by the prince at 75 million 
francs (^3,000,000) of which he urges that 20 million francs (£800,000) should be 
put at his disposal on his taking over the Government of the Principality to meet 
pressing needs and to balance the budget. 

In event of unwillingness on the part of the other Powers to guarantee such a 
loan the Austro-Hungarian and Italian Governments have intimated that they would 
be prepared to guarantee it jointly between them. 

A loan is undoubtedly indispensable, and so long as His Majesty's Government 
continue to take their share of responsibility for the good government of Albania 
through the British delegate on the Commission of Control set up in accordance with 
the recommendation of the Ambassadors' Conference of last year, it would be 
desirable that the loan should be guaranteed by all the Powers and not by Austria and 
Italy alone whose policy it is to reduce Albania to the state of a special preserve of 
their own. 

It would no doubt be made a condition of any loan guaranteed by the six Powers 
that the expenditure of its proceeds should be supervised by the Commission of 
Control, but difficulties might arise in the case of a purely Austro-Italian loan which 
might tend to place the delegates on that Commission of the non-guaranteeing Powers 
in a false position, and might ultimately compel those Powers to withdraw altogether 
from their position of responsibility in Albania. 

In view of the seriousness of the issues thus involved, it is important that His 
Majesty's Government should be in a position to declare as soon as possible whether 
they are willing to participate in the guarantee if the other five Great Powers do the 
same. 



89 



I should propose that His Majesty's Government should state that they will join 
in the guarantee of the loan but onlv on condition that the other five Powers all do 
the same. 



[ED. yOTE. — On January 10, 1914, Sir Edward Grey received a telegram (No. 7) from 
Consul-General Lamb, D. January 9, 9 p.m., in the following terms : — 

" In view of the critical situation on all sides my Austrian and Italian Colleagues 
are asking for more men of war for the Albanian ports. My French and Russian Colleagues 
agree that the participation of the other Powers is desirable." 

The adherents of Essad Pasha had advanced on Elbassan and fighting began there on the 
9th. Bekir Bey had been arrested at Valona on the 8th, and papers in his possession .seemed 
to show the complicity of the Ottoman Government. Sir Edward Grey replied to Consul-General 
Lamb that he was "consulting with French and Russian Gov[ernmen]ts as to despatch of a 
ship,'' telegram (Xo. of January 10. D. 3.1-5 p.m.. and telegrams were sent accordingly on 
the same dav to Sir F. Bertie (No.' 14^ and Sir G. Buchanan tXo. 11). (F.O. 1281/769/14/53.) 
cp. also G.P.. XXXVI (l\ pp. 332-44. 

Consul-General Lamb made further reports on the seriousness of the situation in his 
despatch (No. 10). D. January 12. R. January 19. and despatch (No. 15), D. January 16, 
R January 23. (F.O. 2534/769,14. 53; F.O. 31S9/769/ 14/53.> These documents are' not 
reproduced from considerations of space, cp. infra, p. 96, No. Ill, and note {-).'\ 



I have the honour to report that, having received late last night from the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs the text of the reply to your proposals regarding the 
-Egean islands. (^ which the Italian Ambassador in London had been instructed to 
communicate, I called upon His Excellency this morning to thank him. and to discuss 
one or two points whicli appeared to me to require some further elucidation. I have 
reported his explanations by telegi-aph.f-) He at the same time informed me that a 
reference to the island of Lemnos had been omitted in deference to your views. He 
had never intended to insist on an exception being made for Lemnos, but had thought 
it might have been of value to M. Venizelos to be able to announce at Athens that he 
had succeeded in dissuading the Triple Alliance from pressing for the restoration of 
Lemnos to Turkey. 

I then reminded His Excellency of the communication I had made some days ago 
regarding the Prince of Wied's announcement of his acceptance of the throne of 
Albania, and also regarding the Austro-Italian banking concession. (' i 

The Marquis di San Giuliano said that the Prince was under the impression that 
he had already conveyed his answer through the German Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. ( ^) M. de Jagow had been the channel through which the offer of the 
Powers had been made, and the Prince appeared to think the reply which he gave to 
him indicating certain points on which his acceptance would be conditional, would 
have been communicated by M. de Jagow to the Powers. 

(*) [v. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91 ; and infra, p. 190. No. 203, and note (^).] 

(2) [The explanations reported in Sir R. Rodd's telegram (No. 12) of January 15, 1914, 
D. 3-30 P.M.. R. 7 P.M., referred chiefly to the question of the date at which the Greeks should 
evacuate Albania. A proposal for the extension of the date would be accepted at once. 
(F.O. 2104 9S 14 44.)] 

{^) [The reference is to Sir R. Rodd's communication of January 9, described in his 
despatch (No. 17>. D. January 11, R. January 15, 1914. It was in the sense of Sir Edward 
Grev's telegram (No. 429) of December 24, 1913. to Sir E. Goschen. cp. supra, pp. 82-3, No. 99. 
(F.O. 2041 45,14/53.)] 

{*) [cp. supra, p. 88, Ed. note.'\ 



No. 105. 



5i>- R. Rodd to Sir Edward Gretf. 



F.O. 2715/45/14/53. 
(No. 24.) 
Sir :— 



Rome, D. January 15, 1914. 
E. January 20, 1914. 



90 



As regarded the banking concession he thought there should be no difficulty in 
coming to an agreement. The terms of the concession would have to be modified. 
They seemed to go too far in the direction of a monopoly. At the same time the bank 
in question had been instituted, and certain expenses had already been contracted. 
The Austro-Hungarian Government were disposed to uphold some of the privileges 
acquired for the Bank. Italy could not, owing to her engagements, take a directly 
opposite view. It was essential that she should remain in line with Austria, but at the 
same time she would use her influence in a spirit of compromise. He felt that, while a 
complete internationalisation of Albania was really in Italy's interest, and while she 
ought as far as possible to guard against the contingency of finding herself hereafter, 
if differences arose, standing alone in opposition to Austria, it was nevertheless 
reasonable, in view of their special position in the Adriatic, that Italy and Austria- i 
Hungary should have a somewhat preponderating share of influence, while that of the 
other Great Powers, whose interests were secondary, should also not be excluded. It 
was on this basis that he was now working at Vienna. Count Berchtold had been most 
loyal in all their relations, and he could only approach him in the same spirit. He 
felt, however, that a compromise should be arrived at, and had every hope that a way 
would be found of conciliating the two views. 

I have, &c. 

EENNELL RODD. 



No. 106. 

Sir M. de Bimsen to Sir A. A'icoison.(') 

Private. (-) 

My dear Nicolson, Vienna, January 16, 1914. 

It is really very satisfactory to hear that the Triple Alliance Powers have 
wheeled into line about the Islands.(^) C[oun]t Berchtold prepared me for this a week 
ago, but it is good news all the same. Difficult questions are coming up, but if the 
Powers can be kept together, there ought to be a solution found for all of them. It 
is not easy as yet to see the way out of some of them. Albania is an increasing 
tangle. How Austria and Italy could ever have believed in the possibility of creating 
such a State and setting up a working Government there, I have never been able to 
understand. I was staying lately in a country house in Austrian Silesia, the 
Larish's, where tlie German Emperor had paid a visit last September. I heard he 
had spoken openly there to all he met about Albania, saying the triumph claimed by 
Austria in getting the State of Albania accepted by the Powers would be shortlived — 
that Austrian policy in the Adriatic was foolishness — and that the wise thing to have 
done would have been to let Servia spread to the sea coast and make herself 
responsible for keeping the Albanians in order. This w[ou]ld have relieved Austria 
of an impossible task; it w[ou]ld have given reasonable satisfaction to Servian 
aspirations; and it w[ou]ld have given Servia so much to do at home that she would 
become a harmless neighbour, with whom it would have been easy to live at peace. 
He might have added that it w[ou]ld have prevented the second Balkan war. 

Who now will govern Albania? The Provisional Government seems to be on its 
last legs. Here the Ballplatz held on to Ismail Kemal as long as they could, but 
they have now quite given him up as hopeless. It seems absurd that they should 
uphold the Austro-Italian State Bank which owes its origin to such a charlatan. 
Meanwhile I am telling the French Ambassador that I am not yet instructed to join 
him and the Russian Representative in making an identic representation to this 
Gov[ernmen]t demanding participation in the Bank in proportion to the share to bo 

(1) [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Prime Minister. 
The endorsement is initialled by Sir Edward Grey.] 

(2) [Carnock MSS., Vol. I of 1914.] 

(3) [v. infra, p. 190, No. 203.] 



91 



taken by each Power in the suggested Albanian loan.(*j I suppose there are difficulties 
in the way of our sharing in the loan at all. It seenos such a hopeless prospect for 
the Prince of Wied. Here he is being scolded in the Press for not having accepted the 
throne unconditionally and gone straight to Albania — a bold course which it is 
supposed would have impressed the tribes and prevented the recent raiding attempt at 
Vallona.(,'i But I can well understand the poor Prince's hesitation. 

C[oun]t Berchtold is very uncommunicative. He is hopelessly vague and 
undecided. We all hke him personally and shroul]d be sorry to see him go, but I 
often wish he would speak out a little. He dined quietly here last night but only 
said that nothing was as yet decided about s.'nding another ship to the Albanian 
coast, and that he did not know whether it would be a good thing or not to confide 
the Government of Albania to the International Commission of Control. Touching 
for a moment on the general subject of British foreign policy, he said he thought 
England was more sensitive than any other Power to the sHghtest displacement of 
the^halance of Power in Europe— and that this was generally the key to her action. 
He is alwavs extremely friendly. 

The attitude of Turkey on" the Islands question is an anxiety, with Enver Pasha 
at the Ministry of War. I have reported officially another conversation %vith my very 
deUghtful but warlike Turkish collea2ue.(:h who. I am glad to hear, it not going to be 
removed to St. Petersburg. He is a little too categorical in his statements of what is 
going to happen in the Balkans as a consequence of the attribution of Chios and 
Mitylene to Greece. But though I discount much of what he says, I find it difficult 
to believe in the permanence of the Bucharest settlement. A despatch in the last 
Print which has reached me, from our V[ice] Consul at Uskub. about the State of 
Affairs in Southern Servia — the annexed part — is illuminating. (') There must be 
trouble in that region; and might it not suit Servia best to restore part of it to 
Bulgaria? 

Herr v[on] Tschirsky has just been in to see me. He did not seem to 
know the exact text of the communication made yesterday by the German Charge 
d'Aff[aire]s in London, and I read it out to him.('i He professed great pleasure at this 
proof of the general agreement still existing between the Powers. He said a difficult 
year was before us and no one could foretell what would happen. Much would depend 
on events in Constantinople. The Servians would never succeed in dominating the 
Albanian element of the population. The Ser-\Han insistence on keeping Prishtina. a 
place inhabited by 200,000 Albanians, was foolish beyond description. They might 
in the end control the Bulgarian element, which consisted of Macedonian Bulgarians 
easilv convertible into Serbs, but the Albanians never. Probably marauding bands 
from' Bulgaria would keep up an agitation. Austria no longer had the will, nor Russia 
the power, to interfere much in the Balkans. Things would have to settle themselves 
there, now that the Peninsula was occupied entirely by independent states, except the 
little bit remaining Turkish. The quarrel between Austria and Russia grew rather 
out of Galician questions — namely the constant intrigues of Russia among the 
Euthenes and Poles. But it would not come to war between them. A war between 
Russia and Turkey was more thinkable, but he did not believe it would come about. 
He then spoke of "the Zabern incidents, and said Germany had heaved a sigh of relief 
on hearing of the acquittals. He did not expect an Englishman to understand this, 

(*) [cp. supra, p. 83, No. 99, note {'); p. 85, No. 100, min.] 
(5) [cp. supra, p. 89. Ed. note.1 
(«) [v. infra, pp. 188- 9, No. 202.] 

(') [Mr. Crackanthorpo's despatch (No. 262), D. December 18, R. December 22, 1913, enclosed 
a report from the British Vice-Consul at Uskub. It described the discontent with the Servian 
administration in the recently annexed districts, and suggested that even the Serbs in 
Macedonia might prefer autonomy, while the non-Serb,s would certainly do so. (F.O. 57490/ 
53104/13/39.)] 

(8) [cp. infra, p. 190, No. 203.] 

(') [Further reference to the Zabern incidents will be made in Gooch tt Temperley, 
Vol. X (II). cp. The Times, November and December 1913, passim.] 



92 



but said Germany could not afford to relax her military effort for a moment, and the 
army had to be supported through thick and thin. I said in England it was regarded 
as an internal question, not concerning us. He is very bitter against the Russians, 
and of course the French, and regards Germany as a fort being held against invasion 
from both sides. Germany w[ou]ld not submit to be dominated by "the street," 
and the German Liberal Press. Albania, he said, was in a state of confusion, but not 
really worse than her normal condition for centuries past. He thought our view 
about the Austro-Ttalian State Bank for Albania was right, but doubted whether a 
Bank on which 6 Great Powers were represented would not be an even worse 
instrument of Government. He evidently has no personal behef in the ef&cacy of 
existing arrangements, either as regards Albania "or the Balkans as a whole. 

The Servian Minister gives Enver Bey short shrift. " 11 sera assassine, non pas 
par ses ennemis, mais par ses amis et collegues qui n'accepteront pas longtemps sa 
domination." 

I have written separately about the Canadian Pacific Railway question, (^'') 
officially, and privately to Law. 

Yours ever, 

MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 

p.S. — Mensdorff came to see me today. He leaves next Wednesday 
(Jan[uary] 21) for England, being invited to Windsor for the 26th. 

(1") [Not reproduced.] 



No. 107. 

Consul-General Lamh to Sir E. Crowe. C) 

F.O. 3291/7G9/14/53. Vallona, D. January 17, 1914. 

Dear Sir Eyre Crowe, R. January 23, 1914. 

The more I see of this business, the more strongly I am confirmed in the 
suspicion, which I hesitatingly expressed in November,(^) viz. : that the Austrians 
(unless they simply have no policy at all, a thesis which is not unsusceptible of 
argument), whilst on the one hand posing as the patrons of the Prince of Wied, are 
working underhand to render his situation untenable, either because they want to 
substitute some other candidate or because they wish to make any Prince impossible 
and bring about a state of things which would allow them to extract from a wearied 
and disgusted Europe the mandate to step in and put things to rights. Though even 
then they must inevitably come back to the point they started from, viz. : the necessity 
of coming to a clear and definite understanding with their Allies. 

That the Austrians have for long been coquetting with Essad Pasha I am 
thoroughly convinced, though I cannot prove it. That, as far back as November, they 
were in communication with Bekir, the Young Turkish filibusterer,(^) through Mufid 
and Sureya Beys, is established by the letters and admissions of Mufid himself as well 
as by other evidence. Sureya reported the result of his conversations with Bekir 
directly to the Austrian Embassy in Constantinople, which had intervened directly 
at the Porte to obtain for him the permission to go there. No doubt they only entered 
the combination with a view to directing it to their own advantage but, as usually 
happens in such cases, it soon got beyond their control and I believe they are now 
fairly scared. 

We are all agreed that the only way of maintaining the decisions of the London 
Conference now is to set aside both Essad and Ismail Kemal and establish 

(1) [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King ] 

(2) [This reference cannot be identified.] 

(3) [For further reference to Bekir Bey, v. supra, p, 89, Ed. note.] 



93 



some central authority. We should not have very much difficulty with Ismail. (^) but 
the other is nov\- too strong, as well as too stubborn, to yield to anything but force. 
The Austrians and Italians have each got a ship ready and are prepared to send it, 
but they do not want an international landing. The Russian does not want to hear 
of the Commission going to Duvazzo with only Austrian and Italian vessels. My idea 
would be to occupy Durazzo with marines from the siiips of any country that chooses 
to send them and simultaneously to secure the international principle by moving 
down a detachment of 500 or 600 men from the garrison of Scutari by land to Tirana, 
Ess.U)'s stronghold. This would produce a tremendous effect and. according to our 
officers, would do the men. who have now been bottled up for eight months within the 
ten-kilometre zone, an enormous amount of good ! 

If something is not quickly done, we shall certainly have Essad proclaiming 
himself King of Albania and marching down to take over Korytza from the Greeks. 
Then Europe must either pocket the insult, allow the partition of Albania or resign 
itself to an international occupation, which, by that time, might quite possibly meet 
with resistance in the interior. Servia and Greece appear to be both backing Essad. 
in spite of his expulsion of the Consul of the former state from Durazzo. In regard 
to the latter incident, Essad as usual played a double game, for while he pleased the 
Austrians by tui-ning Siraitch out, he secretly sent word to the latter that he was 
really most anxious to maintain close and friendly relations with SerWa and had only 
acted as he did under irresistible pressure from the common enemy. 

The enquiry into the Bekir case progresses slowly. There has been considerable 
difficulty in constituting a Couit. Of those selected to form it some have not had the 
courage to accept, whilst others have sho^\-n a tendency to abuse then- position for 
personal or political objects. The Dutchmen have laid hands upon a further sum of 
about ;£1300 belonging to the conspirators but no fresh evidence of any great 
importance has been obtained. 

Believe me, &c. 

HAEEY H. LAMB. 

P.S. .Jan[ua]ry ISth. 

The Prince of Wied seems to me to be very badly advised. He appears to draw 
his ideas about Albania from people like Nogga. Cm^isxo Meksi. Sveeta Bey and his 
son Ekrem. Ekrem the brother of MrriD (all " Beys " in pay of Austria Djeiul Bey. 
a discredited "decave" &c. The last named recently went to Potsdam 
accompanied by his wife and it is understood that the Princess proposes to make 
Madame Dje^dl and some other Mussulman lady Dames d'honneur " at her Court. 
T suppose they consider this a concession to the Mussulman element, but is there 
no-one in Berlin with sufficient intelligence to tell them that, though such an 
appointment may flatter the unbelieving wastrels of Valona or such of them as profit 
by it, it will be regarded as a deadly insult to their religious feehngs by the more real 
Mohammedans of the Interior? 

With regard to your query about the Italian cable from Brindisi to Medua, which 
[ answered — officially — yesterday, I venture to annex copy of a letter(^) received this 
morning from the only honest man in Ismail Kemal Bey's " Cabinet." It is worth 
reading as a light on the way things are conducted in this place. (^ 

(■*) [On January 10 Ismail Kemal had offered to hand over his authority to the Commission 
of Control. (F.O. 2534 14 53 '44.) For Essad Pasha's formal resignation, r. infra, pp. 96-7 
No. Ill ; p. 99, Xo. 113.] 

(^) [Not reproduced. It referred chiefly to the Italian cable question, and the unofficial 
employment of Italian agents in the post and telegraph service.] 

(*) [A record of the information contained in this postscript was sent to Sir E. Goschen 
ill Sir Edward Grey's despatch (Xo. 22) of January 30. (F.O. 3291 ' 769/14/53.)] 



94 



No. 108. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Dertie.C) 

FO. 2981/45/14/53. 

Tel (No. 28.1 Foreign Office, January 20, 1914, 11 p.m. 

Albanian Loan. . ^ . . _ 

You should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] that H[is] M[a]esty s] 
Grovernment] are prepared to recommend Par[liamen]t to agree to G[rea]t Britain 
participating in a guarantee of a loan of 3 million pounds to Albania provided all the 
other Powers do likewise, and subject to the consideration that a loan guaranteed by 
all 6 Powers could not be issued by the Austro-Italian Bank, who have acquired from 
the provisional Gov[ernmen]t of Ismail Kemal a concession that is still under 
examination. (^) 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Berlin (No. 25) ; to Vienna (No. 16) ; to Rome (No. 13) ; 
to St. Petersburgh (No. 28).] 

(2) fcp. Imperialismus, 1st Ser., Vol. I, pp. 74-5, No. 87; p. 79, No. 93; p. 83, j\o. 9/.] 



No. 109. 

Sir Edu-ard Grey to Sir F. Bertie.C) 

F.O. 3222/769/14/53 
(No 32.) 

gjj._ Foreign Office. January 20, 1914. 

M. Cambon informed me to-day that M, Doumergue would contemplate sending 
a French warship to the Albanian coast if other Powers sent warships, even if 
Germany adhered to her intention to abstain from sending a ship.(=) German 
abstention, M. Doumergue considered, would be due to a desire to facilitate a free 
hand for Austria and Italy. Under no circumstances, however, would the French land 
a force. 

I said that it had been our view that we would send a ship, if all the other Powers 
did so, but I should not make the abstention of Germany alone a reason for not sending 
a ship. We also were not prepared to land a force. Should it be found necessary to 
remove Essad or his partisans from Durazzo, I supposed that it would be done by 
forces landed by Austria and Italy only. 

M. Cambon said that, in his personal opinion, if ships were sent and a force was 
landed by one Power, all the Powers would have to land forces. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 



(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Prime Minister.] 

(2) [cp. supra, p. 89, Ed. note; infra, p. 96, No. Ill, note (2).] 



95 



No. 110. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. EUiot.C) 

F.O. 3307/98/14/44. 
(No. 7.) 

Sir, Foreign Office. January 21. 1914. 

M. Venizelos came to see me this mornmg.(-"i 

He said that he had discussed in Rome a certain exchange as regards details of 
the frontier of Southern Albania. He proposed, when the Powers communicated their 
decision about the frontier, to make it quite clear that he would accept this decision as 
it stood, hut also to suggest the alteration that he had discussed in Rome. 

I said that, having been the President of the meetings of Ambassadors, I could 
not propose any alteration of the decisions come to bv the meetings : but I would not 
object to any alteration of the frontier of the south of Albania to which M. Venizelos 
could secure the assent of Austria and Italy. 

M. Venizelos said that he would like to have the communication of the Powers 
about the southern frontier and the ^gean Islands as soon as possible : and in 
accepting it he would like to state, not as a condition of Greek acceptance, but as a 
request to the Powers, that liberty of religion and schools should be gi-anted to the 
Christian element in Epirus. 

M. Venizelos said that he hoped it would be agreed that the Greek evacuation 
should be gradual. 

I said that the Italians had complained bitterly of the proceedings of the Greek 
authorities. For instance, during the last day or two the Italian Ambassador had 
complained to me of the severe measures of disarmament taken against Mussulmans 
at Deh"ino. It was most important that the Greek authorities should avoid all acts of 
provocation which aroused Italian susceptibilities. 

M. Venizelos then went on to discuss the question of a guarantee by the Powers 
of the Greek possession of the iEgean Islands. If the islands were to be neutralised, 
Greece would be placed at some disadvantage in defending them : she could not fortify 
them or make preparations in advance for their defence. If. therefore, the Powers 
imposed the condition of neutralisation, it would be only fair that they should 
guarantee to Greece their peaceful possession. He had spoken of this to M. Tittoni, 
the Itahan Ambassador in Paris. The latter had said that he thought his Government 
would consider this reasonable, and he had suggested that I might propose it. 

I told M. Venizelos that I could not make this proposal. It would be for Greece 
to raise the question of a guarantee in her reply to the communication of the Powers. 
I would raise no objection on my part to her doing this, but I thought that it would 
be well for M. Venizelos to feel the ground in Berlin. If Greece asked for a guarantee, 
and the Powers did not agree to give it. the fact would be emphasised that no 
guarantee existed. If, however, he found that the German Government saw no 
objection to a guarantee, then I thought it probable that the Powers would agree to 
it, and Greece might ask for it in her reply to the communication that she would 
receive from all the Powers. I pointed out that, if there was to be a guarantee, it 
would have to be one by all the Powers. If France and we alone were to give a 
guarantee, or if some of the Powers gave a guarantee, while other Powers abstained, 
there would be a division of the Powers into two parties, one for Turkey and one for 
Greece, and things would be thrown into confusion. j^j ^j^^ -j 

E. G[REY]. 

(*) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 
(*) [Count Benckendorff sent a telegram to M. Sazonov on January 21 giving an account 
of this conversation as described to him by Sir Edward Grey. i-. ImperiaJismus, 1st Ser., 
Vol. I, pp. 5S-P, No. 64. A private letter on the subject is printed infra, pp. 194—5, No. 207. 
M. Venizelos visited Paris, Rome. Berlin. St. Petersburgh, Vienna and London during 
January 1914. He arrived in London on January 20 {v. The Times. January 21, 1914) and left 
on January 23 (v. ibid., January 24). cp. O.-U.A.. VII, p. 723, No. 9176. On January 1 
M. Streit took the place of Dr. Panas as Minister for Foreign Affairs. (F.O. 1946/98/14; 53.)] 



96 



No. 111. 

Consul-General Lamh to Sir Edward Grey. 
F.O. 4454/769/14/53. 

(No. 20.) Valona, I). January 22, 1914. 

Sir, R. January 31, 1914. 

The events and correspondence of the last fortnight have left no doubt in the 
mind of anyone, who hesitated to believe it before, that the disquieting situation now 
existing in the district of Elbassan and elsewhere in Albania is mainly, if not entirely, 
due to the ambitions and machinations of Essad Pasha, who has long been scheming 
with a view to extend his influence over the whole of the country and, in particular, 
in the direction of the Greek frontier, in order that he himself may be in a position to 
assume command of the occupation of the Southern provinces on then- evacuation by 
the Greeks. There seems good occasion to believe that a secret understanding exists 
between him and the Greek Government on this subject. 

Under these circumstances, as I had the honour of informing you in my telegram 
No. 16 of the 18th inst[ant],(') the members of the International Commission are 
unanimously of the opinion that the removal of Essad Pasha from Durazzo and the 
destruction of the prestige which he has acquired in the eyes of the ignorant population 
are absolutely essential if the programme established at the London Conference of 
Ambassadors is to have a chance of being carried out. 

Being, however, unable to agree on any course of action and being moreover 
uncertain to what extent it might rely upon material assistance from the Powers, the 
Commission has been compelled to temporise, and accordingly despatched the Albanian 
Delegate Mufid Bey to Durazzo in order to sound Essad on the possibility of his 
falling in with the plan suggested by Ismail Kemal and outlined in my telegram No. 11 
of the 11th inst[ant],(-) viz. : that both of them should resign their power into the 
hands of the Commission of Control, which should endeavour to carry on the adminis- 
tration of the country until the arrival of the Prince. 

From a telegram which I received last night from Mufid Bey at Durazzo I 
understand that Essad Pasha has also consented to retire upon certain conditions 
which are at present unknown to us but which our Albanian colleague, who is fully 
acquainted with our views on the subject, himself considers capable of acceptance. 

This afternoon therefore the Commission called in corf ore on Ismail Kemal Bey, 
and informed him that it was authorised by the Powers to accept his resignation and 
assume the administration. A Proces-verhal (copy of which is annexed hereto) was 
immediately drawn up and signed, after which the decision was announced to the 
members of Ismail Kemal 's "Cabinet," which was ipso facto regarded as dissolved. 
The Commission appointed Feizi Bey AUzot, who for the past two months has acted 
as Minister of the Interior and who appears to be a competent administrator, Director- 
General of Internal Affairs, and telegraphed the appointment to the Mutessarifs of 
Berat and Elbassan, whom it directed to correspond through him. The other Ministers 
were requested to continue to administer the affairs of their respective Departments, 
under the direction of the Commission, until fresh dispositions can be taken. 

Ismail Kemal Bey will probably leave in the course of the next few days for 
Europe. 

I have, &c. 

HAERY H. LAMB. 

(') [Consul-Geueral Lamb's telegram (No. 16) of January 18, 1914, D. 7 p.m., R. 10 p.m., is 
not reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 2411/769/14/53.)] 

(2) [Consul-General Lamb's telegram (No. 11) of January 12, 1914, D. 12-30 a.m. 
R. 11-30 A.M., expressed doubt of the solution proposed unless accompanied by a display of force' 




pate, but cannot object to other Powers doing what is necessary to maintain "the Eurouean 
decision about Albania." (F.O. 1446/769/14/53.)] 



97 

Enclosure in Xo. 111. 



Procbs-verbal. 

Aujourd'hui, le 22 Janvier, 1914, la Commission Internationale de Controle 
s'est rendue aupres de son Excellence Ismail Kemal Bev. Le President du 
Gouvernement Provisoire, persuade que le seul moyen de mettre fin a I'etat de scission 
et d'anarchie dans le pays etait de former un Gouvernement unique pour toute 
I'Albanie et que, dans les circonstances aetuelles, ce but ne pourrait etre atteint que 
s'il remettait le pouvoir entre les mains de la Commission Internationale de Controle, 
representant les Grandes Puissances, reitere la priere qu'il avait precedemment et en 
presence de ses Ministres adressee a la Commission Internationale de Controle, 
d'assumer cette tache et d'accepter la remise des pouvoirs entre ses mains. La 
Commission Internationale de Controle rend hommage aux sentiments patriotiques 
qui ont fait agir son Excellence Ismail Kemal Bey, elle accepte cette remise de 
pouvoirs, et, dument autorisee par les Grandes Puissances, elle assume, au nom des 
Gouvernements qu'elle represente, 1' administration de I'Albanie. 

ISMAIL KEMAL. 

NADOLNY. 

PETEOVIC. 

LEON KRA.JEWSKI. 

HAEEY H. LAMB. 

LEONL 

PETPJAEF. 

Valona, le 22 janvier, 1914. 



No. 112. 

Sir Edward Grey to S de Bunsen.{^) 

P.O. 6568/45/14/53. 
(No. 18.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, February 10, 1914. 

Count MensdorS informed me to-day that the Austrian Government were sending 
the reply of which a copy is enclosed herein, to the French Government (-"i about the 
Albanian Bank. 

Count Berchtold hoped that I would be able to accept the view contained in this 
reply. 

I said that I did not ■wish to precipitate an unfavourable answer, and I would 
wait to hear what the French Government had to say; but I did not think that it 
would be fair to withhold from Count MensdorfE the fact that our \'iew had been that 
there should be equal participation. If the French Government adhered to this view, 
we could not depart from it. Count MensdorfE instanced the precedents of the 
Morocco Bank and the Commission of the Debt in Constantinople as cases in which 
the Powers with special interests had special positions. On this I said that the special 
positions of France and Spain in Morocco had been recognised by Agreements that 
preceded the establishment of the Morocco Bank. The Commission of the Debt in 
Constantinople had originally been arranged as it was, because at the time the 
greater part of the Debt was held by France and England. But internationahsation 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet ] 
(-) [Sir F. Bertie's despatch (Xo. 48), D. January 25, R. January 26, 1914, forwarded the 
text of a memorandum of January 24 communicated to him by M. Doumergue in reply to his 
action in accordance with Sir Edward Grey's telegram (Xo. 28) of January 20 (r. supra, p. 94, 
Xo. 108). It gave the conditions on which the French Government were prepared to participate 
in the loan. (F.O. 3624/45/14/53.) The terms of the conditions were also communicated by 
M. Paul Cambon on January 25, 1914. (F.O. 3673/45/14/53.) cp. M. Jules Cambon's communi- 
cation to Herr von Jagow on January 24, G.P., XXXVI (II), pp. 598-9.] 

[8959] H 



98 



was the foundation on which the Albanian State was built : there was no privileged 
position on the Commission of Control, and to recognise a privileged position in 
connexion with the State Bank would be a new departure. 

Count Mensdorff urged that the State Bank was an economic affair. The 
concession had been obtained by the Austrian and Italian Banks, and it was natural 
that they should have a privileged position. 

I observed that the concession had been obtained from Ismail Kemal. whose 
Government had been very partial and provisional : so much so that the obtaining of 
a concession for a permanent monopoly of this sort from such a Government was 
rather stealing a march upon other Powers. 

Count Mensdorff said that it was necessary to make some progress, and that, 
unless the Austrian and Italian Banks had acted, we should not now be able to discuss 
financial questions at all. 

In reply to a remark of mine that I doubted whether the State Bank had been 
essential for Albania when the concession was granted, he assured me that the Bank 
had been very useful. 

I pointed out to Count Mensdorff, in answer to further pressure from him to 
accept the Austrian point of view about the internationalisation of the Bank, that I 
should have difficulty in getting Parliament to agree to take an equal share of 
international liability with regard to the Loan for Albania while having only an 
unequal share in the Bank. 

Count IMensdorff suggested that perhaps this might be met by the taking of a 
larger share of financial liability by Austria and Italy, but we did not pursue this 
suggestion. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

Enclosure in No. 112. 

The point of view of the Austro-IIungarian Government is that, as during the 
Conferences on the subject of the Albanian Statute the Ambassadors' Reunion in 
London arrived at no decision concerning a future state bank, the financial institutes 
of every country are at liberty to apply for the concession. 

Taking their eminently important economic interests into consideration, Austria- 
Hungary and Italy have supported the steps taken by their banks in this respect at 
the Albanian Provisional Government and are of opinion that the concession granted 
them by the Provisional Government is quite free of objection (einwandfrei) and 
legal. 

Nevertheless to meet as far as possible the desire pronounced by France and the 
other Entente Powers and to enable the Powers to work together in the interest of the 
new Albanian State created by the will of Europe, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
and Italy are ready to enter into a compromise between their aforesaid own — and the 
French point of view, w^hich desires to internationalize the Bank with an equal 
participation of all the Powers. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government consents, therefore, to the principle of inter- 
nationalization, on the condition that a special position should be secured for 
Austria-Hungary and Italy in the State Bank on account of their eminently superior 
interests in Albania created by their geographical position. (1) That a larger 
participation in the Capital should be granted to the Austro-Hungarian and Italian 
concerns, i.e. 30% to each of them and 10% to each of the other 4 Powers; 
(2) Representation on the board equivalent to the above mentioned participation and 
the alternative chairmanship; (3) The sole direction of all the banking transactions 
and of the personnel. 

Concerning the French proposal on the subject of the sphere of action of the 
International Commission of Control the Austro-Hungarian Government is of opinion 
that this has been settled by the Ambassadors' Conference. Through the momentary 



99 



exceptional situation in Albania this sphere has been temporarily enlarged, but it does 
not appear admissible tiiat this extension should assume a permanent character. The 
installation of the Prince brings it to its natural end. The Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment had also only given their consent to this provisional extension on the condition 
that it should be temporary. 

London, February 10, 1914. 



No. 113. 

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edicard Grey. 
F.O. 7402/146/14/53. 

(No. 36.) Durazzo, D. February 12, 19U. 

Sir, R. February 18, 1914. 

With reference to my despatch No. 27 of the 5th inst[ant],(M I have the honour 
to report that Essad Pasha left here this morning on board an Italian steamer for 
Bari, together with twelve members of the deputation selected to offer, on behalf of 
the nation, the throne of Albania to the Prince of Wied. Four other members of the 
deputation are already in Europe. 

From Bari it was the Pasha's intention to proceed to Rome and thence to 
Neuwied, where it has been arranged that the deputation is to be received by the 
Prince on the 19th.(=) 

Before leaving Essad Pasha formally tendered his resignation to the International 
Commission, which however was compelled to pass the sponge over the numerous 
abuses of his past administration, including his lavish expenditure of public moneys in 
the advancement of his personal ambitions amongst which must be mentioned a sum 
of above £'T. 11000 (eleven thousand pounds Turkish^i distributed among the 
mountaineers of Scutari, whom he had during the past month invited to come and 
do homage to him at Durazzo. 

The Pasha's decision to travel by way of Italy rather than by Trieste, his choice 
of an Italian steamer and above all the totally unnecessary detour to visit Rome are 
all regarded here as so many pin-pricks administered to Austria, with whom he is at 
present on the worst of terms. 

There seems to be little doubt that the Austrian Government, which had dropped 
its former protege. Ismail Kemal Bey, as soon as he ceased to be a docile agent and, 
by coquetting with Essad Pasha, had largely contributed to the rapid growth of the 
latter' s power, some time ago became alarmed at the very rapidity of that growth. Its 
alarm and annoyance were increased by the refusal of Essad to allow the opening of an 
Austrian school in his native to^^"n of Tirana and rendered more acute by his intrigues 
with the Catholic mountaineers in the North. The Italians, following the same policy 
as their rivals but apparently ser^-ed by more discerning agents, took advantage of 
these facts to estabhsh their own influence over Essad and to win him over to their 
side. 

I have reason to believe that the resistance which we encountered from the Pasha 
after his first agreement with my German Colleague and myself on .Jan[uary] 30th(^;) 
and his subsequent apparent surrender on the inten^ention of the Italian Consul was 
merely part of a comedy arranged between the latter and himself, who were all the 

(1) [Consul-General Lamb's despatch (Xo. 27), D. February 5, R. February 9. 1914, reported 
that discussions had taken place between the Commission of Control and Essad Pasha. 
(F.O. 6001/ 769 '14 53.1] 

(2) ,"A minute by Mr. C. Russell stated that the Prince had "changed his plans" since the 
despat<'h was written.] 

(') 'The text of this agreement was enclosed in Consul-General Lamb's despatch (No. 25). 
D. January 31, R. February 7, 1914. rp. G.P., XXXVI (I), pp. 351-2; pp. 355-3.] 

[8959] H 2 



100 



time playing into their own hands. I am assured that Essad counts upon the support 
of the Consulta in his endeavour to execute his pet project of inducing his future 
Prince to select him as Minister of War. 

Such an appointment would in my opinion be fatal to the Prince's chance of 
success and perhaps also to that of Albanian independence but it will obviously be 
difficult for the Prince to avoid employing him and as long as he is in the country 
he will be a constant source of anxiety and unrest. It is particularly desirable that he 
should not be allowed to return to Albania before the Prince's arrival. 

I have, &c. 
(For Mr. Lamb), 

M. G. HARMS. 



No. 114. 

Sir Edu-'ard Grey to Sir E. Goschen.Q) 

F.O. 7748/45/14/53. 
(No. 40.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, February 18, 1914. 

The Prince of Wied came to see me to-day. (^) 

I said that I was sure that, on the part of all the Powers, there was the greatest 
goodwill to him personally. 

In the course of conversation, I took an opportunity of telling him that we had 
informed the Austria [s?c ; Austro-Hungarian] and Italian Governments that, in our 
opinion, the advance made by them, which was to be repaid out of a Loan guaranteed 
by all the Powers, should be expended by arrangement with the International 
C'ommission of Control. 

I also said that there were two main points at present being discussed between 
the Powers. 

One of these was equal participation in the National Bank of Albania. I explained 
how, when I went to Parliament to get its consent to our joining the guarantee of the 
Loan for Albania, I should be asked what British interest was involved which justified 
the assumption by the British Government of this financial liability. I should reply 
that it was an international obligation, because we were one of the founders of the 
State of Albania. But, if we were not to have equal participation in the Albanian 
Bank, Parliament would ask why we should assume equal participation in the financial 
liability. 

The second point was that the expenditure of all advances made to Albania, such 
as the existing one from Austria and Italy, should be controlled by the International 
Commission. 

I went on to say that, in order that the discussion of these troublesome financial 
questions should be as little disagreeable as possible to the Prince of Wied, the 
discussion was being carried on between the Governments. 

The Prince of Wied expressed great satisfaction and pleasure at the way in which 
he had been received by the King to-day. 

He told me that he was going to Paris at once, and regretted that the length of 
time it would take to go to St. Petersburgh and back made it impossible for him to go 
there at the present moment, as he was to receive the Albanian Deputation soon. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 

(2) [The Prince of Wied visked London on February 18, leaving the same night. He was 
received by the King and Queen, and had an interview with Prince Lichnowsky as well as with 
Sir Edward Grey. cp. The Times, February 19. Within a fortnight he visited also Rome, 
Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and a little later St. Petersburgh. cp. O.-U.A., VII, p. 896, No. 9397 
sqq., G.P., XXXVI (II), pp. 602-13.] 



101 



I said that, though there were manv difficulties in connection with Albania, 
everything that we heard from unofficial Englishmen who travelled there was in 
favour of the people. Under the Turkish rule, the people had had no chance to develop 
their country, but I hoped that an independent State and the quahties of the people 
would enable it to be developed now. In any case, I understood that the people were 
attractive, and the country picturesque. 

[I am, A'c] 

E. G[REYJ. 



No. 115. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertu .C) 

F.O. 7750/45/14 53. 
fNo. 90. > 

Sir. Foreign Office. February 19, 1914. 

M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff came together to see me this morning. (-) 
M. Cambon said that he assumed that we all adhered to the view that there must 
be equal participation in the National Bank of Albania, and also that the expenditure 
of advances made to Albania should be controlled by the International Commission. 
After the arrival in Albania of the Prince of Wied, the Commission would retain the 
powers that it had originally, but it would give up the executive power that it had 
assumed since the resignation of Ismail Kemal and Essad.f'i 

I agreed to these propositions, saving that I thought the proper course would be 
for the Prince of Wied to consult with the International Commission as to the 
formation of an " Autorite Indigene." which would be the executive, the Commission 
of Control retaining the powers that had been assigned to it at the reunions in London. 
Without referring to the text of the resolution, I could not say exactly what these 
powers were. 

Finally, I observed to M. Cambon that, as he was going to Paris for a few days, 
it might be well for him to discuss there with M. Doumergue what we were to do if 
Italy and Austria refused to agree to equal participation in the Bank of Albania and 
control of expenditure by the International Commission and continued to advance 
money to Albania, perhaps making themselves the whole Loan required by Albania. 
We need not discuss this to-day, but if the situation arose we should have to consider 
whether we should withdraw from Albania, or what our attitude should be. 

M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff agreed that this was a question to be 
considered. 

M. Cambon observed that there would be one lever to influence Italy : because 
Italy was very anxious not to be left alone with Austria in the Albanian question. 

[I am. &C.1 

E. GfEEY]. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. It 
was repeated to St. Petersburgh (No. 68).] 

(-) [cp. Imperialismus. 1st Ser., Vol. I, p. 275, No. 290.] 

(3) [r. supra, pp. 96-7, No. 111. and end; pp. 99-100. No. 113.] 



10«2 



No. 116. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.C) 

F.O. 7937/146/14/53. 

^^'^ Foreign Office, Fchrnanj 19, 1914. 

^ ' I told the German Ambassador to-day the substance of my conversation with tlie 

Prince of Wied yesterday. (^) . 

I said that he had made a most favourable impression, and appeared to be one of 
the most amiable of men. As far as I could gather, he had made this impression on 
everyone. I thought that it was an excellent thing that he had come here, and also 
that he was visiting Paris. ^- r ^• 

The Prince had expressed himself with the greatest pleasure and satisfaction 

respecting his reception by the King. 

^ [I am, &c. ] 

E. G[REY]. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King.] 

(2) [v. supro, pp. 100-1, No. 114, and note {-).] 



No. 117. 

Mr. Grahame to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 7826/146/14/53. 

(No. 107.) Paris, D. February 20, 1914. 

gij. . E. February 21, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you that the Prince of Wied arrived in Paris 
yesterday morning and left again in the evening. The President of the Republic 
gave a small luncheon party in the Prince's honour, at which the President of the 
Council, M. de Margerie, Political Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and 
some members of the Institute were present. 

The Prince also paid a visit to M. Doumergue at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 

M. de Margerie tells me that the Prince personally made a good impression both 
on the President of the Republic and on M. Doumergue, as he had none of the 
disagreeable characteristics commonly associated with the idea of a Prussian officer. 

"^M. Doumergue told the Prince of Wied that, while France had no direct political 
interest in Albania, the French Government regarded his mission in Albania in the 
most sympathetic manner as being calculated to give effect to the decision come to by 
the Powers at the Reunions of Ambassadors in London. He advised the Prince to 
avail himself of the presence of the International Commission in Albania and to lean 
on that body while feeling his way there. 

M. Doumergue followed up this piece of advice by observing that the Prince 
would do well to let the International Commission have the responsibility as regards 
the expenditure of the Austro-Italian advance made to him, for if that advance was 
eventually to be reimbursed from an international loan to Albania, it would be 
convenient if he were able to show that the International Commission had approved 
of the manner in which the money had been spent. 

I have, &c. 

GEORGE GRAHAME. 



108 



No. 118. 

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.O 

F.O. 8878/352/14/58. 

(No. 47.) Athens, D. February 22, 1914. 

Sir, R. February 28, 1914. 

I had some conversation last night with Monsieur Yenizelos at a party. His 
Excellency expressed the hope that the Powers would admit the reasonableness of the 
Greek reply to the collective Note.(-) He laid stress on the difficulty he would have in 
inducing the Epirotes not to give trouble, but he hoped to succeed, if the transfer was 
effected slowly and gradually. The Greek troops would only hand over to regularly 
constituted Albanian forces : if irregular bands appeared the Greek troops would stand 
fast ; it was the only way of avoiding terrible bloodshed. He would say frankly that 
if he had had the slightest hope that the populations could maintain themselves 
unassisted against the Albanians he would have allowed them to try it : all he was 
required by the Powers to do was to evacuate and not to encourage resistance directly 
or indirectly. But he was com-inced it was hopeless, and he was therefore taking the 
coarse which he believed to be best for the populations themselves, as well as for the 
future relations of Greece and Albania. 

In a previous conversation Monsieur Venizelos expressed the opinion that the 
Albanian Government would be well ad\-ised not to attempt to reduce Spiromilios and 
the people of Eliimara for some time to come, but to leave them to the influence of 
time and the example of other districts. 

^[onsieur Venizelos said he was sending Monsieur Varatassi, the Prefect of Corfu, 
to Valona to put himself in communication with the International Commission and 
concert with them details respecting the evacuation and other points. 
Monsieur Varatassi, during several years' office at Corfu, had always got on well with 
the Albanians, and was a man of good sense. 

His Excellency presumed that Essad Pasha would be the Prince of Wied's first 
Prime Minister. He was friendly disposed towards the Greeks — (I remarked that they 
were believed to subsidise him, to which Monsieur Venizelos replied "No, we had 
enough of that with Ismail Kemal " — and it was to be hoped that he would take into 
his Cabinet a Greek from the incorporated districts of Epirus. Nothing would do more 
to reassure the populations. I asked if there were any men among them qualified for 
office. Monsieur Venizelos instanced a Dr. Tourtoulis (if I caught the name rightly) 
who has been acting as Essad Pasha's secretary. He is an Albanian of Greek 
svmpathies, who has lived and ser\-ed in Greece, but who now that an independent 
Albania is to be set up proposes to devote himself to her serA-ice, for which he is 
branded* as a traitor here, but not by Monsieur Venizelos, who on the contrary 
considers he is entirely right. 

I have, &c. 

F. ELLIOT. 

(1) [This despatch was sent to Valona with further information about Dr. Tourtoulis from 
Consul-General Lamb and Lord Kitchener, (cp. F.O. 56536/13799/13/44. F.O. 5570/5570/ 
14753.) cp. infra, p. 111. Ed. note.] 

(*) [The collective note was addressed to M. Streit on February 13, cp. infra, pp. 231-2, 
No. 252, and end. The Greek reply of February 21 is given infra, pp. 235-7, Xo. 255, and end.] 



No. 119. 

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 
F.O. 9667/852/14/53. 

(No. 47.1 Valona, D. February 28, 1914. 

Sir, E. March 4, 1914. 

For several days past rumours have been current in this place to the effect that 
the oft threatened proclamation of autonomy in Epirus had taken place. On the 

(1) [This despatcli was sent to Athens.] 



104 



26th instant, as I had the honour of informing you in my telegram No. 40 of that 
date,(^) printed placards were discovered here containing an announcement to that 
effect, over the signature of the notorious band-leader Spiro-Milio of Khimarra. 
I hope to be in a position to forward you a translation of this document shortly.* 

This morning the President of the International Commission received from 
Corfu a telegram "en clair," signed G. Chr[isto] Zographos, announcing that 
he had been appointed "President of the Provisional Government of Epirus " in 
virtue of a resolution adopted at a meeting of the representatives of all the occupied 
provinces held at Argyrocastro on the 17th instant and warning us that the 
Epirotes would ' ' regard as an act of hostility ' ' and resist by force of arms any 
attempt on the part of the Albanian Gendarmerie to "violate their territory." A 
copy of this telegram is annexed hereto. (^) 

It is perfectly obvious that these measures could not have been adopted without 
the knowledge and connivance of the Greek authorities in occupation of 
Argyrocastro as well as of those in Corfou. It is indeed within my personal 
knowledge that M. Zographos lias been for some time past a frequent visitor at 
Corfou, where he was in close contact with the Prefect Varatassi, whom the 
Greek Government recently designated as Commissaire for the purpose of coming to 
an understanding with the International Commission in regard to the method of 
evacuation. It is therefore difl&cult to imagine that the latter was a stranger to the 
designs and intentions of the agitators. 

I venture to think that these events give a particular significance to the remarks 
of M. Venizelos quoted by Sir Francis Elliot in his despatch No. 47 of the 
22nd instant, (*) of which His Excellency was kind enough to forward me a copy. Tho 
Greek Government would appear at last to have come to the conclusion that the force 
which they have organised in the occupied provinces can be trusted to " maintain 
itself unassisted against the Albanians " and is going to " allow them to try," but it 
required a remarkable degree of effrontery to permit the leaders of this force to 
communicate their intentions to the representatives of the guaranteeing Powers in 
Albania, whilst the country is still officially administered by Greece. 

I have, &c. 

HARRY H. LAMB. 

(2) [Consul-General Lamb's telegram (No. 40), D. February 26, 7-50 p.m., R. February 27, 
1914, 8 A.M., is not reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 8704/ 
352/14/53.)] 

* " I have now obtained a translation of this document, copy of which is annexed hereto 
as Inclosure No. 2." [The enclosures are not reproduced.] 

(3) [Not reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above.] 
(*) [v. immediately preceding document.] 



No. 120. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot. 

F.O. 9959/98/14/44. 
(No. 21.) 

Sir, .Foreign Office, March 2, 1914, 

The Greek Minister read to me to-day two telegrams from the Greek Minister 

for Foreign Affairs, of which I transmit copies herewith. (') 

He said that he was sure that I would realise that M. Venizelos was in a most 

difficult position, but that he acted with perfect good faith. 
I said that I had every confidence in M. Venizelos. 

The Minister then impressed upon me that, if M. Venizelos were only in a position 
to assure the people of Epirus that they would have liberty as regards their Churches, 



(1) [These enclosures are not reproduced as their contents are sufficiently indicated above.] 



105 



schools, and communal arrangements, and that some of the native inhabitants would 
be embodied in the gendarmerie force in their district, so that the force would not be 
entirely composed of Albanians who were distinct from them, then M. Venizelos would 
be able to use some influence in calming the movement in Epirus. 

I said that, in other words, what M. Venizelos desired was a speedy reply to that 
part of his answer to the Powers which asked for these liberties for Epirus. (-) 

The Greek Minister confirmed this, and said that the Italian Minister in Athens 
had already, as it seemed with unnecessary haste, argued that these liberties would be 
inconsistent with the internal organisation of Albania. 

I said that this did not apply, at any rate, to the embodiment of native inhabitants 
in the gendarmerie. I would bear in mind what the Greek Minister had told me when 
we received a communication, as I supposed we should, from Austria and Italy about 
the trouble in Epirus. (^) 

The Minister was anxious that I should make some proposal to the Powers. 

I said that we really could not always take the initiative in everything connected 
with Albania. I would wait for a communication from Austria and Italy about the 
rising in Epirus before I made any proposal. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

(2) [r. infra, p. 237, No. 255, encL] 

(3) [cp. infra, pp. 112-4. Xos. 126-7.] 



No. 121. 

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir F. Bertie.{^) 

F.O. 10161/45/14/53. 
(No. 125.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, March 4, 1914. 

The French and Russian Ambassadors came to see me to-day, and in the course 
of conversation Count BenckendorS gave me the two Memoranda, of which copies are 
enclosed herein. 

M. Cambon read to us the answer that M. Doumergue had given to the Austrian 
and Italian proposal of a 60 per cent participation for themselves, and other privileged 
conditions, in the Albanian National Bank. M. Doumergue had declined to accept 
these conditions, but had said that, outside these conditions, he was willing to 
examine what means could be found of satisfying Austrian and Italian interests as 
regards the Bank. M. Cambon said that he had no idea what means could be found. 

We then discussed the presidency of the Bank. 

They thouglit that Austria and Italy would object to each of the Powers having 
the Presidency in turn for a year, but that the presidency of an Englishman might be 
accepted. 

I said that I doubted whether it would be accepted, and we did not desire it. I 
could not propose it ; but of course, if the five Powers asked us if we could find some 
one of financial experience who would take the presidency of the Bank, we would try 
to do so. 

I added that I agreed with M. Doumergue's reply to Austria and Italy, and had no 
objection to raise to his proposal to find some means of satisfying Austrian and Italian 
interests, but I should like to know what he had in his mind. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 

(1) [This despatch was repeated to St. Petersburgh (No. 77). Count BenckendorflF's account 
of the conversation recorded here is given in Imperialismus, 1st Ser., Vol. I, pp. 373-4, No. 377. 
For the communication from M. Sazonov which forms the first enclosure cp. ibid., pp. 269-71, 
No. 285.] 



106 



Enclosure in No. 121 
Memoranda communicated by Count Benckendorff. 

(1) 

Londres, le 26 Fevrier, 1914. 

Mr. Sazonow me communique en date du 19 Fe\Tier c[ouran]t ce qui suit : 

L'Arabassade d'Angleterre par une notice, en date du 27 Janvier nous demande 
notre opinion sur certaines questions relatives a I'emprunr [sic : emprunt] albanais, 
en ajoutant que Sir Edward Grey trouve desirable d'etablir un accord defini sur ces 
questions entre la Grande-Bretagne, la France et la Eussie.(^) 

Le point de vue du Gouvernement Imperial concernant les questions soulevees 
dans cette notice se resume comme suit : 

Nous sommes d'accord avec I'opinion du Gouvernement Fran^ais sur le montant 
de Temprunt albanais qui pourrait etre diminue. Nous partageons I'opinion de 
Mr. Petriaeff, notre Commissaire en Albanie, que remission d'un emprunt total de 
80 millions, serai t preferable a remission d'un emprunt plus considerable echelonne 
debutant par une emission partielle de 20 millions. 

N'attribuant pas d'importance principielle a ce cote de la question, nous serions 
prets a une solution plus conforme aux voeux des Cabinets de Londres et de Paris. 

II en est de meme pour les conditions purement de banque de I'emprunt, qui 
d'ailleurs ne sauraient etre etudiees qu'apres decision prise sur le principe de 
I'emprunt. 

D'accord en ceci avec la Grande-Bretagne et la France, nous estimons quo 
I'emploi des revenus fournis par I'emprunt de\Ta etre effectue sous le controle de la 
Commission Internationale. 

L' affectation speciale des sommes pourrait etre etablie par les Eepresentants des. 
Puissances a la Commission Internationale. 

Par sa notice, I'Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie nous informe que le Cabinet de 
Vienne ne verrait pas d'objections a ce point. 

Pour ce qui concerne I'internationalisation de la banque albanaise, nous estimons, 
que d'apres les resolutions de la reunion des Ambassadeurs a Londres, le controle des 
finances albanaises devrait etre exerce par toutes les Puissances egalement, ce principe 
etabli serait contredit par une internationalisation, accordant une situation 
preponderante a deux Puissances seulement, comme serait le cas, si I'institution de la 
banque etait basee sur la concession austro-italienne, qui dispose de toutes les sources 
economiques et financieres de 1' Albanie. 

Le Gouvernement Francais, ayant par le promemoria du 22 Janvier, emis une 
opinion precise, nous serions prets a y adherer, si le Gouvernement Britannique de 
son cote s'associait au point de vue que la question de I'emprunt ne peut etre decidee 
qu'apres solution satisfaisante de celle de la banque. ('') 

Si le Cabinet de Paris modifiait son opinion a ce sujet, nous sommes prets a 
prendre en consideration toute nouvelle proposition qu'il aurait a formuler. — Pourtant 
dans notre opinion, il est en tout cas, necessaire que I'emprunt se conclue soit a la 
condition du controle de la Commission Internationale, soit a' celle de I'internationali- 
sation a parts egales de la banque albanaise. 

(2) [The reference is to Sir G. Buchanan's communication of January 27/Februar}' 9, reported 
in his telegram (No. 43) of that date, D. 9-30 p.m., R. 10-30 p.m. (F.O. 6018/45/14/53.) He had 
been instructed on February 7 to make enquiries as to the Russian views on the amount of the 
loan and the interdependence of the loan and bank questions, and Sir Edward Grey added that 
he "would suggest that the French, Russian and British Gov[ernmen]ts sh[oul]d arrive at a 
clear understanding." (Telegram (No. 70) of February 7, 1914, D. 7 p.m. F.O. 5068/45/14/53.)] 

(3) [cp. ImperiaUsmus, 1st Ser., Vol. I, p. 270, No. 285, note (=). cp. also Sir F. Bertie's 
despatch (No. 40), D. January 22, R. January 23, which enclosed a note communicated to him 
by M. Doumergue on January 21, 1914 It contained a statement of the principle that 
participation in the loan should depend upon the internationalisation of the Bank and the 
acceptance of the views previously expressed as to the powers of the Commission of Control 
in financial questions. (F.O. 3167/146/14/53.) cp. also supra, p. 97, No. 112, note (2).] 



107 



Mr. Sazonow ajoute que la question concernant reinprunt albanais est du nombre 
de celles, dont les particularites de\Taient etre debattues a Londros, afin d'etablir de 
cette fac-on un point de vue commun en cette matiere entre les Cabinets de Londres de 
Paris et de S[ain]t-Petersbourg. 

Mr. Sazonow telegraphie en date du 1— er Mars c[ouran]t : 
Le Prince Koudachefif telegraphie de Yienne que le Gouvemement Austro- 
Hon'Tois accede volontiers a la demande que la depense des fond? de I'avance soit 
controlee par la Commission Internationale de controle, si toutefois les autres 
Puissances declarent des a present leur consentement a ce que I'avance de dix millions 
au Prince de Wied soit impntee a I'emprunt a contracter par I'Albanie sous la 
crarantie des Puissances. Quant a I'emploi de la susdite somme de dix millions de 
francs : selon les dispositions du contrat a conclure entre le Prince de Wied et les 
banques preteuses a ce sujet, le produit de I'avance envisagee doit sei-vir au but 
suivant : 5 millions pour travaux d'utilite pubiique, 8 millions pour les frais de la 
gendarmerie, le reste de 2 millions est a la libra disposition du Prince pour lui offrir 
les moyens de consolider son Gouvernement. Par consequent, I'emploi de cette 
demiere somme devrait naturellement etre exempte du controle de la Commission 
Internationale, laquelle, par contre, exercerait relativement a la somme de 8 millions 
pleinement les fonctions de surveillance qui lui seront attribuees. Quant a la garantie 
de ladite avance, il est prevu qu'elle est a valoir sur le premier emprunt qui sera 
contracte par I'Albanie. Subsidiairement sont afEectes au remboursement de I'avance 
les droits de douane de I'Albanie.' 



[EP y OTE— On March 7 Consul-General Lamb informed Sir Edward Grey (in his despatch 
No 51 D March 7 R. March 17. 1914) that the Prince and Princess of Wied had arrived at 
Durazzo that dav in an Austrian ship, the "Taurus." escorted by H.M.S. "Gloucester,'' the 
French cruiser " Bruix " and the Italian cruiser "Quarto." They vrere received by Essad 
Pasha Feizi Bev and Aziz Pasha. Directors-General of Affairs at Valona and Durazzo. The 
Mavor of the toWn also went on board the "Taurus." On landing they were met by General 
de "Weer and his adjutant of the Consular Corps, and the heads of the various religious 
communities. The International Commission of Control met them with an official speech of 
welcome directlv afterwards. Consul-General Lamb stated that two or three points m the 
Prince's speech "in reply seem to have struck some of his hearers as an unnecessary accentuation 
of His Highness' intention to withdraw the conduct of his administration as much as possible 
from the control of the International Commission, which was known to be the aim of his more 
intimate advisers, but that there was nothing to which the Commission could take exception. 
The demeanour of the population was described as being throughout sympathetic, but not 
enthusiastic. (F.O. 11875/146/14/53)] 



No. 122. 

.Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edu-ard GreifJ' 

F.O. 10941/352/14/53. 

(No. 56.^ Confidential. Athens, D. March o, 1914. 

g^. E. March 12, 19U. 

In commenting, in his despatch No. 47 of the 28th of February,(=, upon my 
despatch of the same number of the 22nd of that month, (=) Mr. Lamb appears to do 
less justice to the loyalty of Monsieur Venizelos's policy in regard to Epurus, and even 
to distort the meaning of his very frank declaration to me that " if he had the shghtest 
hope that the populations could maintain themselves unassisted against the Albanians 
he would have allowed them to try it." 

(») [This despatch was sent to Talona.] 
(2) [v. supra, pp. 103-4, No. 119.] 
(») [v. supra, p. 103, No. 118.] 



108 



There was a great temptation to this course, for there was a considerable 
probabihty that the Epirotes would be able to defend themselves long enough, at least, 
to give incontestable proof of their repugnance to the Albanian yoke, provided that an 
European Power did not intervene. It may be believed that Monsieur Venizelos was 
at one time bitten with the idea and encouraged the Epirotes in it; but since he 
realised the danger of it he has worked whole-heartedly against it. I have reason to 
believe that he has impounded a sum of 300,000 francs raised by the Epirotes for the 
needs of their cause, and that of the cheques which continue to be sent to them from 
abroad many are made payable to him (for greater security!) and he refuses to 
endorse them. Therefore if anyone has reason to complain of M. Venizelos's action, 
it is the Epirotes, whom he has by these means, and by the piece-meal evacuation, 
deprived of the prospect of making their resistance effectual. That he sympathises 
deeply with the Epirotes, who are misguided enough not to allow that Europe knows 
better than they do what is good for them, cannot be doubted: but he did not show 
it in his conversations with Monsieur Zographos. to whom on the contrary he used 
language which Monsieur Streit, who was present, evidently thought of excessive 
harshness. Allowances must be made for the difficulties of the position. 
Monsieur Venizelos still retains to an extraordinary degree the confidence of the 
country, but even he might forfeit it if he repressed with too strong a hand e'^ery 
manifestation of Epirote patriotism. 

I have, &c. 

F. ELLIOT. 



No. 123. 

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey. 

Athens, March 8, 1914. 

F.O. 10259/10259/13/44. D. 2-30 p.m. 

Tel (No. 49.) E. 9 p.m. 

Following communication made to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs this 
morning by representatives of the Triple Alliance verbally and collectively (^) : — 

" 1. In consequence of a proposal arising out of our (Austrian) initiative, the 
Commission of Control at Vallona has taken decision, and noted in to-day's protocol, 
that in Albania full equality of rights of religions and of employment of all languages 
there in use will be guaranteed. 

*' We, as well as Italy, will give greatest publicity to this decision. The two 
Cabinets declare to Greek Government that they entirely concur in this decision and 
will use their influence in favour of its complete execution. 

" 2. The two Cabinets adhere to what was agreed upon with M. Venizelos 
respecting rectifications of frontier. The two Cabinets will pursue realisation of these 
rectifications of frontier as soon as Greek troops have evacuated territory attributed 
to Albania. 

" 3. The rectification of frontiers of the kaza of Koritza desired by Greek 
Government is in contradiction with the London decisions and would be exclusively to 
disadvantage of Albania. The two Governments are therefore not in a position to 
give their consent to it, and must insist on complete evacuation of this district also in 
the sense of international decisions. 

" 4. With regard to wishes of Greece on points of detail, as, for instance, inclusion 
of suitable elements from South Albania in Albanian gendarmerie, the two Govern- 
ments are in general prepared to take them into consideration and to recommend them 
to the Prince of Albania." 



(') [cp. G.P., XXXVI (II), pp. 524-5.] 



109 



MINUTES. 

This is the third occasion within 6 months that Austria and Italy have taken separate 
action in regard to Albania. German support was only added in this instance as an after- 
thought, see Sir F. Elliot's tel[egrara] No. 50 (10260), herewith.(2) 

In October the two Powers threatened Servia, and in November, Greece, without any 
reference to the international concert. 

I venture to submit that we should suggest to France and Russia a comm[unicatio]n to 
the Triple Alliance to the following effect: — 

The recent action of the Triple Alliance Powers at Athens, following on what Austria and 
Italy did in Oct[ober] and Nov [ember] last,(^) shews that we cannot count on any unity of 
action among the Powers in Albania. In the present instance, but for the courtesy of the 
German Minister, we should have known nothing of this latest ' demarche,' unless and until the 
Greek Govfernmen]t had appealed to us. 

The discourtes3' is all the more marked, as we were awaiting the views of Austria and 
Italy in order to answer the Greek reply. (*) 

In these circumstances, it is useless for us to co-operate any longer in Albania, and we are 
therefore withdrawing our representative on the International Commission. 

We are unlikely to have so good and opportune an occasion again to escape from a most 
ungrateful task. 

G. R. C. 
9.iii.l4. 



It is diSicult to resist the belief that the Triple Alliance gov[ernmen]ts have made up 
their mind that the British gov[ernmen]t will put up with anything in regard to Albania. At 
the best, the present move is a deliberate discourtesy to H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] ; and 
I agree with Mr. Clerk that we ought now to consider whether we can allow ourselves to be 
persistently treated in this way. 

I do not think that it would be of any use to ask once more for explanations. Explanations 
of a perfunctory and platitudinous character will be made, if we ask for them, as was done on 
the two previous occasions. But the Triple Alliance governments will continue to act with an 
ostentatious neglect of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] as before. 

To remain in the concert on these terms is neither useful nor dignified. If we were to 
retire it would not be so much laying down our flute, as calling attention to the fact that we 
are not admitted to thfe orchestra. There is much to be said, I think, in favour of our taking 
this opportunity to withdraw definitely from Albania, recalling our contingent and our delegate 
on the Commission of Control. It is however a question whether we can decide on this 
definitely without previously speaking to France and Russia. If they oppose withdrawal, we 
should I think make our consent to stay dependent on receiving a formal apology from at 
least the Austrian gov[ernmen]t, who, as appears from Sir F. Elliot's further telegrams Nos. 50 
and 51 (10260) and (10293), (*) are clearly the ringleader in this conspiracy. 

Perhaps the best course would be for Sir E. Grey to speak to the Triple Alliance 
ambassadors first, nd say that as their governments appear deliberately bent on excluding 
Great Britain from the concert as regards Albania, she does not consider it compatible with 
her dignity to remain outwardly associated with them in Albania itself, and that H[is] 
M[ajesty's] G[overnment] must now seriously consider whether the moment has not come to 
withdraw altogether. 

We might then wait and see what effect such language produces at Vienna, Rome, and 
Berlin. 

Meanwhile Sir E. Grey could speak to the French and Russian ambassadors, explain what 
had passed with their Triple Alliance colleagues, and ask them to ascertain the views of their 
respective governments. 

E. A. C. 

M[ar]ch 9. 

F. D. A. 



(2) [Sir F. Elliot's telegram (No. 50) of March 8, D. 2-30 p.m., R. 915 p.m., stated that the 
communication had been " drafted in Vienna, apparently as an Austro-Italian one, but the 
German Minister was instructed to associate himself with" it." (F.O. 10260/10259/14/53.)] 

(3) [v. supra, pp. 32-3, No. 38, and min.; p. 59, No. 69, and note (i).] 
(•») [cp. infra, pp. 235-7, No. 255, end] 

(5) [For Sir F. Elliot's telegram (No. 50) v. supra, note (2). His telegram (No. 51) of 
March 9, D. 9 a.m., R. 10 a.m., is also not reproduced. It stated only that the "communication 
was made by the Austrian Minister on behalf of his two colleagues, not in their presence." 
(F.O. 10293/10259/14/53.)] 



no 



I have spoken to M. Cambon and have asked what M. Doumergue thinks of this 
proceeding.^) 

I will deal with it with the Austrian and Italian Ambassadors here.(') 

E. G 

10 3.14. 

(6) [Sir Edward Grey's despatch (No. 134) to Sir F. Bertie of March 9, 1914, recorded 
briefly this conversation. (F.O. 11034/10259/14/53.) On March 11, M. Paul Cambon and 
Count Benckendorff called on Sir Edward Grey to discuss the situation, cp. infra, p. 241, 
No. 260, note (-).] 

(") [cp. immediately succeeding document, and note (*).] 



No. 124. 

Sir Edivard Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.C) 
F.O. 10842/10259/14/53. 

Tel. (No. 52.) Foreign Ojfice, March 10, 1914, 11 p.m. 

Austrian Ambassador has today informed me of communication made at Athens 
as described in Sir F. Elliot's tel[egram] No. 49 of March 8.(-) He was instructed 
to say that Austrian M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] had been in consultation with 
Italian Gov[ernmen]t and that this communication was the result. Austrian 
j\[[inister for] F[oreign] A[fifairs] had felt that time was of importance and would 
be saved by a verbal "communication before other Powers were consulted. Austrian 
M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] had heard yesterday that communication had been 
made and he hoped it would accord with our views. Austrian Ambassador said but 
only as his own personal impression that the three Ministers at Athens must have 
been rather precipitate. 

I said the bare facts were that Greece had made a communication to all the 
Powers(^) : I had last week asked the Austrian and Italian Ambassadors what was the 
view of their Gov[ernmen]ts as to the reply that should be made. These 
Gov[ernmen]ts had without saying anything to us made a separate reply on their 
own account at Athens and the Greek M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] had 
yesterday announced it to the Chamber. This being so it was useless for me to discuss 
the matter further : we must now either make no reply to Greece or make one 
separately according to our own ideas. 

Austrian Ambassador repeated but again only as his personal opinion that the 
Ministers at Athens must have been too precipitate. 

I said I personally thought there must have been some muddle but I could only 
deal with what Austrian M[inister for] F[oreign] A[fTairs] said. 

Austrian x\mbassador pressed me as to whether I did not think substance of reply 
favourable. I repeated that it was of no use for me to discuss it now. The Powers 
might consult together and act together, but if they were to act separately it was of no 
use to consult. As Greek M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] had been so prompt in 
announcing the communication to the Powers I supposed he considered it favourable 
but I could not discuss it. It was the form of the communication, the fact that three 
Powers had made it separately, and not the substance that I was concerned with.(^) 

(') [This telegram was repeated (for information) to Paris (No. 79); to St. Petersburgb 
(No. 123) ; to Rome (No. 65) ; to Berlin (No. 67) ; to Athens (No. 38).] 

(2) [v. immediately preceding document.] 

(3) [v. infra, pp. 235-7, No. 255, end.] 

{*) [In answer to the above telegram Sir M. de Bunsen telegraphed (No. 40) on March 11, 
D. 8 P.M., R. 10-30 P.M., that he had had a conversation with Count Forgach, who said that the 
Austro-Hungarian and Italian Ministers at Athens had been instructed to make the communi- 
cation and were supported by their German colleague. Count Forgach hoped that the Triple 
Entente Powers would also support what had been said. (F.O. 10932/10259/14/53.) Sir M. 
de Bunsen again telegraphed on March 13 (No. 41), D. 12-35 p.m., R. 2-15 p.m., that Count 
Mensdorft had been instructed to make further explanations to Sir Edward Grey ; there was 
no mistake about the communication but it had seemed to be an urgent question, of special 
interest to Italy and Austria-Hungary, and it was considered important to save time. 
(F.O. 11254/10259/14/53.) Sir Edward Grey's despatch (No. 37) of March 13, 1914, to Sir M. de 



Ill 



Bunsen described this further explanation. ^F.O. 11975/10259/14/53.) The corresponding 
explanations given by the Marquis Imperiali are recorded in Sir Edward Grey's telegram 
(No. 67) of March 11, 1914, D. 9 p.m., to Sir R. Rodd. It was stated that " the communication 
. . . . was made entirely by mistake.'' Instructions had been sent to concert in drawing up a 
communication but not to make one. (F.O. 11053/10259/14 '53.) The Italian explanation was 
borne out bv that of Germany. This is recorded in Sir Edward Grey's telegram (So. 68) of 
March 10, 1914, D. 11 p.m., to Sir E. Goschen. (F.O. 10843, i0259/14/53.) cp. G.P., 
XXXVI (II), pp. 523-4; pp. 527-8. cp. also infra, pp. 240-2, Nos. 259-60.] 



[ED. yOTE. — Consul-General Lamb reported in his despatch to Sir Edward Grey (No. 57), 
D. March 17. R. March 23, that Turkhan Pasha, on the Prince of Wied's invitation, had 
accepted the task of forming a Cabinet, which was to be composed as follows: — 

Turkhan Pasha, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Essad Pasha, Minister of the Interior and of War. 

Aziz Pasha Vrioni, Minister of Agriculture and of Mines. 

MuSd Bey Libohovo, Minister of Justice. 

Hassan Bey Prishtina. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. 

Preak Bib Doda Pasha, Minister of Public Works. 

Dr. F. Adami, Minister of Finance. 

Dr. Tourtolis Bey, Minister of Public Instruction and of Health 

The despatch described the previous services and other capacities of the Members of this 
Cabinet, and stated that the general opinion was that the influence of Essad Pa«ha was likely 
to be much stronger than that of any of the others. (F.O. 12814/12122/14/ 53.) 

On March 19 MuSd Bey, the new Minister of Justice, resigned the post of Albanian 
Delegate on the Commission "of Control. (F.O. 14.343 12122 14/53.) 

The Cabinet remained in office only until Essad Pasha's arrest on May 19. v. infra, 
pp. 11-5-7, Nos. 130-3, and Ed. note. For the succeeding GoTernment, v. infra, p. 117, Ed. note.] 



No. 125. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. EUiot.C) 

F.O. 14081 '352/14/53. 
(No. 81.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, March 23, 1914. 

The Greek Minister gave me to-day the telegram of whFich] copy is enclosed 
herein (see paper herevvith.-i- 

He said that the position of the Greek Government was becoming positively 
dangerous. They could do nothing to influence the situation in Epirus. He asked 
my sympathy for the position in which M. Yenizelos was placed. 

I said that I had every sympathy for M. Yenizelos, and I recognised the 
difficulties. But I could only tell the Minister frankly that it would take a long time 
to get the Powers to agree upon any answer to the Greek Government about the 
southern frontier of Albania going beyond what Austria and Italy had already said. 
This was the inference that I derived from such communications as I received. 

The Greek Minister argued against this view. 

I said that I did not wish to convey that there were no Powers who were prepared 
to go further than what had already been said by Austria and Italy, but agreement 
between the Powers could take place only on something that commanded the assent of 
all of them. I could only tell him what I had done as a fact, and I could not argue 
about it. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

(1) [This despatch was repeated to Paris (No. 178); to Vienna (No. 46); to Berlin (No. 91); 
to Rome (No. 82); to St. Petersburgh (No. 129).] 

(*) [Not reproduced. It referred to the position in Epirus.] 



112 



No. 12G. 



Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.C) 



F.O. 14967/352/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 47.) Vienna, April 4, 1914. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs has shown me a telegram from Austrian Minister 
at Durazzo, expressing anxiety caused by activity of Epirus bands and the insufficiency 
of the gendarmerie to deal with the situation. According to a telegram received at 
Durazzo from Metropolitan in Koritza, Epirotes have been greatly strengthened by 
accession of Greek regular troops. Koritza is said to be in flames, Dutch gendarmerie 
officer wounded, and country at the mercy of insurgents. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs, though outwardly calm, appeared to me to be 
considerably upset by realisation of events which have been so often foretold. He 
said that fortunately understanding with Italy was closer than perhaps it had ever 
been before. He regretted that negotiations between the Dutch colonel of 
gendarmerie and chief of the Epirotes should have been broken o2, and thought best 
prospect of peace lay in their resumption at Durazzo simultaneously with immediate 
evacuation by Greek troops, who not only encouraged insurgents by their presence and 
led them to think that decision of the Powers regarding southern frontier of Albania 
may yet be reversed, but even went over in large numbers to the insurgents. 

(0 [The text given above is taken from the Confidential Print, as the original decypher 
cannot be traced.] 



[ED. A'OTi:.— Consul-General Lamb's despatch (No. 82), D. April 16. R. May 2, 1914, 
forwarded to Sir Edward Grey the draft Organic Statute for Albania, drawn up by the 
International Commission of Control at Valona. (F.O. 19379/7204/14/53.)] 



I have the honour to report that I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs thi? 
morning on his return from his visit to Count Berchtold at Abbazia, where he had 
spent five days in the company of his Austro-Hungarian Colleague. 

He did not wait for me to put any questions to him but began at once by saying 
that he thought that his conversations with Count Berchtold had served a useful 
purpose. As was inevitable on such occasions the papers were full of all sorts of 
assumptions of what had taken place, but my experience would enable me to realize 
that undue significance was apt to be attached to such meetings. In the first place 
there had been no exchange of views about the Mediterranean or about zones of 
influence, and all the suggestions of the press to that effect were purely fantastic. No 
new ground had been broken and tlie only questions discussed were current ones, of 
which the Albanian difficulty bulked largest as most directly affecting the two countries. 
The Albanian situation was causing him considerable anxiety and the position of the 
Prince did not seem well assured. He had discussed at length with Count Berchtold 
what might be done to improve it. There were three aspects of the Albanian question 
which they had to consider. The settlement of the Northern frontier with Montenegro 
and Servia, the internal position, and the difficulties with Greece on the Southern 
frontier. In the north for the moment the most urgent matter was the trouble with 
Montenegro and the reluctance of the Hoti and Gruda tribes to accept the decisions 
taken as to their future allegiance. It had been suggested that the International Corn- 



No. 127. 



Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edicard Grey.C) 



F.O. 18041/18041/14/53. 

(No. 142.) 

Sir, 



Rome, D. April 21, 1914. 
E. April 25, 1914. 



(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King.] 



113 



mission should first settle the frontier with Montenegro, and leave the Serbo- Albanian 
frontier until later. In view of the conditions which had recently developed both he and 
Count Berchtold were in favour of this proposal. Not altogether disassociated from it 
was a suggestion which had been made by Colonel Phillips that a portion at any rate 
of the International contingent at Scutari should be moved to the region in question. 
He was personally disposed to regard this suggestion with favour though he did not 
know whether it had yet come under your consideration, or what you would think of 
it. It seemed to him that the presence on the spot of troops of those countries which 
were supposed rather to favour the Montenegrin view might contribute to disarming 
opposition. Count Berchtold had objected that the international contingents were not 
sufficiently strong to enable them to detach a force, and had dwelt on the principle 
which had been laid down that the radius of international activity was not to extend 
beyond a zone of ten kilometres outside Scutari. But he surmised that the real 
grounds for his demurring to this proposal was his desire to keep the sphere in 
question more exclusively under Austro-Hungarian influence. He thought, however, 
that if the Powers were disposed to favour such a suggestion Count Berchtold's 
reluctance could be overcome. 

As regards the internal situation in Albania they had agreed to recommend very 
considerable concessions to the Epirotes, in fact all such concessions as could be given 
without entailing a disintegration of the new Albanian State, by demands for similar 
concessions from other units in the country, which would tend to that result. 

As regards the Southern frontier it remained to be seen whether the reply of the 
Powers to the Greek note(") would now bring about the immediate evacuation of Epirus 
by the Greek troops, which he felt would greatly facilitate the situation for the 
Albanian Government, as, so long as they remained there, the Epirotes derived from 
them a sort of moral support for resistance. He had learned from Athens that the 
Russian Minister had as yet received no instructions. The Eussians were apt to be 
behind the other Powers, but it was desirable that the reply should be presented with 
as little delay as possible. Also it appeared that there was a slight verbal discrepancy 
in the instructions given to the representatives of those Powers who had received 
them, as to what was to be said to the Greek Government verbally as regards 
evacuation. The Italian Minister had been instructed to request that the evacuation 
might no longer be delayed, the word employed being " domandare," which has not 
the peremptory significance of the English word demand, but is equivalent to 
" demander " in French. The Austro-Hungarian Minister had been instructed to say 
that his Government now "expected" (erwarten) that the evacuation would ensue, 
whereas we and the French had only expressed a " hope " to that effect. There was 
not much difference really, but he learned from Athens that the more forcible word 
' ' expect ' ' would be appreciated by the Greek Government as giving them a somewhat 
stronger reason for acting on the communication from the Powers. 

He had discussed with Count Berchtold the contingency, which he hoped would 
not arise, of Monsieur Venizelos resigning, and a new^ Minister being less disposed to 
give effect to the wishes of the Powers. It would be inevitable that Italy and Austria- 
Hungary should in such an actuality find means of expressing their dissatisfaction, 
but so far as practical measures were concerned they had not arrived at any conclusion 
beyond advising the Albanian Government to continue with more energy the measures 
which had already been initiated of organizing a militia with perhaps some further 
addition of foreign officers. Monsieur Venizelos seemed to be the only man in Greece 
who w^as strong enough to carry out the policy laid down by the Powers, and his 
withdrawal from office would make the difficulties much greater. I was, however, 
unable to elicit from His Excellency any admission that he and his colleague had 
agreed to contemplate separate coercive action. 

I then observed that I had seen some quotations from the Vienna papers, 
reproduced here, (? referring) to Austrian concessions in Asia Minor, and I said I 



(2) [u. infra, pp. 247-8, No. 267, and end; pp. 248-9, No 268.] 
[8959] I 



114 



presumed that these had been discussed with Count Berchtold. The Marquis di San 
GiuHano said that he had thought it best not to adopt an attitude of opposition to the 
Austrian desire to secure a railway concession, but he did not think that the Austro- 
Hungarian Government were as yet very clear as to what they did want. It was 
more a vague desire not to be the only great Power which had obtained no economic 
facilities from the Porte. A short line of railway east of Adalia had been spoken of, 
but he did not think the scheme was a very practical one, or one which would conflict 
with the concessions he was trying to obtain. 

I have, &c. 

RENNELL EODD. 



No. 128. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. (^) 

E.G. 20381/1155/14/53. 
(No. 269.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, May 5, 1914. 

The French and Russian Ambassadors spoke to me to-day of the Memorandum 
given by the Servian Minister as to a strategic frontier line in the neighbourhood of 
Prizrend and Dibra. The line at present went so close to these two places that the 
Albanians could positively fire into these towns from the heights near. It was only 
reasonable that the Servians should have the protection for which they asked. 

I said that my recollection was that, according to independent information, the 
violations of the frontier by Albanians, Df which the Servians had complained, had 
arisen from the fact that, when the Servians evacuated Albanian territory in 
accordance vi-ith the decision of the Powers, they took with them the cattle belonging 
to the Albanians, and the Albanians had come over the frontier in pursuit of their own 
cattle. There had been further trouble because the Albanians were denied access to 
places which had been allocated to Servia, but which were the natural markets for the 
Albanians to secure supplies. It seemed to me, " prima facie," quite reasonable that 
the Albanians should not have the heights that commanded Prizrend and Dibra; but, 
if this point was conceded, there ought to be a clear understanding that the Servians 
did admit the Albanians to the markets necessary to them for securing supplies. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

(') [This despatch was repeated to St. Petersburgh (No. 172). It is endorsed as having 
been sent to Colonel Granet (No. 9) on May 9.] 



No. 129. 

Sir Edtcard Grey to Colonel Granet. 

E.G. 20326/1155/14/53. 

Tel. (No. 4.) Foreign Office, May 11, 1914, 6 p.m. 

Your, despatch No. 11 of May l.(*) 

I have informed Erench and Russian Ambassadors that on your own initiative 
before receiving any instructions from me you had said to your Russian Colleague 
that the line selected at Dibra might be extended further to the North so as efEectually 
to secure the defence of the town. 

In reply to request of Russian and Erench Ambassadors I have said that both at 
Dibra and Prizrend you will support such modifications as are necessary to give Servia 

^•ffi Granet's despatch (No. 11), D. May 1, R. May 7, 1914, described in detail the 

difficulties of the International Commission for the Delimitation of the Northern Frontier of 
(Fo"2^' ^""^ enclosed a map showing the delimitation proposed by the various Powers. 



115 



stratef^ic securitv, but that I agree with your reservation that no more Albanian villages 
should be ceded to Ser\-ia than the military situation requires. You should act 
accordingly. 

I have impressed upon French and Eussian Ambassadors that Servians should 
in each case give Albanians fair access to necessary markets. 

I have informed French and Russian Ambassadors of my telegram No. 2 to you 
of May 7.(-') 

{-) [Sir Edward Grey's telegram ^Xo. 2) of May 7, 1914. D. S p.m., instructed Colonel Granet, 
at the request of the French and Russian Governments, to support '"some small modifications 
of frontier favourable to Montenegro and not incompatible with reasonable latitude given by 
decisions of Conference of Ambassadors in London." (P.O. 20380/ 1155 ,14/ 53.)] 



No. 130. 

Consul-General Lamh to Sir Edicard Grey.C) 

F.O. 22521 '•22521 14/53. Durazzo, D. Matj 19, 1914. 

Tel. (No. 97. K- 3/a»/ 20. 1914. 

An armed movement ha\-ing manifested itself in the interior, of which Essad was 
suspected of being the instigator, the latter was arrested this morning, after two shells 
had been fired into his house, and was conveyed on board the Austrian man-of-war 
'■ Szigetvar." 

At the request of the Prince, Italian flotilla of eleven torpedo-boat destroyers, 
with the cmiser " Yittor Pisani," was recalled from Yallona last night, and landed 
140 men, who, with 60 Austrians, are guarding the palace and the legations. 

(>) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 139) ; to Rome (as Xo. 124) ; to Berlin (as 
No. 130); to Vienna (as No. 89)-; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 218). The text given above is 
taken from the Confidential Print, as the original decypher cannot be traced.] 



No. 131. 

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edicard Grey.C) 

F.O. 22522 22521/14 53. Durazzo, D. Maij 19, 1914. 

Tel. (No. 98.) E- ^loV '^0^ 1914- 

Mv immediatelv oreceding telegram of to-dav.(-) 
Arrest of Essad appears to have been due to Austrian advice. 
Albania is now practically without any Government and the Prince hopelessly 

perplexed. 

(n [This telegram was sent to Paris (.as No. 140) ; to Rome (as No. 125): to Berlin (as 
No. 131); to Vienna (as No. 90V, to St. Petersburgh vas No. 219). The text given above is 
taken from the Confidential Print, as the original decypher cannot be traced.] 

(') [r. immediately preceding document.] 



[ED. .YOTi:.— Consul-General Lamb reported more fully in his despatch (No. 104), 
D. Mav 19, R. May 25. He said that Austro-Hungarian influence had apparently prevailed 
upon the Prince to have Essad Pasha arrested. It had been for some time a matter of 
common report that Essad Pasha had been intriguing with the :MussuImans of the interior, 
to raise armed bands to concentrate on Durazzo and demand a Mussulman Prince. Some of 
these bands had already appeared at Tirana and even at Shiak, about 6 miles from Durazzo. 
The continuing despatch (.No. 105> said that there were between 3.000 and 6,000 men impli- 
cated, and that there had been some fighting. Mr. Lamb stated further that a quarrel 
between Essad Pasha and the Dutch ofiicer commanding the Gendarmerie seemed to have 
precipitated the crisis. When the order for his arrest was given, Essad, with his house full 
of armed retainers, refused to surrender except to the Prince himself or to the Italian 

[3959] 1 - 



116 



Minister. The Dutch ofl5cer therefore dropped two shells ou his house, and he gave himself 
up. Mufid Bey, the Minister of Public Works, accused of aiding and abetting Essad, was 
also put under arrest in his own house. 

Consul-General Lamb said further that in his opinion the only measure to save the 
situation would be an international occupation on the system adopted in Crete (F.O. 23324/ 
22521/14/53; 23530/22521/14/53). On May 25 Sir Edward Grey replied by telegram (No. 63) i 
that "In the light of repeated incidents in the past H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] can 
have no confidence that co-operation between all the Powers is really desired equally by all 
of them, or likely to be secured, unless the situation is radically altered." (F.O. 22838/22521/ 
14/53.) ' cp. infra, pp. 116-7, No. 133, and min. 

Consul-General Lamb reported further in his despatch (No. 105), D. May 20, E. May 26, 
on the critical character of the situation, which he described as even worse than it was before 
Essad Pasha's arrest. Sir Edward Grey's reply is given infra, pp. 121-2, No. 138. Before the 
reply was drafted, Sir Edward Grey minuted Consul-General Lamb's despatch as follows : — 

" In explaining to Mr. Lamb it would be well to point out that Austria apparently 
does not want real international action. Italy desires it only to prevent being left alono 
with Austria but will continue under cover of it to play for her own hand. That it would 
be difficult in any case to work a real condominium of 6 Powers, but that the action of 
Austria and Italy and their special interests make it impossible and that therefore we do 
not propose ourselves to take further steps to establish an international occupation or 
condominium. E. G." (F.O. 23530/22521/14/53.)] 



No. 132. 

Sir Edivard Grey to Consul-General La/nb.(') 
F.O. 22522/22521/14/53. 

Tel. (No. 59.) Foreign Office, May 20, 1914. 

Your tel[egram]s Nos. 97 and 98.(-) 

It seems to me that the Prince should not have taken a step of this surprising 
nature without giving previous or at least simultaneous information as to the reasons 
for it to the International Commission. 

I certainly cannot accept any responsibility for the consequences and it may end 
in our having to withdraw from the international commission being no longer able to 
accept responsibility for consequences of action to which we were not a party. 
Eesponsibility in that event would be left rightly to those who were a party to it. 

But I shall await further information as to the circumstances and the advice on 
which the Prince acted. 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Paris (No. 141) ; to St. Petersburgh (No. 221), with the 
instruction to "inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[fTairs]." It was repeated to Berlin 
(No. 132); to Vienna (No. 91); to Rome (No. 126), "for information only"; to Colonel Phillips 
(No. 1) "for confidential information," on May 21.] 

(-) [v. supra, p. 115. Nos. 130-1. j 



No. 133. 

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edivard Grey.O 
F.O. 23756/22521/14/53. 

(No. 107.) Confidential. Durazzo, D. May 22, 1914. 

^1'*' E. May 27, 1914. 

I venture to offer the following observations in regard to the subject of your 
telegram No. 59 of the 20th instant, (-) to which I replied yesterday in my No. 100. (') 

(>) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 

(2) [v. immediately preceding document.] 

(3) [Consul-General Lamb's telegram (No. 100), D. May 21, R. May 22 1914 is not 
reproduced as its substance is repeated above. (F.O. 22838/22521/14/53.)] 



117 



It is unfortuuatelv incontestable that, since the arrival of the Prince in March, the 
Government of this countr}' has been directed (or sought to be directed, since it would 
be difficult to say that anv definite direction has been given to it) by the Ministers of 
Austria and Italy, just as before his arrival, it was, naturally in a less pronounced 
manner, by the Consulates of the same two Powers. 

As the object which these two Powers have in view is not the advantage of the 
country so much as the securing of a position of special predominance for themselves, 
the system is naturally disastrous for the country and has brought it to the verge of 
complete disaster. If continued in, it must ine^"itably lead to open conflict between 
the two Powers concerned with the resulting danger of serious international 
complications. 

The remedy however, in my humble opinion, is not to be found in the withdrawal 
of the remaining Powers from the International Control but, on the contrary, in their 
insistence on participation on an equal footing in every measure that is adopted in 
regard to Albania. 

This is the desire of all those elements in the population whose opinion is worth 
considering. 

If the Commission has of late been kept in the background, the fault has lain at 
least as much with the Commission itself, (i.e. with those members of it who have 
preferred that it should be so'i as with the Government, the better elements of which 
only needed encouragement to seek its support. 

I have. &c. 

HARRY H. LA^IB. 

MINTTES. 

Qu[ery] Suggest to Mr. Lamb that he should, if a suitable opportunity offers, advise the 
Prince that in his own interest he should insist on receiving counsel from the International 
Commission and submit to it in the first instance any suggestions that may be made to him 
by one or the other Power singly, connect<;d with matters of administration of general policy 
which fall within the Commission's competencv. 

E. A. C. 

Mav 28. 

A. N. 

I do not like to advise the Prince now to consult the International Commission more than 
he has done: he will perhaps promise to do so if the Commission is backed by international 
troops and we are not prepared to send British troops. It will be better to confine our action 
to pointing the moral of the past. 

Point out to Mr. Lamb that had the Prince insisted on receiving counsel from the 
International Commission upon suggestions made to him from any single outside source some 
of his present troubles might have been avoided. 

E. G. 

0) [op. infra, pp. 121-2, Xo. 138.] 



[ED. yOTE. — On May 29 Consul-General Lamb wrote to inform Sir Edward Grey 
(Despatch No. 115. D. May 29, R. June 4) that the Prince of Albania had succeeded in forming 
a new government, in which Turkhan Pasha retained the Presidency of the Council. Only 
three other members of the previous Cabinet (r. supra, p. 111. Ed. note) were retained, two 
of them in their original posts, Mufid Bey and Tourtolis Bey ; Prenk Bib Doda became Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. No Minister of War was appointed to succeed Essad Pasha (F.O. 24918/ 
12122/14/53.)] 



118 



No. 134. 

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir R. liodd.C) 
F.O. 24735/22521/14/53. 

TcJ (No. 137.) Foreign Office, June 4, 1914, 4 p.m. 

Your telegram No. 88 of June 2.(=) -, ,rr • 

If any communique is made it must be to the effect that H[is] M[ajesty sj 
Gov[ernmen]t. wliife not raising objection to any other Powers sending troops to 
Durazzo, do not propose themselves to take part in a military occupation of parts of 
Albania other than Scutari, but. if all the Powers who have ships in the Mediterranean 
decide to send ships to Durazzo, H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t will send a ship to 
co-operate in protecting the person of the Prince. 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Paris (No. 1.59) ; to Berlin (So. 145) ; to Vienna 
CSo 101); to St. Petersburgh ^Xo. 239): to Durazzo (No. 72).] 

(2) [Sir R. Rodd's telegram (No. 88) of June 2, 1914, stated that the Marquis di San 
Giuliano had suggested that it would have " a salutary and calming effect if it were known 
that in the event of a further crisis arising at Durazzo His Majesty's Government would send 
a ship of war if the other Powers did so." (F.O. 24735/22521/14/53.)] 



No. 135. 

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.{^) 

F.O. 25878/22521/14/53. 
(No. 211.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, June 4, 1914. 

M. de Etter, in the course of his conversation with me to-day, remarked on the 
danger that would arise if Servia took matters into her own hands about Albania. 
He heard that she had threatened that she could not keep quiet if one or two Powers 
acted alone in Albania. He also asked me how I thought that Austria and Italy would 
get on if they were left alone in Albania. 

I said that I thought they would get on badly. With regard to Servia, I thought 
that she ought to be told that, so long as the boundaries of Albania that had been 
settled internationally were observed, she had no occasion for interfering, whether it 
was one or two Powers or all the Powers who took action in Albania itself. Of course, 
if the Albanian frontiers were not observed, Servia would have to take measures in 
her own territory to protect herself ; but I could not see that she had a case for taking 
action because of what went on internally in Albania, so long as the frontiers were not 
violated. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. It 
was repeated to Belgrade (No. 46) on June 9.] 



No. 136. 

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir II. Rodd.{^) 

F.O. 25645/22521/14/53. 
(No. 167.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, June 4, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day about Albania, and prefaced his 
remarks by saying, with reference to our disinclination to send troops to Durazzo, (-) 

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. It 
was repeated to Consul-General Lamb.] 
(2) [r;p. supra, p. 118, No. 134.] 



119 



that there had been in the past many things in connection with Albania which were 
obvious [sic], but that it was not too late to amend- It was evident that he meant that 
things had been done by Austria and Italy which would naturally account for our 
disinclination to participate in Albanian responsibilities ; but that, if we would 
continue our participation, we should have less cause for complaint in future. 

The Ambassador went on to say. on the instructions of the ]\[arquis di San 
Giuliano, that the Italian Government had endeavoured to keep the two limits of the 
intervention of Europe and the activity of the two Adriatic Powers. Italy had always 
desired real internationalisation, and all that had happened had been a compromise 
between her views and those of the Austrian Government. They felt now that the 
Prince of Wied ought to be kept in Albania, and that the arrangements come to by 
the International Commission and M. Zographos about Epirus should be agreed to.(^) 

Finally, the Marquis di San Giuliano made an appeal to us to make proposals as 
to what we should be prepared to do in Albania, and to stipulate the conditions on 
which our proposals would be based. The Marquis di San Giuliano would do his best 
to get Austria to accept any reasonable conditions that we proposed. 

I said that public opinion here would not be favourable to undertaking 
responsibility for Albania. For us to make proposals and stipulate conditions would 
be to propose a policy, and I could not undertake this responsibility. The sending of 
troops to Durazzo we regarded as the beginning of a military occupation of Albania. 
We knew by experience that to send a few troops meant being confronted with a 
demand to send more troops, and one thing led to another. I doubted whether, even 
if I recommended it to the Cabinet, they would agree to send British troops to 
Durazzo : and I was not disposed to recommend it. On the other hand, I felt that we 
had some responsibihty to the Prince. One suggestion had been that we should send 
troops solely to protect the person of the Prince. We felt that this could be done as 
effectively by sending ships, and this course would be more convenient, as it was 
much easier to withdraw ships than troops. I had, therefore, telegraphed this 
morning to say that we would send a ship for the protection of the person of the 
Prince at Durazzo, if all the other Powers who had ships in the Mediterranean were 
prepared to send one.(^) By this I meant that, though we should be glad if Russia 
sent a ship, yet, as Eussia had not joined in the naval demonstration or the occupation 
of Scutari, (^) we should not make the abstention of Eussia from sending a ship to 
Durazzo a reason for abstaining ourselves. In conclusion, I said that a condominium 
of six Powers was most difficult under the most favourable conditions(^) ; but if even 
one of the Powers worked against it, it becomes impossible ; and I instanced the 
proceedings in connection with the Albanian Bank. 

The Ambassador admitted my objections as regards the Bank, but said that Italy 
could not always object to every thing that Austria wished. He took a gloomy view of 
what might happen in Albania. He doubted if Italian public opinion would allow 
Italy to send troops to co-operate with Austrian troops alone ; and, even if there were 
action by the two Powers alone, Servia had already intimated that, if action were 
taken by one or two Powers without the others, she would feel obliged to do something, 
and this might precipitate a European war. 



(3) [cp. supra, pp. 103-4, No. 119. Consul-General Lamb reported, in his despatch (No. 103), 
D. May 17, R. May 23, 1914, the business transacted at the meetings between the International 
Commission of Control and the Epirote delegates at Corfu, from May 9 to May 17. After much 
discussion with M. Zographos and the other delegates a formula had been drawn up, and the 
members of the Commission undertook to submit it to their respective Governments. 
(F.O. 23057/352/14/53.) Sir Edward Grey's telegram (No. 83) of June 9, 1914, authorized 
Mr. Lamb to join in a formal notification of approval of the Corfu agreement if his colleagues 
were similarly instructed. (F.O. 25915/352/14/53.)] 

(■>) [v. supra, p. 118, No. 134.] 

(4 [cp. Gooch ct Tew.perley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 641-2, No. 791; p. 786, Ed. note. 'For further 
references, v. ibid., pp. 1122-8, Subject Index sub Alb.vxia.] 
(^) [cp. supra, pp. 115-6, Ed. note] 



120 



I said that M. Grouich had said something of this sort in Belgrade, but I did not 
see that Servia had any concern in the matter, so long as the boundary of Albania, as 
laid down by international decision, was respected. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 



No. 137. 

-Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edivard Grey.C) 
F.O. 25529/25524/14/18. 

(No. 229.) Berlin, D. June 5, 1914. 

Sir, E. June 8, 1914. 

. . . .(^) Referring to Albania the Emperor said that he was in entire agreement 
with His Majesty's Government as to the non-despatch of troops to Durazzo. lie did 
not care in the least what other Powers did, but He certainly was not going to send a 
single German soldier. He had objected to Prince Wied's candidature, had tried to 
dissuade him from going to Albania, and had warned both the Austrian and Italian 
Governments that the Prince, with all his good points, had not the qualifications, 
still less the experience, necessary for a ruler of a new and turbulent principality. 
Everyone, including the Prince, had turned a deaf ear to his advice, and He was not 
now going to risk the lives of German soldiers to get the Prince out of the hole in 
which he had landed himself. He had been certain all along that the Prince would 
come to grief sooner or later, and it had been sooner. Thanks, His Majesty's said, 
to the loyalty and efficiency of the Dutch officers, Essad Pasha had been got rid of in 
the nick of time; had he been allowed to remain a few days longer Essad Pasha 
would, he felt quite certain, have assassinated, or caused to be assassinated, the Prince. 

I presume that the cause of the Emperor's somewhat harsh language respecting 
the Prince is resentment that the latter had laid himself open to statements in the 
press that in a moment of panic he had deserted his post. The Emperor said that of 
course this was not true, as the Prince's personal courage was beyond all question, but 
he had in any case committed a grave error of judgment and had not had the strength 
of will to resist what he ought to have known was bad and probably interested 
advice. It was a bad business altogether and he rather hoped that the Prince would 
take the first opportunity of withdrawing from a position with which he was unable 
to cope, with as much dignity as was possible under the circumstances. His Majesty 
added that it was a mercy that the Pi-ince had followed the advice given to him not 
to allow himself to be proclaimed King of Albania, as now he could, if forced to 
abdicate, return to Germany and live quietly on his estates under his own original 
title and without the prefix of " Ex-King." . . . .(^) 

I have, &c. 

W. E. GOSCHEN. 

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Prime Minister.] 

(2) [The omitted paragraphs refer to a State luncheon given at the New Palace at Potsdam 
on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday, to which all the members of His Majesty's Embassy 
at Berlin were invited.] 

(3) [The remaining paragraphs refer, in general terms, to the proposed visit of a British 
squadron to Kiel. cp. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. XI, pp. 6-11, Nos. 6-8, and ends.] 



[ED. NOTE.—Sh- Edward Grey's telegram (No. 87) of June 13, 1914, D. 1-15 p.m., to 
Consul-General Lamb stated that as all the Powers had agreed to send a ship to Durazzo, and 
as the Austro-Hungarian and Italian Governments considered that the situation called for the 
early presence of vessels, Rear-Admiral Troubridge, commanding the 1st Cruiser Squadron, 
had been ordered to proceed to Durazzo forthwith in H.M.S. "Defence" (F.O. 26576/22521/ 
14/53.) 

From June 15-June 20 Durazzo was besieged by insurgents, and on the 17th Rear-Admiral 
Troubridge was asked by the Prince of Albania to bombard the attacking force, but the 



121 



Admiral's instructions would not permit of such action. He could only offer the Prince refuge 
at any time on board H.M.S. " Defence," but the Prince said that neither he nor his family 
would under anv circumstances again embark in a foreign ship (F.O. 26979/22521/14/53; 
26991/22521/14/53; 27554/22521/14/53; 28584/22521/14/53). 

Consul-Geiieral Lamb's despatch (No. VIA), D. June 16, R. June 23. 1914, gave a detailed 
account of the attack. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson, the Director of Military Operations at 
Durazzo, was killed, and was succeeded by Major Kroom, a Dutch officer. (F.O. 28178/22521/ 
14/53.) A flag of truce with offers of terms was sent to the insurgents on June 20 (F.O. 28647/ 
22521/14/53) and a temporary armistice was concluded. On the 30th, however, the Prince asked 
Admiral Troubridge to establish a blockade of the coast to prevent the rebels from being 
provided with arms, but, again, the Admiral's instructions did not permit him to agree. As the 
Prince was practically a prisoner in his own palace, the Admiral advised him to consult the 
International Commission of Control. (F.O. 30529/22521/14/53.) For later events, v. infra, 
pp. 126-7, No. 141, and end; pp. 128-9, Xo. 143.] 



No. 138. 

Foreign Office to Consul-General Lamh. 

F.O. 23580/22521/14/53. 
(No. 89.) Confidential. 

Sir, Foreign Office, June 17, 1914. 

I am directed bv Sec[retary] Sir E. Grey to state that he has given careful 
consideration to the opinion which you have expressed on various occasions since the 
outbreak of the recent crisis at Durazzo, that the best, if not the only, method of 
ensuring peace and order in Albania is by the employment of international troops. 

There is of course no doubt that disciplined foreign soldiers, if sufficiently 
numerous, would eventually establish the Prince's authority throughout Albania more 
efficiently and more rapidly than any local forces which H[is] H[ighness] may 
contrive to raise, and it is even conceivable that had H[is] H[ighness] had at his 
disposal a comparatively small international detachment from Scutari at the time of 
Essad Pasha's arrest, the moral effect would have been sufficient to check the growth 
of the movement at Tirana in its early stages and thus enable H[is] H[ighness] to 
assert his authority in circumstances which would have enhanced his prestige so far 
as to secure him the obedience of all his subjects. But, apart from the facts that it 
was physically impossible to get the troops to Durazzo before events had reached a 
stage where only a large expeditionary force would have been effective, and that 
unless the Prince had shown unusual capacity for rapid and energetic decision he 
would probably have missed his very brief opportunity, there were serious questions of 
general policy to be weighed and considered before H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] 
could consent to British troops being actively employed against Albanian insurgents. 

Had Albania been left as the spoils of war for the neighbouring Balkan States, 
neither Austria nor Italy would have acquiesced in such a partition and both Powers 
would have developed a policy of active interference in the Balkans that might easily 
have led to an European conflagration. To avert this, and to protect the Albanians 
from incorporation in alien states, the Conference of Ambassadors created the State 
of Albania and appointed an international Commission to suggest and work out the 
conditions under which the new State might take its place among the peoples of 
Europe, but the Powers did not thereby, either individually or collectively, assume 
any responsibility for constraining the Albanian tribes, by force of arms, to submit to 
the form of government which might seem, in the eyes of Europe, best adapted for 
their needs. In short, the policy of the Powers was to offer Albania the assistance of 
an expei'ienced body of officials in framing a constitution and the loan of funds 
wherewith to make a start of administration, but not to take any steps to force Albania 
to follow one or other particular line of development. 

This applies especially to Great Bcitain, whose direct interests with Albania are 
practically non-existent, and where public opinion would make it impossible to justify 



122 



the active emplovment of British troops, which might easily and inevitably have 
followed from the" despatch of an international detachment to Durazzo. 

But even had it proved possible to limit action to a peaceful occupation of the 
countrv, a condominium of the 6 Powers would merely invite failure. It may be 
doubted whether Austria would really be in favour of, and prepared to co-operate 
loyally in, joint action, while Italy would only accept in preference to being left alone 
with her rival, and would continue to play for her own hand. Even m the most 
favourable circumstances a condominium has rarely been attended with success, but 
hampered as such a measure would be by existing rivalries and suspicions, H[is] 
M[ajesty's] G[overnment] could take no steps to further its establishment or to 
commit this country to anv responsibility beyond that involved in readiness to protect, 
by the despatch of" a ship of war, the persons of the Prince and others from actual 
physical danger. H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] would also be ready, in concert 
with the other Great Powers, to use their influence to restrain Albania's neighbours 
from infringing her frontiers, but within those frontiers it is for the Albanians 
themselves t'o evolve the gov[ernmen]t they require, not for the Powers to force upon 
them an administr[atio]n resting upon foreign bayonets. 

The International Commission of Control was intended to supply the advice and 
experience which was lacking in the native element, and had the Prince invited their 
counsel upon suggestions made to H[is] H[ighness] separately by one or another 
Power, some of the troubles which now beset him might have been avoided. It^ is to 
be hoped that H[is] H[ighness], profiting by experience, may consult the Commission 
more freely in future and thus avail himself of the assistance which the Powers have 
placed at his disposal before finding himself in a position which impels him to ask for 
their armed support. 

In conclusion, I am to point out that the presence of international troops at 
Scutari cannot be held to conflict with the above statement of the relations bet\yeen 
Albania and the Great Powers. Those troops are merely the successors of the sailors 
who were originally landed for the protection of the naval officers who took over 
Scutari from the Montenegrins, and it is only owing to the fact that the Albanian 
Gov[ernmen]t has not yet been able to assume the administration of that town that 
the foreign detachments are still there. As soon as an Albanian governor is 
appointed, and an effective native administration established, the question of definite 
withdrawal of the troops will have to be considered, and meanwhile their duty is 
confined to the one specific purpose of carrying on the local direction of affairs in 
Scutari and Alessio. 

[I am, &c.] 

E[YRE] A. C[ROWE]. 



I 

No. 139. 



Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.C) 
F.O. 29147/28724/14/53. 

(No. 235.) Confidential. Rome, D. June 23, 1914. 

Sir, E. June 29, 1914. 

I have had the honour to report to you by telegraph to-day(^) the substance of 
certain observations made to me by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 
subject of alleged Italian intrigues in Albania, which he understood had met with some 
credence in London. 

I have noticed that for some time past, in fact ever since the deportation of Essad 
and the bombardment of the Albanian Mussulmans who had assembled in the 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King. It was sent to Consul- 
General Lamb (as No. 119) on July 24.] 

(2) [Sir R. Rodd's telegram (No. 103) of June 23, 1914, D. 5-45 p.m., R. 9 p.m., is not repro- 
duced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 28382/28382/14/53.)] 



lt>3 

neighbourhood of Durazzo. the Austrian press has been making such charges against 
Italy, and most especially the " Xeue Freie Presse " has conducted a very outspoken 
and violent campaign against this country. The Italian press has retaliated perhaps 
in rather mild terms, but with very marked resentment of what are described as 
disreputable calumnies. The newspaper war has even gone so far that certain 
publicists have recommended that the incompatibility of \iew between Austria and 
Italy in the Adriatic should be frankly admitted, and that it is of no use going on 
alienating other and older friendships in pursuit of a chimerical reconciliation. My 
Austrian colleague, I am told by one who should have reason to know, is anxious as 
to the relations which are re-establishing themselves, not between the Governments, 
but between the peoples, and the effect they may have on the Triple Alliance. 

Such consistently maintained charges as are levelled against Italian agents in 
Albania can hardly be regarded as altogether imaginary. Indeed the long-standing 
rivalries which are known to have been encouraged in the past between the secret 
agents of Austria and Italy warrant the belief that their effect is still actively 
prevalent, and I have obsen-ed in Mr. Lamb's reports a tendency to suspect some such 
occult Italian intrigues, for which he cannot quite account. It is probable that the 
agents of both rivals are to blame. But at the present time I am disposed to acquit 
the Italian Government of any connivance, and to accept the assurance of the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs that if there had been any such undergi-ound action it is wholly 
unauthorised and disapproved. And this for the following reasons. It is impossible 
to see what interest Italy can have in trying to upset the regime which had been 
established. It might be an object to Austria to see Albania once more in the 
melting-pot, but it can hardly be an object to Italy, whose whole policy there has been 
governed by the fear of Austria, and whose only hope of checking the increase of 
Austrian influence on the opposite shore of the Adriatic has lain in the creation of an 
autonomous Albania. Italy's position is just now a very weak one. She has 
embarrassed her finances and finds difficulty in securing the acceptance of any scheme 
for their rehabilitation. She has brought upon herself the obligation to immobilise a 
large portion of her forces in Africa. Her internal situation is such as to cause serious 
preoccupation. She is in no position to embark on new adventures, and is in constant 
danger of a public exposure of the weakness she has struggled to conceal under a 
parade of sounding words and phrases. Even were she in a position to take more 
direct charge of the situation in Albania, public opinion would be averse fi-om her 
taking action in concert with Austria, and she dare not act against her. The best 
chance for her would be the maintenance of the regime wliich has been established 
with the greatest available accession to it of international support. 

It is therefore almost inconceivable that the Government, who have the best of 
reasons for knowing the weakness of their position, could have given any countenance 
or encouragement to the elements which seem destined to upset conditions which it is 
Italy's obvious interest to uphold. 

I have. &c. 

EEXXELL EODD. 

MIXTTES. 

I have felt all along the difiBculty of seeiDg any ultimate end to account for the 
machinations of Austria and Italy in Albania, but I cannot altogether share Sir R. Rodd's 
acquittal of the Italian Gov[ernmen]t. Their agents may have exceeded their instructions, but 
jealousy and fear of Austrian supremacy in Albania account for Italian intrigues : so long as 
the pot is boiling, no one can be ' top dog ' for very long, but if the pot is taken off the fire 
and allowed to settle, Italy may find herself definitely at the bottom : therefore, keep it on and 
add fresh fuel if necessary. 

G. R. C. 
30-vi-14. 

Surely the explanation is not so very recondite as Sir R. Rodd imagines. There is fairly 
conclusive evidence that the policy of the Italian government, and not only of their agents, 
has all along been to strengthen their own position in Albania by attracting to themselves the 
sympathies of the Mussulmans, who are naturally opposed to the Catholic Albanian party 



124 



leaning on Austria. In supporting the Mussulmans, the Italian gov[ernmen]t have, without 
probably being aware of it, supported the intrigues against the Prince. The Italian agents 
have been either blind to this danger, or have deliberately thought that opposition to the 
Austrian influence in Albania was more important than support of the Prince's government 
and authority. 

E. A. C. 

July 1. 
A. N. 

F. D. A. 
E. G. 



No. 140. 

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.C) 
F.O. 30343/30343/14/53. 

(No. 124.) Confidential. Vienna, D. June 26, 1914. 

Sir, E. July 6, 1914. 

The Servian Minister asked to see me yesterday and we had a conversation about 
Balkan affairs. I referred to an article which had appeared in the ' ' Tagblatt ' ' and 
which evidently took it for granted that the appointment by King Peter of his son as 
Eegent was equivalent to His Majesty's abdication and signified the triumph of the 
Chauvinist military party over those Servian statesmen who desire to keep the 
direction of affairs in the hands of the Civil Power. Monsieur Jovanovitch said there 
was no truth in all this. The King was completely broken in health and was incapable 
of facing, without danger to his life, the anxieties and fatigues of the electoral period 
which is about to be opened in Servia. Prince Alexander was well qualified to deal 
with the situation, and his more vigorous personality was better fitted than that of his 
father, in his present condition, to impress the people and to uphold the prestige of 
the throne through the impending political conflict. It was false to describe Prince 
Alexander as a fire-eater. His Eoyal Highness' political views were entirely sensible 
and moderate, and Monsieur Jovanovitch had had means of assuring himself that he 
sincerely desired a friendly settlement of outstanding questions with Austria-Hungary. 
The King had no idea of abdicating and had merely thought that the interests of the 
throne could be best secured by his temporary retirement behind the scene. 

Monsieur Jovanovitch said his Government was painfully interested in the recent 
developments in Albania. The trouble had arisen from the dissensions between the 
Italians and the Austrians. Whatever the two Governments might say, the truth was 
that the two nations had each of them aimed at getting the upper hand in Albania at 
the expense of the other. On both sides the idea prevailed that money was to be made 
in Albania and that the prize was for the most enterprising and the most audacious. 
A game of grab ensued, with the natural result that each of the two nationalities 
intrigued against the other, that the task of setting up a Government was rendered 
impossible, and that a state of anarchy was produced in the interior which threatened 
to pervade the whole country. Albania had been created to stave off war between 
Austria and Eussia, the latter country acquiescing in the rejection of the Servians 
from Durazzo on condition that an international State should take the place of Servia 
on the Adriatic coast. Now Austria and Italy were at loggerheads, and they would 
probably remain so as long as present arrangements with regard to Albania remained 
in force. How much better it would have been to allow Servia in the north and Greece 
in the south to undertake the task of governing Albania. But neither Austria nor 
Italy would hear of such a combination at present. Monsieur Jovanovitch wondered 
if the time would not come when they would see that the only way of avoiding a war 
between themselves over Albania is to allow Servia and Greece to take it over. From 
the Austrian point of view this would surely be a most desirable arrangement. Servia 

(') [This despatch was sent to Bucharest and to Belgrade.] 



125 



would be satisfied with gaining unhampered access to the sea. She would no longer be 
the enemv. Her energies would be concentrated on commercial expansion and internal 
reform, and she would cease casting her eyes beyond the Austro-Hungarian frontier. 
He knew that Austria was not yet educated up to this point, but it should be easy to 
reassure her. The Sen-ian and Greek Adriatic ports could be neutralised by an 
international compact. They would be made incapable of serving any but a commercial 
purpose. The fear that Russia would use them as naval stations would thus be 
removed. The danger of the mouth of the Adriatic being bottled up would be for ever 
eliminated. The principal bone of contention between Austria and Italy would 
disappear. The Albanian experiment having now hopelessly broken down, 
Monsieur Jovanovitch could not help indulging in these dreams of the future. But 
Servia believed in her ultimate destiny and would do nothing to precipitate events. 
Time was surely working for her. and she was content to wait. 

The French Ambassador tells me that he is hearing \-iews similar to the above 
expressed by others besides the Servian ^finister, and indeed it is not unnatural that 
people's minds should be casting about for an alternative to the scheme de%-ised under 
Austrian and Italian pressure in the London Conference of Ambassadors,!- in the event 
of that scheme proving ultimately to be hopelessly unworkable. Monsieur Dumaine 
has heard lately, from a Prussian source on which he relies, a good deal concerning the 
\-isit of the Emperor of Russia to Co[n]stantza. Roumania appears to have spared no 
effort to show in a worthy manner her appreciation of this act of Imperial favour. If 
His Excellency's informant is not mistaken, 4.300,000 francs were spent by the 
Roumanian Government on buildings and entertainments. But Roumania had not 
been seduced from the dominant position which she claimed to occupy as the Power 
best placed to control the destinies of the Balkan nations. She would be the ally of 
neither Russia nor the Triple Alliance. She had everything to gain from independence 
of either group of Powers. In the event of a great war, if Russia won she would gain 
Transylvania and the Bukowina ; if Germany and Austria won, she would regain 
Bessarabia. She had no intention of blindly upholding the results of the peace of 
Bucharest. It was already clear that much of that piece of work required amending. 
But nothing should be done without her consent. She was already thinking of the 
advantage to be derived from a possible partition of Albania. By gi\"ing Sen'ia an 
outlet to the sea, it would become possible to satisfy Bulgaria with a slice of Macedonia. 
Arrangements in short could be made which would enable the Balkan States to settle 
down peacefully and contentedly side by side. 

After hearing Monsieur Dumaine "s speculations to the above effect, I told His 
Excellency, who had not yet heard of the Austro-Italian proposal in question, that a 
scheme was under consideration which, if it proved practicable, might yet result in 
bolstering up the Prince of Albania for some time longer, namely the suggestion that 
a native Albanian force should be recruited and trained by officers of the international 
forces at Scutari. His Excellency thought the scheme worth trying, if only for the 
reason that if it should unfortunately fail, the Powers could no longer be reproached 
with any appearance of justice for lea^-ing the Prince whom they had set up in the 
lurch. 

I have. &c. 

MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 

(-) [cp. supra, p. 1, Ed. note.] 

(*) [Sir R. Rodd's telegram CSo. 100) of June 22, 1914, had reported the proposal for the 
formation of an Albanian militia organized by the ofi&cers of the international force already at 
Scutari. The proposal had been made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to that of Italv. 
(F.O. 27933 33 14 -53.) In Sir Edward Grey s telegram (.No. 97) of June 2.5, 1914. D. 6 p.m., 
he enquired the views of Consul-General Lamb and Colonel Phillips. (F.O. 28830/33/14/53.1 
Sir Edward Grey informed Colonel Phillips, in his telegram (No. 17) of July 16, 1914, D. 7 p.m., 
that the question of financial support alone delaved the formation of such a force, although 
the Powers had agreed. (F.O. 32457/33/14/53.)] " 



12G 



No. 141. 

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.Ci 

F.O. 32186/22521/ 14/53. ^ ^ ^ 

(No 152^ ' Durazzo, D. July U, 1914. 

^Q-^^' E. July 16, 1914. 

' As I had the honour of reporting to you in my telegram No. 152(') of this 
afternoon, the Prince of Albania yesterday evening invited to the Palace the Mmisters 
of the four Great Powers that are diplomatically represented here and made to them, 
from written notes, a statement in which he ascribed the present hopeless situation of 
the country in the first place to the failure of the Powers to settle the question of 
Epirus in accordance with their own decisions and subsequently to their unwillingness 
to assist him in his successive difficulties, winding up with an appeal to them to urge 
their respective Governments to afford him adequate financial and military support 
and also to compel the Greek Government to evacuate the territories, ascribed by the 
Powers themselves to Albania, which its forces, avowed or unavowed, have usurped. 

I understand that Mukid Bey, as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the 
absence of Turkiian Pasha, (^) was"' intended to have made to my Russian colleague 
and to myself a similar communication on the part of the Prince, but Mufid, having 
resigned later in the evening, on the pretext that he had not been summoned to be 
present at this important colloquium with the foreign representatives, either did not 
receive these instructions in time or did not think it necessary to act on them. 

His Highness does not appear to have made any direct allusion to his intention 
of abdicating in the event of no satisfactory reply being received from the Powers, but 
it is generally understood that this will be the inevitable result. 

I am confidentially informed by Admiral Troubridge that the Prince detained 
Herr von Lucius, when the other three Ministers took leave of him, and asked him 
what he thought he ought to do. Herr von Lucius replied that, speaking not as 
German [Minister but merely for himself as a German, he did not see what remained 
for the Prince to do but to go, to which the latter replied that he would be glad enough 
to do so, if he had anywhere to go to, implying that he felt himself unable to return 
to Potsdam. 

I have, &c. 

HARRY H. LAM}} 

P.S. — I am indebted to the courtesy of the Austrian Legation for the annexed copy 
of the Prince's notes which were communicated to the four Ministers at the conclusion 
of the audience above reported. 

[H. H. L.J 

Enclosure in No. 141. 

Notes of the appeal made by the Prince of Albania lo the foreign representatives for 

transmission to their governments. 

Vous savez que les Epirotes ont pris Korytza et sont avances sur toute la ligne 
vers le Nord. Les Gouvernements des Puissances par lesquels je suis designe comme 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 

(2) [Consul-General Lamb's telegram (No. 152), D. July 11, R. July 12, 1914, is not repro- 
duced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. It was repeated to all the Embassies, 
with instructions to ascertain the views of the governments to which they were accredited. 
(F.O. 31512/22521/14/53.) Sir H. llumbold, in his telegram (No. 84) of July 14, 1914, expressed 
the general view that nothing could be done for the Prince of Albania beyond hastening the 
formation of the Bank in order to give the Prince more money. The Great Powers had sent 
ships but could not all agree to send troops. The Austro-Hungarian and Italian Governments 
were anxious to prevent arms from reaching the insurgents by sea. The revolt at Epirus was 
stated to be the most serious feature of the situation. (F.O. 32001/22521/14/53.)] 

(3) [v. supra, p. 117, Ed. note.] 



127 



Prince de ce pays et qui m'ont toutes promis leur secours, avaient neutralise I'Albanie 
en fixant ses frontieres. Des mon arrivee ici, j'ai eu des difficultes avec I'Epire qui 
etait encore occupe par les Grecs. Sur les conseils des Grandes Puissances, I'Albanie 
a fait des concessions aux Epirotes et remettant enfin la cause entre les mains de la 
Commission de Controle/^l a accepte I'arrangement de Corfou par lequel les Epirotes 
ont recu de grands avantages. Pour ne pas etre sans force armee contre les bandes en 
Epire. I'Albanie a essave de reunir quelques milices suivant les conseils de quelques 
Grandes Puissances. Le rassemblement des milices dans le centre de I'Albanie a ete 
exploite par quelques puissances etrangeres pour - organiser une revoke contre le 
Gouvernement pour empecher une action energique dans le Sud. Ainsi paralyse des 
le debut par la cause de I'Epire qui etait soutenu par la Grece, le Gouvernement n'a 
pu faire aucun travail dans le pays et a du depenser son argent pour defendre ses 
frontieres garanties par les Grandes Puissances. Maintenant Zographos profitant 
des diflBcultes interieures a attaque et pris Korytza quoique nous eussions conclu 
un armistice. Je suis persuade que I'Albanie en quelques annees aurait atteint un 
grand developpement. mais des Puissances etrangeres I'ont empeche. Pour avoir une 
periode de paix il faut de I'argent et des troupes etrangeres. C'est pourquoi je vous 
prie d'insist:r aupres de vos gouvernements pour I'emprunt qu'on m'avait promis et 
pour I'envoi des troupes Internationales ou roumaines et de faire une pression sur la 
Grece pour qu'elle retire ses troupes de I'Epire et force Zographos a accepter 
I'accord de Corfou et de renvoyer les bandes grecques qui ont encore dernierement 
incendie plusieurs villages albanais. 
Le Prince a ajoute : 

Si les Grandes Puissances s'empressent de nous accorder ces secours, nous aurons 
dans peu de temps I'ordre dans le pays et on pourra recommencer a travailler. Comme 
les autres pays balcaniques ont eu des secours materiels des Grandes Puissances pour 
se developper, I'Albanie en a aussi besoin. 

(*) [cp. supra, p. 103, Xo. 118; pp. llS-9. Xo. 136, and note (3).] 



[ED. yOTE.—On July 23 Consul-General Lamb in his despatch (No. 163) reported a letter 
addressed by the Shiak insurgents to the Representatives of the Six Great Powers, dated 
July 22, which was practically an ultimatum to the Prince of Albania. All the delegates to 
the Commission of Control, except the Austro-Hungarian, considered that the Prince should 
withdraw, nominally for a time, leaving the Regencv in the hands of the International 
Commission. (F.O. "34497/32945/14/53.^ 

The work of the Commission wa? interrupted by the outbreak of war. v. Gooch cfc 
Temperley, Vol. XI, p. 307. Xo. 574. Consul-General Lamb, the last to go, was withdrawn on 
August 12. (F.O. 35441/34335/14/53.) The Prince was expected to leave the country on 
August 31 (F.O. 45063/352 14/53), and he actually arrived in Venice on September 5. 
(F.O. 46312/33901/14/53; 46317/33901/14/ 53.) 

Later in the vear Essad Pasha was elected President and Commander-in-Chief in Albania. 
(F.O. 61672/44754/14/53,)] 



No. 142. 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Akers-Douglas.{^) 

F.O. 33459/29582/14/53. 
(No. 36. i 

Sir, Foreign Office, July 21, 1914. 

M. Take .Tonesco came to see me to-day. He informed me that he had seen the 
King of Eoumania and the Prime Minister. They did not wish to send Roumanian 
troops to Albania, but they were afraid that Albania might disturb the peace of 

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 



128 



Europe, and thev would send troops if the Powers would address a request to them 
to do so.(') Tt would, however, be essential that the Powers should each send 100 or 
50 men of their own. to give the force an international appearance. Otherwise, the 
Prince of Wied being related to the King of Eoumania, it would look as if the sending 
of Roumanian troops was a dynastic affair. Eoumania could send troops only if it 
was clear that it was European international action that required them to be sent. 
He spoke with great anxiety of what might happen between Austria and Servia, and 
of the danger of Albania embroiling things. 

I explained to him our reluctance to send British troops into Albania. I said that 
two Powers, Germany and Russia, would certainly not send any: and I asked him 
whether it would be' sufficient for Roumania if Austria and Italy each sent 100 or 
50 men. 

He replied that Roumania would certainly not send troops if only these two 
Powers sent some. It would be essential that at least we and France should send 
troops, as well as Austria and Kaly. He said that we had been quite right in agreeing 
to the creation of an autonomous Albania, as it was really the price of peace. Though 
many people did not believe it, he was convinced that Austria would have gone to war 
during the Balkan crisis if the creation of an Albanian State had not been agreed to. 

I said that this was why we had willingly consented to the creation of Albania. 
We had no special interests of our own in Albania, and we had feared that Albania 
would be very troublesome. My view was that it was for Austria and Italy — to whose 
wish alone the creation of the State of Albania was due — to deal with the troubles 
there. 

M. Take Jonesco admitted the logic of this, but he said that, in the first place, 
there was danger of Italy and Austria falling out between themselves. 

I admitted this to be a drawback, for it would lead to trouble in Europe. 

M. Take Jonesco said that, in the second place, even if Austria and Italy came to 
an agreement as to their action in Albania — which he thought not impossible — the fact 
of Austria occupying the northern part of Albania and thus stretching further round 
Servia would be sure to make difficulties with Servia. 

I said that, for the moment, Austrian feeling against Servia was so embittered 
since the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand that the question of what demand 
Austria might make upon Servia, without any reference to Albania, overshadowed any 
possible risks that were inherent in the Albanian question. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 

(2) [On July 6 a suggestion was received from Austria-Hungary and Italy that Rumania 
should send 3,000 troops to keep order in Albania. (F.O. 30577/29582/14/53.) Herr von 
Bethmann Hollweg was reported to agree. (F.O. 30927/29582/14/53.)] 



No. 143. 

Sir Edxcard Grey to Consul-Gcneral Lamb.{^) 
F.O. 34835/34835/14/53. 

Tel. (No. 122.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914, 4-50 p.m. 

I have informed Powers that H.M.S. " Defence " and the British destroyer now 
at Durazzo have been authorized to rejoin fleet and that in view of Austrian 
declaration of war on Servia and of possibility of complications that may involve 

(1) [A copy of this telegram was sent to the Admiralty and to the War OflSce.] 



129 



Montenegro. H[is] M[ajestv's] G[overnment] have decided to withdraw Col[onel] 
Phillips and the British detachment from Scutari.(') 

Admiral Troubridge and Col[onel] Phillips are being informed accordingly. (^) 

Conf [identiajl. 

I presume that Austria and Italy will retain sufficient naval strength at Durazzo 
to protect persons of Prince and of International Commission and their staffs, but in 
the contrary event you are enjoined to leave Durazzo with your Assistant either on 
one of the foreign men-of-war or by Italian or Austrian steamer, as may be most 
convenient or readily available. 

(2) [cp. Gooch d- Temperhy, Vol. XI. p. 196, No. 308.] 

(3) [Sir Edward Grey's telegram (No. 20) to Colonel Phillips of July 30, 1914, D. 2-30 p.m., 
directed him to hand over his Governorship to the next senior foreign officer. The troops were 
withdrawn to Malta. (F.O. 34835/34835/14/53.)] 

(*) [cp. Gooch cfc Temperhy, Vol. XI, p. 313, No. 591.] 



[8959] 



130 



CHAPTER LXXXV. 
THE ^GEAN ISLANDS. 

[ED. NOTE— The subject of this chapter is treated in G.P., XXXVI (II), pp. 425-594, 
Chapter 281, and pp. 749-847, Chapter 283; cp. also Imperialismus, Vols. I-III.] 

No. 144. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.^) 

F.O. 37555/13799/13/44. 
(No. 507.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, August 12, 1913. 

The French and Itahan Ambassadors called to see me this morning,(^) and 
informed me that their Governments both agreed to -the following formula respecting 
the ^gean Islands at present occupied by Italy : — 

Lorsque, conformement a la premiere partie de la declaration italienne du 
5 aout,(') I'article 2 du traite de Lausanne aura ete integralement execute par les deux 
parties contractantes, les six Grandes Puissances se prononceront sur I'attribution du 
Dodecanese et prendront d'un commun accord entre elles la decision a ce sujet. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. It 
was repeated to Rome (No. 205).] 

(2) [M. Paul Cambon's account of the conversation is given in D.D.F., S""' Ser., Vol. VIII, 
pp. 25-7, No. 20.] 

(3) [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), p. 954, No. 1202; cp. also ibid., pp. 1066-7. App. V.] 



No. 145. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.C) 

F.O. 37556/13799/13/44. 
(No. 206.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, August 12, 1913. 

Yesterday, in the course of conversation with the Italian Ambassador, I pointed 
out what a difficult situation would arise if the fulfilment of the Treaty of Lausanne 
was indefinitely delayed by the Turks, and Italy therefore remained indefinitely in 
occupation of some of the Mgean Islands. I thought that it might become necessary 
to propose some fixed date by which, if Turkey did not fulfil the Treaty of Lausanne, 
Italy and the other Powers in consultation should decide the fate of the Islands. 

The Ambassador assured me that it was a matter of good faith on the part of 
Italy to abandon the Islands. lie would pledge himself in every possible way that she 
would do so ; and, if she did not, it would be impossible for him to stay in London. 

To-day he informed me that he had reported to his Government what I had said 
about the possibility of fixing a date. He implored me not to press any thing at the 
moment, but he had impressed upon his Government that, now that an agreement had 
been come to about southern Albania, they must be under no mistake as to the 
positive nature of British views with regard to the ^gean Islands. He urged very 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 



131 

strongly that I should not say too much in public in my speech this afternoon in the 
House of Commons. 

I said that something was due to British public opinion, and I must deal with the 
matter a? best I could. 

[I am. itc] 

E. G[BEY]. 

(-) [v. Pari. Deh.. 5th Ser., (House of Commons), Vol. 56, pp. 2285-7. cp. immediately 
succeeding document, note (-).] 



No. 146. 

.Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.^ 

F.O. 41973/106/lR 44. 

(No. 239.) Rome, D. September 8, 1913. 

Sir, E. September 13, 1913. 

I have the honour to report that as the Minister for Foreign Affairs had 
expressed a desire to see me, and was himself unable to leave Fiuggi owing to a 
somewhat severe attack of gout, I motored there this morning and saw His Excellency 
as well as the President of the Council who is also undergoing a cure. 

The ^Nfarquis di San Giuliano was apparently under the impression that I was 
lea\"ing in the course of the next few days for England and had therefore wished to 
put certain matters before me for personal communication to you. As, however, 
should leave be granted to me, I had not contemplated leaving Italy for at least 
another fortnight, T will also place his obsei^vations on record. 

He said it was once more the question of the islands which preoccupied him. 
He was ready to repeat for the twentieth time in the most formal manner possible 
that Italy had no intention of retaining any one of the islands now occupied for herself, 
neither Rhodes nor Stampaiia nor any other. "^Miat she had undertaken to do she 
would abide by. 

He hoped and felt you were comnnced of the sincerity of the declarations made 
to you by the Italian Ambassador in London, confirming those which had been made 
at the Embassy here. 

But there was one point on which he felt a certain nervousness. The Enghsh 
mentality was different from the Italian. Englishmen took words at their face value. 
Italians read subtle intentions and significances into phrases, and he was haunted by 
the dread of some misapprehension arising which might have the very consequences, 
which it was his greatest object to avoid, namely to occasion a feelmg of irritation 
between the two nations owing to the excessive susceptibilities of the Italian people. 
He wished to appeal to me to place his views before you, because I knew what that 
Italian mentality was. and he thought that in all probability you, accustomed to deal 
with the simple and direct mind of the English, might not have reaUsed how readily 
a word, which in itself, and as used by an Englishman, meant no more than its literal 
signification implied, might become a stumbUng block and a cause of offence to the 
excitable Italian. 

I then gathered that he was under the impression that there would be an autumn 
session of Parliament, in which he apprehended, through a question or owing to the 
necessity of declaring policy, some ofi&cial statement might have to be made regardint^ 
the islands. On this point I was able to reassure him and explained that ParUamenl 
would not meet again before next year. 

He then returned to the matter under discussion, and said what he was especially 
anxious to secure was, that in any public statement which might have to be made, 
nothing should be said which could possibly be interpreted here as imphing pressure 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet A 
copy was sent to the Admiralty on September 19, 1913.] 

[8959] K 2 



132 



or menace, in regard to the islands. The Itahan Government had open y decia red 
their intentions, and any utterance which appeared to suggest doubts as to their 
loyalty in abiding by them would give serious offence and might compromise the good 
understanding which it was his special aim to maintain. I must have seen how 
certain Italian papers had endeavoured to represent that your speech at the close o 
the session had been intended to convey a sort of warning to Italy.^) The Government 
had endeavoured to correct public opinion on that point, but the lact that it had been 
raised showed how verv susceptible opinion was m this respect. 

He therefore hoped if the subject came up agam due consideration would be 
given to these susceptibilities in making any public announcement and that it might 
be found sufficient, if in the meantime circumstances had not changed, to say that 
there was nothing to add to your statement. He had in view of the recent utterances 
of certain journals advocating a revision of policy in view of subsequent events, 
discussed with the President of the Council wliether anythmg more should be said 
here on the subject. But Signor Giolitti had decided that no notice should be taken 
of these newspaper politicians. No serious importance need m his opinion be 
attributed to their views and there was no doubt that Signor Giolitti understood the 
feeling of the country and took his decisions in accordance with his experience. He 
had stated in the Chamber the intentions of the Government, and was firmly resolved 

to abide by them. . ^ . , . . -r> • j ^ r 

After I had seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs I paid a visit to the President ot 
the Council. Signor Giolitti was no doubt aware of what his colleague had intended 
to say to me and himself in the course of conversation introduced the question. 
He said he was at a loss to understand why it was assumed in certain quarters that 
Italy contemplated evading her undertakings, and he referred especially to the 
insistence of the French press in this respect. He had declared his policy once for 
all in the Chamber when the question had been raised as to what the future of the 
islands would be. He had then said that Italy had no intention of retaining any of 
them; the population was entirely Greek, and the last thing he would contemplate 
would be to give occasion for a current of Hellenic irredentism directed against Italy. 
He had never gone back and had no intention of going back on what he had then 
announced. The Treaty of Lausanne had provided for their restitution to Turkey 
before the Balkan war 'broke out, before there was any question of the transfer of 
Ottoman territory to Greece. Circumstances had caused and might continue to cause 
inevitable delay, but Italy was bound by her treaty obligations. 

I was very glad to have received so categorical a statement from Signor Giolitti 
on the subject, who is a man of his word and one who weighs carefully the significance 
of any announcement which he makes. So long therefore as he remains in control of 
public affairs in Italy, whether directly or indirectly, we may I think rest assured 
that there will be no revision of policy. Other valid reasons have now manifested 
themselves to explain evident efforts which Italy is making to secure the good will and 
friendship of Turkey, as in so doing she is not only associating herself with the policy 
of her German ally, but she hopes to obtain valuable commercial concessions. I am 
therefore now disposed to think that there is no necessity to connect these efforts with 
any ambition to secure the permanent retention by a bargain with Turkey of an 
island as a naval station, a possibility to which I referred in my despatch No. 229 
Confidential of the second instant.(^) In coming to the above conclusions I do not 
think that Italian statesmen have adopted this attitude altogether willingly, but they 
are, I believe, convinced that any other course would meet with strong opposition from 

(^) [The speech made in the House of Commons on August 12, contained the statement 
that "the destiny of these ^gean Islands — all of them including those in the temporary 
possession of Italj'- — is a matter which concerns all the Great Powers, and must be settled 
eventually by them and no Great Power is to retain one of these islands for itself." Pari. 
J)eh , 5th Ser.. (House of Commons), Vol. 56, p. 2286. cp. M. Paul Cambon's comment, D.D.F., 
3""= Ser., Vol. VIII, pp. 29-31, No. 24.] 

(3) [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 1000-1, No. 1255.] 



133 



Great Britain and France, and they have therefore thought it more prudent to take 
the initiative in disavowing any intention of doing what they reahse would bring them 
into inevitable conflict with those Powers. 

Under these circumstances I submit that it may be politic, in the interests of good 
relations, to give due consideration to the appeal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
that nothing may be said which could be interpreted here as implying any doubt as 
to the loyalty of Italian declarations, or as suggesting the exercise of pressure which 
the susceptibility of Italians might regard as humiliating. 

I have. iSrc. 

RENNELL EODD. 



MINUTES. 

These declarations are categorical enough to allay our fears and those of the French, but 
I still feel that Italy will delay acting on them on some pretext or other. 

If she shows a disposition to act in good faith there will be no necessity for any warnings 
in Parliament, but if not I do not see why we should undertake to spare her susceptibilities 
bv silence. 

H. N. 

Sept [ember] 13, 1913. 

These assurances will give H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overninent] a stronger position than they 
have occupied since the adoption of the Italian formula by the ambassadors' conference. That 
being so. we may well reserve any declaration or remonstrance until the occasion arises, that is 
until a delay to evacuate becomes a flagrant evasion of the Italian undertaking. 

It is a pity that the published declarations of the Italian gov[ernmen]t are not equally 
explicit as their confidential assurances. According to the ofi&cial " communique " published by 
them on Sept[ember] 8 (See 41972), (^) Italy claims to have retained "full liberty of action . . . . 
in accordance with the decisions taken at the conference in London.'' 

E. A. C. 

Sept [ember] 15. 
E. G. 

(■•) [Not reproduced, as the subject of the communique is sufiBciently indicated above. 
(F.O. 41972/106/13/44.)] 



No. 147. 

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edivard Grei/.^) 

Paris, September 9, 1913. 

F.O. 41560/106/13/44. D. 4 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 126.) Confidential. E. 9 p.m. 

French Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me this morning about the .£gean 
islands occupied by Italy. He asked whether 1 had any information as to the 
intentions of the Italians. I said that I had none, and upon my asking him whether 
he had, he replied that he had information (wliich) came from London and Italian 
newspapers which had the appearance of a desire on the part of the Italian Government 
to evade withdrawal, and the French consul at Rhodes reported that the proceedings 
of the Italians there denoted a permanent stay. 

French Minister for Foreign Affairs asked what would be your attitude, supposing 
that Italian Government, on the plea of the pressure of public opinion in Italy or on 
some other pretext, failed to withdraw from the islands. He wished me to enquire. 

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Military 
Operations] 



134 



MINUTES. 

The French feel very strongly about this question and will be quite willing to take the , 
initiative. We could back them up and doubtless Russia, whose flirtation with Italy appears 
to be over, would do the same. 

H. N. 

I am afraid we are not in a strong position. The ambassadors' conference adopted the ' 
following resolution(2) : — 

" Lorsque, conformement a la premiere partie de la declaration italienne du 5 aout, j 
I'article 2 du Traite dc Lausanne aura ete integralement execute par les deux parties ' 
contractantes, les six Grandes Puissances se prononceront sur I'attribution du Dodecanese 
et prendront d'un commun accord entre elles la decision a ce sujet." 

If, for some reason, the Turkish gov[ernmen]t play into Italy's hand by delaying the 
withdrawal of the remnant of the Turkish forces from Tripoli, the Italians will have a perfectly 
good legal case if they meanwhile retain the islands. I do not see how in these circumstances 
we can expect to dislodge them except by the threat, and if necessary the actual use, of force. 

The only means that seem otherwise open to us to use pressure would be to work upon the 
Turks and insist, in the interest of a definite settlement essential to the peace of Europe, that 
the Turkish officers or troops must be withdrawn at once. But it is very doubtful whether we 
have the power to drive the Turks into any such action. Failing this there is nothing to do 
but to wait, unless France and England were to decide to occupy other islands at once and 
declare their determination not to evacuate them unless and until Italy on her part gives up 
her islands. 

E. A. C. 

Sept [ember] 10. 

The question is a very complex one. It is fairly clear that Italy will not evacuate all the 
islands — notwithstanding previous protestations. We asserted our intention over and over 
again to evacuate Egypt and have never done so and will not do so. Italy w[oul]d plead force 
of cir[cumstan]ces, &c., and will remain in Ehodes or one or two other islands. We could not 
make a casus belli of it. 

I think eventually we shall have to recognise the permanent occupation of one or two 
islands, and it w[oul]d to my mind be well to ascertain carefully from Adniir[alt]y on what 
conditions such recognition could be accorded. As to M. Pichon's direct enquiry we might say 
we should like to exchange views and ask what his are.(^) 

A. N. 

(2) \v. Gooch ct Temperhii, Vol. TX (11). pp. 1066-7, App. V; v. also supra, p. 130, Xo. 144, 
and note (^).] 

(3) [v. immediately succeeding document.] 



No. 148. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. C) 

F.O. 41560/106/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 332.) Foreign Office, September 13, 1913, 2-15 p.m. 

Your tel[egrara] No. 126. (=) 

I do not intend to let the matter drop. I shall take it up with Italian Ambassador, 
who has given very explicit assurances on the subject, on his return to London, and if 
no progress is made I shall point out that Italy is apparently by cultivating cordial 
relations with Turkey while Turkey's engagements as regards Tripoli remain 
unfulfilled, acquiescing in non-fulfilment of those engagements. This w^ill be in 
practice collusion between Italy and Turkey to enable former to remain in the Islands. 

I must consult Prime Minister and ray colleagues when we re-assemble after the 
holidays as to what our attitude should be if Italy indefinitely prolongs her 
occupation.(^) 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Rome (Xo. 264).] 

(2) [v. immediately preceding document.] 

(^) [Note by Sir Edward Grey: " (I cannot say more than this at the present moment, 
but there will be trouble if Italy does not evacuate and I will discuss the question with 
Sir A. Nicolson and Sir E. Crowe when I return to London). E. G."] 



185 



No. 149. 

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 

F.O. 42851/106/13 44. 

(No. 468.1 Confidential. Paris, D. Septemler 17, 1913. 

Sir, E. September 19, 1913. 

Monsieur Pichon has been absent from Paris and only returned late last night. 

I saw His Excellency by appointment this morning(- and informed him that, as he 
had desired. I had made enquiry of you as to what would be your attitude supposing 
that the Italian Government on the plea of the pressure of public opinion in Italy or 
on some other pretext failed to withdraw from the J:Igean Islands. 

I told His Excellency that you had replied (see your telegram No. 332 of 
September 13th that you did not intend to let the matter drop; that the Italian 
Ambassador had given very explicit assurances on the subject, and on his return to 
London, you would revert to the subject, and. if matters had not advanced, you would 
point out that if, while Turkey had not fulfilled her engagements as regards Tripoli 
Italy cultivated cordial relations with Turiiey and thereby apparently acquiesced in 
the non-fulfilment of Turkish pledges it would amount to collusion between Italy and 
Turkey in order to enable Italy to remain in the islands. I further stated to M. Pichon 
that you would consult with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet after the holidays as 
to what attitude should be adopted by His Majesty's Government were Italy to prolong 
indefinitely her occupation of the Islands. 

M. Pichon %s-ished me to thank you for the communication which I had made to 
him with which he expressed himself as quite satisfied. He felt sure he said that if 
England and France continued their representations and made a firm stand as regards 
the question, Italy would end by carrying out her engagements to evacuate the 
Islands, 

M. Pichon has no information which would lead him to think that Germany and 
Austria are encouraging Italy to keep one or more of the Islands. 

I have. &c. 

FRANCIS BEETIE. 

MINITE. 

Since our tel[egram] Xo. 332(3) to Paris the Italian Gfov[ernmen]t have again given 
explicit assurances.(^) 

H. X. 

Sept [ember] 19. 1913. 
R. P. M. 

Sept [ember] 19/13. 
E. A. C. 

Sept [ember] 19. 
E. G. 

(}) [This telegram is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. A 
copv was sent to the Admiraltv.] 

"(2) [cp. D.D.F., 3" ' Sir.. Vol. VIII, pp. 205-6, No. 159.] 
(') [p. immediately preceding document.] 
(*) [cp. supra, pp. 131-3, Xo. 146.] 

(^) TMr. Bering's despatch (Xo. 244), D. September 13, R. September 16, 1913. mentions 
an official denial of any desire to annex the islands, published by the Stefani Agency in the 
Popolo Bomano on the i3th. (F.O. 42447/106/13/44.)] 

No. 150. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. EUiot.C) 

F.O. 44596/33220/13/44. 
(No. 113.) 

Sir, Foreign Omce. September 27, 1913. 

The King of Greece came to the Foreign Ofi&ce to-day, and spoke to me with 
anxiety about Greek relations with Turkey. His whole apprehension of trouble arose 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 



136 



from Turkish designs upon the ^Egean Islands, especially Mytilene and Chios. There 
was news that the Turks were preparing an expedition. The trouble arose from the 
dilatory methods of the Powers, who had undertaken to settle the question of the 
Islands, and had not done so. 

As he seemed desirous to know what prospect there was of the Powers setthng 
the matter, I observed that the latest decision of the Powers had been that the 
^Egean Islands were to go to Greece, with the exception of Tenedos and Imbros, and 
also the exception of the islands in the occupation of Italy, as to the final destiny of 
which the Powers had reserved their decision. I could not say that the Powers were 
likely to take any active steps in the way of intervention the Concert of Europe had 
throughout shown great reluctance to intervene by force in any thing. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 



[EB. NOTE. — The King and Queen of Greece were on a visit to England from September 17 
to September 30, 1913. The King paid a visit to Paris on September 21, and on his way home. 
cp. D B F., 3™^ Sir., Vol. VIII, pp. 291-2, No. 228 ; p. 307, No. 241 ; pp. 310-1, No. 244.] 



No. 151. 

Mr. Bering to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 47102/47102/13/44. Rome, D. October 15, 1913, 8-50 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 178.) R- October 16, 1913, 8 a.m. 

My immediately preceding telegram. (M 

Indirectly when speaking of Italian projects at Adalia (group omitted : M[inister 
for] F[oreign] A[ffairs]) alluded in half-apologetic manner to fact that Italy, like 
Germany, was a new nation and had come late into the field of spheres of influence 
in (group omitted : ? countries) bordering on Mediterranean. He likened her to 
unexpected guest at dinner for whom space must perforce be made and said that I 
should quite realize her legitimate desire for expansion of her commercial interests. 
It was Italy's desire to maintain territorial status quo in Asia Minor which he hoped 
would not be disturbed. He then referred to conversations which had been almost on 
the point of beginning both here with Sir R. Rodd and in London with the Italian 
Ambassador with regard to mutual understanding between the two (gr[ou]p omitted : 
? countries) on Mediterranean questions.(^) These conversations it was true had not 
got far because so many urgent events had cropped up for instance in the Balkans 
which had required immediate attention, but he was inclined to think that there was 
no reason now why they should not soon be renewed. I said I would report his 
remarks to you. I gathered from H[is] E[xcellency']s manner that he is ? very 
desirous that there should be no question which could in any way cause friction 
between Great Britain and Italy in Mediterranean, and could not but feel that he 
might be paving the way for these conversations in order to see if he could not get 
us to alter our attitude about Rhodes and Stampalia. If this supposition were in any 
way well founded it might be well to encourage H[is] E[xcellency] to speak out and 
let us see what is at back of his mind. 

MINUTES. 

I should have thought Italj-, by her seizure of Tripoli, had done pretty well for herself 
as regards "countries bordering on the Mediterranean." Western Dep[artmen]t as to 
Mediterranean understanding with Italy.(2) 

Mr. Vansittart as to islands. 

(1) [Mr. Bering's telegram (No. 177) of October 15, 1913, D. 8-15 p.m., R. 10-30 p.m., refers 
to Italian Railway projects at Adalia. Mr. Bering was assured that the Italian project would 
not encroach on any concessions in the region, and that, if it did, it would be modified to suit 
all parties. (F.O. 46976/39484/13/44.)] 

(2) [This subject will be treated in Gooch <& Temperley, Vol. X (II).] 



137 



If room has to be made for Italy in regard to railway enterprise in Asiatic Turkey it can 
hardly be expected that this should be done at the expense of the only remaining British 
railwav in Turkev. 

A P. 

Oct[ober] 16, 1913. 

The Italians have given us the most categorical assurances about the islands. It w[oul]d 
be rash to believe them. It is most important that the Italians sh[oul]d not keep Stanipalia. 
If the Italians have the arriere pensee that seems probable, it w[oul]d certainly be well if we 
c[oul]d find it out for certain. 

R. G. V. 

Oct[ober] 16. 

The position as to the proposed " North African " agreement is that Sir R. Rodd was 
told in February last that if the Italian M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] raised the question 
again he might tentatively put forward the draft formula we have drawn up. (.See print 
section in 1487 '13. H"'^ The Italians have never referred to the subject again until now, but 
we feared in March that if they were pressed on the subject then, they might wish to mix the 
question of the .?]gean Islands with it and perhaps that of the coast of Asia Minor (see 
11261 13. )(*) It appears that they are still likely to try to do so and we must be careful to 
keep the two questions separate. 

D. 

16.X.13. 

It is fairly clear that the Italians wish to mix up the questions of the Xorth African 
agreement and the -£gean Islands so as to make their consent to the former conditional on 
a modification of our attitude on the latter or in regard to the Adalian project. It should, 
I think, be made quite clear that we consider the Xorth African agreement question one that 
stands quite by itself and that, though we are at any time ready to discuss it, we shall do so 
quite independently of any other subject. 

I venture to add that when Sir R. Rodd mooted the idea in April. 1912,(5'> it was under 
the shadow of the renewal of the Triple Alliance and its possible extension to the Medi- 
terranean. Since then the Alliance has been renewed and not extended, and the conclusion 
of a North African agreement has therefore lost much of its first importance for us. 
See minutes on 46976. 

G. R. C. 
1610.13. 

The agreement never had any real value for us and we should be making a very bad 
bargain if we were to make any concessions on any point merely in order to get such au 
agreement, which, if concluded at aU, should bo concluded on its own merits. 

I am doubtful as to the wisdom of encouraging Italy to put forward any suggestions for 
an Italian acquisition of ^gean islands. We are in a strong position in holding Italy to the 
letter and spirit of her most solemn assurances. If we once allow her to discuss with us the 
possibilitv of her disregarding those assurances, our position would perhaps be weakened. 

E. A. C. 

Oct[ober] 16. 

As far as I recollect the idea of a Mediterranean agreement with Italy was on our part 
that we should promise not to disturb Italy in Tripoli. Secure possession of Tripoli for Italy 
was to be the basis. We wanted her to be content with that. Apparently she now wishes to 
continue the discussion on the basis that besides Tripoli she should get something in the 
Islands and in Asia Minor. We cannot encourage that. We need not oppose anj-thing in 
Asia Minor that does not conflict with the rights of the Smyrna-Aidin R[ailwa]y but we must 
oppose Italian projects in the Islands. 

E. G. 

(') [Sir R. Rodd's despatch (No. 3, Confidential) of January 4, 1913, comments on the draft 
formula sent to him in Sir Edward Grey"s despatch (No. 2S.5t of December 20. 1912. 
(F.O. 51092/1830S/12;22. 14S7 14S7 13 22.)] 

(*) [The reference is to Sir Edward Grey's despatch (No. 174, Secret> to Sir F. Bertie, of 
March 5, 1913, in which he said it would '"be better for us to leave the matter as it was for 
the present." (F.O. 11261, 1487, 13/22.1] 

[Sir R. Rodd sent a private letter to Sir Edward Grey on April 13, 1912, dealing with 
the question of a possible understanding with Italy in North Africa. (F.O. 18308/13308/12/22.)] 

(6) [cp. Pribram, Vol. I, pp. 244-59.] 



138 



No. 152. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.C) 

F.O. 47401/47102/13/44. 
(No. 629.^ 

gij. Foreign Office, October 22, 1913. 

' The French Charge d' Affaires informed Sir E. Crowe on the 17th October that 
the Itahan government were showing signs of great eagerness to arrive at some general 
understanding with France respecting a common pohcy in the Mediterranean. (=) He 
referred to what had recently passed between Monsieur Paleologue and the Italian 
Charge d'Affaires at Paris, as' reported in your despatch No. 489 of the 1st instant. r^) 
Since then a further communication from the Italian government had been received 
to the effect that they were most anxious for a friendly arrangement, similar to that 
which had settled the lines of Franco-Italian policy in North Africa, and that they 
expected soon to receive the proposals which France would no doubt wish to make. 

M. de Fleuriau said he was instructed to bring this to my notice, as France wished 
in this matter to proceed in the closest co-operation with England. 

Sir E. Crowe thanked M. de Fleuriau and said we had just received a telegram 
from Rome conveying a message from the Marquis di San Giuliano to a similar effect 
as regards an Anglo-Italian understanding.(^) and that he felt certain it would continue 
to be my wish that France and England should remain in touch in respect to this 
question. Sir E. Crowe then asked M. de Fleuriau whether, in the opinion of the 
French government, the present move of Italy was connected with her plans and 
ambitions in regard to the islands. M. de Fieuriau said this was undoubted: and 
proceeded to tell Sir E. Crowe the following : 

There had been much talk and speculation in diplomatic circles at Constantinople 
of late as to the lines on which a settlement of the question of the islands could be 
effected. A plan had been mooted by which the Powers would allow Turkey to retain 
Chios and Mitylene in return for her agreeing to transfer to Greece all her rights to 
and in the islands now in Italian occupation. The French embassy had sounded the 
Italian Piepresentative as to how such a plan would be regarded by the Italian Govern- 
ment. The reply had been that it was quite inacceptable, and the impression created 
by what the Italian Representative had said was that Italy wished Chios, Mitylene and 
ail the islands now occupied by her to be assigned to Turkey from whom Italy would, 
in return for bringing about such a solution, expect to obtain some recognition, taking 
the form of concessions etc., of Italian special interests not only in the islands but on 
the mainland opposite to them. In fact, Italy's plan seemed to be to carve out a large 
sphere of influence, with claim to ultimate possession, in respect to those important 
Turkish provinces. 

Sir E. Crowe told M. de Fleuriau that the existence of some such scheme in Italy's 
mind was attested to some extent by her efforts to obtain an important railway con- 
cession for connecting Adalia with the interior. Sir E. Crowe said we were very 
grateful to him for having given us the first information concerning this railway 
project, which had enabled us to put in effective protests at Constantinople and Rome. 
Sir E. Crowe also informed M. de Fleuriau that the Italian government now seemed 
anxious to connect a friendly arrangement respecting this concession with the proposed 
general understanding relation of Anglo-Italian policy in the Mediterranean, but that 
it seemed to him, Sir E. Crowe, altogether undesirable to mix these things up together, 

(1) [This despatch is based on Sir E. Crowe's' record of his conversation with M. de 
Fleuriau on October 17.] 

(2) [cp. D.D.F., 3'"« Ser., Vol. VIII. p. 478, Xo. 377, and note (>)•] 

(3) [Sir F. Bertie's despatch (No. 489), D. October 1, R. October 2, 1913, is not reproduced. 
It referred also to M. Poincare's recent visit to Spain. (F.O. 44812/42850/13/17.) cp. D.D.F., 
S"- Ser., Vol. VIII, p. 287, No. 223.] 

(■*) [v. immediately preceding document.] 



139 



Otherwise it would become easy for the Italian government, by taking credit for 
withdrawing from a railway scheme which infringed prior British rights, to claim, in 
return for such a manifestation of good-will, a recognition of Italian claims of a more 
or less exclusive character to other regions in Asia Minor. 

Monsieur de Fleuriau expressed concurrence in this view. 

[I am, (tc] 

E. G[KEY]. 



No. 153. 
.Sfir Edward Grey to Mr. Bering. {^) 

F.O. 47873 106/13/44. 
(No. 260.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, October 29, 1913. 

The Italian Charge d" Affaires put to Sir E. Cro«e on the 14th October the two 
following questions, to which he said he was instructed to ask for my answers ; — 

(V Does the British government consider that the question of the islands has 
been definitely settled, so far as the Six Powers are concerned, by the Ambassadors' 
Conference, and in what sense? 

(2~i What would be the attitude of the British government if Turkey should 
succeed in recovering some of the islands at present occupied by Greece. 

Sir E. Crowe said that as these questions raised somewhat grave issues, he could 
not be expected himself to answer them ofi hand, and that all he could do was to refer 
them to me. 

In the course of some informal conversation on the subject. Sir E. Crowe observed 
that the Italian government were in as good a position as the British government to 
say what was decided by the Ambassadors' Conference. Sir E. Crowe's own impression, 
he said, was that the views of the Conference on the question of the islands were 
nowhere recorded in a precise and definite formula solemnly adopted and approved by 
the six governments, except to the extent that the belligerents devolved upon the 
6 Powers, and the 6 Powers formally assumed, authority to decide the ultimate fate of 
all the islands. Nor was there. Sir E. Crowe thought, any doubt, that all the Powers 
had accepted the solution of letting all the islands, except two or three specified 
(Tenedos. Imbros. Thasosi go to Greece, under certain reservations, made separately 
by several of the governments. Whilst Sir E. Crowe believed that all these various 
reserv-ations were practically disposed of and allowed to be made good in the course of 
the further debates, the final result was not explicitly summarized or restated in concise 
form. So far as Great Britain was concerned, I had made it abundantly dear that she 
considered the transfer of all the islands Twith the few exceptions mentioned^ to Greece 
as the only real solution : and when the southern frontier of Albania was considered 
and the question arose of fixing a line which would involve the abandonment by Greece 
of Koritza and a large belt of northern Epirus. I had explicitly stated that if I agreed 
to call upon Greece to make this sacrifice, it was on the understanding that she would 
be compensated by receiving the islands. 

As regards Prince Borghese's second question. Sir E. Crowe said that the latest 
indications of Turkish policy made it appear improbable that any attempt would be 
made now to wrench the islands from Greece. In these circumstances it might well 
appear to me unnecessary to define precisely the attitude of the British government in 
a contingency which had not arisen, which was not expected just now to arise, and 

{') [This despatch is based on Sir E. Crowe's record of his conversation with Prince 
Borghese. The changes made when the record was transformed into a despatch are of a very 
unimportant character. The marginal comments appear on the original record.] 



140 



which, if it arose, would be likely to do so in circumstances that could not, at present, 
be accurately foreseen. 

Prince Borghese finally referred to the islands in Italian occupation. He had on 
several occasions lately received instructions to re])eat to us the assurances already 
given by his government in various forms, that Italy would adhere to her solemn 
pledges. He had not acted on these instructions, and had explained to the Marquis di 
San Giuliano that in his opinion there was no need to repeat those assurances as he 
felt sure the British government did not belong to those who doubted the good faith 
and honour of the Italian government in this matter. 

Sir E. Crowe said that I had made it quite clear in my speech in the House of 
Commons(^) that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] have full confidence in the loyal 
attitude of Italy and in the faith of her plighted word. Since then we had made 
several communications to the Italian government through our Embassy at Rome, 
breathing the same spirit of absolute confidence, and I understood from the Marquis 
di San Giuliano's answers to those communications that this attitude of the British 
gov[ernmen]t was appreciated. 

Prince Borghese in thanking Sir E. Crowe for telling him of the latest of our 
communications at Pome, said this confirmed him in the impression that there was no 
need for him to give effect to his instructions on this point. He said he had only 
mentioned the matter to me on account of the constant reference to alleged Italian 
designs in the press, including the " Times." ("'') 

Sir E. Crowe observed that if the Italian gov[ernmen]t were anxious to put an 
end to all newspaper talk of this kind, they might do well to stop the mouth of their 
own rather indiscreet officials, and he referred to the extraordinary speech reported 
recently to have been made in the island of Rhodes by General Ameglio.(') It was 
utterances of this kind which fed the suspicions of journalists and of a sceptical public. 
Prince Borghese admitted that these " terrible generals " did a lot of mischief.^*) 

[I am, &c. 

E. GEEY.] 

(2) [v. Pari. Deb., 5th Ser., (House of Commons), Vol. 56, pp. 2281-310 1 

(3) [v. The Times, October 14, 1913, p. 7.] 

(<) [Marginal comment by Sir Edward Grey: "An opportune and wholesome reference" 
[E. G.].] 

(5) [There is a note by Sir Edward Grey at the end of Sir E. Crowe's record- "Sir E 

Crowe should see a letter I wrote to Sir A. Nicolson last week defining my personal view of 

how the Powers stood as regards the Islands occupied by Greece. It agrees substantiallv with 

Sfo T^^'Tfnno'f '^^^ reference is to a letter of October 7, 1913. ckrnock 

Mteo., Vol. IX or 1913.] 



No. 154. 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Derinq.C) 

F.O. 48214/106/13/44. 
(No. 262.) 

Foreign Office, October 29, 1913. 

With reference to my despatch No. 260 of to-day's date,(') Sir E. Crowe, by my 
instructions, gave the Italian Charge d'Affaires on the 20th October the following reply 
to the two questions which he had propounded on the 14th instant : — 

(1) The view of the British government as to the decision taken by the 
Ambassadors' Conference respecting the islands is that when it was agreed to assipn 
Koritza and neighbouring districts to Albania, this was on the distinct understanding 

? ^^^^^ ^'"^ ^- Crowe's record of his conversation with Prince 
H«n.t i! • slight alterations made when Sir E. Crowe's minute was transformed into a 

.nnv!!!.-"" affect the sense of the document. M. de Fleuriau gave an account of the 

47T8rNo%r'] *° °^ i^^-^- VIII, 

(2) [v. immediately preceding document.] 



141 



that all the islands PTCppt Imbros and Tenedos (and Thasos^ would go to Greece. If 
anv attempt was now to be made to modify this settlement so far as the islands were 
concerned, it would be open to anv of the six Powers to demand the reopening and 
reconsideration of their decision as regards the Southern Albanian frontier.(') 

(2"> If the continsency, not at present probable, should arise of Turkey 
re-occupying by force the islands of Chios and Mitylene. the British government would 
expect all the six Powers to deliberate and determine in common what action should 
be taken. 

Sir E. Crowe also made clear to Prince Borghese that on point (1) the under- 
standing was of course only inter se between the Powers. They never communicated 
any formal resolution to Greece or Turkey, or to anyone, so that it is only as between 
the Powers that any understanding exists. 

[I am. &c. 

E. GEEY.] 

(») [cp. Gooch <fr Temperhy, Vol. IX (II). p. 825, No. 1019 ; pp. 943-4. No. 1187 ; pp. 945-6, 
No. 1190; p. 948, No. 1193; pp. 949-50, No. 1195; pp. 954-6, No. 1202; pp. 1066-7. App. V.] 



Xo. 155. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.C) 

F.O. 50190/106/13/44. 
(No. 665.^ 

Sir, Foreign Office, October 31, 1913. 

In speaking to M. Cambon to-day I again asked liim to ascertain M. Pichon's 
view as to what we should do if the Commissions in Albania came to a deadlock and 
broke down.("l 

I indicated a preference for withdrawal on our part as we had little interest 
politically in Albania, but I impressed upon M. Cambon that we felt very differently 
about the .Egean Islands. The Admiralty held a very strong opinion that none of 
these islands must go to a Great Power; it had not yet been necessary for us to 
discuss what steps we should take if there was real difficulty about the Islands, but 
M. Pichon must not suppose that because we felt little interest in Albania we should 
disinterest ourselves as regards the Islands. 

M. Cambon said for France the question of the Islands was one of great interest. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 
(21 [cp. supra, p. 50, No. 58, and note (=) : cp. also D D.F., 3"" Sir., Vol. VIII, pp. 523-4, 
No. 417.] 



No. 156. 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Dering.{^) 

F.O. 50656/106/13 44. 
(No. 268.> ' 

Sir, Foreign Office, Sovemher 4, 1913. 

I asked the Italian Ambassador to-day, on his return to London, about the 
.£gean Islands. 

He said that, while he had been away, I had no doubt heard what had been said 
to Sir Kenneli Eodd. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 



142 



I replied that the most exphcit pledges had been reported to me from the British 
Embassy in Eome.(-) 

The Ambassador said that there was no doubt about the fulfilment of these 
pledges, but the Turks had not fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty of 
Lausanne : they had even sent fresh Officers to Tripoli. If the Italians gave back the 
Islands, the pledge that they held for the fulfilment of these obligations, and the 
surrender of the Islands was followed by some Turkish action in Tripoli, the position 
of the Italian Government would be quite untenable, and rightly so. 

I remarked that Italy was on very good terms with Turkey, and that, so long as 
Turkey found that she could be on good terms with Italy without fulfilHng her 
engagements under the Treaty of Lausanne, she was not likely to fulfil them. 

The Ambassador said that the real thing that influenced Turkey was the fear that, 
when the Islands had been restored to her, the Powers might take them away from her 
and hand them over to Greece. As soon as Turkey was sure that she would retain 
the Islands, she would no doubt hasten to fulfil the engagements of the Treaty of 
Lausanne, for she would not wish Italy to remain in occupation of the Islands. There 
would be a strong sentiment in Italy against giving up the Islands when the time 
came, but this would be much allayed if the restoration could coincide with some 
economic concession to Italy in Asia Minor. 

I said that it would not do for the question to drag on indefinitely. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

{-) [ v. supra, pp. 131-3, No. 146; p. 135, No. 149, and note (5).] 



No. 157. 

Sir Edu-ard Grey to Sir F. Bertie.C) 

F.O. 49995/47102/13/44. 
(No. 663.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, November 5, 1913. 

M. de Fleuriau called on the 1st November to tell Sir A. Nicolson that according 
to recent information which his Ministry had received the Italian Gov[ernmen]t were 
in active negotiations with BerUn as to the recognition of certain spheres of influence 
in Asia Minor and as to Italy being permitted to retain one or two of the islands at 
present in her possession. Berlin would probably be not unfavourable to such an 
arrangement. The French Gov[ernmen]t were fairly sure that when the Triple 
Alliance was renewed a naval agreement was also concluded and that an article was 
inserted regarding policy in Eastern Europe. (^) 

The Italians in their conversations at Paris, informal and preparatory conversa- 
tions, regarding a possible Mediterranean agreement have not mentioned the question 
of the islands though they have touched upon the question of Asia Minor. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY] 

(1) [This despatch is based on Sir A. Nicolson's record of his conversation with 
M. de Fleuriau. There is a report to M. Pichon of this date in D.D F 3"^ Ser Vol VIIT 
pp. 533-4, No. 423, but it refers to Albania.] ' ' 

(2) [For the text of the Treaty of December 5, 1912, v. Pribram, Vol. I, pp. 244-59.] 



143 



No. 158. 

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

F.O. 50499/106/18/44. 

(No. 545.) Secret. Paris, D. November 6, 1913. 

Sir, R. Novevxher 7, 1913. 

Monsieur Pichon was in a pessimistic mood to-day. His conversation was to the 
effect that Turkey is prepared to go to extremes with Greece and that Bulgaria will 
join with Turkey against Greece, that Austria and Italy are very aggressively inclined 
against Greece and Servia; that Italy is more committed than ever to the Triple 
Alliance as interpreted by Germanv.(-) 

His Excellency expressed great distrust of Italian policy. According to informa- 
tion which he has received and which he regards as trustworthy, the Marquis de [sic ;] 
San Giuliano stated recently to an Austrian agent that the Italian Government would 
not relinquisli Rhodes. 

Monsieur Pichon has instructed ^NFonsieur Cambon to confer with you on the 
general situation. He thinks that the only thing that will exercise an effectual control 
over the Italian Government is fear of the British Na\'y. They might risk the 
displeasure of France in the question of the ^gean islands, as they might rely on the 
support of Germany against France, but they could not hope for German assistance if 
England asserted herself in a Mediterranean question. 

I assured Monsieur Pichon as I had frequently done before that on the question 
of the ^gean islands he might confidently rely on your support. It was an essential 
principle of British policy that no Great Power should alter the status quo in the 
Mediterranean by the occupation of an island in the ^gean Sea. You would therefore 
hold the Italian Government to their engagement not to retain any such island. 

Monsieur Pichon said that he had always had full confidence in the assurances 
which you had given to him that you would support the French Government in 
representations to the Italian Government, and that you had recently informed 
Monsieur Cambon that you intended to again speak strongly to the Italian Ambassador 
on the subject of the Islands. (') 

I have, &c. 

FRANCIS BERTIE. 

MINUTES. 

An opportunity of reopening the question may arise if and when Italy again wishes the 
Powers to put pressure on Greece to evacuate Koritza and the Southern Albanian borderlands. 
We should then be in a position to reply that when those districts were assigned by the 
Ambassadors' Conference to Albania, it was on the understanding that all the islands would 
be given to Greece; and we could point out the injustice of insisting on one side of a bargain 
whilst ignoring the counter-obligation. 

E. A. C. 

Nov [ember] 8. 
A. N. 
E. G. 

? Was this so? I thought the understanding was limited to the islands in Greek 
occupation. 

A. N. 

As far as I remember we can fairly contend only that it was the islands in Greek 
occupation. 

E. G. 

(*) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King.1 

[cp. M. Pichon's telegram of this date to M. Paul Cambon, D.D.F.. 3"" Sir., Vol VIII 
p. 558, No. 444.] 

(3) [A conversation between Sir Edward Grev and M. Paul Cambon on October 31 is recorded 
in BD.F.. 3"" Sir., Vol. VIII, pp. 523-4. No. 417.1 
(*) [cp. SMXjra, pp. 140-1, No. 154, and note {^).'] 



144 



No. 159. 

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Dermg.{^) 

F.O. 51254/106/13/44. 
(No. 276.) 

gjj. Fore'ujn Office, November 7, 1913. 

The Italian Ambassador said to-day that he had observed a reference that I had 
made in Newcastle yesterday to the speech that the Prime Minister was to make in 
the Guildhall on the" 10th of this month.(-) He therefore took upon himself personally 
to urge that the Prime Minister should not introduce the question of the ^gean 
Islands in Italian occupation. Italy had given her pledges, and would fulfil them. 
We were not the only Power who was interested in the fulfilment of Italy's pledges 
about the islands, and there was no reason why we should, by a reiteration of our 
view in public, draw upon ourselves the sole responsibility for pressing Italy in the 
matter. He hoped that I would not mind his putting this to me personally. It was 
really impossible for the Italian Government to evacuate the islands till Turkey had 
fulfilled the conditions of the Treaty of Lausanne. 

I again pointed out that Italy was very good friends with Turkey and that, as 
long as Turkey found that she could have Italian friendship without fulfilling the 
conditions of the Treaty of I^ausanne, she was not likely to fulfil them. 

The Ambassador reiterated that, when Turkey was sure that she would keep the 
islands, she would be only too ready to hasten the Italian evacuation. 

In pressing the point that the Prime Minister should not bring the question of the 
islands into his Guildhall speech, the Ambassador reminded me that, when we had 
given pledges that we would go out of Egypt, and other Powers, France especially, 
were pressing us about them, Italy alone had never bothered us in the matter. 

I said that our experience in Egypt had been that the longer one stayed in a place 
the more difficult it was to get out of it, and that was why 1 did not wish the same 
thing to occur elsewhere. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the Prime Minister.] 

(2) [The freedom of the City of Newcastle was conferred on Sir Edward Grey on 
November 6. v. The Times, November 7, 1913, p. 6. For Mr. Asquith's speech at the Guild- 
hall, V. ibid., November 11, 1913, p. 10.] 



No. 160. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

F.O. 53081/106/13/44. 

(No. 937.) Confidential. Constantinople, D. November 15, 1913. 

Sir:— E. November 24, 1913. 

I have the honour to report that I had some conversation this evening with 
Monsieur Take Jonesco who is paying a short visit to this capital on his return to 
Bucharest. 

After congratulating him on the success which had attached to his efiorts in the 
cause of peace, I enquired whether, in his opinion, it w^as likely to be durable and 
whether he had any conversation with Monsieur Venizelos on the subject of the 
islands. 



(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King. A copy was sent to the 
Admiralty.] 



145 



Monsieur Take Jonesco was disposed — perhaps not unnaturally, to take a hopeful 
view of the question. He said that he had not touched officially upon the question of 
the islands because it was too big a question for Koumania to settle but he had 
discussed the question privately with Monsieur Venizelos and other leading men and 
he was under the impression that the Greek Government would accept a solution 
which was unanimously recommended by the Powers — if the decision was not delayed. 

The Greek people were in a very good temper at the i)re3ent moment on account 
of the demobilisation orders and would be more likely to accept a compromise now 
than later on, when life had returned to its normal course and the results of the war 
began to make themselves felt. The same arguments applied to the South Albanian 
frontier. 

I then asked Monsieur Take Jonesco to tell me quite privately what his own 
opinion was as to the sort of settlement which might be arrived at and he replied that 
the Greek Government would probably accept the cession to Turkey of Tenedos and 
Imbros. I said that this would, so far as I had been able to gather, by no means satisfy 
the Turkish Government. The Grand Vizier had volunteered to me in the most 
uncompromising language that the Ottoman Government would never under any 
circumstances consent to the permanent cession of ^litylene and Chios — the possession 
of those islands was a matter of life and death to the Turkish Empire, and if necessary 
they would achieve their reconquest by force. (-) Monsieur Take Jonesco replied that 
the Greek Government might perhaps consent to compromise and leave one of those 
islands to Turkey under certain guarantees, that he was aware of the strength of 
feeling in this country in regard to the islands but he still thought that an arrange- 
ment might be come to without a resort to force — possibly the Greek Government 
might consent to leave either ]\[itylene or Chios to Turkey, under certain guarantees. 
We were interrupted at this moment and I did not pursue the conversation. 

I have, &c. 

LOUIS MALLET. 

(-) [rp. infra, p. 157, No. 173.] 



No. 16L 

Mr. Bering to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 

F.O. 53044/52046/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 208.^ Very Confidential. Rome, Xovemher 22, 1913. 

^ly telegram No. 205 of 21st November : .^gean islands. (-) 

Turkish Ambassador, referring yesterday to the contradiction published here of 
rumour as to loan on guarantee of islands, told me there was not a word of truth in 
the report, and that Turkey was most anxious to regain possession of the islands as 
soon as possible. 

I asked him when the last Turkish troops would be withdrawn from Cyrenaica in 
order to bring this about. He replied that there were only forty soldiers there now- 
left by Faik Bey in the hands of Senoussi. He told me confidentially that he had been 
instructed to ask the Italian Government to send an expedition to rescue them, but 
had replied to his Government that it was no use suggesting it, as it would mean a 

(1) [The text given above is taken from the Confidential Print, as the original decypher 
cannot be traced.] 

(-) [Mr. Bering's telegram (No. 205) of November 21, 1913, contained the test of an official 
notice which had appeared in the Italian Press on November 21. It ran as follows: — 

" Announcement published by a Russian newspaper of a loan to be made by Italy to 
Turkey on the guarantee of the possession of Rhodes and Stampalia is entirely without 
foundation." (F.O. 52898/52046/13/44.)] 

[8959] I. 



146 



loss of men to the Italians and probably the Turkish soldiers would be exterminated 
by the Senoussi before they could be reached. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs here had given him assurances over and over again 
of Italy's intention to return the islands to Turkey ; only a few days ago the Italian 
Ambassador at Constantinople had repeated the same assurances to the Grand Vizier, 
and the Turkish Charge d'Affaires at Vienna had also reported that he had likewise 
been assured by his Italian colleague. To himself the Itahan Prime Minister had said 
that Italy would restore the islands to Turkey if the Great Powers made no objection. 
This reservation seemed to him a little significant, but could be accounted for by the 
fear entertained by the Italian Government which, he could tell me in strict confidence, 
had been expressed to him (Minister for Foreign Affairs) that France, England, and 
Kussia meant to give the islands in Italian occupation to Greece. Minister for Foreign 
Affairs did not distrust British loyalty, and had often spoken in the highest terms of 
your policy, but he did distrust the French Government on this point. The 
Ambassador added that the Ottoman Government would never allow these islands to 
be handed over to Greece. 

I replied that the Prime Minister's reservation appeared to me clearly to refer to 
the fact that the question of the islands was expressly reserved by the Conference of 
London for settlement by the Great Powers, and that I considered personally that the 
apprehensions of the Minister for Foreign Affairs were wholly unfounded. No doubt 
the Greek Government would desire to acquire the islands, but that the desire need 
not lead to fulfilment. Referring again to the loan, the Ambassador said that Italy 
desired to join in the loan to Turkey now in contemplation to extent of a fixed sum. 
I forget the amount he stated, but will ask him again when I call to-day, which will be 
at his request. But he added that Italy really has no money to lend, for she needs all 
she has at home, and he did not believe she would be able to participate to the amount 
for which she had asked as her share. 

I asked again at once if this part of the loan was on the security of the islands 
held by Italy, and the Ambassador replied certainly not. 

MINUTES. 

I do hot know on what authority Mr. Dering made the rather embarrassing statement 
referred to. Even if H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] were to be eventually compelled to 
relinquish the plan of securing the islands for Greece, it cannot be judicious to say so at this 
moment, still less to disavow any such intention. 

The whole question of the islands is becoming acute. France is displaying much 
nervousness on the subject, and our Admiralty are equally apprehensive. The moment doe& 
seem to have come for speaking seriously to the Italians. But before doing so H[is] 
M[ajesty's] G[overnment] will no doubt consider it wise to come to a definite conclusion as to 
what they are prepared to accept and what not, as also how they will endeavour to effect 
their purposes. 

E. A. C. 

Nov [ember] 22. 

I told M. Cambon on Wednesday that I would discuss the question of the Islands with 
the Prime Minister. 

Mr. Dering ought not to have expressed an opinion about the ultimate destination of the 
Islands : there are no instructions that warrant what he said and this should be pointed out 
to him.(') 

Bring up on Monday. 

E. G. 
23.11.13. 



(3) [A telegram (No. 356) to this effect was sent to Mr. Dering on November 25, 
D. 12.45 P.M. (F.O. 53044/52046/13/44.)] 



147 



No. 1G2. 

Mr. Dering to Sir Ediiard Grey.{^) 

F.O. 53940/106/13 44. 

(No. 32G.) Verv Confidential. Rome, D. November 23, 1913. 

Sir:— ' R. November 29, 1913. 

The polemics in the French and Italian press, to which His Majesty's Ambassador 
at Paris has alluded in a recent despatch, (-) now show some signs of abating in Italy. 
Ever since the French press comments on the action taken at Athens by the Italian 
and Austro-Hungarian Governments alone in regard to Greek interference with the 
work of the International Frontier Commission in Southern Albania, the tone of the 
Italian newspapers has been almost hostile. The real reason for this I believe to be 
the conviction which has become common throughout Italy that France is supporting 
Greek pretensions and aspirations, not only on the Albanian frontier but also in 
connection with the yEgean islands. There have been many indications of late which 
lead me to infer that the Italian Government share this opinion, which may be the 
reason why no steps have been taken to induce the Italian press to moderate their 
attitude towards France, However, the Italian press appear to have exhausted for the 
moment their stock of sarcastic and acrimonious remarks, and it may be that the battle 
has ended for want of fresh ammunition. The fact remains that Greece('') is not 
popular in this country at present. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is certainly apprehensive of the role which 
Greece is likely to play in the Eastern Mediterranean in the event of her becoming 
the permanent mistress of at all events those islands of the .^Egean which she at 
present occupies. The questions recently addressed to you on his behalf by Marquis 
Imperiali on the subject of those islands would alone prove as much. Marquis di San 
Giuliano has told me in plain language that he mistrusts the French Government and 
their policy with regard to Greece, and to the Turkish Ambassador he has been still 
more frank, saying that a strong naval Power such as Greece was liable to become in 
the ^gean, would be a danger to Italy, seeing that in the event of a conflict between 
the two great European groups of Powers, all her support would be naturally attracted 
to France and the Triple Entente. Marquis di San Giuliano has even intimated his 
fear to the Turkish Ambassador that, should Italy hand over to Turkey at the present 
juncture Rhodes and the other islands occupied by her troops, France, supported by 
Russia, possibly by Great Britain, and even by Germany, of whose attitude as regards 
Greek aspirations he does not feel quite sure, might make a strong effort to secure their 
surrender to Greece. This, I gathered from Naby Bey, would be bitterly opposed by 
Italy and naturally likewise by Turkey. 

As you remarked on November 7 to Marquis Imperiali, the longer one stays in 
a place the more difficult it becomes to get out of it.('') It is true that there is not 
only in military and naval circles here, but also among Senators and Deputies, an 
intense longing to possess Rhodes, at least, of the islands, and that the idea of " Rodi 
italiana " is already strongly rooted. It is also a fact that the Italian Government have 
gone no further towards evacuation of the islands than to give repeated assurances all 
round, including many to the Turkish Ambassador here, that it is their intention to do 
so. Naby Bey has pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that only forty 
Turkish regulars remain in Cyrenaica, that these are held prisoners by the Senoussi 
and are incapacitated from lea\-ing the country, and that in order to comply with the 
provisions of the Lausanne Treaty the Ottoman Government have struck these men off 
the roll of the Turkish army. If this is correct, there are no longer, as I have suspected 

(*) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Prime Minister.] 

(-) [Sir F. Bertie's despatch (Xo. 558">, D. November 14, R. November 15, 1913, enclosed 
extracts from the French press commenting on the hostile attitude of the Italian press. 
(F.O. 01845/5184.5/13/17.)] 

(^) [Unsigned marginal comment: " ? France."] 

i*) [v. supra, p. 144, No. 159.] 

[8959] L 2 



148 



for. some time, any Turkish soldiers left in Cyrenaica, although the Italian Government 
may argue that the forty men unable to get away are technically still Turkish soldiers. 
I have not gathered, though, that they do argue thus : on the contrary, Naby Bey was 
quite recently assured by the Minister for Foreign Affairs "pour la millieme fois " 
that Italv meant to surrender the islands to Turkey, and expressed to me his conviction 
that Italy would do so very shortly, but is only hindered by the fear that they might 
then be adjudged to Greece. 

Discussing Italian policy towards Turkey, Naby Bey intimated to me that it was 
inclined to be Machiavellian. Perhaps with a view to obtaining valuable concessions 
in Asia Minor, perhaps in order to obtain Turkish active support against Greece, 
Marquis di San GiuHano had recently made the most, in course of conversation witii 
him, of the services rendered by friendly Italy to Turkey. These ser^aces, the 
Ambassador observed to me smiling, did not really amount to a row of pins. For 
instance he had been asked to believe that Italy even had a hand in obtaining the 
retrocession of Adrianople to Turkey, which, said Naby Bey, was most certainly an 
exaggeration. It was interesting to observe throughout the Ambassador's remarks the 
oriental tendency to pit one group of European Powers against the other, to the 
probable benefit of his own country. He professed himself keenly anxious to secure 
the surrender to Turkey of Ehodes and the other islands, and I think he is sincere. 

Still I feel it my duty to mention the idea which occurs to me that, rather than 
contemplate the possibility of Marquis di San Giuliano's fears becoming realized and 
see those islands in the possession of Greece, Turkey might even prefer to see them 
retained by a friendly Power for at least some time longer and might be induced to 
suggest this to Italy if she saw any signs of a proposal of this kind. Or Turkey might, 
on receiving back the islands, ask for or be offered Italy's guarantee for support in 
the event of a Greek attack on the islands or any attempt to dispossess her. At present, 
however, if Naby Bey is to be believed as to his continued representations to the 
Italian Government, there appears to be no question of any such intention on the part 
of the Ottoman Government. 

To revert to the I'ranco-Italian press polemics, I have to report that last Friday 
Signor Luzzati, a staunch friend to France, published two vigorous articles in the 
Milanese " Corriere della Sera" and the Eoman " Italie," strongly advocating a 
return to reason. He pointed out that there were no real grounds for France and Italy 
to disagree ; that Germany and Austria-Hungary did not hesitate to cultivate friendly 
relations and carry on negotiations with the Powers of the Triple Entente, while still 
preserving their loyalty to the Triple Alliance. "Why then should not Italy do likewise? 
He urged the advantage to Italy of a fi-ank understanding with Great Britain and 
France in the interests of the new Libyan colonies, and declared that the alleged 
difference of interests between France and Italy was not real and would be heard of 
no more when the press of both countries had allowed their better sense to prevail. 
No English or Russian newspapers had attacked Italy on subjects connected with 
Greece, which interested both these countries as much as France. He ended his 
extremely dignified exhortation by warning the Italian and French Governments of the 
grave responsibility which they would be assuming in permitting press acerbities to 
continue, tending to separate two countries which ought to be co-operating. Europe 
requires peace, he added, and will have it at any price. 

Signor Luzzati's pen is powerful in Italy just now, while he is known in France 
as a friend, so it is not unlikely that the modification of tone to which I alluded at 
the beginning of this despatch may also be due in some measure to the publication of 
his signed articles. 

I have, &c. 

HERBERT G. BERING. 

MINUTES. 

It would be possible now to say to the Italians that we learn the Turkish Gov[ernmen]t 
has withdrawn all its forces from Tripoli ; that only 40 Turkish soldiers remain in Cyrenaica 
who are actually prisoners in the hands of the Senoussi, and for whom accordingly the Porte 



149 



cannot be held responsible, especially as they have been struck off the roll of the Turkish army. 
In these circ[umstance]s Hfis] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] must remind the Italian gov[ern- 
nienjt that, the conditions of the treaty of Lausanne having been fulfilled, the time has come 
for them to redeem their solemn and reiterated pledges and evacuate the islands. 

E. A. C. 

Dec[ember] 3. 
A. N. 
E. G. 

The Italian Ambassador unfortunately told me yesterday that Turkish oflBcers have gone to 
Cyrenaica and that the Italians have got a correspondence between Talaat and Enver, who is 
at the bottom of the whole thing. The Ambassador is ready to give me this information. 

E. G. 
4.12.13. 



No. 163. 

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 54106 '33-220/13/44. 

{No. 359.) St. Petcrsburgh, D. Xovember 24, 1913. 

Sir:— E. Decemher 1, 1913. 

The conclusion of peace between Turkey and Greece through the intermediary 
of the Eoumanian Prime Minister could not fail to give rise to some bitter reflections 
in St. Petersburg. A short time ago it would have been natural to expect Russia and 
not Eoumania to appear as the mediator between these two antagonists, and it is 
necessarily galling to Russians to see Roumania successfully fulfilling a part which 
Russia attempted and failed to take on herself at the moment when war was about to 
break out between Bulgaria and her former Allies. Nor has the soreness caused here 
by the recent course of events in the Balkans been diminished by the present attitude 
ol King Ferdinand and the Austrophil Statesmen who are now in control at Sofia. 

Russian publicists naturally complain of the ingratitude of the Balkan States. 
They point out that when Austria mobilized at the commencement of the first Balkan 
campaign in 1912, Russia by maintaining an extra force of 400,000 men under arms 
kept the Dual Monarchy in check and saved the Allies from an Austrian advance in 
their rear which mu~t have been fatal to their plans. In addition to the inestimable 
ser\-ice thus rendered to the Allies Russia suppHed Bulgaria during the campaign 
with money, arms and ammunition, and also with the fuel which the Balkan Railways 
lacked and without which the victorious advance of the Allies would have been 
arrested at a critical moment. It might have been supposed after these occurrences 
that counsels proffered by Russia at Sofia, Belgrade and Athens would have been 
allowed the force of commands. Yet when Russia called on the AUies to submit their 
quarrels to her arbitration the reply which she received from each was tantamount to 
a refusal. 

^Mien Russians complain of the ingratitude of their Balkan proteges they are apt 
to forget that the Balkan States on their side have during the past twelve months 
been severely disillusioned with regard to the extent of the support which they could 
expect from Russia. Events have shown that when the territorial expansion of the 
Balkan States brought them into opposition with the wishes and pk.ns of Austria- 
Hungary Russia was not disposed to run the risk of war in the interests of her 
proteges even though those interests were of first-rate importance. Russia's decision 
was no doubt a wise one, but something more had unquestionably been expected of 
her by the Balkan peoples and also, as I believe, by the majority of Russians them- 
selves. The prudent policy which she adopted during the recent complications could 
not but react unfavourably, for the time being at least, on her influence and prestige 
in the Balkan Peninsula. 

I have, &c. 

HUGH O'BEIRNE. 



150 



No. 164. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.C) 

F.O. 53772/10G/13/44. 
(No. 146.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, November 25, 1913. 

The Greek Minister asked me to-day about the question of the ^Egean Islands. 

I said that it had not been raised amongst the Great Powers for the last few 
months. I observed that Greece was in occupation of the Islands, and I asked him 
why he mentioned the matter. 

He said that he did so only incidentally, but there were unfavourable rumours to 
the efifect that the Islands, or some of them, were to be formed into a Confederation 
apart from Greece. 

I said that I could not say that no Power was likely to raise the question of the 
Islands, but it had not been raised lately, (-) and as Greece was in possession I did not 
see that it was to her interest that it should be raised, nor had I thought it wise to 
raise it. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 

(2) [cp. infra, pp. 151-2, No. 166; p. 339, No. 378.] 



No. 165. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grcy.C) 

Private. (^) 

Dear Sir Edward, Constantinople, November 25, 1913. 

I have been trying to find out whether anything is going on between Italy and 
Turkey about the islands in the occupation of the former, but hitherto I have not been 
successful. The Grand Vizier poured derision on the story of an Italian loan secured 
on one of the islands, although that is far from being a conclusive proof that no 
negotiations have been on foot, because it is quite possible that a secret emissary of 
the Committee has been engaged on them, behind His Highness' back. We have 
discovered that an agent of this kind has recently returned from Piome, but his mission 
which was supposed to have for its object the acquisition of two Italian warships is 
said to have failed. Our [sic ; '? One] story is that the war-ships were to be given in 
exchange for Stampalia. 

The general impression seems to be that Italy means to give back the islands, but 
not until the question of the islands now occupied by Greece is settled. The Grand 
Vizier said to one of my colleagues on Monday that he did not want the surrender to 
take place till then. 

If Italy does restore the islands to Turkey, we may be sure that she will retain 
some kind of lien on some of them. 

There is a great feeling here about the islands now in the possession of Greece. 
The Grand Vizier has said to me more than once that Turkey will fight unless the 
Powers decide in her favour. Mitylene and Chios are those to which they attach the 
most importance; it is assumed that Imbros and Tenedos at any rate will go to them. 
He says that they must be restored without condition and will not hear of autonomy. 
I am convinced that a solution unfavourable to Turkey will not be accepted here and 
that the Turks are quite prepared to march on Greece, and set the Balkans ablaze if 
they are thwarted. 

(1) [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; to 
Sir A. Nicolson.] 

(2) [Grey MSS., Vol. 41.] 



151 



My new Bulgarian colleapue TochefE, who talks very freely, deplores this 
possibility and earnestly hopes that the Powers will decide in Turkey's favour, because 
if war breaks out in the spring, Bulgaria will not be able to profit by it, as she would 
do if it happened four or five years hence. 

My German and Austrian colleagues are openly in favour of Turkey, but Giers 
has not committed himself in speaking to me and Bompard is very difficult to see. He 
is at present busily engaged in making up to the Turks, and the visit of the much 
admired Lapeyrere is being made the occasion of great demonstrations of friendship. 
I hear, however, that the francophil manifestations in Beyrout have caused great 
misgi^■ings here. 

It would be Interesting to know what line the French and Russians will take about 
the islands, but I sincerely hope that a division of opinion between the Triple Alliance 
and the Triple Entente will be avoided and that we shall not be forced into taking up 
a hostile attitude to Turkey over this question. 

That would really be the last straw so far as our influence here is concerned. The 
Turks have received several shocks in the last two years and will not stand much more. 
On the whole they are pleased with Mr. Asquith's last speech,(^) but a little shy and 

inclined to contrast it with his Salonica and xA.drianople speeches C^ i 

Yours sincerelv, 

LOUIS MALLET. 

(3) [The reference is presumably to Mr. Asquith's speech at the Guildhall on November 10, 
V. The Times, November 11, 1913.]" 

(*) [The remaining paragraphs refer to Armenian Reforms (cp. infra, pp. 424-548, passim) 
and the riverain concession (cp. infra, p. 361, No. 405, note (*) ). They add nothing of 
importance to information given elsewhere.] 



No. 166. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.O 

F.O. 54052/13799/13/44. 
(No. 717.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, November 26, 1913. 

M. Cambon told me to-day that the Greek Minister in Paris had urged upon 
M. Pichon that the decision about the southern frontier of Albania, mentioning 
Koritza, should be reconsidered by the Ambassadors' reunion. M. Pichon had said 
that it was impossible to go back upon the question of Koritza, and it could not be 
reconsidered. 

I told M. Cambon of the protest that the Greek Minister had made here yesterday, 
and of what I had replied, both about the southern frontier of Albania and about the 
jEgean Islands. (-) 

M. Cambon said that Greece was to have the Islands if Koritza and Stylos went 
to Albania. 

I said that undoubtedly this had been the understanding on which a decision had 
been arrived at to give Koritza and Stylos to Albania. The Powers had undertaken 
no obligation towards Greece in the matter, but the understanding between them had 
been that Greece was to keep all the islands in her occupation, except Tenedos and 
Imbros ; and, if any other decision was come to about the islands, it would be open to 
any of the Powers to re-open the question of the southern frontier of Albania. I had 
spoken in this sense to the Italian Ambassador when he had asked me about the 
matter; and, I thought, also to the German Charge d'Afiaires. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 69-70, No. 84; p. 150, No. 164; cp. also supra, pp. 70-1, Ed. note.] 



152 



M. Cambon said there had been a report that Sir Eennell Eodd had proposed that 
the islands should be formed into a separate Confederation. M. Cambon asked me 
whether I had discussed the matter with him. 

I said that I had not discussed such a proposal with Sir Eennell Eodd at all. I 
had given him certain instructions before he returned to Eome,(^) but I had not given 
him any instructions about tlie islands in the occupation of Greece. In regard to the 
islands in the occupation of Italy, I had instructed him to point out to the Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs that the longer this question dragged on the more awkward 
it would become ; and to urge upon him that the Italian Government should give the 
islands back to Turkey. The Powers could then decide about their future destiny. 
All that we could press Italy to do was to give them back to Turkey, in accordance 
with the Treaty of Lausanne. 

M. Cambon showed me some information from Constantinople to the effect that 
the Turks admitted that they had not yet pressed Italy to restore the Mgean islands 
that were at present in Italian occupation, but affirmed that they were going to do so. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

(3) [t. immediately succeeding document, and note (-).] 



No. 167. 

.Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edicard Grey.C) 
F.O. 55119/39484/13/44. 

Tel (No. 218.) Rome, December 6, 1913. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw to-day. at once entered into conversation 
on some of the points which you directed me on 26th November to discuss. (^) 

As regards islands in Italian occupation some progress ma}^ be recorded, as his 
Excellency seems now to have abandoned the plea that the presence of Turkish troops 
in Cyrenaica makes a continuance of occupation imperative, and reiterates 
emphatically that Italy entirely upholds view adopted by Powers that none of them 
should seek territorial acquisitions from Turkey, whose Empire in Asia it is Italy's 
interest to preserve permanently if possible. The one point, however, which he 
considers of imperative importance is that Italy should find some sphere for economic 
and commercial development in Turkish Empire. There was a disposition to meet 
their views in Turkey as regards south-west angle of Asia Minor, but nothing of a 
concrete character had yet been concluded. I explained your views as to Smyrna - 
Aidin Eailway Company, and he said he quite realised that they had both established 
rights and interests, but he did not see why there should not be found means of 
conciliation of these with some sphere of activity for Italy. There were harbour works 
both at Adalia and elsewhere and other fields of enterprise of a not too ambitious or 
costly character. If these could be obtained for Italy in a definite form, he felt it 
would become easy for her to proceed with evacuation of the islands and to deal with 
public opinion, which expected some return for money and energy expended on 
occupation. He had himself thought it might be of advantage that Italy should 
endeavour to deal directly with railway company, and if that met your views he was 
prepared at once to approach them. 

(') [The text given above is taken from the Confidential Print, as the original decypher 
cannot be traced.] 

(2) [cp. immediately preceding document. Reference to Sir Edward Grey's instructions to 
Sir Rennell Rodd while the latter was in England occur in D.D.F., 3""^ Ser., Vol. VIII, p. 681, 
No. 538; p. 686, No. 545; pp. 754-5, No. 601; p. 775, No. 618.] 



153 



No. 168. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.C) 
F.O. 55119 39484/13 44. 

Tel. CSo. 866.^ Foreign Office, December 11, 1918. 

Your Excellency's telegram No. 218 of 6th December.(^) 

It will not do to connect schemes of Italian expansion on mainland of Asiatic 
Turkey with the question of Italian evacuation of the islands. ('^'i Respecting the islands, 
Italian Government have given ns repeated and solemn assurances, which we cannot 
how [sic : now] be expected to treat as contingent on extraneous conditions under 
which Italy would obtain compensation in some other form elsewhere. 

Apart from this, the policy of His ^fajesty's Government, and we believe of other 
Powers interested in Turkey, is altogether opposed to the di^asion of Turkish territory 
into defined spheres of interest, which would be tantamount to the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire. It is accordingly desirable to restrict discussion to the consideration 
of particular concessions in particular places, a course which has been followed in 
respect to German and French railv,-ay schemes. 

If the Italian Government are right in holding that their Adalia concession does 
not encroach upon the district of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway, they should have no 
difficulty in coming to an amicable arrangement with the British company, but the 
mention of harbour works at Adalia and local hnes starting from that port for the 
interior makes it very doubtful whether the view is in fact accurate ; for such enter- 
prises would, so far as I am able to judge, undoubtedly ran counter to the letter and 
spirit of the British company's concession, and would seriously compromise their 
position. 

The situation is made needlessly difficult for us by our remaining in ignorance of 
the precise terms of the Italian concession. 

Your Excellency should, in speaking to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
bring the above views to his notice, and endeavour to obtain a copy of their 
concession. 

(*) [The text given above is taken from the Confidential Print, as the original decypher 
cannot be traced.] 

(-) [r. immediately preceding document.] 

(») [cp. D.D.F., 3"' Ser., Vol. VIII, p. 770, Xo. 613.] 



No. 169. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen. 
F.O. 55760/13799 13, 44. 

Tel. (No. 418.' Confidential. Foreign Office, December 12, 1918. 

My immediately preceding telegram. (M 

I should be glad if Your Excellency could see the Chancellor himself and make 
to him in my name an appeal that he will not only consider favourably the proposed 
settlement of the question of the islands, but will use his influence at Vienna and 
especially at Eome in the same direction. 

I have reason to beUeve that the Turkish government is being encouraged by 
certain Powers in their design of a reconquest of Chios and Mitylene. I should look 
upon a renewed outbreak of war between Turkey and Greece with dismay. It would 
reopen all the difficulties now happily allayed by the conclusion of general peace, but 
the difficulties would be accentuated, would have still more far-reaching consequences, 

(>) [v. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91, and note (i).] 



154 



and might seriously strain the friendly relations which we have so far succeeded, not 
without much patient effort, in maintaining between the Great Powers. 

I feel confident that the Chancellor will recognize the justice of this view.(-) I 
confess that I can think of no alternative solution to that now put forward ; and some 
solution seems to me imperative. 

(2) [cp. supra, p. 79, No. 93.] 



No. 170. 

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. 

Rome, December 13, 1913. 

F.O. 56803/39484/13/44. l'^^ 
Tel. (No. 222.) 6-45 P.M. 

I spoke last night to the Minister for Foreign Affairs m the sense of your telegram 
No. 366 of Dec[ember] 11. (^) 

He said that the idea of connecting concessions from Turkey with the evacuation 
of the islands was rather put forward by him as personal to myself and with a view to 
facilitating the task of the Government in Italy than with the idea of new conditions. 
He maintained that Turkey, by not carrying out treaty conditions, had entailed on this 
country increased expenditure^ caused by the prolongation of resistance in Cyrenaica 
and the maintenance of the occupation of the islands. 

I objected that Turkey claimed to have done all she could to remove the Turkish 
troops. This he would not admit, and alleged suspicion that she did not desire to 
accelerate evacuation because she feared that the islands might go to Greece. Italy 
was entitled to an indemnity for the prolongation of this situation, and he had thought 
that the best means of settlement would be by a grant to Italians of concessions which 
would compensate for losses incurred. The Ministry had to deal with a young and 
excitable nation, and he felt that I must realise that at the present moment no 
Government could propose the abandonment of the one lever they possessed for 
exercising pressure on Turkey, which had not even asked for the restitution of the 
islands, without having some plausible pretext for their action. He repeated 
assurances as to the sincerity of their ultimate intentions and firm resolve not to 
incorporate in this kingdom any European populations other than Italian and thus 
sacrifice the existing advantages of homogeneity. These assurances will be repeated 
in the Chamber, probably to-day. Any overt pressure by the Powers, which he 
earnestly trusted would not be exerted, would only increase the difficulties of the 
Government by arousing opposition here. I urged that the longer it was delayed the 
more difficult it must become. He agreed, but urged the necessity of awaiting an 
opportune moment which ho felt would present itself if they had some success to 
report in the negotiations for concessions. As his Excellency has returned to the 
standpoint of the Treaty of Lausanne, it may be worth considering whether Turkey 
should not now take some initiative and claim to have fulfilled the treaty. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs quite agreed with you as to the inadvisability 
of claiming a sphere of interest. He had done all he could to check the campaign 
initiated in Turin " Stampa " (see Mr. Bering's despatch No. 298). (') The idea that 
a sphere of interest had been marked out arose from Italy's having endeavoured to find 
some region for economic concessions where she would not be in conflict with those 
obtained by other countries. He had no knowledge, when the question first arose, of 
the extent of the concession of the Sm-vrna-Aidin Eailway. Now that he knew he 
realised that the only course was to endeavour to come to terms with that company. 



(1) [v. supra, p. 153, No. 168.] 

(2) [Mr. Bering's despatch (No. 298), D. October 29, R. Noyember 1, 1913, merely analysed 
articles in the Stampa. (F.O. 49568/39484/13/44.)] 



155 



On my again asking whether any real concession existed, and, if so, what were 
its terms, he admitted that an ItaHan syndicate had received authorisation to make 
studies. In so far as that was a concession, it might be said to exist, but there was no 
concession for any concrete undertakings. Pie said that he did not know whether a 
copy of the vaguely worded document drawn up at Constantinople existed in the 
Itahan Foreign Office, but could ask the director of the " Commercial Bank," which 
seems to be the promoter, whether it could be communicated to me. 



MINUTE. 

Italy persists in keeping us in the dark about the terms of her concession. Evidently she 
cannot afford to be open and frank about it. 

E. A. C. 

Dec [ember] 15. 
A. N. 
E. G. 



No. 171. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet. 

F.O. 57005/13799/13/44. 
(No. 461.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, December 16, 1913. 

The Turkish Ambass[ado]r observed to Sir A. Nicolson this afternoon that he 
had read in this morning's papers a telegram from Paris to the effect that H[is] 
M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t had proposed to the Powers a solution of the question of 
the islands, and that Imbros and Tenedos were to be left to Turkey. (^) He wished to 
point out that, if it were true that the Powers were discussing the above question, 
Turkey had always requested that islands lying in close proximity to the mainland, 
such as Scio and Mitylene, should not be placed in other than Turkish hands. 

Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha that, as the Southern Albanian frontier 
delimitation was approaching completion, we had felt the moment had come to raise 
the question of the future of the islands, as a solution could not be indefinitely post- 
poned. We were, therefore, in communication with the Powers on the subject, and as 
the question was not an easy one intercommunication would probably take some 
time.(-) 

Tewfik P[ash]a said he wished to tell Sir A. Nicolson confidentially that the 
Italians had explained privately to the Turkish Gov[ernmen]t that they would be 
unable to evacuate the Dodekanese until Greece had evacuated islands so close to the 
mainland as Scio and Mitylene. (^) 

[I am, &c. 
E. G.] 

(1) [cp. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91.] 

(-) [In Sir A. Nicolson's original record of this conversation, on which the despatch is 
based, he added here: "Further information I did not give him."] 

(3) [Note by Sir A. Nicolson: "We had heard of this from other sources." Note by 
Sir Edward Grey: "Something should be said to M. Cambon to point out the unfortunate 
effect of our note having been communicated to the French press : it is most unfortunate and 
will very likely prejudice whatever chances the proposal had of being accepted. E. G." For 
the note, v. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91.] 



156 



No. 172. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 57407/13799/13/44. 

(No 1011 ) Constantinople, D. December 16, 1913. 

■ R. December 22, 1913. 

' The Italian Ambassador, Marquis Garroni, having returned from leave of absence, 
I paid him an official visit this morning. After the usual exchange of courtesies, I 
asked the present position with regard to the islands. 

He said that all those in Italian possession would be restored to Turkey accordmg 
to the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, when the conditions mentioned therein were 
fulfilled. Doubt had been cast on the good faith of Italy, but it was the truth,— Italy 
had no wish to retain possession of these Islands which would be a source of weakness 
instead of strength, unless the Italian Fleet were largely increased, and this would 
mean a large expenditure for which Italy was not prepared. 

I enquired what were His Excellency's views in regard to the Islands now 
occupied by Greece. He said that he understood that the Powers intended to award 
them all to Greece save Tenedos and Imbros. I replied that I knew nothing of the 
intentions of my Government, and enquired what he thought of the proposal. 

He said that he did not think it was wise and that it might lead to trouble. It 
was in the interest of both Great Britain and Italy to maintain the integrity of 
Turkey, and the possession of Mitylene and Chios by Greece, if agreed to by Turkey, 
would'^be a standing menace to her, for it would be a foyer of intrigue with the 
mainland, which the Turks would be unable to control as they do now. There were 
manv thousands of Greeks on the littoral, which would soon be converted into a second 
Macedonia. He thought it possible that the Turkish Government would not tamely 
submit to such a decree of the Powers. 

I enquired what line the Italian Government would take in regard to the proposal. 
He said that the Italian Government were very anxious to be on good terms with His 
Majesty's Government, who, he understood, would press for its adoption, and that they 
would probably give way in order to please Great Britain, but he personally thought 
that such a policy would have bad results. 

The Marquis Garroni is a very able man which is shown by the position held 
here by Italy only a year after the war, and, as you are aware, he is an intimate friend 
of Signor Giohtti. 

I have, &c. 

LOUIS MALLET. 



MINUTE. 

We now know that the Italian Government is secretly doing the very opposite of what 
thev profess.C) 

E. A. C. 

Dec [ember], 24. 
E. G. 

(') [v. infra, pp 163-4, No. 179, and note (^).] 



157 



No. 173. 
L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

F.O. 57414 a3799/ 13/44. 

(No. 1018.) Pera, D. December 17, 1913. 

Sir:— R. December 22, 1913. 

I have the honour to report that rumours have recently reached Turkish olScial 
circles to the effect that His Majesty's Government is about to initiate a proposal that, 
of the islands occupied by Greece, only Tenedos and Imbros should revert to Turkey 
while the remainder — including Chios, Mitylene, Samos &c. should be left to Greece. 

As I already have had occasion to report, such a decision would be strongly 
resented by the present Government of Turkey, the Grand Vizier having once stated 
to me (vide my despatch No. 937 Confidential of Nov[ember] 15th, 1913)(-) that 
Turkey would go to war with Greece rather than agree to any such solution. 

The feeling here is so strong on the subject that it would be easy to create an 
atmosphere from which war would be the only issue. 

The recent civil and military appointments to, and the military dispositions in, 
the Smyrna region go to denote the intention to adopt extreme measures in the matter 
of the islands close to the Smyrna coastland, while, should Turkey not be in a position 
to operate successfully against Greece by sea, indications are not wanting that the 
Salonican and Macedonian elements in the Committee would welcome a pretext, 
should the international position be favourable, for marching against Greece through 
Western Thrace in the double hope of forcing Greece to restore the islands and of 
freeing Salonica and its Macedonian hinterland from Greek, and perhaps, Servian 
rule. Should such a situation arise, it would appear that the Bulgarians, who would 
equally welcome the disappearance of Greek and Servian rule, none too popular 
among the non-Greek and non-Serb elements in Macedonia, would content themselves 
with a pro forma protest against the passage of Turkish troops through western 
Thrace, and that they would be willing to retrocede that district to Turkey in return 
for territory west of the Mesta kara sou or even for the autonomy of Macedonia. 
There are signs that the Bulgarian occupation of Western Thrace is not at present of 
a permanent character while the Turkish bands organisation, which played such a 
prominent part in the reoccupation of the Adrianople and adjoining districts in July 
last, is still kept up here and has connection with the elements in Albania which some 
time ago engaged in the anti-Serb attacks. 

It would thus seem that the question of the islands now occupied by Greece may 
serve as a pretext or cause for Turkish military adventures west of the Maritza. That 
His Majesty's Government should be held responsible for a decision in the matter 
adverse to Turkey would naturally render her unpopular here and would be difficult 
to reconcile in the Turkish mind with the friendly statements made by the Prime 
Minister in his Guildhall speech, (^) while in the general interests of Turkey it would 
seem highly undesirable that she should be afforded any pretext for, or incentive to, 
engaging in adventures of a nature seriously to impair, if not to imperil, the vital work 
of reform in her Asiatic provinces. 

I have, &c. 

LOUIS MALLET. 

MINUTES. 

It w[oul]d have a most salutary effect on the Turks if the Germans told them to keep 
quiet. We have incurred unpopularity both in Greece and Turkey by our proposals designed 
to find a way out of the position of suspense that has prevailed all too long. It is time some 
one else did a bit too — especially Germany. C[oul]d this be pointed out? Another reason 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. A 
copy was sent to the Director of Military Operations.] 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 144-5, No. 160.] 

(3) [v. The Times, November 11, 1913.] 



158 



why Turkey can be kept from war is the financial situation. France can help there. Turkey 
should get no help till the question of the islands is solved and the decision of the Powers 
accepted by her. 

R. G. V. 

Dec [ember] 23. 

I very much doubt whether Germanj' would put any pressure on the Porte, however much 
they professed to agree with us in theory. 

We have made our proposal to the 5 Powers and shall know where we stand when we get 
their considered replies. Meanwhile the Turks are getting accustomed to the situation, 
" public opinion " is busily blowing off steam, and when, if ever, a concrete proposal is put 
before them it will anyhow not have the disadvantages of an unexpected blow. 

Nor need we be deterred from our course by threats of a Turco-Greek war in the spring : 
there is a long road between Turkish speech and action. 

G. R. C. 

23.xii.13. 
E. A. C. 

Dec [ember] 23. 
E. G. 



No. 174. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edivard Grey.C) 

Private. (-) 

Dear Sir Edward, Pcra, December 17, 1913. 

We have made our enquiry and are not very much the wiser. Perhaps the fact 
that the Commandant de Place is responsible for order here under the direct orders 
of the Minister of War during a state of siege may enable Eussia to take a more lenient 
view. 

Personally I am sorry that we have made this demarche though the telegrams 
from St. Petersburg which have now arrived in the sections explain the difficulty of 
our position. (') 

The situation is a difficult one here. All the Powers including ourselves, are trying 
hard to get what they can out of Turkey. They all profess to wish the maintenance of 
Turkey's integrity but no one ever thinks of this in practice. Although I fully admit 
their shortcomings it appears to me to be much against our interests to allow this 
Government to go to pieces either by suggesting ourselves any action or by supporting 
any action which might have an injurious effect upon them. On the contrary I think 
we ought to give them what support we can. J 

It might be argued that it would be dangerous to give this Government money, II 
which might be spent on war with Greece, supposing the Powers ignore the Turkish 
point of view in respect of the islands. But, it might be equally dangerous to thwart 
their wishes and to give them no money for they would then be more tempted to take 
the Debt revenues and would employ them as they liked. It must be remembered that 
the men at present in power are very energetic to say the least of it. They might be 
called desperate. It is they who made the coup d'etat because the Government were 
signing away Adrianople and they might not submit tamely to an arrangement by .| 
which they were deprived of Mitylene and Chios which the Grand Vizier has described I 

(') [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the Prime Minister; to Sir A. Nicolson; 
to Sir E. Crowe ; with copies of Sir Edward Grey's private telegram in reply, and of his private 
letter of December 23, v. infra, pp. 164-5, Nos. 180-1.] 

(2) [Grey MSS., Vol. 41.] 

[The reference here is probably to Mr. O'Beirne's telegrams (No. 382) of November 10, 
1913, and (No. 387) of November 18, 1913. The former stated that Russia had advised the Porte 
to show moderation in the negotiations with Greece and quoted the Russian view that there - 
would be no Turkish loan floated in Paris until Turkey concluded peace. (F.O. 51124/33220/ 't 
13/44.) The second of these telegrams reported M. Sazonov's anxiety to resume the Conference 3 
of Ambassadors in London, as the only practical means of settling the question of the ^gean } 
Islands. (F.O. 52471/106/13/44.) The term "sections" in the text above refers to the 
Confidential Print.] 



159 



to me as vital to their security, as I have reported in my despatch No. 937(^) and in 
my private letter of November 25th.(^) 

On the arrival of the new Military Attache last week, I asked him to study in all 
its bearings the likelihood of Turkey being able to take military action and he 
is starting today on a journey to Thrace to see whether any preparations are being 
made. 

I am relying on your statement to me before I left England that you did not 
propose to take any initiative in the matter of the islands, and if you have done so I 
hope that Turkey's point of view will be borne in mind, otherwise there may be trouble. 

My own position, however, except in so far as I3ritish interests are concerned, is 
not of importance, but I shall feel very uncomfortable with the Grand Vizier and 
Talaat, who have confidence in my good will, and whom I have been endeavouring to 
persuade of British sincerity and friendship, if His Majesty's Government have made 
proposals unfavourable to Turkey. 

Yours sincerely, 

LOUIS MALLET. 

(*) [v. supra, pp. 144-5, No. 160.] 
(') [v. supra, pp. 150-1, No. 165.] 



No. 175. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edicard Grey. 

F.O. 57204/13799/13/44. Constantinople, December 19, 1913. 

Tel. (No. 634.) K. 10 p.m. 

My telegram No. 631 of 17th December.(^) 

All colleagues are in possession of British proposals, which are known everywhere. 
My ofl&cial ignorance of them places me in a somewhat false position to enquirers. (^) 

Comments in press are naturally unfavourable ; initiative of His Majesty's 
Government is looked upon as a very great moral blow to Turkey.(^) The leading 
Government organ states that fact of His Majesty's Government making proposals so 
injuriously affecting Turkey's vital interests in Anatolia is inconsistent with your 
profession of interest in Turkish integrity. 

It is painful for Turkey to realise that England, who took lead in Adrianople 
campaign, deliberately pursues a policy of reversal of friendship to her. And it is 
remarked that it appears from manner in which proposals are ('? stated) that His 
Majesty's Government's decision has been taken, not on merits of question, but on 
opportunist grounds. 

(1) [Sir L. Mallet's telegram (No. 631) of December 17, 1913, D. 4 p.m., R. 5-30 p.m. 
(F.O. 56901/13799/13/44), is not reproduced as the substance is given more fully in his 
despatch (No. 1018) of December 17. v. supra, p. 157, No. 173.] 

{-) [cp. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91, and note (>) j infra, p. 161, No. 177.] 

(^) [cp. infra, pp. 162-3, No. 178.] 



No. 176. 

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edivard Grey. 
F.O. 57433/13799/13/44. 

(No. 201.) Confidential. Vienna, D. December 19, 1913. 

Sir, E. December 22, 1913. 

Count Berchtold has now made his last speech on Foreign Affairs both in the 
Austrian and the Hungarian Delegations. The votes in both assemblies on the Secret 
Service Fund display a very qualified approval of his policy, and the constant repetition 
against him of the same charges throughout the discussions show that his explanations 
have not been convincing. Criticism tended always to concentrate on three principal 



160 



points, namelv (1) his failure to define before the war the sphere of Austro-Hungarian 
interests which the Servians should not be allowed to transgress, (2) the use made of 
the Prochaska incident to stir up warhke feeling and so to justify mobilization, and 
(3) the alienation of Eoumania by pressing for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest. 
To these indictments he replied generally that to <Jraw a hard and fast line beyond 
which Servia was not to penetrate would have meant war, and would ha,ve exposed the 
Monarchy to the reproach of seeking to check the expansion of the Christian States of 
the Balkans ; that no unnecessary mystery was kept up in the Prochaska case by the 
Press Bureau; and that every effort had been made to retain the friendship of 
Roumania. 

From a usually well-informed quarter I have heard that Count _ Berchtold may 
shortly take the opportunity of resignnig his present office. An indication pointing 
that way is perhaps to be found in the fact that the office of Chief Chamberlain, 
recently rendered available by the death of Count Gudenus, is not yet filled up. 
Count Berchtold is thought to be peculiarly well fitted for the post, which requires a, 
man of cultivated taste to take charge of the Imperial Art Collections. Possibly this 
office is being kept open for him. But the Emperor may think it more important to 
keep him where he is. Personally Count Berchtold is known to desire rehef from the 
unceasing work of the Foreign Office. Whatever may be said eventually of the results 
of his policy, the Monarchy must feel relieved of a great anxiety by the dissolution of 
the Balkan Alliance, and as a set-oif against the vast expenditure involved in 
mobilization it may well point to the greatly increased power and efficiency of the joint 
army which have "by this means been secured, without the actual risks of war. 

"l have already reported by telegraph that the French and Russian Ambassadors 
are supporting here your proposals for a general settlement of the Islands question. (^) 
M. Dumaine had several times spoken to me on the subject of the Islands before your 
instruction came. Personally he had inclined towards a solution founded on the 
formation of a purely nominal Turkish Governorship for the whole of the ^Egean 
Islands, both those in Greek and those in Italian occupation, — excepting always the two 
nearest to the mouth of the Dardanelles. The Islands would all have obtained, under 
this arrangement, the autonomy which you are now proposing to reserve to the 
Dodecanese under Turkish sovereignty. His Excellency had sounded M. Streit, the 
universally consulted Greek Minister, as to how far Greece would fall in with such a 
suggestion. M. Dumaine was led by M. Streit's reply to think that Greece would have 
reluctantly accepted. "When therefore I informed him of your proposals he expressed 
some surprise at the contemplated exemptions of IMitylene and Chios from Turkish 
sovereignty. He has since learned that his Government entirely agrees with your 
view, which he is wholeheartedly supporting at Vienna, though himself very 
apprehensive of resistance at Constantinople assuming proportions which it will require 
force to overcome. 

To me the Greek Minister, as I have remarked in another despatch, (^) has not 
concealed his opinion, formed possibly since he has become aware of the British 
proposal, that war would result from the attempt on the part of Turkey to take 
possession of the Islands now held by Greece. 

M. de Tschirschky, German Ambassador, is himself not unfriendly towards the 
Greeks, and I presume his feelings on this point correspond to the present direction of 
German policy. (*) He has assured me of the desire which would be felt at Berlin to 
meet as far as possible any proposal coming from yourself. On the other hand he has 
expressed himself to me as being very doubtful whether your proposals, useful though 

(1) [Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram (No. 199) of December 17, D. 8-5 p.m., R. 10-30 p.m., 
contained this information. It is not reproduced as its contents are given more fully above 
(F.O. 56906/13799/13/44.)] 

(2) [Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch (No. 200), D. December 18, R. December 21, 1913, is not 
reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. It mentioned the appointment of 
M. Streit as Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. (F.O. 57432/57432/13/44.)] 

(3) [cp. supra, pp. 157-8, No. 173, and min.] 



161 



he admits them to be, can be realized in their present form. He fears desperate 
resistance from Turkey, considerable hesitation at Rome, and that in any case a long 
negotiation will be required. 

The Turkish Ambassador, Hilmi Pasha, informed me yesterday that he had 
enquired at Constantinople as to the impression made there by the press accounts of 
your proposals. He had been told in reply that the Turkish Government could not 
acquiesce in a transference of sovereignty from Turkey to Greece over islands lying in 
the close vicinity of the coast of Asia Minor. Turkey indeed, had agreed, with Greece, 
to leave the disposal of the Islands in the hands of the Great Powers, but in doing so 
had expressly stipulated that due account should be taken of legitimate Turkish claims. 
I do not know whether, in making these remarks. His Excellency referred to any 
specilic comm.unication made by Turkey to the Powers in this connection. 

The French Ambassador is to see Count Berchtold today on the subject of your 
proposals. The new Russian Ambassador, M. Shebeko, has already seen His Excellency 
and spoken strongly in support of them. Count Berchtold could not give him any 
indication of what would be his final decision. It is perhaps as well that, before gi%'ing 
me his \-iews. Count Berchtold should have had an opportunity of hearing how the 
question is regarded in Paris and Petersburg. 

I have. &e. 

MAURICE DE BUXSEX. 



Xo. 177. 

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir L. Mallet. 

F.O. 56901 13799 13 44. 

Tel. (Xo. 587.) Foreign Ojnce, December 20, 1913, 1-15 p.m. 

Your Excellency's telegram Xo. 631 (56901 of Dec[ember] 17(^) : -Egean Islands). 

I have despatched to you by post on December 18 full text of my proposals. (-) I 
purposely did not do so before, as I thought it might be an advantage to you to be 
able to decline any discussion with the Porte so long as uncertainty prevailed as to 
the form in which my proposals would emerge from the discussion with the Powers. 
I much regret that practically our whole proposal has now appeared in the " Temps " 
which renders it impossible to preserve its confidential character. (■^) This being so it 
is better that Y[our] E[xcellency] should be fully informed. 

Should the Ottoman Government raise question, you should dweU on the fact 
that the general line consistently adopted by the Powers has been, subject to the 
maintenance of an independent Albania, to recognize the territorial status quo 
established as the result of the appeal to arms. This was notably the case as regards 
the fate of Adrianople and Eastern Thrace. On the same principle, the islands 
conquered and occupied by Greece should remain with her, an exception in favour of 
Turkey being made in the case of Tenedos and Imbros, and special guarantees 
proposed to safeguard Turkey against any danger that the islands close to the Asiatic 
coast might be used to embaiTass Turkey. 

On the other hand Y[our] E[xcellency] should lay stress on the fact that we want 
the islands in Italian occupation to revert to Turkey. The Porte has hitherto been 
e\-idently embarrassed in working for Italian evacuation by the fear that the islands 
would fall to Greece. If our proposal is accepted, this question will be settled in 
favour of Turkey by securing and placing on record a formal decision of the Powers 
that Italy must withdraw. 

(.1) Iv. supra, p. 159, No. 175, and note (i).] 
(2) [v. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91, and note (i).] 

(') [cp. infra, pp. 163-4, No. 179. A version of the note was published in Le Temps on 
December 14, 1913. cp. The Times, December 17. 1913, pp. 7, 9.] 



[8959] 



M 



1G2 



No. 178. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. 

FO 57836/13799/13/44. Constantinople, D. December 22, 1913, 8 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 637.) ^- December 23, 1913, 12-45 p.m. [sic]. 

Your tel[egram] No. 587 of Dec[ember] 20.(') 

Greek islands. 

The Grand Vizier spoke to me at his official reception, which I attended on account 
of other business, respecting the British proposal which His Highness said had taken 
him entirely bv surprise and had been a bitter disillusion to the Government as to the 
sentiments of His Majesty's Government. I replied that I regretted the unintentional 
discourtesy to the Porte involved in the premature and mischievous publication of tlie 
proposals but I had myself only become aware of them through the press and had on 
Saturday only received an instruction from you on the subject. As to His Majesty's 
Government's action the question had been left to the Powers to settle, or had to be 
settled, and it was natural that you should take the lead as the Conference had been 
held in London. I proceeded to argue in the sense of your instruction respecting the 
general lines observed by the Powers in recognizing the territorial status quo resulting 
from the appeal to arms. Plis Highness replied that if that were the case the Powers 
might just as well have left the matter alone. He had understood that the object of 
leaving the question to the Powers was to secure a settlement which would be accepted 
by Turkey and Greece. The settlement proposed by His Majesty's Government would 
never be accepted by Turkey and was bound to lead to war sooner or later. 

He felt that M. Venizelos would not like the proposal either because he had had it 
indirectly from him that he would be embarrassed if Mitylene and Chios were left to 
Greece knowing that it would involve Greece in another war. I expressed my surprise 
and His Highness repeated the statement categorically. He went on to state that if 
His Majesty's Government were guided by the rule of status quo why did they give 
Imbros and' Tenedos to Turkey? I said that His Highness could scarcely complain of 
a breach of this principle so entirely in their favour and that Imbros and Tenedos 
had been left to Turkey for strategic reasons which were obvious. As to Mitylene and 
Chios they would only be a source of weakness to Turkey. An agitation would be set 
on foot for reannexation to Greece and they would constitute two Cretes lying oS the 
mainland whilst under the conditions proposed in the British Note they could not be 
a source of danger to Turkey, His Highness denied that these islands had been 
elements of unrest like Crete. Their population was peaceful and commercial which 
if left under the Turkish rule would not have complained. If they remained Greek 
they would be centres of intrigue from Athens and no safeguard could be provided 
against that. As he had told me before possession of these islands was a matter of 
life and death to Turkey who would not give them up, I said that they were already 
in Greek possession and that it was more a question of Greece giving them up which 
she would be unlikely to do without a struggle. I went on to point out advantages 
of British proposal so far as islands occupied by Italy were concerned. His Highness 
did not agree. He said that Italy had undertaken by treaty to restore them to Turkey. 
Greece could not take them without declaring war and Turkey could not be expected 
to be grateful to the Powers for not taking them from her and giving them to Greece, 
His Highness went on to speak most bitterly of England's attitude. The Porte 
no longer believed what they were always being told that she or any of the other 
Powers wanted her regeneration. They wanted the destruction of Turkey. They 
boycotted them when they were starving for money. They refused them officials for 
reforming provinces. They were creating troubles about military mission(^) when 
Russian Ambassador had known for months past that it was contemplated and might 
have pointed out in a friendly manner to the Porte the Russian objections instead of 
waiting until it was too late and the question was settled, 

(1) [v. immediately preceding document, and note (2).] 

(2) [cp. infra, pp. 338-423, Chapter LXXXVII, passim.] 



1G3 



I said that I deeply regretted that His Highness should imagine that His Majesty's 
Government were actuated hy unfriendly feeling. 1 thought that some of their 
diflBculties were of the Porte's own creation and that there had been the most 
deplorable delay about Armenian reforms and as to the Military ]\rission it might have 
occurred to the Porte that objection would be taken to a foreign commander in tho 
capital. 

MINUTE. 

See records of my conversation with Tewfik Pasha and M. de Flenriau to-day and minutes 
thereon. (.•■') 

E. A. C. 

Dec [ember] 23. 
E G 

(3) [Sir E. Crowe's conversation with Tewfik Pasha is described infra, p. 173, No. 187; 
his conversation on the same day with M. de Fleuriau was recorded in Sir Edward Grey's 
despatch (No. 1) to Sir F. Bertie of January 1, 1914. The record shows that a Turkish 
conmiunication had been made at Paris " to the effect that the Turkish Government would 
absolutely refuse their consent to the islands near the Asiatic mainland being left to Greece 
and that if necessary they would go to war to reconquer them." (F.O. 58615/13799/13/44.) 
cp. infra, pp. 171-2, No. 186.] 



No. 179. 

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.C) 
F.O. 58084/13799/] 3/44. 

(No. 356.) ' Confidential. Rome, D. December 22, 1913. 

Sir, P- December 29, 1913. 

I have had the honour to report to you fully by telegraph today (-) the conversa- 
tion which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning on the subject of 
the proposals embodied in your telegram circular (No. 449 to Paris) of the 
r2th instant. (^) The somewhat meagre results there recorded is the utmost I have yet 
been able to extract from him in the course of four interviews since the receipt of your 
instructions. Nevertheless the impression I have derived is that he is not unfavourable 
to the general lines of policy suggested, but is apprehensive that an opportunity may 
be lost, by a too ready acceptance, of acquiring merit with Turkey from whom Italy 
aspires to concessions. There is an evident desire to gain time and take note of 
tendencies, and meanwhile the press is being utilized to give currency to the argument 
that a form of indemnity is due to this country for the prolonged state of war in 
Cyrenaica and the expenditure entailed by the Italian occupation of the ^gean 
islands. 

Delay is at present being secured on the plea that it is necessary to obtain the 
views of the other members of the Triple Alliance, who have not yet expressed them- 
selves definitely. ^Meanwhile the inopportune publication of the substance of these 
proposals in the Paris " Temps " has led to a communication from Turkey to the effect 
that she cannot consent to the transfer of the coastal islands to Greece('*) and this 
communication Italy, in her zeal for concessions, may plead that it will be difficult for 
her altogether to disregard. The French version of the proposals as published in the 
press here, was incomplete, and suggested a note of warning to Italy that the time had 
come for her to carry out the promised evacuation. Now that it is known that any 
suggestion of peremptoriness was foreign to the real contents of the communication, 
the French are accused of having deliberately tried to make mischief between Italy 

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; 
to Lord Crewe; to Lord Morley.] 

(2) [v. supra, p. 81, No. 97.] 

(3) [v. supra, pp.- 76-7, No. 91.] 

{*) [cp. immediately preceding document, and note (3).] 

[8959] M 2 



164 



and the country whose tact and equitv has been so amply demonstrated in the recent 
negotiations. Altogether the premature publication seems to have risked compromising 
what was rather a favourable atmosphere for a settlement. 

The Turkish communication was probably also responsible for the Marquis di San 
Giuliano's observations to me this morning as regards the attitude of Germany. 
Germany was, he understood, apprehensive that insistence on the immediate putting 
into effect of vour proposals might load to a resumption of hostilities between Turkey 
and Greece, while at the same time it was hoped in Berlin that with time and negotia- 
tion the desired result might in substance eventually be obtained. His exposition of 
the views of Germany did not carry much conviction, and had I then been aware of the 
contents of Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 213 of the 14th instant,(') I should, without 
betraying any confidence, have known better how to appreciate his account of the 
probable" attitude of Germany. Unfortunately the messenger did not arrive this 
morning until nearly two hoiirs after he was due, and the sections containing the 
telegram from Berlin which reports what both the Imperial Chancellor and the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs undertook to say at Eome and Vienna only 
reached me after my interview with the ]\Iarquis di San Giuliano. 

The mistrust of the Greeks displayed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs was very 
apparent, though I should perhaps not go so far as Herr von Jagow has done, speaking 
privately to Sir E. Gosclien, and describe his feelings as a hatred almost amounting to 
mania. Indeed I must do him the justice to say that in referring to their action in 
Southern Albania, when I spoke of the traditional association of the Suliotes with the 
cause of Hellenism, he frankly admitted that the Greeks had only done what it was 
natural they should do and what Italians had also done when they were struggling for 
their independence. His attitude is perhaps intensified by an effort to suppress 
misgivings as to how far he has been right in permanently alienating the sympathies 
of the Greeks, misgivings which are shared by a great many thinking people in this 
country. It is possible however that to my German and Austrian colleagues he speaks 
of the Greeks with less reserve than he does to me. 

I have, &c. 

EENNELL RODD. 

{^) [v. supra, p. 79, No. 93.] 



No. 180. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.C) 

Private.(=) 

My dear Mallet, Fallodon, December 23, 1913. 

I had quite forgotten that I had told you that I did not mean to take any initiative 
about the Islands. f*) 

This became eventually the only chance of avoiding a catastrophe in South 
Albania, and as all thi'ough the Summer it was only on the understanding that Greece 
was to have the Islands (except Tenedos and Imbros) that we and others agreed to 
deprive Greece of Korytza and Stylos, there was no help for it, except to make the 
proposal that I did. But I am full of compunction at not having told you and explained 
it all to you beforehand and I realize what this may have added to your difficulties, 
and if the results are untoward at Constantinople they shall go to my account, not to 
yours. 

The best cards I can give you are that we have on our own initiative put in a 
condition that the Powers should engage to Turkey that they will keep Greece up to 

(1) [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the Prime Minister ; to Sir A. Nicolson r 
to Sir E. Crowe.] 

(=) [Grey MSS., Vol. 41.] 

(3) [cp. supra, p. 159, No. 174.] 



1G5 



the marlc in the repression of smuggling : and that we have come down on the Turkish 
side as regards the Islands in Italian occupation ; this had not always been our 
intention. 

I have not in my official proposal mentioned the island of Kastelcoritza close to 
the Turkish coast : I am not sure that it is occupied by either Greeks or Italians. I 
agree that it should go to Turkey. 

As to the German command, my private telegram(') in answer to your letter of 
the 17th(^) and the print will have shown you the part that we have played. It has 
been anything but unfriendly to Turkey in view of the way I have been pressed by 
Russia. (') 

The Turks ought now to see that, by holding back as regards definitive British 
appointments in Armenia we have served [sic ; '? saved] them from serious con- 
sequences. It is hardly too much to say that, had it not been for our caution about 
Armenian appointments and for our refusal to precipitate a crisis over the German 
command, the Russians would have been in Armenia by now, and the disintegration 
of Asiatic Turkey would have begun. For the Germans are not going to fight Russia 
to defend Turkey, they are going to claim their sliare if disintegration begins. There 
is an article in the "Temps" of December 19 on what Turkey owes to the Triple 
Alliance and to the Entente respectively, which has some good points, though it presses 
them too far in some cases. 

Finance is going to be a great difficulty for the whole of Europe except perhaps 
ourselves, for we do not live on loans. Paris is the only market and the French them- 
seh^es and the Russians have the first claim on it ; it is a market over exploited 
already and countries that cannot get along without borrowing from outside may 
collapse. Whether Turkey really is such a country I am not sure. On paper she is 
bound to collapse without loans, but Eastern countries can do without money in a way 
of their own, and the French have invested so much in Turkey that they will strain 
many points to keep her on her feet. 

Yours sincerely, 

E. GREY. 

(*) [v. immediately succeeding document.] 
(5) [v. supra, pp. 158-9, No. 174.] 

(«) [cp. infra, pp. 328-423, Chapter LXXXVII, passim.] 



No. 181. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet. {^) 

Tel. Private.(') Decemher 24, 1913, 8-35 p.m. 

Your private letter of 17th. (^) I much regret I overlooked what I had said to you 
about the Islands as I would have told you beforehand when it became necessary to 
make some proposal to avoid future trouble. Settlement of S[outh] Albanian frontier 
being based originally upon leaving Islands to Greece I could not make any proposal 
more favourable to Turkey than I did. 

As to German command Turks ought not to resent our having made an enquiry, 
the more so as it is so far due to us that nothing more than an enquiry has yet been 
made and that time has been gained for calm discussion before any peremptory 
demands were made. This is in the interest of everybody concerned, but especially of 
Turkey. 

A letter follows by next bag.(*) 

(1) [This telegram -is endorsed as having been sent to the Prime Minister; to Sir A. 
Nicolson ; to Sir E. Crowe.] 

(2) [Grey MSS., Vol. 41.] 

(^) [v. supra, pp. 158-9, No. 174.] 

■ ') [v. immediately preceding document.] 



166 



No. 182. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen. 
P.O. 58G05/13799/13/44. 

Tel. (No. 431.) Foreign Office, December 27, 1913, 3*15 p.m. 

I hear from a Turkish source that Italy has made a communication to Turkish 
Government to the effect that she will never evacuate Islands in her occupation if the 
other Islands are to go to Greece. 

In view of the fact that in discussions which took place between Ambassador in 
London and myself in the earlier part of the year Italy was an active party to under- 
standing that if Korytza and Stilos were given to Albania, Islands in Greek occupation 
except Tenedos and'imbros should go to Greecef') this report is hardly credible. But 
it comes to me from a good source. 

It means in effect that Italy is instigating Turkey to upset the understanding on 
which settlement of S. Albanian frontier was arrived at. 

It is also contrary to assurances given by Italy to evacuate Islands in her 
occupation, assurances to which no condition was attached except that of Treaty of 
Lausanne, and which were given to us subsequently to understanding about 
S. Albanian frontier and islands in Greek occupation. 

You should when there is a reasonable opportunity inform German Chancellor 
and say that while I shall await the reply of Italy and her allies to proposals that I 
have made, the Italian attitude if confirmed will destroy all prospect of agreement on 
these questions and of settlement of S. Albanian frontier. 

The result would be that Italy and Austria would have to deal with S. Albanian 
frontier without any agreement between the Powers, while Turkey and Greece would 
be in the same position as regards the Islands in Greek occupation. 

What the attitude of respective Powers and the relations between them would 
become under these complications it is difficult to forecast. I cannot contemplate the 
prospect without misgiving. 

I can suggest no better way of avoiding these undesirable contingencies than the 
proposals which I have put forward and which indeed have their origin in existing 
understandings and assurances of which they were the outcome, and I hope the 
German Government will do its utmost to remove the difficulties that are now 
threatening. 

MINUTE. 

Sir E. Grey. 

The passages marked in the attached papers entirely confirm your impression that Italy 
took an active part in framing the resolution at the ambassadors' conference by which the 
question of Koritza and Stylos was linked with the fate of the islands in Greek occupation. (3) 

This being so, I have had your telegram to Sir E. Goschen sent off. 

Sir R. Rodd, in a private letter to me, just received,(*) suggests that the intimation made 
to Turkey that Italy would the more readily be got to evacuate the islands in her occupation 
if the other islands were not left with Greece, was probably conveyed not through any official 
channel — which would have exposed the Italian gov[ernmen]t to many risks — but through 
the unofficial negotiators who recently endeavoured to come to a special agreement with 
Turkey on the basis of an Italian loan in return for some indirect lien on the islands to be 
evacuated. 

E. A. C. 

Dec [ember] 27. 
E. G. 

(') [Before this telegram was sent off Sir Edward Grey wrote a minute asking that " the 
records of any conversations in the spring and summer with the Italian Ambassador should 
be examined " to make sure that his recollection was correct. The minute below is the result 1 

(2) [cp. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 940-1, No. 1185.] 

(3) [v. ibid., pp. 975-6, No. 1226. The " passages marked " include references to documents 
printed ibid., pp. 844-5, No. 1051; pp. 940-1, No. 1185; pp. 945-6, No. 1190.] 

(*) [The letter is not reproduced as it cannot be traced.] 



167 



No. 183. 

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

Roine, December 27, 1913. 

F.O. 58250 13799/13 44. D. 7-30 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 233.) R. 9-30 p.m. 

The Turkish Ambassador has just informed me of the substance of a long 
conversation with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. 

He found him much embarrassed, and believes that he would now be disposed to 
settle the question of evacuation rapidly, if he could save his face with Italian opinion. 
This the Ambassador attributes to your proposals having taken Italy by surprise and 
encourages him to believe that the allies of Italy are urging their general acceptance. 
The Minister explained to him that there (?) [are] elements in the Italian Chamber 
which it is diflBcult to satisfy, and that the question of compensation for the prolonga- 
tion of occupation was being pressed. The cost, he alleged, including the retention of 
extra troops with the colours, amounted to 3,000?. a day. wliich seems to be exaggerated. 
He did not anticipate that Turkey could pay indemnity, but urged the facilitation of 
evacuation by gi^'ing Italy something to show on the credit side, thus bringing the 
issue round again to concessions. 

The Ambassador told me that Turkey was now anxious to recover the islands, and 
he thought it to their advantage to settle at the cost of such a small blackmail which 
might fairly be given to a friendly nation. He therefore asked precisely what he was 
to be asked to recommend. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the question of 
a railway line from Adalia was to be settled with the British Aidin Company ; what 
he wanted from Turkey was a concession for harbour works there. The Ambassador, 
who had anticipated much larger demands and does not believe in the fixture of 
Adalia, said that he had recommended this as a solution if there was no obstacle to the 
concession, belie\"ing that it would also be our interest to accelerate the evacuation, 
and feeling that, if such a compromise could be arranged, Italy would have far less 
chance of intriguing in a region where British interests were already established. He 
had gathered, but was not positive, that the Austrian demand, which had been for a 
small 25-kilom[etre] line, had been dropped at the instance of Italy. 

(Secret.) 

His observations on Italian methods gave me an opportunity to ask whether he 
had any reason to believe that Italy had given Turkey encouragement to endeavour 
to recover any other islands from the Greeks. He said that he could positively affirm 
that there had been such encouragement. This was apparent six weeks ago. 

(1) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 434) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 813) ; to 
Vienna (as No. 347) ; to Constantinople (as No. 393) ; to Paris, by bag.] 



No. 184. 

Sir M. de Bunseii to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

Vienna, December 28, 1913. 

F.O. 58019 13799 13 44. D. 8-16 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 204.1 E. 9-30 p.m. 

.£gean Islands. 

The Turkish Ambassador gave me to-day his \-iews on your proposals. (-) If 
accepted as they stand, Turkey would be compelled by her \dtal interests in Asia Minor 



(1) [This telegram was sent to Constantinople (as No. 594).] 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91.] 



168 



to resume by force possession of the islands proposed to be assigned to Greece The 
ensuing conflict with Greece would inevitably bring Bulgaria into the field as the ally 
of Turkey Servia would also become involved. Albania would invade Epirus. The 
Great Powers might not again be able to keep the peace among themselves. Bulgaria 
would keep Roumania quiet bv ceding to her the remainder of the quadrilateral; 
Bulgaria would take Cavalla. or as much of Servia as she could. In short, the Balkans 

would be again in a blaze. . , , r -, ^ ^■ 

Turkey hoped that some alternative settlement might be put forward on the lines 
advocated bv Lucien Wolf in the " Graphic " of 11th October, according to which the 
Rhodes group would fall to Greece and all the islands dominating the coast of Asia 
Minor would revert to Turkey. . . 

When I reminded him that Turkey had agreed to leave the organisation question 
in the hands of the Powers, he said that her consent had been made conditional on her 
vital interests being respected. 

As the Turkish Ambassador has quite recently met at Vienna the Turkish 
Ambassador at Berlin and the Turkish Minister of Finance, it is probable that these 
views are the result of the conversation of these gentlemen. The Turkish Ambassador 
thought that Italy would be glad to see renewal of the war, but that Germany, and 
probably Austria-Hungary, were in a peaceful mood. Unfortunately in the 
Mediterranean the Triple Alliance was guided by Italian policy. 

The Turkish Ambassador has also spoken at length to the French Ambassador in 
the above sense. 

MINUTE. 

The objection to the proposal of the Turkish Ambassador is of course that Italy will not 
agree to it. 

E. G. 



No. 185. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

F.O. 865/365/14/44. 

(No. 1048.) Confidential. Constantinople, D. December 29, 1913. 

Sir, R. January 5, 1914. 

Colonel Jemal Bey, whose appointment as Minister of Public Works I am 
reporting in a separate despatch,(') called upon me this morning. He had dined with 
me on the occasion of an ofl&cial dinner which I had given to the Grand Vizier and he 
had then asked whether he might come and see me to explain his views on matters of 
importance to England and Turkey. 

I was therefore expecting Jemal Bey's visit and had thought that he was desirous 
of speaking to me about some question such as the Smyrna-Aidin Railway or matters 
of that kind. But this was not the real object of his visit though he touched upon 
it in connection with the question of Italian claims for concession in the neighbourhood 
of Adalia. 

I need not repeat what I reported (in my telegram No. 643 of today) (') was his 
attitude on the subject of Italian Rail and Port concessions in this province. 

Italy had, he said, openly spoken of her wish and right to have a sphere of 
influence in Turkey, and he, Jemal Bey, would never admit such a right. " Zones of 
work ' ' foreign countries might have, but not of political influence. He could never 
forget moreover that Italy was primarily the author of all Turkey's recent 
misfortunes. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King.] 

(2) [Sir L. Mallet's despatch (No. 1044), D. December 30, 1913, R. January 5, 1914, gave 
details of the career and personality of Jemal Bey. (F.O. 361/361/14/44.)] 

(3) [Sir L. Mallet's telegram (No. 643) of December 29, 1913, D. 9-20 p.m., R. 10 p.m., is not 
reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 58508/39484/13/44.)] 



169 



I said that he was probably aware of the pro-raeraoiia which I had left with the 
Grand Vizier on the position of the Smvrna-Aidin Eailway.f and of my request that 
the Turkish Government would inform me if any application was made by the Italian 
Government or any negotiations undertaken. 

Colonel Jemal Bey said that he realised what was our position but did not pursue 
the subject. 

He went on to speak of tlie position of the Islands and, in this connection, he said 
that, rather than give up to Italy one of the islands now in her occupation he would 
see the Empire destroyed. I said that, by your proposal, all these islands would revert 
to Turkish Sovereignty and that this seemed to be of great advantage to Turkey and 
should ]>rove a relief from their embarrassment. He did not reply but passed to the 
question of the islands now occupied by Greece. 

I enquired whether, if the proposal, which it was convenient to call British but 
which was in reality a resume of the views of the Ambassadors' conferences in London, 
was adopted, Turkey would in the long run be the loser. In view of the fact that the 
islands were inhabited by Greeks in vast majority would they not always be a source 
of weakness to the (Htoman Government? .Jemal Bey replied that he would never 
consent to the islands lying off the coast passing permanently into Greek hands. 
These islands were practically part of the mainland, they were inhabited by a peaceful 
commercial community who would be perfectly contented under Turkish rule. If the 
Greeks owned them, they would become the centre of intrigues with the mainland and 
be a constant source of dispute. Should the Powers commit the injustice of giving 
them to Greece, there would never be permanent peace, for Turkey would not rest 
till she got them back. 

Colonel Jemal said that he personally would be ready to give the largest autonomy 
to all the islands, which might be grouped together, but they must be placed under the 
sovereignty of the Sultan. 

He smihngly added that he would not object to European Inspectors General. 

I pointed out that the vnews held by His Majesty's Government when I was m 
Jjondon were in opposition to a policy of military and naval adventure on the part of 
Turkey and that they hoped that the Government would devote themselves to the 
regeneration of their great Asiatic possessions, to the improvement of the condition 
of the people and to the development of their economic resources, a task which was 
more worthy of a statesman than the pursuit of ambitions of conquest, and one which 
would gain them the sympathy of Europe and especially of Great Britain. Colonel 
Jemal replied that the security of the country was the first consideration and he said 
that Turkey without Adrianople and without the islands was like a room with doors 
open to robbers and malefactors. I expressed a doubt whether the financial resources 
of Turkey would stand the strain of keeping up a fleet which I understood it was 
intended to create in addition to an adequate army, but Colonel Jemal Bey replied that 
the existence of Turkey depended on her ability to defend herself from attack — this 
lesson they had learnt from the war when everyone was against Turkey — Greece had 
a fleet stronger than Turkey at present but this should not last, for the Government 
were determined to be stronger at sea than Greece. Would not this be a great 
advantage to Great Britain for Turkey's fleet would always fight on her side? They 
would help to maintain the balance of power in the Mediterranean against the growing 
power of Italy. He was a strong partisan of France and England. 

I said that I had heard rumours that they contemplated the purchase of a large 
capital ship and I doubted whether the Turkish navy would be able at present to make 
use of such a vessel— Could they man her and where was the dock into which she 
could go for repairs? 

I expressed the view that Turkey was attempting too much and was in too great 
a hurry. Let them proceed slowly and devote themselves for the present to education 
and reform of the Administration. When they had worked hard at this for a few 



(■*) [Not reproduced.] 



170 



years, they would find themselves much stronger and they would have a solid basis on 
which to build. Might they not arouse the jealousy of one Power in particular by 
proceeding too quickly in the matter of the fleet? Would it not be more prudent to 
proceed with caution in the matter? 

Jemal at once enquu-ed whether England had not lent them a Naval Commander 
and other officers and was not now on the point of lending them more naval experts 
in order to help them to create a good fleet. Was not England serious in the matter? 

The Turkish Government had deeply felt the refusal of His Majesty's Government 
to lend them Inspectors General and other officials for the Armenian provinces. I had 
spoken of reforms and he could assure me that he was firmly resolved to introduce 
them but he wanted our help. I said that I was at the Foreign Office at the time of 
the Turkish application and had had the advantage of discussing the question with 
you on more than one occasion. I could therefore explain to him exactly what your 
reasons were for first consenting to lend officials and afterwards in modifying your 
assent — for I reminded him that you had not refused, but had only stipulated that 
pending the settlement of reforms no permanent appointment should be made. 

I said that your assent in the first instance was a proof of your sincere desire to 
help Turkey and that the subsequent modification of view was due entirely to a desire 
not to cause Turkey embarrassment from another Power who perhaps naturally felt 
that her interest in the Armenian populations owing to the presence of 2,000,000 
Armenians in the Caucasus gave her the right to be consulted in regard to the 
limitrophe provinces. Colonel. Jemal Bey did not admit that it was likely that the 
Russian Government would really have made any difficulty had His Majesty's 
Government insisted on maintaining their point of view. In the case of the German 
Military Mission(^) the Eussian Government had made a great outcry but the question 
was now settled and the Russians had done nothing but threaten, i did not take this 
up for it appeared that Colonel Jemal was unaware of the confidential negotiations, 
now on foot, for a retreat on the part of Germany on this very question. 

Colonel Jemal went on to say that Turkey could not now yield on the question of 
the Mission. He was not a member of the Government when the decision was taken 
to give the German Government the command of the i^'irst Army Corps and he would 
not himself have favoured it, because he knew from his own experience that no one 
man could possibly undertake the executive command of the Corps and at the same 
time devote himself to its reorganisation. Now however they could not yield for that 
would be admitting the intervention of foreign Powers in then- internal concerns. 

I advised Colonel Jemal not to be so uncompromising. Sometimes it was 
necessary in the best interests of one's country to submit to what seemed hard 
conditions, and sacrifices of ' amour propre ' were the least of the sacrifices that 
statesmen were called upon to make in the interests of their country. 

This discussion respecting the mission was in the nature of a digression and Jemal 
Bey returned to the question of England and Russia and his regret that England 
could not have seen her way to insist on the loan of Officials. 

I thought it was right to put our position quite plainly before Jemal Bey and I 
asked him whether he had ever considered the European situation as a whole and the 
role which Great Britain had always played in maintaining the balance of power in 
Europe. For reasons with which he was familiar Great Britain found herself 
diplomatically on the side of France and Russia at the present time and Turkey must 
always remember that His Majesty's Government had first to consider how far her 
general interests and relations with France and Russia were affected by questions of 
the kind that we had just been discussing. His Majesty's Government had sometimes 
to make sacrifices in view of larger interests and they would be very loth to put 
Turkey into a position from which it would not be possible for Great Britain to 
extricate them. As Lord Salisbury had said on one occasion, " Great Britain could not 
send a navy across the Taurus." 



(•••) [v. infra, pp. 338-423, Chapter LXXXVII, passim.] 



171 



Jemal Bev quite recognised this: but did not Eussia attach equal importance to 
England's friendship which was necessary to her pending the consolidation of her 
position in the Far East? He pleaded strongly and earnestly with me to ask His 
Majesty's Government to consider whether it would not be possible to take rather a 
less negative hne with Turkey than they had done in the past two years. 

I have tried to give a faithful account of our conversation. It derives importance 
from the position and character of Jemal Bey. 

I do not think my remarl;s made any impression at all upon his mind but we are 
on verv friendlv terms and he did not resent my frankness. 

I have. &.C. 

LOUIS MALLET. 

MINUTE. 

Entirely approve language. 

H. N . 

Jan[uary] 6. 1914. 
J. D. G. 
E. A. C. 
A. N. 
E. G. 



No. 186. 

Communication from Teicfili Pasha. 

London, D. December 30, 1913. 
F.O. 58785 13790 13 44- December 31, 1913. 

' L' \mbas5adeur de Turquie presente ses compliments a Sir E. Grey, et a 
rhonneur de rappeler a Son Excellence que des le debut des negociations de paix qui 
ont abouti au Traite de Londres, le Gouvernement Imperial Ottoman, tant par la 
voix de ses delegues que par la voie diplomatique avait exprime ses reserves formelles 
au suiet de la solution eventuelle de la question des lies de la Mer Egee detenues par 
la Grece, question dont I'examen avait ete reserve aux Grandes Puissances 
mGdifttncGS. 

Ces reserves avaient ete faites pour des considerations qui ne pouvaient echapper 
a la vi<nlance d'aucun Gouvernement soucieux des interets du pays et de la defense 
nationale et etaient fondees. alors comme aujourd'hui. sur la proximite immediate de 
certaines lies occupees par la Grece, comme Mytilene, Lemnos. Chio, Imbros, Tenedos 
et autres, des cotes asiatiques de 1' Empire Ottoman et du Detroit des Dardanelles. 

En dehors- de ces considerations strategiques, il y aurait aussi a relever les 
innombrables et continuelles difficultes qui result eraient de 1' annexion, meme 
subordonnee a des garanties. de ces lies au Eoyaume Hellenique : Par leur proximite 
immediate des cotes de I'Asie naitrait incontestablement une contrebande continue 
d'armes avec les localites riveraines de la Turquie; les elements perturbateurs de 
I'ordre public trouveraient en meme temps un champ libre et facile a une propagande 
en faveur de Thellenisme parmi les nombreuses populations gi-ecques de 1' Empire 
Ottoman, dont la grande majorite habite les villes maritimes de la Turquie d'Asie, 
sans compter les criminels de droit commun qui poursuivis en territoire Ottoman, 
trouveraient aisement et tres facilement un asile dans ces Iles.^ 

A ces arguments bases sur le voisinage immediat des cotes asiatiques, il y a 
egalement lieu de relever I'obligation oii se trouverait la Subhme Porte, dans le cas 
de la non restitution des lies d^ja citees, de renforcer la defense des Dardanelles et 
de prendre des mesures mihtaires exceptionnelles qui pourraient dans leur application 
porter entrave et creer des obstacles serieux au commerce international et a la 
navigation etrangere. 



172 



C'est pourquoi, si on venait malgre ces reserves formelles et expresses^ a adopter 
une decision contraire a ce point de vue, le Gouverneraent Imperial Ottoman se 
verrait malheureusement dans I'obligation legitime d'employer toute sori actiyite et 
d'user de tous les moyens en son pouvoir, pour chercher a reprendre a la Grece les 
lies qui lui sont indispensables pour la securite et la sauvegarde de son Empire 

asiatique. . , ^ ^ . * v, 

A cette occasion le Gouvernement Imperial Ottoman ne peut s empecher, non 
plus, de relever encore une fois que les lies detenues provisoirement par I'ltalie et 
dont I'occupation par cette derniere Puissance, se trouve etre anterieure a la crise 
balkanique. ne sauraient en aucun cas etre assimilees a celles qui sont actuellement 
occupees par la Grece, ni soumises a une discussion en meme temps que ces dernieres. 
La Sublime Porte ne pourrait, partant. admettre tout autre arrangement que celui de 
la restitution pure et simple par I'ltalie des lies detenues par elle et soumises aux 
stipulations du Traite de Lausanne; tout en se reservant de faire beneficier leurs 
populations des dispositions du Firman Imperial faisant partie dudit Traite. 

II n'y a done pas lieu dans ces conditions d'envisager I'octroi d'un regime 
autonome' a ces lies, etant donne que leur sort se trouve etre deja defini et ne peut 
donner lieu a aucune nouvelle discussion. D'autre part, s'il est vrai qu'il y ait une 
tendance a vouloir etablir une certaine correlation entre la question des lies de la 
Mer Egee en general et celle de la delimitation de la frontiere meridionale de 
I'Albanie, il y aurait lieu de relever que dans I'esprit du Gouvernement Imperial 
Ottoman ces "deux questions sont absolument distinctes et qu'il ne tient nuUement a 
ceder ses droits sur les lies, etablis et fixes par un Traite, au profit de tiers qui auraient 
interet a trouver une certaine correlation entre la question des lies proprement dite 
et le reglement de la frontiere albanaise. 

Londres, le 30 Decemhre 1913. 



MINUTES. 

Tewfik Pasha came to speak to me about this today. He said the present protest had 
been made against his own advice. He had urged that there was no proposal before the 
Turkish gov[ernmen]t. The latter had explicitly left the decision of the fate of the islands 
in the hands of the Powers,(i) and they could therefore properh' do or say nothing until the 
Powers approached them on the subject. 

I said that was undoubtedly good advice and it was a great pity the Porte had not 
followed it. Since the protest had now been made, it would of course be submitted to Sir E. 
Grey, but I could tell H[is] H[ighness] at once that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] had 
cause to be considerably surprised at such a communication. After the solemn engagements 
subscribed by the Turkish government it was impossible for Sir E. Grey to foresee that they 
would now claim entirely to repudiate those engagements. Nothing could be more clear than 
the definite and unconditional acceptance by the Turkish government of the principle that 
the fate of all the islands was to be decided by the 6 Great Powers. I reminded him of : 

(1) Article 5 of the treaty of peace signed by the Turkish plenipotentiaries, and those of 
the three Allies, in London on May 30th, 1913.(2) 

(2) Article 15 of the treaty of peace concluded between Turkey and Greece at Athens on 
November 1st, 1913.(3) 

(3) The formal Note sent by the Porte on April 1st, 1913, in answer to the joint note 
addressed to them by the six ambassadors on March 31st, 1913. (*) 

In view of the formal and unconditional undertaking embodied in the above 3 documents, 
it was impossible to contend that the Great Powers were in any way fettered in making their 
decision or that such decision could be questioned in good faith. 

Tewfik Pasha, whose tone was most friendly, intimated that personally he felt he had 
no arguments to oppose to what I had said. 

(1) [v. Gooch d; Temperley, Vol. IX (II), p. 545, No. 668, and note (2).] 

(2) [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), p. 1050. App. III.] 

(3) [v. B.F.S.P., Vol. 107, pp. 893-902 ; the text of Article XV of the treaty is as follows : — 

" Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent a maintenir, en ce qui les 
concerne, les dispositions du Traite de Londres du 30 mai, 1913, y compris les stipulations 
de Particle V dudit traite."] 

{*) [v. Gooch (fc Temperley, Vol. IX (II), p. 631, No. 775.] 



178 



It will perhaps be better to return no written answer for the present to the Turkish note. 
If, as I still hope, the Powers come to an agreement before long as to the islands, they will 
have to communicate their decision presumably, in a fresh collective note to the Porte, to be 
presented by the 6 ambassadors at Constantinople. In such a note the above arguments 
would find their appropriate place. 

E. A. C. 

Jan[uary] 2. 

Yes: the Turkish protest cannot be dealt [with] by individual Powers separately. 

E. G. 



No. 187. 

Sir Edu-ard Grey to Sir L. Mallet. 

F.O. 58650/13799/13/44. 
(No. 2.) Very confidential. 

Sir, Foreign Office, January 1, 1914. 

The Turkish Ambassador called on the 23rd ultimo to ask whether His Majesty's 
Government had as yet received the reply of the Powers to their proposal respecting 
the fate of the Aegean Islands. 

Sir E. Crowe, wlio received His Excellency, explained to him that so far as the 
Ottoman Government were concerned there would be no question of a " proposal ' ' 
until the six Great Powers had come to a conclusion among themselves. 

In the course of a conversation which was most friendly, Sir E. Crowe explained 
the views of His Majesty's Government on the lines indicated in my telegram No. 587 
of the 20th ultimo to your Excellency. (^) 

Tewfik Pasha seemed to consider the suggestions and arguments put forward as 
quite reasonable, and merely said the difficulty of the Turkish Government was partly 
strategical and partly one of revenue and commerce. They did not wish to be involved 
in further heavy expenditure for defence, such as would be necessitated by the islands 
close to the Asiatic mainland and near the Dardanelles being in Greek hands, and 
they were afraid of a further extension of the system of smuggling arms and of other 
contraband traffic which already gave so much trouble at Samos. 

Sir E. Crowe explained that on both these points His Majesty's Government had 
carefully stipulated that satisfaction must be given to Turkey and Tewfik Pasha said 
that this was important. 

His Excellency then went on to speak of Italy and complained of her continuing 
to make ever fresh conditions for her evacuation of the islands now in her occupation. 
Her last communication was to the effect that Italy would never evacuate those islands 
if the other islands were to go to Greece, arguing that when she agreed at Lausarme 
to evacuate on certain conditions, the strategic situation was quite different from 
what it was now. In present circumstances Italy must guard against a Greek 
aggressive policy. 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 

(1) [v. supra, p. 161, No. 177.] 



No. 188. 

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 484/98/14/44. 

(No. 1.) Confidential. Vieiina, D. January 1, 1914. 

Sir, B, January 5, 1914. 

In all conversations I have had in Vienna concerning the proposed settlement of 
the Islands question, expression has been given to the feeling that the attitude of 
Turkey constitutes a main difficulty in the way of agreement between the Powers. 



174 



Hilmi Pasha has had the goodness to give me his views on the subject. As his 
name carries some authorit}', I may perhaps be permitted to amplify a httle the 
telegram (no. 204 of the 28th ultimo )(\) in which I have already had the honour to 
report his remarks in outline. After producing a copy of the "Graphic" of 
October 11th, which contains a map showing the distribution of the islands suggested 
by Mr. Lucien Wolf, His Excellency said that some such arrangement would give 
satisfaction to Turkey — namely one by which Samothrace, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos, 
Mitylene and Chios w^ould all fall to Turkey, while from Samos southwards the 
islands, except I tliink Kos, might all be assigned to Greece. Turkey, he said, had an 
altogether secondary interest in the southern group, and he would personally advocate 
its surrender to Greece, even in the event of the Powers uniting to compel Turkey by 
force to accept Greek ownership of Mitylene and Chios. Mitylene and Chios would be 
a serious danger to Turkey if left in Greek hands. The Greeks could easily transport 
from Mitylene to the coast of Asia Minor a force which would threaten from the rear 
the Asiatic fortifications of the Dardanelles. From Chios they could threaten the 
approaches to Smyrna. I reminded the Turkish Ambassador that it was proposed to 
neutralise the islands to be left to Greece, and to guarantee the non-erection upon them 
of military works. Their pacific character would thus be assured. His Excellency had 
no confidence in the efficacy of such restraints upon the hostile spirit of the Greeks. 
The fulfilment of the plan to which publicity had been given by the Press w^ould 
immediately revive Turkish animosity against Greece in its most warlike form. 
Turkey would forcibly capture from the Greeks the islands she held to be essential to 
the security of Asia Minor. If she could not do so at once, she would wait six months 
or a year, but no long period could elapse before she would make the attempt, and she 
would soon be strong enough at sea to ensure success. This of course meant war with 
Greece. Naturally ISulgaria would take the opportunity to seize Cavalla if she could. 
Servia would be drawn, no doubt, into the conflict, and the Albanian tribes would rise 
against Servia and Greece. The worst experiences of the Balkan Peninsula would 
assuredly be renewed, and it was almost too much to hope that one or more of the 
Great Powers would not become involved in the fray. 

Monsieur Dumaine, the I'rench Ambassador, has received a similar declaration 
from Hilmi Pasha, and when he remarked that French financial aid would certainly 
not be forthcoming to enable Turkey to wage war with Greece, Hilmi Pasha replied 
that in that case she would get the money she wanted, by hook or by crook, from other 
quarters. 

Hilmi Pasha doubts whether Italy is in any way entitled to compensation in 
exchange for fulfilment of her Treaty obligation to hand over the Dodecanese to 
Turkey. Accounts between the two countries were balanced at Lausanne, and Italy 
had since paid over to Turkey 50 millions of francs in accordance with one of the 
Articles (presumably Article X) of the Lausanne Treaty. (^) If Italy claimed compensa- 
tion on account of expenses incurred in the islands in consequence of her having been 
compelled to hold them for a longer period than was at first expected, His Excellency 
said she should be required to furnish a statement showing not only the nature and 
extent of those expenses, but also the amount of revenue she had derived from the 
islands. The difference would not be considerable, and might be assessed by 
arbitration. 

In the settlement of the Islands question Hilmi Pasha expects that the Italian 
point of view, which will probably be found to be hostile to the development of Greek 
naval power in the ^gean Sea, will receive a good deal of support from Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. He believes that a general understanding exists between the Powers 
of the Triple Alliance in virtue of which each Power receives the support of the other 
two in the region in which it is principally interested. In the case of Italy that region 



(1) [v. supra, pp. 167-8, No. 184.] 

(2) [v. Gooch ct- Temperley, Vol. IX (I), p. 442, Xo. 460, e«c/.] 



175 



is the Mediterranean Sea : in the case of Germany, Asia Minor ; in the case of Austria- 
Hungary, the Balkans. 

Hilrai Pasha claims that, though Turkey agreed that the settlement of the 
question of the Islands should be left to the Great Powers, she would be justified in 
resisting any settlement which disregarded her vital interests, and he states that she 
made full reservations on this point at the time when she signified to the Powers her 
acceptance of tlie arrangement in question. 

I have already reported by telegraph(') that Hilmi Pasha left on the 29th instant 
at the Ballplatz a written protest against any settlement founded on the assignment 
of Mitylene and Chios to Greece. 

I asked Hilmi Pasha whether he did not think Koumania would intervene to 
prevent a fresh rearrangement of the Balkan States as the result of a Turkish War 
with Greece. He said Bulgaria would probably be able to keep Eoumania quiet by 
ceding to her another strip of Bulgarian territory, including Rustchuk. Shumla and 
Varna. The Servian Minister, Monsieur Jovanovich, however, with whom I have had 
one or two conversations lately, believes that Bulgaria is too much exhausted to go to 
war again, on the faint chance of getting back Cavalla, and even of wresting from 
Servia a portion of tiie territories annexed by that country by virtue of the Treaty of 
Bucharest. Monsieur Jovanovich does not think Bulgaria would be so foolish as to 
give up more fortresses to Eoumania. Her prospect of recovering territory from 
Greece and Servia would be very problematical. Servia would be compelled by her 
defensive alliance with Greece to stand by the latter country. 

Monsieur de Tchirschky, the German Ambassador, speaks appreciatively of your 
proposals, though he always says their realisation, in whatever form it may prove 
possible, will take a long time. Meanwhile he is not prepared to suggest any amend- 
ments to them. He called a few days ago to tell me he had just received a letter from 
Monsieur de Jagow whose object, like yours, was to assist, in any way he could, to 
prevent a Turkish war against Greece. Monsieur de Jagow had no present suggestion 
to make. 

I have. Sec. 

MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 



(') [Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram (Xo. 205t of December 29, 1913, D. S-2o p.m., R. 11 p.m., 
is not reproduced as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. (F.O. 58510/13799/13/44.)] 



No. 189. 

M. Gennadius to Sir E. Crowe. 

F.O. 160 '98 14/44. London, D. January 1, 1914. 

Dear Sir Eyre Crowe, R. January 2, 1914. 

I beg leave to enclose, as suggested, a copy of the telegram which I had the 
honour to communicate to you this afternoon. 

In a subsequent despatch on the same subject, telegraphed to the Greek Legation 
at Berlin, M. Panas added : — 

" Je tiens a attirer votre attention que dans la seance du 5 aout dernier des 
Ambassadeurs a Londres,(') le Prince Lichnowski declara que I'AUemagne adhere 
aux cinq points proposes par Sir Edward Grey, dont le troisieme, concernant les iles 
occupees par nous, est ainsi concu : ' La Grece restera, sous certaines conditions de 
neutralite, en possession des iles habitees en majorite par une population grecque, et 

(1) [v. Gooch d Temperley, Vol. IX (Il\ pp. 954-6, Xo. 1202.] 



176 



occupees actuellement par les forces helleniques, a 1' exception de Tenedos, Imbros et 
Thasos.' " 

The latter island, of course, forms an integral part, to all intents and purposes, 
of Kavalla, which is now Greek territory. 

Yours sincerely. 

J. GENNADIUS. 

Enclosure in No. 189. 
Telegram received hy Greek Legation in London. 

Selon nos informations la S[ublimej P[orte] aurait declare au Cabinet de Paris 
qu'elle ne saurait acquiescer a la proposition anglaise. et tacherait de toute maniere 
reprendre les iles occupees par nous. Or, non seulement par I'article V du Traite de 
Londres(') le Sultan et les vUlies declarerent confier aux Souverains des six Grandes 
Puissances le soin de statuer sur le sort de toutes les iles Ottomanes de la Mer Eget), 
I'ile de Crete exceptee. mais encore, par la Convention d'Athenes, qui a confirme le 
Traite de Londres, la Grece et la Turquie. en prenant I'engagement de maintenir le 
dit traite, ont speeialement mentionne I'article V concernant les iles. 

La S[ublime] Porte, paraissant anjourd'hui vouloir se soustraire a ses engage- 
ments formels, le Gouvernement *Royal croit devoir attirer a ce sujet 1' attention des 
Grandes Puissances, et invoquer aupres d'elles le fait que la question des iles occupees 
par la Grece ayant fait I'objet des deliberations des Ambassadeurs a Londres dans 
leur seance du 5 Aout dernier,(^) et n'ayant souleve aucune objection, elle a ete resolue 
d'une fa^on definitive avec la reserve seule de condition de neutralite et a I'exclusiori 
des iles de Tenedos et Imbros. 

En prenant vis-a-vis des Grandes Puissances, par le Traite de Londres, I'engage- 
ment de se reraetti-e a Elles pour le sort des iles et la fixation de la frontiere sud de 
I'i^lbanie, la Grece considerait, et considere toujours. ces deux questions connexes, 
qu'on ne saurait solutionner qu'ensemble, et il est de son devoir de faire part au 
Gouvernement, aupres duquel vous etes accredite, de son sentiment a ce sujet, qui 
acquiert d'autant plus d'importance que les Grandes Puissances, par leur declaration 
dans la seance du 5 Aout, reconnurent elles-memes sans restriction la connexite des 
deux questions. Veuillez entretenir dans ce sens son Excellence le Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres. 

PANAS. 

AtMmes, le 26 dccemhre 1913. 

MINUTES. 

When M. Geiiiiadius handed tu me the enclosed telegram from his government, I said 
that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] adhered to their view that the two questions were 
connected and should be treated together. I told him that there was nothing to show that 
this was not equally the view of the other Powers. They had now given their answer to the 
first part of our proposal, but the answer on the second part was only delayed for a very 
short time, simply because it was not yet quite ready. We had every reason to hope it would 
reach us soon and would be satisfactory. 

M. Gennadius then referred to the Turkish protest to the Powers, of which he had full 
knowledge, and to the threat openly made at Constantinople that Turkey would seize Chios 
and Mitylene. It was no doubt that the purchase of the Brazilian ship(*) was part of this 
programme. If it became quite clear that Turkey would proceed to warlike acts, the Greek 
government would possibly find that they could not afford to wait passively till the blow fell. 
They might on their part take steps to counteract the Turkish menace. 

I merely said that these were entirely hypothetical contingencies at present. It remained 
to be seen whether Turkey would break its engagements to the Powers if the latter notified 
to her their unanimous decision in a matter which she had solemnly agreed to leave in their 
hands. 

(2) [v. Gooch (b Temperley, Vol. IX (II), p. 1050, App. III.] 

(3) [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 954-6, No. 1202.] 

(*) [The correspondence on the subject of the purchase of this battle-ship has not been 
included for reasons of space. (F.O. 342/115/14/44.)] 



177 



I made use of the arguments in the present Greek communication, when talking to 
Tewfik Pasha to-day (see 58785/ 13.)(^) 

I did not think it worth while to raise with M. Gennadius the question how his 
gor[ernmen]t could quote to us the proceedings at the Ambassadors' conferences, which were 
confidential. 

E. A. C. 

Jan[uary] 2. 

The proceedings at the Meeting of Ambassadors were not commuuicated to Greece. They 
constitute Agreements between the Powers, but no obligation on the part of the Powers 
towards anyone else, except when formally and officially communicated on behalf of the Powers. 

For instance the Powers would be entitled by agreement between themselves to alter the 
decision about the Islands without consulting Greece or Turkey. 

E. G. 

(5) [cp. supra, pp. 172-3, Xo. 186, nn'n.] 



No. 190. 

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 1074/98/14/44. 

(No. 1.) Confidential. Rome, D. January 2, 1914. 

Sir:— E. January 9, 1914. 

My Russian colleague, whose temperament impels him to rush in where others 
venture more warily, tells me that, when seeing the ilinister for Foreign Affairs the 
day before yesterday, he had observed to His Excellency that, speaking quite personally' 
and unofficially, he was anxious to know how it could be claimed that there was no 
connection between the question of the southern frontier of Albania and the future 
disposal of the .^gean islands, because he had always understood that during the 
discussions in London the Italian Ambassador had accepted the view that if the 
frontier was settled in the manner desired by Italy, she would be ready to see the 
islands in Italian occupation go to Greece. The Minister protested that never for a 
moment had this been understood, and if the Italian Ambassador had accepted such 
a condition he had certainly exceeded iiis instructions. Whereupon the Russian 
Ambassador observed that if he was to be disavowed it should have been done at the 
time and not so many months afterwards, but the question had now only a historic 
interest as the proposals which had since been put forward, and had been accepted by 
Russia, contemplated the restoration of those islands to Turkey. At any rate, he 
continued, there was a distinct understanding that if the frontier defined by Italy was 
agreed to, the islands actually occupied by the Greeks should be retained by them. 
To this the Mini.ster for Foreign Affairs replied that at most there might have been a 
sort of half-engagement, and that it was not material now to enter into this question 
as the formal proposal for the disposition of the islands was under consideration. The 
Russian Ambassador observed that half-engagements were unknown in diplomatic 
negotiation, and that he might say, speaking now in his official capacity, that the 
Russian Government considered that the engagement was formal and definite. The 
Marquis di San Giuliano was, he said, e\-idently much embarrassed to know what 
to say. 

When I saw His Excellency yesterday I did not approach this matter quite so 
uncompromisingly as my Russian colleague, but contented myself with asking why the 
Italian press and even the semi-official press was so concerned to explain to the public 
that the two issues had been completely separated, as though this constituted a sort 
of diplomatic success. I found it the more difficult to understand inasmuch as the 
retention of the islands by Greece had been laid down as a condition for the 



(I) [v. Gooch <t- Temperley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 954-6, Xo. 1202.] 
[8959] N 



178 



reduction of the Greek claims north of Epirus. The Marquis di San Giuliano rather 
evaded the question by protesting that he had done all he could to prevent the 
newspapers from discussing the matter, but that he had not been able to restrain even 
the semi-official " Tribuna " from dealing with a subject upon which it was contended 
by the editor public opinion was so greatly excited. As the whole issue was likely to 
be dealt with in a few days' time and he had every hope that the decision would be 
satisfactory, it really would not serve any practical end to go into the question of 
whether or no, or of how far there had been an engagement on the subject. 

I did not pursue the matter further as, if the object in view is to be attained, it 
appears immaterial whether or no the Italian Government may derive some minor 
satisfaction from allowing it to be supposed that they have been successful in upholding 
the point that the two questions should be dealt with independently. It is, however, 
evident that they wish Italian public opinion to be thus impressed. 

It is of course always possible that they hope, if they are able to claim that an 
absence of connection between the two issues has now been established and tacitly 
admitted, that there may be opportunity for bargaining about individual islands and 
acquiring merit with Turkey, which would not have been possible if they had 
recognized that they were already definitely committed to a solution in favour of 
Greece. I trust this may not be so, but should it prove to be the case, occasion might 
arise to draw attention to the proposal recorded in the last paragraph but one of your 
despatch No. 192 of the 28th July last,(*) and to the clear statement of the conditions 
on which instructions to the international commission for the delimitation of the 
Albanian frontier would depend, recorded in your despatch No. 196 of the 31st July.(^) 

I have, &c. 

EENNELL EODD. 

MINUTE. 

The plain speaking of the Russian Ambassador is refreshing. (^) 

A. N. 
£ G 

(2) [v. Gooch <h Temperley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 940-1, No. 1185.] 

(3) [v. Gooch (k Temperley. Vol. IX (II). pp. 945-6, No. 1190, and note (i).] 
(*) [cp. infra, pp. 178-9, No. 192; pp. 183-4, No. 198.] 



No. 191. 

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. 

Rome. January 4. 1914. 

F.O. 346/98/14/44. D. 11-25 a.m. 

Tel. (No. 2.) R. 12-30 p.m. 

German Ambassador told me confidentially last night that the reply to your 
proposals regarding islands was being drafted in BerHn.(') Retention by Greece of 
islands occupied by her would be agreed to. There was a difficulty as regards islands 
occupied by Italy in fixing a date for their surrender to Turkey. 

(1) [cp. infra, p. 190, No. 203.] 



No. 192. 

Communication from M. de Etter.O 

F.O. 660/98/14/44. Russian Embassy, London, January 5, 1914. 

D apres des renseignements Turquie consentirait a : 

1) Restitution a Turquie des 4 iles defendant I'entree des Dardanelles 

2) des Iles riverains de I'Asie— Samos compris. 

V. inflict f^^No."98.]' °^ conversation with M. de Etter on January 



179 



3) des Certaines iles actuellement occupees par I'ltalie. 
Nos considerations : 

1) Chios et Mitilene devraient rester a la Grece (Au point de vue economique 
aucune ile occupee par Italie ne pent etre eomparee a ces deux iles). 
1) Aucune raison de restituer Samos aux turcs. 

3^ Un arrangement qnelconque en vue de laisser aux turcs Lenmos et Samothrace 
''sureniont compris parmi les 4 ilesi, vue leur importance strategique — pour maintenir 
liberte de navigation de les detroits, — sur la base de cession a la Grece d'autres iles, — 
pourrait etre pris en consideration selon Mr. Sazonoff. 

4) Toutes autres pretentions turques devraient certainement etre ecartees. 



No. 193. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

Constantino'ple, January G, 1914. 
F.O. 754/98/14/44. D. 12-10 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 9.) H. 2-45 p.m. 

I cannot say what the ultimate effect of Enver Bey's appointment will be.(^; 
There is however no prima facie disadvantage in younger men taking office. 

His nomination vdW not be popular with part of the army and may tend to 
perpetuate the two factions but his name is prominent in Moslem world. 

He yAW be more agi-eeable to the German Government than Djemal Bey who is 
too independent. It is said that the latter may become Minister of Marine and other 
younger men are mentioned for other Ministries. 

I see no reason to take alarmist \iew but as I have reported the Turkish 
Government consider the question of islands a vital one. 

The Grand Vizier who had just seen Italian Ambassador asked me to tell you 
that of course if you insisted on alienation of Mitylene and Cliios and if France and 
England sent their fleets to enforce this compromise Government would have to yield 
but they would yield to force alone. They must have those islands and Dodecanese. 

He spolce despondently and his language was not meant as a threat. I think 
apart from sentimental considerations economic and geographical reasons make 
Turkish claim reasonable. If war ensued at any future time one of the objects of His 
^Majesty's Government's proposal would be defeated. 

As I have reported men at present in power so far as my short experience of them 
goes are capable and earnestly bent on the regeneration of Turkey. 

They have great difficulties both internal and external but should they have the 
political support of the Triple Alliance their position will be strong because it would 
seem that in the end France must supply them with money in order to save French 
investors who have about one hundred and fifty million pounds invested in Turkey. 

It is premature to set aside possibility of Turkey making some progress and it 
is possible that she may become a more important factor in European Equilibrium than 
has seemed likely recently 

Our position here has undoubtedly been much shaken by His Majesty's -Govern- 
ment's lead in Adrianople and islands questions but our moral support is still of some 
importance to the Turkish Government m \'iew of respect which is still felt for us 
amongst the masses. The situation moreover changes rapidly in this country. I 
should not be surprised if pro-English views expressed by Djemal Bey as reported in 
my despatch No. 1048 of Dec [ember] 29 are sincere. (^) 

(*) [A copy of the last two paragraphs of this telegram was sent to the Admiralty.] 

(2) [Enver Bey succeeded Izzet Pasha as Minister for War earlv in January 1914 "I 

(3) [r. supra, pp. 168-71, No. 185.] 

[8959] N 2 



180 



If Djemal Bey went to Ministry of Marine he might possibly make calls on us 
which might prove embarrassing. 

I am told but cannot vouch for truth of the report that the Porte are seriously 
considering question of an Italian naval mission if we fail them. The question of 
command in war is occupying their attention. This possibility which could not 
entirely be disregarded should strengthen our hands if Eussia were inclined to criticise 
our interest in the fleet. 

Negotiations are on foot with Italian firm for purchase of six destroyers. 

MINUTE. 

Either the decision of the Powers that Greece is to keep Mytilene and Chios will be 
enforced by the fleets of all the Powers or else that decision will not be arrived at. There is 
no question of its being enforced by France and ourselves alone. 

E. G. 



No. 194. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.{^) 

F.O. 1221/98/14/44. 
(No. 11.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, January 6, 1914. 

M. Cambon came to see me to-day, on his return from Paris. 

I told him the reply from the Triple Alliance about the southern frontier of 
Albania. (-) A further reply was expected shortly about the ^gean Islands, and there 
were indications that this reply would be favourable as regards the islands in Greek 
occupation, but would perhaps not be so satisfactory with regard to the islands in 
Italian occupation. As to these latter islands, it was true that we could not at once 
have a date fixed, for the Italian withdrawal, so as to connect it with the negotiations 
as to the southern frontier of Albania ; but I considered that we could not make a 
peremptory communication in Athens, insisting upon tlie acceptance by Greece of the 
southern Albanian frontier and her evacuation of territory to the north of it, without 
also making a communication to her about the islands in her occupation which would 
be more or less satisfactory. If I was pressed for a reply to the communication that 
the Triple Alliance had now made about the southern frontier of Albania, I would 
reply in this sense. 

M. Cambon said that this was entirely the view of his Government, who thought 
that the question of the southern frontier of Albania must be connected with a settle- 
ment of the Mgean Islands question satisfactory to Greece. He heard that the 
authorities in Vienna were much preoccupied about the state of things ir southern 
Albania, where there were said to be 60,000 or 70,000 armed Greeks. Th Prince of 
Wied had suspended his acceptance of the post of Prince of Albania until the . nntry 
had been pacified and a loan guaranteed. (^) Greece might very well ask, in connection 
with the withdrawal of her troops, what the Powers were going to do to prevent anarchy 
in the district evacuated by her. 

I added to this that I heard it was physically impossible for the Greek troops to 
be withdrawn from some districts in the middle of the winter. I thought, however, 
that these were difficulties with regard to which Italy and Austria might be asked to 
make suggestions. 

M. Cambon said that Italy was now going to claim some compensation for all her 
expenses in the islands in her occupation. Italy wished this to take the form of a 
concession in the region of Adalia. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet 1 

(2) [cp. supra, pp. 87-8, No. 103.] 

(3) [cp. supra, pp. 79-80, No. 94.] 



181 



On this I said that, as he knew, I could not agree to admit any sphere of interest ; 
but, as regards this particular concession, I opposed it only in the interests of the 
Smyrna-Aidin Eailway Company. As we ourselves were not going to apply for new 
railway concessions in that part of Asia IMinor, which was a field almost entirely 
covered now by French and German railway concessions, 1 should disinterest myself 
in the nenotiations- in Constantinople for the Italian concession, if the Italians 
succeeded in satisfying the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 



No. 195. 

Sir M. de Bimsen to Sir Edward Grey.O 

Vienna, January 7, 1914. 
F.O. 901/98/14/44. D. 8-45 p.m. 

Tel (No. 1.) E. 10-45 p.m. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that he has now good hopes of early answer 
being returned by the Powers of the Triple Alliance to the second part of your 
proposals — namely, that which deals with the ^gean islands. (vi He could not say more 
tlian that it would be in general conformity with your views and with the resolutions 
of the conferences of Ambassadors at London. Text of reply was still being drafted in 
Berlin (group undccypherable). Press states that it concedes retention by Greece of 
Mitylene and Chios under conditions ensuring their complete neutrality. German 
Ambassador assures me that good progress is being made at Berlin in the direction of 
meeting your proposals. 

The Turkish Ambassador informs the Minister for Foreign Affairs that, if Izzet 
Pasha is on his way to Albania, the Turkish Government has no hand in the matter or 
intention to interfere in any way in Albanian affairs. Minister for Foreign Affairs was 
much relieved by this declaration, as he had been greatly upset by recent news from 
Albania. 

Italian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh told me yesterday on his way to his post 
that Italy will certainly not retain a single island of those now in her occupation, and 
that evacuation is only subject to her obtaining compensation for expenses incurred. 

(1) [The second paragraph of this telegram was sent to Coiisul-General Lamb at Valona 
(.as No. 5) on .January 8.] 

{-) [V. O.-l'.A., VII, p. 710, No. 9160.] 



No. 196. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen. 

F.O. 1597/98/14/44. 
rXo. 12.^ 

Sir, Foreign Office, January 7, 1914. 

The German Ambassador told me to-day (') that he had received a telegram saying 
that the reply about the iEgean Islands was on its way.(-) He gathered that it would 
agree to what I had suggested about the islands in Greek occupation. 



(0 [cp. G.P., XXXVI (ID, p. 470.] 
(2) [cp. infra, p. 190, No. 203.] 



182 



I said that I would wait till I received the reply; but, if it was as outlined in his 
telegram, it seemed to me that it would provide a basis for a joint communication by 
the Powers in Athens and Constantinople. 

He made it clear that the reply would make the retention of ^Egean Islands by 
Greece conditional upon her carrying out the evacuation of southern Albania and not 
causing trouble there. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 



No. 197. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.n 

F.O. 1596/756/14/44. 
(No. 6.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, January 7, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador brought M. Martino, the Head of the Italian Foreign 
Office, to see me to-day. They presented the Italian view about the Turkish islands 
in Italian occupation. The prolonged occupation had cost Italy much money. Since 
the Treaty of Lausanne, the operations of Turkish Officers in Tripoli, continued 
contrary to the Treaty, had caused great expense to Italy, and, before giving up the 
islands to Turkey she ought to have some thing that would indemnify her for this. 
Turkey had no money, and what Italy wished to have was a concession for a port at 
Adalia, in Asia Minor. Without something of this sort, Italian public opinion would 
be bitterly disappointed. 

I observed that our Secret Agreement with Italy, made many years ago respecting 
Tripoli, (^) though it had not contemplated any actual alteration of the "status" in 
Tripoli, had yet led us to acquiesce in the Italian annexation of Tripoli. (^) While, 
however, the Italians were annexing Tripoli, they had occupied the islands, and they 
had assured us at the time that this occupation would be only temporary. They had 
given us further assurances subsequently, and now it did not seem reasonable to attach 
new conditions to their withdrawal from the occupation. But, if they wished for some 
compensation from Turkey to indemnify them for extra expense, the natural solution 
would be a money indemnity. Turkey it appeared had no money for this purpose, 
and if some other compensation was asked instead of money I could raise no objection 
provided that it was not paid by a British Company. I then went over the familiar 
ground about the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company being the only British railway 
enterprise in Asia Minor; and I said that, if the Italians could, by direct negotiations 
with the Company, satisfy the latter that their commercial interests would not suffer 
by the Itahan concession, I would not oppose the negotiations in Constantinople for 
this concession. 

The Italian Ambassador was anxious that I should indicate to the Company that, 
for political reasons, 1 should be glad to see them come to an agreement with the 
Italians. 

I said that I had asked that the Company should keep us informed of what 
happened, but I could not ask them to sacrifice their commercial interests, and 
whatever view they took of the Italian proposals must be " bona fide " their own. I 
gathered that the Italians wished to have a concession for a port at Adalia; but that, 
as regards railway access to that port, dues to be levied, and so forth, they would be 
prepared to treat with the Smyrna-Aidin Company. 

(^) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. It 
was sent to Constantinople (as No. 46).] 

(2) [cp. Gooch & Tem.perhy, Vol. VIII, pp. 18-23, passim.] 

(^) [cp. Gooch cfc Temparley, Vol. IX (I), pp. 259-448, Chapter LXXIV, passim.] 



183 



The Ambassador went on to say that the French Press, while I had been away, 
liad been making mischief by stating that our proposals about the south of Albania 
demanded a date to be fixed for Italy to evacuate the islands in her occupation. 

I said that I had not seen the French Press while I had been away, I had thought 
it had been occupied entirely with an interview of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 
the subject of expenditure on armaments. But, with regard to my actual proposals 
about the ^gean Islands, the Italian Government had the text,(*) and I would wait 
till I received the reply from the Triple Alliance on the subject of the islands before I 
discussed the question. > 

The Ambassador said that the reply about the islands in Greek occupation would 
be in accordance with what we wished. Italy had worked in this sense, though she 
had not wished to put herself forward prominently, because she desired not to offend 
Turkish susceptibilities. 

I said that I had so often heard complaints, such as I had this afternoon, of the 
behaviour of the Turks respecting the conditions of the Treaty of Lausanne that it did 
not seem to me quite natural that Italy should be on such cordial terms with Turkey 
and so sensitive about Turkish susceptibilities, when the conditions of the Treaty of 
Lausanne were not being fulfilled by the Turks. 

This remark caused a revival of conversation, in the course of which the 
Ambassador informed me that there was a large bundle of the protests that Italy had 
addressed to Turkey about the non-fulfilment of the conditions of the Treaty of 
Lausanne. There had been no collusion with Turkey about the islands, but until 
Turkey was assured that she would keep them she naturally had no interest in seeing 
Italy evacuate them. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[EEY]. 

(*) [t>. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91.] 
(5) [cp. infra, p. 190, Xo. 203.] 



No. 198. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.{^) 

F.O. 660, 98/14/44. 
(No. 7.) Confidential. 

Sir, Foreign Office, January 8, 1914. 

The Russian Charge d'Affaires informed Sir E. Crowe on the 5th instant, in 
strict confidence that according to reports which had reached his government from 
Constantinople, the Turkish government would be likely to meet the decision of the 
Powers as regards the islands in Greek occupation by a counter-proposal to the efiect 
that 

(1^ Turkey should retain the four islands commanding the entrance of the 
Dardanelles (i.e., not only Tenedos and Imbros, but also Samothrace and Lemnos) ; 

(2 1 Turkey should also keep the islands along the Asiatic coast (including 
Samos) ; 

(3) Turkey should recover certain of the islands in Italian occupation. 

The observations of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on this were that he 
would in this matter follow the lead of England and France. Subject to this general 
consideration, he thought there was something to be said for letting Samothrace and 
Lemnos go to Turkey, in view of their strategic importance and in order to assist her 

(1) [This despatch is based on Sir E. Crowe's record of his conversation with M. de Etter. 
cp. supra, pp. 17S-9, No. 192.] 



184 



in maintaining the freedom of navigation in the Straits. Perhaps some other islands 
could be assigned to Greece in exchange. Chios and Mitylene on the other hand ought 
certainly to be left to Greece, and there was no reason whatever for Turkey having 
Samos. In fact, no other Turkish pretensions ought to be allowed. 

Sir E. Crowe said that my present position was that I had asked the Powers 
formally to take action on the proposal already accepted at the Ambassadors' 
Conference that, in return for the sacrifice which Greece was to be asked to make in 
southern Albania, she was to get all the islands now in her occupation except Tenedos 
and Imbros (and Thasos, which clearly went with the Thracian coastland). It might 
give rise to further discussions and complicate an otherwise clear situation, if 
proposals were now put forward excepting from Greek possession other islands than 
those already earmarked for Turkey. For this reason I should probably prefer to 
maintain my proposition at least for the present. If subsequently Greece herself were 
to seek an^ arrangement with Turkey by which she surrendered Samothrace and 
Lemnos to the latter in return for compensation elsewhere, the two parties might be 
left to arrange matters between them.f^; 

I am, &c. 

E. GREY. 

(2) [Note by Sir Edward Grey: " The small Island of Castelloritza, which is I understand 
almost part of the Mainland may be left to Turkey. I am not sure that it has been occupied 
either by Italy or Greece. Greece may certainly cede to Turkey Samothrace and Lemnos and 
any islands tliat she wishes, but we cannot alter our proposal at present. E. G."] 



No. 199. 

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. 

P.O. 135fi/98/14/44. Rome, D. January 9, 1914, 9 p.m. 

Tel (No. 8.) R. January 10, 1914, 11-15 a.m. 

M. Venizelos has just been to see me after his interview with the Italian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. He told the latter that he accepted South Albanian frontier as 
defined by Commission on condition islands occupied by Greece were retained by her. 
At the same time while accepting that frontier he would ask whether Powers agree to 
slight exchange of territory between Greece and Albania. Frontier as laid down cut 
off small northern portion of Pogoniani district which contained Greek villages and 
was entirely Greek-speaking. The coveted district only included about five hundred 
square kilometers, but some eight thousand people from this region actually lived in 
Athens and their relations with local population made future pacification very difficult. 
On the other hand Greece could afford to renounce to Albania considerable coastal 
strip assigned to her by the Commission south of Cape Stylo down to Pagania. 
Together with cession of this strip he would propose payment to Albania of a sum of 
two hundred thousand pounds in compensation. If this proposal were to be adopted 
it would enable him to deal with the situation in Greece where he felt he could secure 
its general acceptance. 

The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said he did not see any objection in 
principle to this exchange but must of course consult allies before giving definite 
answer. It would have been easier to agree before the Commission had submitted 
their line. His Plxcellency also said that in the reply of Triple Alliance to your 
proposals there would be some suggestion that the allocation of Lemnos and 
Samothrace might be reconsidered but it was not intended to hold out about those 
two islands if their assignment to Greece was insisted on. He gave M. Venizelos to 
understand that Greece could count on obtaining both, and suggestion is evidently 



185 



only for Turkish consumption and in order to throw the responsibiHty of their ultimate 
destination on non-Triple Alliance Powers. 

M. Venizelos gathered that Italy would not require Greece actually to withdraw 
her troops as it would ease the situation that some organised force should remain to 
prevent disturbances. Gradual withdrawal would better meet the case. 

He goes on to Paris on the morning of January 11th and should be in London 
before the end of the week.(') 

(1) [cp. supra, p. 95, No. 110, and note (2).] 



No. 200. 

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

P.O. 1946 '98 '14 '44. 

(No. 4.^ Confidential. Athens, D. January 9, 1914. 

Sir, Pi. January 15, 1914. 

^Monsieur Streit was sworn in as Minister for Foreign AfEairs on the 4th instant, 
and held hi? first diplomatic reception yesterday. 

He told me that his latest information was to the effect that the Powers of the 
Triple Alliance were tending towards acceptance of the "English proposal" with 
regard to the .-Egean islands in Greek occupation, on condition that they should be 
neutralised and that guarantees were given for the protection of minorities. (I 
reminded him that your proposal also required guarantees of the prevention of 
smuggling.^ With regard to the minorities, no guarantees were required, since they 
were provided by the Greek Constitution, which stipulated equality of treatment for 
all. without distinction of race or religion. However, if the Powers required a further 
declaration, the Greek Government would have no difficulty in making it. 

With regard to the undertaking not to fortify the islands or to use them for 
military purposes. Monsieur Streit said that the Greek Government were also ready 
to agree to it.''-' But he would like to say to me, what he would not for the present 
say to any of the representatives of the Triple Alliance, that he assumed that that 
obUgation on the part of Greece imphed a corresponding obligation on the part of the 
Powers towards whom it was contracted to see that no infraction of neutrality is 
attempted by another party. They could not well deprive Greece of the means of 
defending her tenitory without guaranteeing that that territory- should not be 
attacked. 

I asked if he thought that in the event of an attack by another Power, say Italy, 
on Corfu, Greece was entitled to appeal to the Guaranteeing Powers to prevent it : and 
he repHed that he certainly did. I said I did not know what your view was, but that 
I thought it possible that the intention of the Powers in stipulating the neutrality of 
the Ionian Islands was to prevent aggi'ession on Turkey. I would however report to 
you what he had said. 

In view of the present attitude of Turkey towards Greece Monsieur Streit's 
suggestion does not seem unreasonable. 

It occurs to me also to suggest that in whatever public instrument the cession of 
northern Epirus to Albania is determined, it would be well to prohibit the erection of 
fortifications on the coast between the Bay of Yallona and Phtelia. If, as I cannot 
doubt, the object of Italy in pushing the Greek frontier as far south as she can is to 

(*) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King.] 
(*) [cp. supra, pp. 175-7, Xo. 1S9, and end.] 



186 



keep as large a territory as possible in reversion to herself on the failure of the 
Albanian experiment, it would be a convenience to her to find fortifications on the coast 
ready to her hand. 

I have, &.C. 

F. ELLIOT. 

MINUTES. 

The question raised by M. Streit as to the Powers guaranteeing Greece against an attack 
(by Turkey) on the islands which the Powers are going to demand should not be fortified or 
used for any naval or military purposes, raises an important question of principle which will 
have to be considered when the assurances to be given by Greece come to be formulated. 

The Greek view is not unreasonable. But it may be difficult to obtain an effective joint 
guarantee from the Powers. Nevertheless such a guarantee would really be to our interest as 
it would tend to give stability to the Greek regime in the islands and would eventually give to 
H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] a treaty right to oppose their acquisition by any third Power, 
should H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] wish to do so, without necessarily obliging them to take 
action if the other guaranteeing Powers fail to do so. 

Should we confidentially ask the Admiralty whether from their point of view they would 
favour such a guarantee by the six Powers? 

E. A. C. 

Jan[uary] 16. 

The Greek view is reasonable — but the question of guaranteeing the islands against attacks 
will have to be carefully considered when it is raised by Greece. I do not think the Admiralty 
can give us very valuable advice on a question which is really one of policy — and I should be 
inclined to take no action for the present. 

A. N. i 
E. G. 



No. 201. 

Sir H. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 2179/98/14/44. 

(No. 18.) Rome, D. January 11, 1914. 

Sir:— R. January 16, 1914. 

I have the honour to report that when I went yesterday evening to see the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to make the communication reported in my 
immediately preceding despatch, (^) I took the opportunity to ask him when we might 
expect the answer to your proposals regarding the future of the islands, which the 
Italian press has represented as being ready for delivery, reminding him that the 18th 
was rapidly approaching and that the Greek evacuation of the districts assigned to 
Albania would be contingent on a favourable decision as regards the islands occupied 
by Greece. 

The Marquis di San Giuliano said that he thought the question of the evacuation 
might be regarded as no longer urgent. The undertaking given by M. Venizelos and 
the new suggestions which the latter had put forward made insistence on the actual 
evacuation less necessary, and it might for many reasons be advantageous that, once 
the principle was established, the process should not be hurried on. As regards the 
reply, the terms of it were established, and if it had not actually been delivered it 
was merely a question of " redaction," which was a lengthy process when it had to be 
settled by telegraph between three capitals. As the reply will no doubt be in your 
hands before this despatch reaches you, I need not recapitulate the general tenour of 
its terms which he explained to me. 

The point upon which he enlarged with great emphasis was that, while Italy did 
not wish to retain ' ' even a stone ' ' in the iEgean, the date for her withdrawal must 

(!) [Sir R. Rodd's despatch (No. 17), D. January 11, R. January 15, 1914, is not reproduced. 
(F.O. 2041/45/14/53.) The communication mentioned dealt with the question of the Albanian 
loan (cp. supra, pp. 55-6, No. 64; pp. 79-81, Nos. 94-6; pp. 82-3, No. 99; p. 86, No. 101; 
pp. 88-9, No. 104).] 



187 



depend on the Turkish Government. The legal adviser of the Government had 
furnished them with a clearly reasoned argument establishing that Italy was forced 
to remain in the islands by the non-compliance of Turkey with the terms of the 
Treaty of Lausanne and that, in consequence of the expenditure which had been 
entailed she was entitled to compensation. The claim for compensation was in fact 
legitimatized by the Treaty of Lausanne. (-) He repeated that the occupation cost 
three thousand pounds a day : that, in all, some six miUions of expenditure had been 
incurred since the signature of the Trea[t]y. Even now new arrivals of Turkish officers 
in Cyrenaica were reported, and he was tempted to believe that Turkey did not wish 
the islands to be restored until she had sufficiently advanced her naval preparations 
to be able to prevent a movement in those islands in favour of annexation to Greece, 
or to make it dangerous for Greece to declare war and seize them. 

I observed that it was a new principle in international law to claim compensation 
for the cost of a military occupation. He replied that there were continual new 
developments in international law. It was in any case beyond doubt that no Govern- 
ment in Italy could withdraw from the occupation of the islands after what had taken 
place, without some form of indenmity. He seemed to imply that a service had 
actually been rendered to Turkey by the occupation, which had prevented the islands 
from falling into the hands of the Greeks. The country would not tolerate the 
presentation of the huge bill upon a simple withdrawal. They did not ask for any 
financial indemnity. They only asked to be admitted to participation as a Great 
Mediterranean Power in those commercial enterprises in the Mediterranean area of 
the Turkish Empire, in which other Great Powers had obtained their share. In their 
case it would only be a small proportionate share, as they were a Power which had 
come to maturity late in the family of nations. But without some such participation 
the country would never allow the Government to surrender the only lever they could 
bring into action. The present Government were probably more disposed to carry out 
the evacuation promptly than other Governments might be, because the Prime 
lilinister had definitely pronounced upon the question and was personally anxious to 
carry it through. He, therefore, hoped that the negotiations which had been initiated 
for the harbour works at Adalia would have our encouragement and lead to definite 
results. 

All this has been said before but the Minister for Foreign Affairs has perhaps 
never put it quite so emphatically. It would seem that in this attitude Italy has 
secured the firm support of her allies. I believe it to be true that it will be easier to 
bring about the evacuation under Signor Giolitti's administration than under possible 
future Governments which have less prestige and authority, and it is not possible to 
forecast how long the President of the Council will remain in office. If then it is 
desirable to liquidate this question with the least possible delay, I can only recall the 
opinion which I have derived here from such investigation as it is possible to make, 
tliat the only alternative to a line of action on our part which I should deplore in the 
present still somewhat uncertain future of the ultimate orientation of Italy, is to 
further her claims to participation in such concessions in Turkey as she can reasonably 
ask for. 

I have, &c. 

EENNELL EODD. 

MINUTE. 

Sir R. Rodd was right in pointing out that it was a new principle in intern [ationa]! law 
to demand an indemnity. I believe the discussions between M. Nogara and the Smyrna Aidin 
Co[mpany] are proceeding smoothly and hold out hopes of an amicable arrangfemenjt. But 
I have my doubts if some fresh pretext will not be found for prolonging Italian occupation. 

A. N. 
E. G 

(2) [v. Gooch Jk Temperley, Vol. IX (I), pp. 438-42, No. 466, end. and note {*).] 



188 



No. 202. 



Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.C) 



F.O. 2494/98/14/44. 
(No. 14.) Confidential. 
Sir, 



Vienna, D. January 12, 1914. 

R. January 19, 1914. 



During the visit which Hilmi Pasha, Turkish Ambassador, was good enough to 
pay me this afternoon. His Excellency developed further his views on the ^Egean 
Islands question, which I have already had the honour to report upon in my despatch 
No. 1 of January Ist.(^) 

His Excellency is still convinced that the attribution of Mitylene and Chios to 
Greece, under whatever technical safeguards, must lead, sooner or later, to war 
between Turkey and Greece. He still thinks that Bulgaria would actively cooperate 
with Turkey in such a war. Eoumania, he now considers, would be Ivcpt quiet by the 
mere confirmation by the Sobranye of the cession of territory made by Bulgaria to 
that country. But even assuming Roumanian hostility, Turkey, with Bulgaria as an 
ally, would be strong enough to contend with both Greece and Roumania. Servia 
would be rendered innocuous either by an Albanian rising, or, as His Excellency 
thinks more probable, by an arrangement with Bulgaria on the basis of the cession to 
Bulgaria of a strip of territory including Kochana and Istip, and of the extension of 
Servian territory southwards to Salonika at the expense of Greece. Bulgaria would be 
compensated for her warlike effort by obtaining Seres, Drama and Kavala. A patriotic 
Greek statesman ought to see the danger, and he was not without hopes that 
M. Venizelos might yet see it. Greece should realize that by accepting the gift of 
the two islands in question at the hands of the Powers, she would be sacrificing, almost 
certainly, the whole of her Macedonian acquisitions. From the point of view of the 
Entente Powers who desired the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean 
he could not understand how it could be desired to give the Dodecanese to Turkey 
rather than to Greece. Turkey could not hold the Dodecanese against Italy, which 
country would only evacuate the Dodecanese, if she ever did so, with the intention of 
picking a quarrel with Turkey whenever it suited her, and then reoccupying it. 
Nothing could be easier than to pick such a quarrel, and if Italy were given a footing 
in Asia Minor, she would repeat there the methods which had turned out so well for 
her in Tripoli. But His Excellency did not think that the Italians really intended to 
evacuate. Turkey would give them a pretext for remaining by refusing the desired 
concession to Adalia. Anyhow the result would be the same, and the Islands, if 
Turkey ever got them, would inevitably revert to Italy. Thus the status quo of the 
Mediterranean would be destroyed. On the other hand, by giving the Dodecanese to 
Greece, re-occupation by Italy would be for ever precluded. Only in this way could 
Italy be kept out of the Eastern Mediterranean. M. Venizelos ought to summon the 
Greek notables of Mitylene and Chios to Athens and explain to them the true situation, 
which required that they should acquiesce at least for a time in the maintenance of 
Turkish rule over the Islands, as the only means of preserving for Greece her hold 
over a portion of 'Macedonia. If in the course of the next few years Greece grew 
manifestly stronger than Turkey at sea, the islands would naturally become Greek in 
the end. For the present it was in the true interest of Greece to renounce possession 
of them. 

Greece, Hilmi Pasha said, would want an army of 500,000 men to hold her portion 
of Macedonia against Turkey and Bulgaria. But at present she could not put more 
than 100,000 men in the field, and it would take years to create an army fit to stand 
up against an assault by the two allies. Bulgaria was getting stronger every day. She 
was quietly re-organizing her army, though nothing was said about it. 



(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 173-5, No. 188.] 



189 



His Excellency spoke of Enver Pasha as a young man full of ambition, who alone 
could have dared to dismiss by a stroke of the pen, some hundreds of Turkish oflficers 
from active service. Izzet Pasha had shrunk from assuming responsibility for such a 
bold stroke, and Izzet had himself suggested Enver as being the only man capable of 
putting it into execution. Hilmi did not pi-etend to approve. He was too old for such 
desperate experiments. He had however, great regard for Enver and hoped he might 
prove a successful War Minister. If he failed, the War Office would have to be again 
filled by an older and more prudent Minister. 

Speaking of the recent abortive Turkish raid on Albania, Hilmi Pasha said neither 
the Grand Vizir nor the Turkish Government had anything to do with it. Nor had 
Izzet Pasha, who was far too cautious and reasonable to embark on such schemes. It 
was likely enough that the enterprise had originated at some meeting of Albanians in 
Constantinople, where there are at least 50,000 Albanians. I asked His Excellency if 
he knew anything of Bekir Bey. He said he had known him well in Macedonia as a 
daring and unscrupulous leader of bands who had done much harm to the Greeks. 
Hatred of the Greeks was his most marked characteristic. It might well be that he 
had offered his services in Albania to combat the Greeks. 

His Excellency thought the disturbed condition of Albania was due largely to the 
failure of the Austrians to . understand the importance of Essad Pasha. When Essad 
had come a few months ago to Vienna he had been given the cold shoulder. He was 
now engaged in demonstrating that no Government in Albania would be able to ignore 
him. He was very rich and had a much stronger hold on the country than Ismail 
Kemal who had nothing to live on but the doles he received alternately from Austria 
and Italy, and even from Greece. If the Prince of Wied ever came to Albania, he 
would do well to select his ad%dsers neither from the camp of Ismail Kemal nor from 
that of Essad. ) Albania could only be successfully 'governed by applying the system 
employed by England at Aden. No attempt should be made to set up a European 
administration throughout the country. The Central Government should employ as 
its agent in each of the regions into which the country was naturally divided the local 
chieftain who was most feared there. Thus tliere would be no interference with the 
secular habits of the population which would never submit to be administered and 
taxed in a European manner. 

The Turkish Ambassador takes an unhopeful view of the prospects of peace being 
maintained in the Balkans during the present year. 

I have thought it worth while to report the above conversation although there is 
perhaps reason to doubt the soundness of His Excellency's conclusions on several 
important points. It seems to me difficult to believe that Eoumania would tamely 
acquiesce in the tearing up of the Treaty of Bucharest, (*) in exchange merely for a 
Bulgarian Parliamentary acceptance of the new frontier between Bulgaria and 
Eoumania. It seems also probable that Austria-Hungary, which watches every Servian 
move with suspicion, would flare up again at the thought of Servia becoming mistress 
of Salonika. But though the Turkish Ambassador is no doubt over confident, it is 
impossible not to be struck by the unanimity with which the representatives of Turkey 
are endeavouring to convince foreign Powers of the determination of that country to 
resist even by force, the incorporation of Mitylene and Chios in the Kingdom of 
Greece. 

I have, &c. 

MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 

(') [cp. supra, p. Ill, Ed. nofc] 

(*) [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 1141-4, Subject Index, sub B.KLKAy War 
Thhid.] 



190 



No. 203. 

Memorandum communicated hy Herr von Schubert. C) 

F.O. 1929/98/14 '44. German Emhassy, London, January 14, 1914. 

L'Allemagne consent que les lies de la Mer Egee occupees par la Grece— excepte 
Imbros et Tenedos ainsi que Kasteloriso — soient attribuees a la Grece a la condition 
que les troupes grecques aient evacue, jusqu'a la date du 18 janvier, les territoires 
attribues a I'Albanie y compris I'lle de Sasseno et que le Gouverneraent Hellenique 
assume I'engagement de faire cesser toute resistance contre I'ordre des clioses qui a 
ete etabli par les Puissances en Albanie meridionale. II s'ensuit que I'attribution des 
lies a la Grece n'entre en vigueur qu'apres raceomplissement des conditions ci-dessus 
mentionnees. 

L'Allemagne accepte les garanties demandees par la note anglaise pour les lies 
et elle proi)Ose en outre que d'autres garanties soient donnees par la Grece pour 
la protection des minorites musulmanes. 

Quant a la derniere proposition de Sir Edward Grey, concernant le Dodecanese, le 
Gouvernement Italien maintient sa declaration qu'il sera pret a rendre ces lies a la 
Turquie, mais il declare que la date et les conditions de la restitution doivent former 
I'objet d'un accord ulterieur entre les deux Gouvernements conformement au traite de 
Lausanne. 

Ije Gouvernement Allemand et le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois adherent a ce 
point de vue. 

Londres le 14 Janvier 1914. 

MINUTE. 

My first impressions are that we should express gratification at the terms of the reply and 
observe as regards the first paragraph that the date of the 18th of January, having already 
arrived or been passed the word " immediately " should take its place. The words 
" engagement de faire cesser " &c. will require a little modification. Greece cannot be held 
responsible for possible future troubles that might be caused by Ismail, Essad or any 
adventurer. We want therefore some words such as " undertake to offer no resistance and 
not to support or encourage directly or indirectly resistance of any kind.'' I would make it 
stronger and say " to discourage " but that would imply that Greece has such an influence on 
the inhabitants of the district that it ought properly to be Greek. 

2nd and 3rd paragraphs may be agreed to. As regards the Dodecanese we might while 
accepting that paragraph say that as long as one of the Great Powers remains in occupation 
of these zEgean Islands the situation will remain abnormal and that while the arrangement of 
the return of these Islands to Turkey in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 
Lausanne is primarily a matter to be settled by Italy and Turkey, yet the Powers with whom 
by agreement it rested to decide the ultimate destination of the Islands have an interest in 
their fate. We might suggest that two communications be drawn upon these lines, one 
suitable for communication at Athens, and the other at Constantinople, (2) on condition that 
the Powers will in common accord take steps if necessary to make their decision respected. 

These are only my first impressions. I will discuss it on Monday morning. 

E. G. 

16.1.14. 

(1) [This memorandum is minuted as having been sent to the King. A copy was sent to 
Paris in despatch (No. 23) and to St. Petersburgh in despatch (No. 19) on January 14, for 
communication to the French and Russian Governments. A telegram stating that the memo- 
randum had been received, and that it amounted to a general acceptance of the British 
proposals, was sent on January 15, D. 5 p.m., to St. Petersburgh (No. 20) ; to Rome (No. 8^ ; 
to Vienna (No. 11) ; to Constantinople (No. 30). v. also infra, p. 193, No. 205 ; pp. 196-8, No. 211, 
and ends. cp. G.P., XXXVI (II), pp. 475-6. A similar communication was received from 
Count Trauttmansdorff (F.O. 1931/98/14/44), cp. t').-U..i., VII, pp. 732-3, No. 9193, and end, 
and from the Marquis Imperiali. (F.O. 1929/98/14/44.)] 

(2) [f. infra, p. 198, No. 211, ends.; pp. 231-4, Nos. 252-3, and ends.] 



191 



No. 204. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edicard Grey.C) 

Private.(=) 

Dear Sir Edward. Constantinople. January 14. 1914. 

Many thanks for your letter of the 23rd of December which reached me last 
Saturday in the bag.f/'i It is very kind of you to have wxitten. 

I hesitate to say anything about the islands question, because I do not know on 
what lines agreement will be reached between the Powers. 

My despatch No. lO(^) which goes by this bag points out some of the disadvantages 
of a settlement unacceptable to Turkey. The Turks dwell much upon the danger to 
Turkey from a permanent Greek occupation of Mitylene and Chios, but I am myself 
more impressed by the danger to Greece, whose position seems to be far from secure, 
and will be considerably weakened if -Mitylene and Chios are left as hostages at 
Turkey's mercy. Unless it is proposed to put Turkey into leading strings at once and 
impose financial control and limitation of armaments, this danger is a real one. 

Djevad Bey, who was councillor in London, called on me today and repeated to 
me what everyone is sa\'ing that Turkey cannot accept a permanent alienation of 
islands so near her coast as Mitylene and Chios. If the Powers use force to compel 
them to do so. they will submit, but such a settlement would only be short-lived. The 
Porte are most anxious to avoid war : they had fully reaHsed how delicate was the 
position, but had hoped that an arrangement would be come to. 

The proposal now before the Powers had upset all calculations ; it had increased 
Venizelos' difficulty, made it almost impossible for him to compromise and had 
compelled the Porte to take measures against future possibilities. 

He begged me to represent to you that a hostile decision of the Powers, communi- 
cated to them in a form which it would be necessary for them to accept or to refuse, 
would increase the danger of the situation. 

Could the Turkish Government not be consulted? Must the decision be definite 
and irrevocable? I do not quite know what was in his mind, but I think that there is 
an idea that an exchange of Mitylene and Chios for some of the smaller islands now 
occupied by Italy f excluding Rhodes'! might be arranged. 

He said that he had not been authorised or permitted to speak to me and begged 
that his name might not be mentioned. 

I said that I was not dealing with the question, and that I did not know what 
was its last phase, or in fact anything about it. but that your proposal was Hnked up 
with the Epirus frontier, and unless that question was left open, I did not see how 
the discussion about the islands could be left open. 

I agreed to let you know what he had said. 

I do not know whether in the course of the conversations with the other Powers 
any opportunity may offer of some kind of compromise, or whether Venizelos' visit to 
PiOme and to the other capitals has any connection with the possibility of an ultimate 
exchange of islands. If that were likely, then perhaps it might be found possible to 
suspend a final verdict, but I would not go so far as to recommend this without further 
knowledge and consideration. 

I have held out no hopes to Djevad Bey, but I should like to say again, how 
desirable a compromise seems from a local point of view, as eUminating one source of 
danger to peace. 

Another source would still «xist in the question of Salonica, for it is pretty clear 
that some understanding exists with Bulgaria for common action in regard to 

(1^ [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; to 
Sir A. Xicolson ; to Sir E. Crowe. ~ 
(2) 'Grey M5S-. Vol. 41.] 
(^) [i-. supra, pp. 1&4-5, No. 180.] 

(*) [Sir L. Mallet's despatch (No. 10\ D. January 7. R. January 19, 1914. gives the Turkish 
economic, political, financial and geographical objections to the cession of Mitylene and Chios 
to Greece. (F.O. 2453 ,'98, 14, 44.)] 



192 



Southern Macedonia, and of late there seems to be evidence that the plot is thickening. 
This danger would be considerably diminished, if an arrangement could be brought 
about between Servia and Bulgaria, on the basis of a cession of Ishtip and Kochana 
to the latter. Bulgarian ambitions would be satisfied temporarily, and I think that 
the temptation to intrigue here with the Turks would be considerably diminished. I 
do not say that it would entirely disappear. 

The sudden outburst of energy on the part of the Turks, the ardour for reform of 
army and navy has revived speculation as to the future of this country. Most people 
think that very little will come of the reforms, — that the German Mission will arouse 
jealousies and be unable to accomplish much, and that the navy will never be able to 
compete with those of . European Powers. 

There are some people, however, who think the contrary, and that we have got 
men in power here wlio are determined to put Turkey on a modern basis and who will 
succeed sufficiently to make her rather more formidable than she has been for some 
years. 

Some people are talking of financial control and limitation of armaments. 

I expect that there would be some difficulty in imposing financial control on an 
unwilling Turkey, who would quite see that it was the end of her aspirations and the 
beginning of partition. 

She might be expected to put up a serious fight and the Powers might have to 
face the question of using force. The withholding of money would be met by the 
imposition of the 4^-% and by a seizure of the Debt revenues. This would bring 
securities down with a run, and the French investor would be hard hit. 

In my view it would serve our interests better if control came gradually and 
indirectly, as, indeed, it is coming. 

The Turks realize that they can do nothing by themselves, but like all Orientals 
they attach great importance to saving their faces. A curious instance of this is their 
action in regard to Liman von Sanders. (^) The foreign correspondents were told four 
days ago that he was no longer Commander of the first Army Corps, but the native 
Press has been forbidden to mention it, and not a word has been said to the 
Ambassadors. They consider that this procedure saves their dignity. 

Yours sincerely, 

LOUIS MALLET. 

P.S. — Since writing this your telegram asking me whether I have heard whether 
any direct negotiations are going on between Greece and Turkey about the islands 
has arrived. (®) 

Unless I can glean any information during the next few hours, I propose to reply 
that I have no information. 

I had already written in a despatch(') that the Turks are likely to employ the 
interval between the decision of the Powers and the arrival of a new ship in negotia- 
tions with Greece. It is quite possible that some indirect pourparlers may have begun 
somewhere already. On receiving your telegram I went to see my Italian Colleague 
Garroni, who is extremely well informed, and talked about the islands among other 
subjects. I mentioned the possibility of a direct understanding of course quite 
casually and without saying a word of your enquiry, but he said nothing worth 
repeating on the subject. 

He is very pessimistic as to the effects of an adverse decision and as to the 
inevitable result and he irritates me by constantly repeating that Italy have only 
yielded to the British proposal out of respect for you. 

L. M 

(5) [cp. infra, pp. 338-423, Chapter LXXXVII, passim.] 

(«) [Sir Edward Grey's telegram (No. 25) of January 13, 1914, D. 5-5 p.m., is not reproduced 
as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. The telegram was also sent to Athens (No 4) 
(F.O. 1915/98/14/44.)] 

(■) [This refers to Sir L. Mallet's despatch (No. 10) summarized in note (^).] 



193 



No. 205. 

Sir Edu-ard Grey to Sir F. Bertie.C) 

F.O. 1929/98/14/44. 

Tel. (No. 27.^ Foreign Office, January 19. 1914. 10-30 p.m. 

My desp[atch] No. 23.(=) 

My view is that I should express my general gratification at the terms of the 
reply of the Triple Alliance Powers, (-) and make the following observations on 
particular points. 

Para [graph] 1. As the date of January 18 has already been passed, the 
expression as soon as possible " should take its place. 

The words ' engagement de faire cesser ' should be modified. Greece cannot be 
held responsible for possible future trouble that might be caused by Ismail Kemal or 
Essad or some independent adventurer in S[outh] Albania. I would therefore suggest 
some such wording as " undertakes to offer no resistance and not to support or 
encourage directly or indirectly resistance of any kind." I would make it stronger 
and say discourage." 

Para [graphs] 2 and 8 can be agreed to. 

Para [graph] 4. As regards the Dodecanese, I would, while accepting that 
para., say that as long as one of the Great Powers remains in occupation of these 
jEgean islands, the situation will remain abnormal, and that, while it is primarily a 
matter for Italy and Turkey to arrange the return of these islands to the latter in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, yet all the Powers with 
whom by the subsequent agi-eement of last August/") it rested to decide the ultimate 
destination of the Islands have an interest in their fate. 

I should conclude my reply to the Triple Alliance Powers by suggesting that two 
declarations, based on their answer and modified as above, should be drawn up for 
communication by the 6 Powers to Athens and Constantinople respectively, on 
condition that it is formally acknowledged by the Powers that they will in common 
accord take steps if necessary to make their decision respected by each of these two 
countries. 

y[our] .E[xcellency] should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] and 
ascertain his views as soon as possible. (*) 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to St. Petersburgh (No. 27). It was repeated also to 
Berlin (No. 23); to Rome (Xo. 11); to Vienna (,No. 14); to Constantinople (No. 39), "for 
information only."] 

(-) [v. supra, p. 190, No. 203, and note {^). It would appear that the two sentences included 
in paragraph 1 of the text there given are treated as two separate paragraphs in the above 
telegram. For the answer to the Triple Alliance, r. infra, pp. 196-8, No. 211, and ends.] 

(3) [v. Gooch ct- Temperley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 949-50, No. 1195; pp. 954-5, No. 1202; 
pp. 1066-7, .4pp. v.] 

(•*) [The aide-memoire communicated by Sir G. Buchanan to M. Sazonov is given in 
Imperialismus. 1st Ser., Vol. I, pp. 47-8, No. 51. A conversation between M. Isvolski and 
M. Doumergue on this subject is recorded ibid., p. 64, No. 75. Replies concurring with the 
above telegram were received from St. Petersburgh on 21 January, telegram (No. 20), 
(F.O. 3024/98/14/44), and from Paris on 22 January, despatch (No. 36),\f.O. 3163/98/14/44).] 



No. 206. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.{^) 

F.O. 3057/98/14/44. 
(No. 25.) 

Sir, Foreign Office, January 19, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day, and began by expressing the hope 
that I was pleased with the reply of the Triple Alliance about the Mge&n Islands. (^) 

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. 
Telegrams were sent to Rome (No. 10) ; to Berlin (No. 22) ; to Vienna (No. 13).] 
(2) [r. supra, p. 190. No. 203.] 

[8959] 0 



194 



I said ihat T thought that all the Powers might make communications in 
Constantinople and Athens, respectively, based on this reply. I was ascertaining the 
views of the French and Russian Governments as to the makmg of these communi- 
cations, and I would then send an answer to the Triple Alliance on this point.(') One 
or two modifications would have to be made : the date of the 18th January was now 
impossible, and we should have to substitute " as soon as possible " or some words to 
that effect. 

The Ambassador said that ho thought his Government now contemplated 
January 31st as the date to be specified. 

I observed that the Greeks could not be held responsible for everything that might 
happen in Albania as a result of the actions of Essad or Ismail Kemal or independent 
adventurers. , . 

The Ambassador admitted this, but proceeded to tell me with some indignation 
of the actions of the Greeks at Delvino in disarming and illtreating Mussulmans, and 
of the landing of Evzones, and other things that were quite contrary to the spirit of 
the conversations of M. Venizelos in Rome. 

I said that of course such action on the part of Greece must be discontinued. The 
Italian Government could, if they liked, make the suggestion when we came to make 
a communication in Athens, that the communication should include a mention of these 
proceedings as instances of the sort of thing that Greece must discontinue. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 

(3) [v. infra, pp. 196-8, No. 211.] 



No. 207. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.C) 

Private & Secret.(') 

My dear Elliot, London, January 21, 1914. 

M. Venizelos broached with me this morning(') the idea of an "Entente" 
between England and Greece to preserve the ' ' status quo ' ' in the Mediterranean. He 
intimated that Greece was ready for such an arrangement, and would like it. Now that 
the Conference of Ambassadors was over, there would perhaps not be the same 
objection to its being considered. 

I said that I thought it premature to consider a separate arrangement of that 
kind between two Powers. We had better first see whether a guarantee of all the 
Powers could be secured for the Mgean Islands in Greek possession. It would be 
undesirable to enter into a separate arrangement about the Mediterranean which must 
ofEend the susceptibilities of other Powers interested in it. Later on, perhaps, all the 
Powers interested in the Mediterranean might be disposed to enter into an agreement 
to maintain the "status quo." It would be much better to arrange things in that 
way, as a separate agreement between two Powers was always regarded as being 
directed against others. For instance, when Germany had proposed to us an agree- 
ment for the maintenance of the " status quo " in the North Sea, we had declined to 
enter into an agreement unless all the Powers interested in the North Sea were invited 
to do so also.(*) This had been done, and the agreement had been come to in this way. 

(1) [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; to 
Lord Morley ; to Lord Crewe.] 

(2) [Grey MSS., Vol. 24.] 

(^) [For M. Venizelos' visit, cp. supra, p. 95, No. 110, and note (2).] 
(*) [V. Gooch ffc Temperley, Vol. VIII, pp. 137-8, No. 113, sqq.] 



11)5 



M. Venizelos obsen^ed that Alliances and " Ententes " might be purely defensive, 
as the Triple Alliance was understood to be. 

I said that the Triple Alliance, at its origin, had been regarded as a menace to 
France, and it had resulted in the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance, to 
counterbalance it. 

Finally M. Venizelos asked that, as he had mentioned the idea, it should be 
regarded as most contidential. He said that he had not mentioned it even in Paris. 

I said that I would mention it only to the Prime Minister and my Colleagues. I 
had given him my personal opinion, and T should like to reflect upon it, but I had no 
desire that it should be brought under the reflection of others. 

Yours sincerelv, 

E. GKEY. 



No. 208. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. 

Privale.(') 

Dear Sir Edward, Constantinople, January 21, 1914. 

I saw Limpus this morning and he told me that the Minister of Marine had spoken 
to him often on the subject of the islands. The Admiral had not been able to advise 
them that the islands especially Lemnos were not of gi"eat strategic importance to 
them, but now the decision of the Powers was known he had told them clearly that 
they must accept it. His impression is that they do not want to make war on Greece 
but would like to negotiate. 

His opinion on the subject was that they might come to an arrangement by 
exchanging some of the Dodecanese islands against Chios, Mitylene and Lemnos. The 
Minister told him that they had already " tried." 1 asked Limpus whether he meant 
that they had approached Greece and he was not sure but thought it must mean that. 

Limpus said that if he were in their position he would try again. 

The idea of negotiation is in the air and this is perhaps natural, as the Turks, as 
far as one can tell, are, apart from financial embarrassments, powerless by sea at 
present and in a bad military position in Thrace for an advance on Salonica. My 
despatches will show you however that there is considerable hkehhood of disturbance 
in Macedonia some time or another, and that there are strong signs of collusion with 
Bulgaria. 

The situation is disquieting because all the elements of discord exist in the Treaty 
of Bucharest. If some agreement could be come to between Greece and Turkey about 
the islands and if Bulgaria and Serbia could be brought nearer on the basis of a small 
cession of teiTitory to the former there would be a better chance of peace for a time. 

I hear from Crawford that Giinther has been pressing the Turkish Government 
to put on the 4% at once without waiting for the consent of the Powers. (-) 

I hope to be able to say something definite about Armenian reform in a day 
or two. 

Y[ou]rs sincerelv, 

LOUIS MALLET. 

(') ^Grey MSS.. Vol. 41] 

(*) [This subject vrill be treated in Gooch <t Tempcrley, Vol. X Ul).] 



[89591 



196 



No. 209. 

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edivard Grey. 

Athens, January 23, 1914. 

F.O. 3313/98/14/44. I>- 1-45 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 12.) E- 5 p.m. 

Turkish Minister who has not yet presented his credentials spoke yesterday 
unofficially to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs about islands saying that possession 
of Chios and Mitylene by Turkey was essential to avoid another Cretan question. 

Minister for 'Foreign Affairs replied that if Turkish Minister had spoken officially 
he would have replied that question did not admit of discussion between them being 
in the hands of the Powers : unofficially he would say that it was possession of the 
islands by Turkey not by Greece that would raise a Cretan question; that their 
neutralisation would guarantee Turkey against aggression and that Greek Government 
being desirous of friendly relations would discourage Hellenic agitation on mainland. 

Turkish Minister was dissatisfied and said he would return to the subject, Greek 
Minister rejoining that he would receive the same answer. 

Sent to Constantinople. 



No. 210. 

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir L. Mallet. O 

F.O. 1929/98/14/44. 

Tel. (No, 48.) Foreign Office, January 23, 1914. 

Following is text of note which I have addressed to German, Austrian and Italian 
Embassies on receipt of the reply of their Gov[ernmen]ts(^) to my circular tel[egram] 
of Dec[ember] 12(^) resp[ectin]g Southern Albania and the .^gean Islands, and of 

Turkish 

communication which I propose sh[oul]d be made to the Qj.ggj^ Gov[ernmen]t on 
this subject. 

(Here insert text of Note.(*) At end of Note, cypher words: "Note ends. 

Enclosure begins.") 

(And at end of tel[egrara] : — ) 

— Crrt^di 
Text of commLunicatioJn to r]i^^y}.-g^ Gov[ernmen]t(^) follows by post, for your 

inform[atio]n. 

(•) [This telegram was repeated to Athens (No. 5) mutatis mutandis; telegrams (Nos. — ^ 

6 

gave instructions " You should join with your colleagues in making this communication to 
Turkish 

Qj-eek Government when they receive similar instrvA;tions."] 
(2) [v. supra, p. 190, No. 203, and note (i).] 
(^) [v. supra, pp. 76-7, No. 91.] 
(*) [v. immediately succeeding document.] 
(*) [v. immediately succeeding document, and ends.] 



No. 211. 

Sir Ed^rard Grey to Prince Lichnowskv.C) 

F.O. 1929/98/14/44. 

Y[our] E[xcellency], Foreign Office, January 23, 1914. 

I have the honfour] to acknowledge the receipt of the note, dated Jan[uary] 14,(') 
communicated to me by order of Y[our] E[xcellency]'s Gov[ernmen]t on the subject 

(1) [cp. G F., XXXVI (II), pp. 478-81. This communication was made also to the Marquis 
Imperiah and to Count Trauttmansdorff, cp. 0.-U..4.., VII, pp. 773-6, No. 9239, and end. 
/^^'^oor? *° ■S''"' ' *° ^^'■''^ (No. 21) ; to Vienna (No. 8) ; to St. Petersburgh 
(iNo. ^9); to Rome (No. 28); by telegraph to Constantinople (Nos. 43-4); to Athens (Nos. 5-6.)l 

(2) [v. supra, p. 190, No. 203.] ^ n 



197 



of the -Egean islands and the southern frontier of Albania, and to express my 

German 

gratification at the terms of the replv of the Austrian Gov[ernmen]t to the 

Italian 

suggestions of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overmuent] for the solution of these questions. 
I have now the hon[our] to offer the following observations upon the above-mentioned 
note. 

In regard to paraTgi-aph] I thereof, in which Y[our[ E[xcellency]'s 
Gov"ernmen]t agrees that the .^Igean islands in Greek occupation — except Imbros, 
Tenedos and Kasteloriso — sh[onlld be retained by Greece on condition that she 
sh[oul]d evacuate the territories allotted to Albania by .Jan[uary] 18, it is necessary 
to observe that, as the date in question is already past, the words ' jusqu'a la date du 
18 Janvier ' " must be replaced by some other expression such as " ' aussitot que 
possible," or .the mention of a new date or dates. As a further condition to such 

German 

assent it is also proposed by the Austrian Gov[emmen]t "que le Gouvemement 

Italian 

hellenique assume I'engageroent de faire cesser toute resistance contre Tordre des 
choses qui a ete etabli par les Puissances en Albanie meridionale." The wording of 
this condition appears to H[isl Mfajesty's] G[overnment] to require some modifica- 
tion, inasmuch as the Greek Gov~remmen]t c[oul]d not justly be held responsible 
for eventual troubles in those regions that might be due to causes over which it has no 
control, such as internal rivalries or the acts of some independent adventurer. I 
w"oul]d therefore propose that the sentence above quoted be replaced by some such 
wording as: "que le Gouv^ernemenlt hellenique s'engage a n'opposer aucune 
resistance, et a n'appuyer ou encourager. d'une maniere directe ou indirecte, aucune 
resistance, quelle qu'en soit la forme, a I'ordre des choses qui a ete etabli par les 
Puissances en Albanie meridionale." 

H^is] Mfajesty's] G[ovemment] agree in the stipulation of Y[our] Gov[em- 
men"t that the definitive allocation to Greece of the islands in question sh[oul]d only 
take effect on the fulfilment of the above-mentioned conditions. 

German 

H[is] M[ajesty's] G[ovemment] also concurs in the proposal of the Austrian 

Italian 

Gov[ernmen]t that guarantees sh[oul]d be given by Greece for the protection of 
Mussulman minorities. 

HTis] M''ajesty's] G[overnmentj take note of the declaration of the Italian 
Govremmenft that they are ready to restore the Dodecanese to Turkey, but that the 
date and conditions of this restitution must form the object of an ulterior agreement 
between those two Gov[emmenjts in conformity with the Treaty of Lausanne. I 
w[oul]d, however, point out that, as long as one of the Great Powers remains in 
occupation of these .tgean islands, the situation will remain abnormal, and that, while 
it is primarily a matter for Italy and Turkey to arrange the return of these islands to 
the latter in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, yet all the 
Powers with whom, by the subsequent agi-eement of last August, it rested to decide 
the ultimate destination of the islands have an interest in their fate. 

In conclusion I w[oul]d propose that two declarations, the texts of which are 
enclosed herewith, and which are based on the above-mentioned note of Jan[uary] 14, 
and modified in the sense that I have suggested, should be communicated by the six 
Powers at Athens and Constantinople respectively, on condition that it is formally 
acknowledged by the Powers that they will in common accord take steps, if necessary, 
to make their decision respected by each of the two countries concerned. 

[I am. tic] 

E. G[REY]. 



198 



Enclosure 1 in No. 211. 
Declaration. 

The Sublime Porte undertook by Article 5 of the Treaty of London of May 17th 
(30th) 1913, between Turkey and the Allied Balkan States,(^) and also by' Article 15 
of the Treaty signed at Athens between Turkey and Greece on November 1st [14th], 
1913.(^) to leave to the six Powers the decision as to the destiny of the iEgean Islands. 

The six Powers consequently took the matter into their careful consideration, and, 
after interchange of views, have decided that Greece should restore to Turkey the 
islands of Tenedos and Imbros and should retain definite possession of the other 
iEgean islands which she at present holds in occupation. The island of Kastelorizo 
will also be restored to Turkey. The six Powers have also decided that satisfactory 
guarantees shall be given by Greece to the Powers and to Turkey that the islands, 
possession of which she will retain, shall not be fortified or used for any naval or 
military purposes, and that she will take effective measures for the prevention of 
smuggling between the islands and the Turkish mainland. 

The six Powers also engage to use their influence with Greece to secure that these 
conditions are effectively carried out and maintained. The six Powers will further 
require from Greece satisfactory guarantees for the protection of Mussulman minorities 
in the islands which she acquires. 

The six Powers confidently trust that the above decisions will be faithfully 
respected by the Ottoman Government. 

Enclosure 2 in No. 211. 
Declaration. 

Under Article 5 of the Treaty of London of May 17th (30th\ 1913, between 
Turkey and the Allied Balkan States,(^) and also by Article 15 of the Treaty signed 
at Athens between Turkey and Greece on November 1st [14th], 1913. the Hellenic 
Government agreed to leave to the six Powers the decision as to the destiny of the 
.^gean Islands. 

The six Powers have consequently decided to allocate to Greece all the Mgean 
Islands at present in Greek occupation with the exception of Tenedos and Imbros 
which must be restored to Turkey, as also the island of Kastelorizo. The Powers have 
further decided that, as regards the islands assigned to Greece, satisfactory guarantees 
should be given by the Hellenic Government to the Powers and to Turkey that these 
islands should not be fortified or used for any naval or military purposes; and that 
effective measures will be taken for the prevention of smuggling between the islands 
and the Turkish mainland. 

The six Powers have engaged to use their influence with the Hellenic Government 
to secure that these conditions are faithfully carried out and maintained. They also 
request that Greece will give satisfactory guarantees for. the protection of musulman 
minorities in the islands which she has acquired under the above mentioned decision 
of the six Powers. 

The definitive allocation to Greece of the islands which the Powers have decided 
should be left in her possession will only become effective after the Greek troops have 
evacuated the territoi-ies assigned to Albania as well as the island, of Sasseno and 
when the Greek Government have formally undertaken to offer no resistance, and not 
to support or encourage, directly or indirectly, resistance of any kind to the order of 
things which has been established by the Powers, in Southern Albania. 

The six Powers confidently trust that the above decisions will be faithfully 
respected by the Hellenic Government. 

(3) [i;. Gooch & Tempefley, Vol. IX (II), p. 1050, App. III.] 

(*) [For the text of this treaty v. B.F.S.P., Vol. 107, pp. 893-902. cp. infra, p. 281, No. 313.] 



199 



No. 212. 

Sir I J. MaV.ct to Sir Edward Grey. 

Constantinople, January 26, 1914. 
F.O. 3785/98/14/44. D. 6 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 62.) E. 10 p.m. 

Your telegram No. 43 of Jan[uary] 23.(') 

A formal acknowledgment by the Powers that they will make their decision 
respecting islands respected might commit them to the use of force if Turkey at any 
future time found herself strong enough to attempt re-occupation of Chios and Mitylene 
or made a forward movement in Thrace with object of bringing pressure on Greece to 
give them up. Decision of tlie Powers would obviously be inapplicable if Turkey and 
Greece came to an amicable arrangement, which, as far as I can say, is desired here. 

If my information is correct it would seem unlikely that Turkey would re-occupy 
islands until lier naval forces are superior to those of Greece, but when that happens, 
unless she has come to terms with Greece in the meantime and unless there is a change 
of administration here, she might endeavour to re-occupy some of the islands or make 
a move in Thrace, perhaps both. In the circumstances, a naval demonstration might 
have requisite effect, but before Powers commit themselves it would be well to consider 
what other measures could be taken if it failed. 

An international occupation of islands in dispute would be logical, but obviously 
undesirable. 

An international occupation of Dedeagatch might be effective in preventing 
movements in Thrace, but might be thought to commit us more than British interests 
warrant. 

I am inclined to think that pressure least open to objection, although it also has 
obvious drawbacks, would be financial, and that if France, partly for reasons of self- 
interest, is not able to withhold money from Turkey, and is unable to devise guarantees 
that money will not be spent on war. it might be more prudent for the Powers not to 
commit themselves to threats of force, although French would possibly prefer it. 



MINUTES. 

I believe that if the Powers remain united and will plainly intimate to Turkey, all 
together, that they will insist on their decision being respected, Turkey will bow to the 
inevitable. 

E. A. C. 

Jan[uary] 27. 

We must wait to hear whether the Powers will engage to take steps if necessary to make 
their decisions respected. 

A. N. 

If the Powers will not agree to the phrase about making their decision respected the whole 
thing may fall through as far as we are concerned. 

On the other hand if Turkey and Greece wish to make subsequently a voluntary exchange 
of the Islands the Powers need not and in my opinion should not interfere. 

E. G. 



(1) [v. supra, p. 196, No. 210.] 



200 



No. 213. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.C) 

F.O. 2580/98/14/44. 

^No. 52.) Foreign Office, January 26, 1914. 

' The Turkish Ambassador called here on the 15th instant, and was received by 
Sir A Nicolson. H[is] E[xcellencv] mentioned that he had read in the newspapers 
that the Triple Alliance had replied to the British proposal regarding the ^Egean 
Islands and when Sir A. Nicolson said that this was the case, His Excellency enquired 
what was the nature of the reply. Sir A. Nicolson pointed out that H[is] M[ajesty's] 
Government must communicate the substance to the French and Russian Govern- 
ments and that, until the views of these two Powers were received, he was unable 
to give any information. 

Tewfik Pasha said that he had received a telegram from the Ottoman M[inister 
for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] to the effect that the Turkish Government trusted that 
proper consideration would be given to their views in regard to the disposal of the 
islands adjoining the mainland of Turkey, and looked to England especially to protect 
Turkish interests, as they wished to base their policy, present and future, on a most 
friendlv understanding with England. 

Sir A. Nicolson told His Excellency that the future of the islands had been left in 
the hands of all the Powers, and that any decision which might be arrived at would 
be the collective decision of all the Powers, and not of any one Power; that all con- 
siderations and views had been carefully examined and weighed by the Powers before 
arriving at a decision, and that the conclusions which would finally be reached would 
be such as would, in the opinion of all the Powers, be best calculated to safeguard the 
interests of all parties. 

The Ambassador explained that he had merely spoken unofficially. 

[I am, S:c. 

E. GREY.] 

(!) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King ; to the Prime Minister ; to 
Lord Crewe; to Lord Morley. It is based on Sir A. Nicolson's record of his conversation with 
Tewfik Pasha. Sir A. Nicolson added the following note to his record: — 

" I thought it well to be a little general and vague — but I rather gathered that Tewfik 
had been told to intimate that Turkey's friendship to us was dependent on our attitude in 
regard to the islands — and so I wished to sweep all the Powers into the same bag. A. N."] 

(2) [v. supra, p. 193, No. 205, and note (■»).] 



No. 214. 

Sir Ij. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. 

Constantinople, January 11, 1914. 
P.O. 3948/98/14/44. D. 4-20 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 64.) R. 4-30 p.m. 

Your telegram No. 43 of January 23('). 

Should note communicating decision be collective or identic? Question may be 
raised when all my colleagues receive their instructions and to avoid delay I should 
be glad of your instructions. Perhaps I should conform myself to the views of the 
majority of my colleagues?(^) 

(1) [v. supra, p. 196, No. 210, and note (i).] 

(2) [A telegram (No. 50) was sent to Sir L. Mallet on January 29, D. 3-40 p.m., informing 
him that the communication, if made, should be collective, but that the agreement of the Powers 
had not yet been given. (F.O. 3948/98/14/44.)] 



201 



No. 215. 



Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 



F.O. 4474/98/14/44. 

(No. 25.^ 

Sir. 



Vienna, D. January 27, 1914. 

E. January 31, 1914. 



Having reported in my despatches No. 1 of January Ist(-) and No. 14 of 
January 12th(') my previous conversations with Hilmi Pasha, Turkish Ambassador at 
Vienna, I have the honour to forward the following account of some further remarks 
which His Excellency made to me yesterday in conversation. 

While still maintaining stubbornly the position that Turkey will not accept 
without protest the proposed attribution of ^Mitylene and Chios to Greece, Hilmi 
Pasha's tone was rather less menacing than before. Turkey, he said, was in no 
warlike mood. She did not contemplate an immediate campaign for the re-capture of 
the Islands or for the re-conquest of Greek Macedonia. She would merely bide her 
time. Complications would surely arise which would enable her to have her revenge. 
She had perhaps no strong reason for hurrying the Italians out ot the Islands of the 
Dodecanese. Why should she do so, when she was convinced that Italy would only 
hand them over to Turkey with the intention of taking them back again by picking a 
fresh quarrel with her at the first convenient moment'? Moreover the southern Islands 
were of no particular importance to Turkey. She would have no reason for wishing to 
oblige the Powers by putting an end to the Italian occupation. Nor could she be 
expected after the contemplated act of mutilation, to use her influence in restraining 
her former Mussulman subjects now incorporated in Greece and Servia from making 
matters generally uncomfortable for their new masters. I understood His Excellency 
to mean that Turkey would encourage, or at least do nothing to discourage, the 
formation of marauding bands in Northern Greece and Southern Servia when the 
winter is over, and that there would be no lasting peace in the Balkans till Turkey was 
satisfied. 

His Excellency realizes that the Powers could not be expected to modify their 
decision concerning the Islands. He still thinks however that Greece may wake up 
to a sense of the danger to which her Macedonian possessions will be exposed if the 
"vital interests" of Turkey are ignored in the settlement of the Islands question. 
He would not be surprised if M. Venizelos on his return to Athens from his present 
tour, were to make some proposal to the Ottoman Government conceding a portion at 
least of their demands. From a casual remark of His Excellency's, I am inclined to 
think that he had in view a possible Greek proposal to retain Chios for Greece, and to 
restore Mitylene to Turkey. Hilmi Pasha is a native of Mitylene and always speaks 
with bitterness of the proposal to hand it over to Greece. His Excellency again 
quoted Lucien Wolf who has contributed to the weekly " Graphic " of January 24th 
a further article in opposition to the settlement favoured by the six Powers. He told 
me that M. Steeg, Assistant Director of the Ottoman Bank, had lately passed through 
Vienna and had appeared to be convinced by Hilmi's arguments to the effect that 
Greece, either on her own account or acting on the suggestion of the Powers, would be 
well advised to enter upon a discussion of these questions directly with Turkey. 

Hilmi Pasha also spoke of Albania. He doubts if Albania will be able, for many 
years to come, to pay her own way. The country can provide a revenue of between 
5 and 10 millions of francs a year. The whole of this revenue would be required to 
pay the gendarmerie alone. This force must be brought up to 10,000 men if it is to be 
of any real use. According to Hilmi's experience 700 francs per man per annum is 
the lowest possible estimate of the cost. Thus he reaches 7 millions of francs a year 
(^280,000) as the annual cost of the gendarmerie. What, then, would remain for the 
Civil List of the Prince and for the ordinary cost of the administration? Austria- 



(1) [A copy of this telegram was sent to Consul-General Lamb 1 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 173-5, No. 188.] 
(s) [v. supra, pp. 188-9, Xo. 202.] 



202 



Hungary and Italy must make up their minds to find some 12 or 15 millions of francs 
a year to make good the deficit. They can hardly expect the other Powers to share 
expenditure secured bv no conceivable guarantee. 

If the Prince of Wied makes up his mind to take over his Principality of Albania, 
he will be faced, in Hilmi's opinion, with the difficult problem of how to distribute his 
favours without alienating the chiefs whom he finds it impossible to satisfy. Essad 
Pasha will of course endeavour to put the Prince in his pocket, but the Prince will no 
doubt be alive to this danger.(*) 

The general impression left on my mind by Hilmi Pasha's declarations was that 
His Excellency believes in the power of his country to make or mar the peace of the 
Balkans, and in the resolve of the Turkish Government to make themselves as 
disagreeable as possible to the Powers if something is not done to meet their 
grievance. 

I have, Sec. 

MAURICE DE BUNSEN. 

{*) [cp. supra, pp. 92-3, No. 107.] 



No. 216. 

Sir Edicard Grexj to Sir R. Rodd.C) 

P.O. 4336/98/14/44. 
(No. 32.) Confidential. 

gir^ Foreign Office, January 28, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador told me to-day that his Government thought that, 
instead of saying " as soon as possible " for the Greek evacuation of Epirus, a new 
date would have to be proposed. 

I said that I had rather expected this, and had so worded my reply(') as to leave 
that alternative open. 

The Ambassador told me that his Government accepted what I had said about 
Greek responsibility, provided that Austria would accept it also. 

With regard to a pledge that the Powers would make their decision respected, 
Italy must reserve the question of taking part herself in applying any forcible pressure 
to Turkey; but he was to inform me most confidentially that this reserve was made 
only in order to facilitate Turkey's making to Italy concessions that were necessary to 
secure the Italian evacuation of the .3^gean Islands. 

I said that, if a reserve of this sort was made, we should probably reserve our 
rights to abstain from the application of force either to Greece or to Turkey. 

The Ambassador said that his Government pointed out that the question of 
applying force to Turkey to secure the islands for Greece could not arise until Greece 
had actually evacuated Epirus and could be discussed then. 

I said that we would not agree to put pressure on Greece to evacuate Epirus unless 
it was understood that, when Greece had done so, all the Powers would if need be apply 
pressure in the same way to Turkey with regard to the islands. It was most unpopular 
to apply pressure to any Power : if pressure was to be applied in connection with one 
decision of the Powers, and if we were to join in it, it could be only on the 
understanding that the same course would be followed by all the Powers in connection 
with the other decision. 

As for making a reserve in order to facilitate obtaining concessions from Turkey 
we ourselves wished for some concessions and if Italy made a reserve from that motive 
I did not see why we should not do the same. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 

(2) [v. supra, pp. 196-7, No. 211.] 



2U3 



The Ambassador considered that as the concession which Italy desired was 
connected with the evacuation of the islands it was a special case, but I could not see 
this. 

[I am. Ac] 

E. G[EEY]. 



No. 217. 

Sir Edrcard Grey to Sir R. Eodd.C) 

F.O. 4337,98 14 44. 
(So. 33. Confidential. 

Sir. Foreign Office, January 28. 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador, after drawing my attention to-day to the unfortunate 
leakage by which my last Note(-) had been published in the " Daily Telegraph" of 
yesterday, said that the Marquis di San Giuliano was very much upset at the 
expression in my Xote that, till the J^gean Islands in Italian occupation were restored 
to Turkey, the situation would be abnormal. The Ambassador explained to me how 
essential it was that the Italians should have something from Turkey. He showed 
me most confidentially and in secret, as a mark of confidence, a Note that they were 
addressing to Turkey, in which they recited all the expenses to which Turkey had put 
them, claimed the right to present to Turkey a bill of the total expenses when they 
restored the islands, and, knowing that Turkey could not pay such a bUl, proposed 
that Italy should receive an economic concession. The Ambassador feared that my 
Note would be regarded bv Turkey as an intimation that, if Turkey refused all 
concession to Italy, the Powers would inter\'ene to see that the islands in Italian 
occupation were restored to Turkey without a concession on Turkey's part. He urged 
me very strongly to say something in Constantinople to remove this impression. 

I said that my Note had not been intended to prejudice any negotiations that 
were proceeding between Italy and Turkey. My statement, that while any Great 
Power remained in occupation of the islands the situation was abnormal, was intended 
as a statement of fact. It had been agreed that the situation was abnormal : and. had 
I let the statement in the Italian reply to our first proposal pass without comment, it 
might have been construed as meaning that we had no interest in the question. But 
what I had said was intended as a statement of fact, and not as a reproach against 
anyone. 

The Ambassador asked me whether I would propose, when the moment came for 
handing the islands of the Dodecanese back to Turkey, that two Italian Inspectors 
should be retained to see that the population was fairly treated, in accordance with 
the Article of the Treaty of Lausanne. This would be very helpful with Italian pubUc 
opinion. 

I replied that I could not make any promise on this point, and all I could say was 
that it was a point to be considered when the time came for handing back the islands. 
I added that I could not encourage any new conditions. 

The Ambassador said that his Government would not put it forward as a condition, 
and it would not be one : but it would be very helpful if I would put it forward. 

In the course of this conversation, the Ambassador dwelt upon the difficulty that 
the Marauis di San Giuliano had in keeping Italian public opinion quiet as regards 
Great Britain over the question of the islands. The Ambassador himself had worked 
exceedingly hard in this direction also, and he appealed to me to make things easy. 

I said that, if it was a question of being patient, the Italian Government must 
remember our ix)int of view. Italy had annexed Tripoli, and this had excited 

(*) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 
(») [c. supra, pp. 196-7, Xo. 211.] 



204 



Mussulman feeling in Egypt; but, owing to our secret agreement of years ago, 
disinteresting ourselves in Tripoli,(') though it did not contemplate any actual change 
in the status of Tripoli, we had felt bound to stand on one side. In the course of the 
war, the Italians had occupied some islands, assuring us that the occupation was only 
temporary. After the war was over, the conditions of the Treaty of Lausanne were 
attached to the evacuation of the islands, and now further conditions were being made. 
The Italian Government had selected the district close to the Smyrna-Aidin Railway 
to acquire a concession, and, had it not been for friendship to Italy, I should have 
opposed that concession unconditionally, instead of trjdng to find a way to reconcile it 
with the interests of the British Company, which I must protect. In addition, the 
Italian Government were now claiming that, if Abyssinia broke up, they were to have 
Lake Tzana, the control of which we regarded as essential to the waters of the Nile. 
In fact, in one way and another, during the last year or two the Italian Government 
had encroached more upon British interests than any other two European Powers put 
together. I most cordially endorsed the Ambassador's plea that he personally had 
done everything to make relations good and to smooth public opinion, but his 
Government had not always made things easy for us. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 

(•■') [cp. supra, p. 182, No. 197, and note {-).] 



No. 218. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.{^) 

Private.(") 

Dear Sir Edward, British Embassy, Constantinople, January 28, 1914. 

I will spare you a long letter by this bag as I am already ashamed of the 
amount which I am sending home this week. 

The Press is quieter since the receipt of a telegram from Djavid in Paris warning 
the Gov[ernmen]t that they will get no money, if they do not adopt a less warlike 
attitude. This is an index of the influence which France can exercise on the situation 
here and I think that the best policy would be for them to dole out money occasionally, 
so as not to lose this leverage. Once the Turks are given a large loan, there is no 
knowing what they might not do in their present mood — if it lasts. They have sent 
Tocheff to Sofia in a terrible fright. They flout the Servian Delegate when he talks 
of his peace negotiations and it cannot be denied that the Greeks will be in a most 
unpleasant position, unless a compromise is arranged or unless the Powers guarantee 
the islands against attack, which would be most difficult I should imagine. 

There are undoubtedly many unpleasant features in the situation and some which 
distinguish it from similar crises in the past. 

The Ministers are reckless and desperate — there has been for some time a secret 
Mussulman propaganda going on which has recently broken out in boycotting of 
Greek shops and in general acts of violence. Those who know tell me that this might 
easily spread and result in hostility to all Christians. There is not much doubt that 
the Salonica Jews are at the bottom of the boycott which benefits their compatriots, 
of whom the Greeks are successful trade competitors. The Turks think that the 
movement will benefit Mussulmans but it will do nothing of the sort for they are not 
traders and hardly own any shops at all. 

(1) [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; to 
Sir A. Nicolson; to Sir E. Crowe. It is minuted by Sir Edward Grey: "I will dictate a 
reply. E. G." cp. infra, p. 224, No. 240.1 

(2) [Grey MSS., Vol. 41.] 



205 



I do not want to exaggerate this danger but it requires watching and unless we 
are prepared to go far, I would deprecate anything in the nature of threats. I am very 
much interested in the work which is engrossing to an extent which I did not think 
possible when in the F[oreign] 0[ffice] but the difficulties of obtaining correct infor- 
mation and still more of forming an accurate forecast of events are very great and 
must excuse me, if I am wrong. 

Y[ou]rs sincerely, 

LOUIS MALLET. 



No. 219. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet. C) 

F.O. 3402/98/14/44. 
(No. 57.) 

Sir, Foreiy7i Office, January 29, 1914. 

The Turkish Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 22nd inst[ant] that 
he wished to ascertain what was passing in regard to the iEgean Islands &c. 
Sir A. Nicolson replied that the Powers were in consultation on the subject and that 
he could give H[is] E[xcellency] no information. 

Tewfik Pasha then stated that he had received a visit from M. Yenizelos, who had 
intimated that Greece would be glad to arrange an " Entente " with Turkey. H[is] 
E[xcellency] had answered that he personally would be in favour of such an 
" Entente," but that M. Venizelos, when he returned to Athens, had better think over 
the matter and explain to the Porte on what basis he desired an " Entente," and what 
was to be its scope and character. Tewfik Pasha remarked that he understood 
M. Venizelos to desire an ' ' Entente ' ' guaranteeing peace between Turkey and 
Greece in the iEgean Sea. Upon Sir A. Nicolson asking whether such a proposal 
would be favourably regarded at Constantinople, H[is] E[xcellency] observed that he 
did not know. He had, he said, been consulted by his Gov[ernmen]t as to overtures 
made by Bulgaria for Turkish co-operation in possible adventures against Greece and 
Servia, or in any case for benevolent Turkish neutrality should hostilities arise. He 
had strongly recommended, and he believed his Gov[ernmen]t were in accord, that 
such overtures should not be entertained. Turkey had need of repose and recupera- 
tion, and it would be foolish policy to assist Bulgaria, even indirectly, to have her 
revenge on Greece or Servia, as should Bulgaria be victorious she would thereby 
become stronger and would then endeavour to recover from Turkey what the latter had 
been able to regain. It was not to the interest of Turkey to encourage the designs or 
aspirations of Bulgaria. 

[I am, &c. 

E. GREY.] 

(1) [This despatch is based on Sir A. Nicolson's record of his conversation with Tewfik 
Pasha.] 



No. 220. 

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 4525/98/14/44. Rome, D. January 30, 1914, 9 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 18.) R. January 31, 1914, 11 -30 a.m. 

Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning spoke to me regarding that portion 
of your reply to the Triple Alliance Powers referring to situation as abnormal as long 



'206 



as Italy occupied the islands and said that this sentence had produced unpleasant 
impression in the country though Ttahan Government had done their best to check 
adverse press comment. My impression would be rather in a contrary sense and that 
Minister's object is to hope to make capital out of pretext oi" grievance. "While accepting 
my thesis that statement referred to was merely part of a summing up of results 
achieved or still incomplete he asked what purpose was served by addition of a sentence 
which was interpreted hero as an admonishment and he showed me notice of inter- 
pellation in the Chamber just handed in asking whether Italian Government had made 
any observations on what appeared to be dictation regarding an Italian interest. 

He said that he did not think that he could get the interpellation withdrawn and 
there might be others in a similar sense but he might be able to procure postponement 
of reply and he would like to be able to give not merely an answer which would dispose 
of contention but one which would secure general expressions of approval by his being 
able to state that the attitude of His Majesty's Government had been actually 
friendly. As it was Turkey would take advantage of any impression derivable from 
your note to Triple Alliance Powers(Mthat there might be divergence between England 
and Italy in order to postpone or refuse concession they had asked for. Also he heard 
from Constantinople that the fact we had asked for information about any concession 
to be granted in south-western Asia Minor had been there interpreted as implying 
that we were opposed to such concessions. He asked whether it would not be possible 
to make it known at Constantinople that this was not the case and rather to urge an 
acceleration of the solution really favourable to Turkey by her meeting Italian 
aspirations in reasonable spirit where they did not conflict with existing rights. If this 
question could be settled and he could announce a concrete result as secured or 
proximate to which our good-will liad contributed, it would enable him to respond to 
interpellation in a manner which would greatly advance our good relations, efface any 
unwelcome impression derived from the text of the note, and also further object we 
ourselves had in view, viz. restoration of islands to Turkey. 

He said Italian Ambassador at Constantinople had gathered that Turkey was not 
anxious at present to have to take islands. I said that I thought he was mistaken. 
He replied that if so why did she make difficulties over simple issue of concession. 

While it may well be that this exposition masks an adroit manoeuvre to further 
objects which Minister for Foreign Affairs has in view, I do not wish to be understood 
to deprecate action such as he suggested which I think may materially contribute to 
solution and would have its advantages here. 

(') [v. supra, pp. 196-8, No. 211, and ends.] 



No. 221. 

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.{') 

F.O. 5554/98/14/44. 

(No. 42.) Very Confidential. Rome, D. January 30, 1914. 

Sir, R. Fchruary 7, 1914. 

1 have the honour to report that I have this morning had a long and interesting 
conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of which I was able 
to extract from him certain admissions which throw some light on recent events and 
especially on the preliminaries to the reply of the Triple Alliance Powers to your 
proposals regarding the southern Albanian frontier and the islands. 

I have already reported by telegraph(^) the especial point to discuss which His 
Excellency had invited me to the Foreign Office, but as we traversed much more 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister , 
to Lord Crewe; to Lord Morley.] 

(^) [v. immediately preceding document.] 



207 



ground than it was possible for me to deal with in a summary report, I will endeavour 
to recapitulate as far as possible all that passed between us, reserving for another 
despatch his observations about the Austro-Italian Bank concession. 

The Marquis di San Giuliano began by saying that the passage in your note to 
the representatives of the Triple Alliance Powers, dwelling on the fact that the 
situation would not be normal so long as oi^e of the Great Powers remained in 
occupation of certain of the ^gean islands, had produced a somewhat grave impression 
in this country. He did not himself see things quite in the light in which people who 
did not know England and the English modes of expression were apt to regard them 
here. He felt that in drafting this sentence you would have regarded it as simply the 
record of a fact which was indisputable and which English directness of thought had 
no hesitation in formulating. But just because it was indisputable and undisputed, 
and because in international comu mications of such a nature every word is apt to be 
carefully weighed, people asked themselves here why was this particular sentence 
included. Some special purpose was presumed, and the conclusion at once adopted 
that it constituted a sort of admonition to Italy. 

I observed that in your reply you were summing up the situation as revealed in 
the answer of the Triple Alliance Powers, and having regard to the lines laid down at 
the Reunion of the Ambassadors in London, you had simply placed on record the 
results achieved as contrasted with those which were still incomplete. It appeared to 
me that what was really abnormal was the susceptibility of the Italian public, if they 
were obliged to go out of their way to affect umbrage on such a pretext. His 
Excellency replied that they were exceptionally susceptible, especially since the long 
tension of the war with Turkey, which was a new experience in the history of the 
nation, and they had by no means recovered from it yet, and had to be carefully 
handled. He had done his best to hold the press in restraint. With the ' ' Tribuna ' ' 
he had been tolerably successful (he subsequently admitted that the " Tribuna " 
article practically emanated from the Foreign Office); with the " Giornale d'ltalia," 
less so. 

Now with regard to this statement I venture to think that His Excellency's 
language was " diplomatic" rather than accurate, and I am the more persuaded of 
this by reason of a piece of e^^dence to which I will return later. My own impression 
is that the public in Italy would have been little impressed by the exposition of the 
obvious contained in your reference to the situation as abnormal, if the question of 
its significance had not been suggested to them. I had learned from my German 
colleague before the press had any knowledge of the terms of your reply that the 
Italian Foreign Office was preoccupied with the phrase in question, and the unanimity 
with which the Roman press had followed the view of the Consulta is suggestive. I 
feel assured that the resourceful Minister for Foreign Affairs had perceived that the 
pretext of a grievance and the alleged public preoccupation might be turned to useful 
account in an endeavour to gain us over to supporting the Italian claim for concessions 
in Asia Minor. 

The Marquis di San Giuliano went on to say that he did not see what purpose 
was served from our point of view by the words to which he had referred. Moreover, 
they were likely to have an unfortunate consequence, inasmuch as in Turkey they 
would be understood to imply that there was a prospect of divergence between Greai 
Britain and Italy, and the well known methods of Turkish diplomacy would jump at 
an opportunity which encouraged procrastination and the postponement of a settle- 
ment with regard to the Italian concessions, which would therefore tend also to 
postpone the restoration of the islands to Turkey. 

His Excellency then showed me the text of an interpellation announced in the 
Chamber on the subject of your reply, which had, he said, just been handed to him in 
accordance with the conditions of preliminary notice by Count Soderini, who had only 
left him just before I came in. In this interpellation the deputy enquired whether 
the Italian Government had made any comments on the implied dictation as to the 
mode of dealing with an Italian interest. 



208 



Now ray interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs was to have taken place 
on the preceding evening but was postponed as His Excellency did not feel very well, 
and if this interpellation had only been handed to him just before I came in, he could 
not have been in possession of it when he first suggested our meeting. At the same 
time without this interpellation to use as an argument there would have been much 
less reason for the suggestion he was about to make to me, and therefore I am of 
opinion that he was perfectly aware, when he invited me to a conversation, that such 
an interpellation was impending, and my presumption is that it has a collusive 
character. This presumption together with the conviction to which I have above 
referred, that the press lias not been so much restrained as prompted, have led me to 
conclude that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has been combining in his active and 
resourceful brain an ingenious method for securing that our influence at Constantinople 
should be exercised in favour of the concessions which it has now becom.e a matter of 
the first importance to the Italian Government to obtain. 

To return to the interpellation, the terms of which His Excellency admitted were 
rather strong, I observed that it appeared to me that the reply was easy. A settlement 
of the various questions arising out of the Balkan war, which had been left to the 
Powers to deal with, had made considerable progress; the international situation 
would once more become normal when the liquidation was complete ; as long as there 
were obstacles to its completion it would rem.ain to that extent abnormal, and was 
admitted to be so by Italy herself. It was therefore quite beside the mark to describe 
an ofiicial document summing up the position as partaking of the nature of dictation 
to Italy. He said that no doubt it would be easy to dispose of the interpellation in 
general terms, but he would have preferred that it should not have been necessary. 
He did not think he could obtain its withdrav^al but it might be possible by agreement 
with the interrogator to secure a postponement of the reply and discussion. It would 
be worth while to make this effort, if by so doing he could be enabled to give an 
answer which would not only meet the facts of the case but which would at the same 
time give him the opportunity of convincing the Chamber that all suspicions and 
insinuations such as were implied in the terms of the notice were not only unfounded 
but in direct opposition to reality. He would like to be able to make a reply which 
would comnliice the House of the sincerity of Anglo-Itahan friendship. The desire for 
information, which we had expressed at Constantinople, with regard to any contem- 
plated concessions in the neighbourhood of Adalia, which he recognised as certainly 
legitimate and natural, had been misinterpreted by the Turkish Government and was 
by them regarded as signifying that we were opposed to any such concessions being 
granted to Italy. This had made their task more difficult, as the Turk still sought his 
advantage in exploiting the supposed rivalries of the Powers. Would it not be possible 
to take steps at Constantinople to remove this misapprehension and to record that we 
should take a favourable view of any such arrangement, not conflicting with our own 
acquired rights, which would accelerate the withdrawal of Italy from the islands? If 
something concrete could be obtained, and he were enabled to announce it in the 
Chamber with an expression of appreciation at the friendly attitude displayed by Great 
Britain in bringing about the result, it would not only remove any unfortunate 
impression which might have been received here of an absence of cordiality, but would 
enable him to give a triumphant and crushing answer to the insinuations implied in 
the interpellation. 

He felt there was the more reason to adopt this course because the terms of the 
passage in your note to which he had first drawn attention had weakened the case of 
Italy to some extent at Constantinople. It was essential for her to remain on friendly 
terms with Turkey, and yet she had had to place herself in opposition to Turkey by 
adhering to the proposal for the transfer tc Greece of the islands which she had taken 
possession of during the war. By so doing Italy had lost ground in Turkey. 

This gave me an opportunity for observing that I quite understood his difficulty 
there, as I had gathered that the Turkish Government had expected to have the 
support of Italy against their surrender to Greece. The Marquis di San Giuliano, who 



209 



appeared for a moment at a loss for an answer, said that Turkev had no right to have 
formed such an impression. The most that could have been anticipated would have 
been that Italy might dissociate hers*^lf from anv direct action and leave it to the other 
Powers to deal with the question. This con\-inced me that the reports which have 
reached us with regard to Italy's action at Constantinople in this matter had good 
foundation. (/i He went on to say that it had been a very difficult issue for Italy to 
meet. She had, he now in a moment of frankness admitted, resisted the acceptance of 
your proposals as regards the islands held by Greece up to the last moment, and only 
given way in the face of the determined insistence of her allies. A strong card to play 
in the negotiations with Turkey had thus been lost, and the latter Power was now- 
making it felt that Italy's professions of friendship had led to no practical advantage. 

These unexpected revelations were extremely interesting, and I felt that the 
admission that Italy was looking out for occasions of proving herself the friend cf 
Turkey with a well-defined object in N-iew gave me an opportunity of touching on 
another matter. I said to His Excellency that the article to which he had referred in 
the ■ ' Tribuna ' ' as having been controlled by the Foreign Office, contained, it appeared 
to me, a passage which was hardly felicitous. It was there said that the consideration 
of eventual measures to make the decisions of the Powers binding on both Greece and 
Tiu"key might logically be postponed so far as Turkey was concerned until after the 
attribution of the islands to Greece had become definitive ; that an exchange of views 
on this subject was going on between the Powers of the Triple Alliance, and that the 
Italian Government found in this portion of the British reply a new occasion to display 
to Turkey the friendship by which they were inspired and would continue to be, if 
Turkey reciprocated this friendship in a concrete manner. I observed that, of course, 
this was only a newspaper article, but it had appeared in a semi-official organ, and 
surely to make a bid for the friendship of Turkey by what was tantamount to an 
announcement that Italy could be induced for a price to oppose any steps to enforce 
the decisions of the Powers with whom she had acted, was rather a strange proceeding, 
though it was to some extent explained by what I had gathered from him as to the 
prenous policy pursued. I could understand the policy, but I could not well 
understand their compromising its possible success by giving it away. His Excellency 
said it was impossible in any case nowadays to keep anything secret. France would see 
to that. The article in question (translation of which vrWl be found in my despatch 
No. 39 of yesterday's date,(*i had, he admitted, been directly inspired by his Depart- 
ment. He could not however be responsible for any passage in it. At the same time, 
as he knew the passage in que.^tion the moment I referred to it, I had no doubt it had 
been drafted at the Foreign Office. He was, I tliink, rather perplexed to know how lo 
answer, but with his 'asual adroitness endeavoured to explain that the step implied was 
really in our interest, as, if Turkey could be induced by Italian friendliness to assent 
to the conditions which would make the \vithdrawal from th<i islands possible, we 
ought to be content. I could not quite restrain my amusement, in which he frankly 
shared, and 1 congratulated him on his ingenuity in turning the question, though he 
had not convinced me that that was the way in which the words would be interpreted 
by those who read the text. 

His Excellency then said that he had just received a very interesting report from 
the Italian Consul at Calcutta, discussing the actual situation in India and bearing 
testimony to a considerable improvement under Lord Hardinge's viceroyalty. He had 
however drawn attention to the fact that at a recent Indian Native Congress at 
Lucknow the Mussulman element had been present in considerable numbers, which 
was a new and rather disquieting symptom. The Consul attributed this to the 
dissatisfaction of the Indian Mussulmans with the anti-Turkish attitude of the Homo 
Government during the Balkan war and its liquidation, and especially over such 
questions as those of the islands. 

(») [cp. supra, pp. 166-7, Xos. 1S2-3.] 

(*) [Sir R. Rodd's despatch (No. 39^. D. January 29. R. February 4, 1914, is concerned chiefly 
with the views of the Italian press. (F.O. 5081/98/14/44.)] 

,3959] P 



210 



It was evident that this report had afforded His Excellency an expedient for 
recommending to our notice the utility of a friendly attitude to Turkey and for 
deprecating rigorous measures in enforcing the decisions of the Powers. 

I replied that I did not think the complaint of the Mussulmans was so much that 
we had opposed Turkey as that we had not actively defended her and supported her 
when attacked; and that the real occasion for their discontent had been the war in 
Tripoli and the wresting away of Mussulman provinces from the Khalifa by Italy, 
without any protest on our part. His Excellency was obliged to admit that as a point 
of fence this argument had scored. But when I continued to argue that it was the 
promoting occasion of the Balkan war and all the subsequent misfortunes of the 
Ottoman Empire, he put forward a very interesting objection. He said it was not the 
fault of Italy that the Tripoli war had afforded the Balkan states their opportunity. It 
was the fault of another Power (Austria) which had intervened to prevent Italy from 
availing herself of the means of bringing pressure to bear on Turkey which would have 
concluded the Tripoli war in a month or six weeks. 

This despatch has, I fear, run on to an inordinate length but it was necessary to 
record the process by which the Marquis di San Giuliano was led to make disclosures 
which will, I am sure, prove interesting and to explain the reasons which led me to 
believe that the issue which he began by raising w'as put forward with a deliberate 
object. 

Whether this is so or not, and I have little doubt that it is, the consequences 
which may result, must be taken into consideration. The susceptible Italian will 
quickly seize the point, will feel that we have shown a want of cordiality and that he 
has a right to be aggrieved at what he regards as an implication that the word of his 
Government is not as good as their bond. This impression can now no doubt be 
easily effaced, and as there is every reason to believe that Italy, with the support of 
her allies will end by obtaining some concrete concessions from Turkey, it appears to 
me that it is in our interest that they should be obtained with, and perhaps through 
our goodwill rather than be supposed to have been secured in spite of our opposition. 
I have ventured before to submit that the final orientation of Italy in Europe is not 
yet determined and I feel that we have still some fair prospect of inclining the scale 
in the most advantageous direction. Therefore even if the process of enforcing it on 
our notice may excite suspicion, I think the suggestion of the Italian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs is well worthy of our consideration. 

I have, dc. 

EENNELL RODD. 

MINUTES. 

An enlightening despatch. 

A. N. 

Thank Sir R. Rodd for his very interesting and suggestive despatch. (s) 

E. G. 

(5) [A despatch (No. 42) was sent in these terms on February 13. (F.O. 5554/98/14/44.)] 



No. 222. 

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. 

Berlin, January 31, 19J4. 

F.O. 4568/98/14/44. D. 8-30 p.m. 

Tel (No. 14.) R. 9-30 p.m. 

I had a short conversation yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs on the subject of your reply to the Triple Alliance Powers respecting Albania 
and the yEgean islands. (M He said he thought your reply was slightly evasive. I asked 
him in what way, and he said " vague " was perhaps the term he ought to have used. 



(») [v. supra, pp. 1S6-8, No. 211, and ends.] 



211 



On my pressing him on the subject, he said you had expressed no decided opinion as to 
whether evacuation should be " aussitot que possible" or on a fixed date as desired 
by Italian Government. Further, that you had omitted to mention any condition 
with regard to evacuation in your draft communication to Greek Government. I 
replied that you liad probably done this as the point was still unsettled, and that 
terms of communication could not be definitely fixed until all the Powers were in 
agreement, but he begged me to call your attention to the point. He told me the word 
""abnormal had caused great dissatisfaction in Italy. I pointed out while a country 
was occupied by foreign troops it could not be regarded as being in a normal state, 
and that in the sense you had used the word it was absolutely devoid of offence. After 
some discussion, he admitted that perhaps the Italians had attached too much 
importance to the word. His Excellency also thought words in last paragraph of your 
note from words " on condition that " to the end were somewhat vague, as you offered 
no opinion as to what steps Powers should take to make their decisions respected. He 
would be glad to know your ideas on this subject, as he was sure that the Imperial 
Government would not agree to participate in any coercive measures. 

(2) [v. supra, p. 198, Xo. 211, end. 2.] 



No. 223. 

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

F.O. 4606 '98/14/44. 

(No 44 ) Berlin, D. January 31, 1914. 

Sir/ ■ E. February 2. 1914. 

As I have already had the honour to report to you by telegraph M. Yenizelos 
called upon me on the 28th instant(-) and was good enough to give me an account of 
his conversation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and of the reception 
given bv the latter to the various suggestions and proposals which he submitted to His 
Excellencv. To put the result of these conversations briefly, Herr von Jagow admitted 
that the suggestion made by M. Yenizelos to the effect that if the Greek Government 
were called upon not to fortify their Islands, the Ottoman Government should, on their 
side, be called upon to engage not to attack them, was quite logical and reasonable; 
but he stated at the same time that Germany was opposed to a naval demonstration, 
or at all events would not take part in one, either to compel the Ottoman Government 
to give the above mentioned engagement or generally to enforce the decision of the 
Powers. As regards the other proposals of M. Yenizelos, viz. that Greece should 
evacuate the districts occupied by her troops in Southern Albania by " etapes," and 
that certain wholly Greek districts allotted by the Powers to Albania should be ceded 
to Greece in return for 5 million francs and a slight rectification of frontier in favour 
of Albania on the coast, Herr von Jagow said that the Imperial Government would be 
quite ready to agree to them if the other Powers raised no objections. 

This account of the conversation was given to me by M. Yenizelos and confirmed 
to me today by Herr von Jagow. 

Although M. Yenizelos showed hunself so anxious that Turkey should be restrained 
from anv aggressive action by a naval demonstration on the part of the Powers, he 
nevertheless spoke to me in a very optimistic vein of the small chance there was of 
Turkey making war on Greece. He regarded a "coup de main" against Scio and 
Mitylene, an eventuality witli regard to which Herr von Jagow had expressed some 
anxiety, as entirely out' of the question aout a fait exclus\ owing to the Turks being 
quite aware that any such attempt would be easily frustrated by the strong force of 
Greek torpedo boats which were stationed round those islands. 

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 
r-) I'Sir E. Goschen's telegram CSo. lit of January 29, 1914. D. 8-45 p.m.. R. 11 p.m., is not 
reproduced as the contents are suflBciently indicated above. (F.O. 4244/98/14/44.)] 

[8959] 2 



212 



As regards a campaign on land, Turkey would certainly not undertake such a 
dangerous adventure without assistance direct or indirect, from Bulgaria, and he had 
the firm conviction that such assistance would not be forthcoming. The Bulgarians 
were too exhausted in a military sense to give direct assistance, and as regards 
indirect assistance, they were fully alive to the danger of letting the Turks march 
through territory from which they had only ' so recently been ousted. Besides 
Eoumania was an important 'factor which made for peace, as both Turkey and Bulgaria 
knew that she would resist any attempt on their part to upset the equilibrium in the 
Balkan States which she regarded as her own creation. 

Further, without Bulgaria Turkey would certainly not be in a position to make 
war on Greece as long as she had not command of the sea, and that she would not at 
all events have until her new Dreadnought was in fighting trim. That would in all 
probability not be the case until towards the end of the year. Between now and then 
many things might happen at Constantinople and amongst other things Enver Pasha, 
who was the chief source of anxiety, might have disappeared from the scene ! 

Notwithstanding all his optimism M. Venizelos seemed rather disappointed that 
Herr von JagO'n had not fallen in with his ideas of a naval demonstration, even to the 
extent of detaching the German stationnaire from Constantinople for that purpose. 

He was also disappointed that he had not been able to convince the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador here that his suggestion that the Greek troops should evacuate 
the occupied districts in Albania by etapes was not a favour which Greece was asking, 
but an arrangement suggested for carrying out the evacuation with the minimum of 
disorder and for enabling the small force of gendarmerie available to deal successively 
with such opposition as might arise on a small scale instead of being hopelessly out- 
numbered by an entire population, as might be the case if the whole district occupied 
was evacuated at the same time. M. Venizelos hoped however that Count Berchtold 
would take a clearer view of what was meant by his suggestion. 

Herr von Jagow spoke to me this afternoon on the subject of the conversations 
and he told me that he had made it so clear to him that Germany would take no part 
in a naval demonstration, that in subsequent conversations with the Emperor and the 
Chancellor M. Venizelos had not alluded to the subject. Herr von Jagow reiterated 
to me the arguments he had used in talking this matter over with M. Venizelos, 
namely that Germany was opposed in principle to naval demonstrations and had never 
taken part in one, and further that the Imperial Government objected to participate 
in action of which the duration could not be foreseen and of which the efl&cacy was so 
doubtful. 

He told me also that the Imperial Government were ready and willing to give any 
amount of good advice to the Ottoman Government and to point out to them the folly 
of entering upon another military adventure but that they would not take part in any 
measures of coercion. 

Whether from fear -of being pressed to participate in such measures, or because of 
information received from Constantinople, Herr von Jagow informed me that he was 
now less anxious respecting aggressive action on the part of the Turks and felt fairly 
confident that during this year at all events there would be no fresh war. He added 
however that should he be wrong in this point, and war break out, it was his firm 
opinion that all the Powers could, or, in fact, should do was to use their best endeavours 
to localise it. I told Herr von Jagow that I could not agree with him on that point. 
It seemed to me that it was very much the business of the Powers to see that the 
resolutions to which they had come after long deliberation and negotiation were loyally 
carried out by the parties interested, and that, personally speaking, I thought that 
there had already been quite enough disregard shown of decisions arrived at by the 
Powers. If such rebuft's were allowed to continue the prestige of the Great Powers in 
the Near East would reach a very low ebb. 

He said that in the case of arbitration it was the duty of the arbitrator to give a 
decision, but none of his business to coerce either of the parties between whom he had 
arbitrated to carry out that decision. I said that I could not see the analogy ; this was 



213 



not a case of arbitration, but a decision on the part of the Great Powers in a matter in 
which they had, some of them a direct, and all of them an indirect, interest. We had 
some further conversation on the subject but the upshot of it was that llerr von Jagow 
gave me to understand once more that the Imperial Government would give adWce, 
but that they would not imperil their great interests in Turkey by taking part in any 
measures that even had the appearance of coercion or undue pressure. I told him that 
it would be equally disagreeable to His Majesty's Government to exercise pressure on 
Turkey, where British interests wei-e from many points of \-iew perhaps even greater 
than those of Germany, but that still I thought that you held strongly the opinion that 
it was incumbent on the Powers. ha\'ing once given their decisions, to see that they 
were carried out loyally by the parties concerned. 

I have. kc. 

W. E. GOSCHEN. 

MINUTES. 

1 am afraid that the attitude adopted by the German government, coupled with the care 
that has been taken to take credit for it in anticipation at Constantinople means the end of 
the policy of co-operation between England and Germany, and the relapse on Germany's part 
into the cynical policy of promoting discord among other Powers fur the purpose of acquiring a 
I>osition of vantage for herself. 

It is a question whether we should not make an earnest effort to bring home to 
Herr von Jagow what his present policy really implies, and I still think there would be an 
advantage of communicating without further delay with the triple alliance Powers somewhat 
in the sense of the circular telegram of which I submitted a draft this morning.*^ ) 

E. A. C. 

Feb[ruary] 3. 

After the telegrams which were despatched this moming,(*) it would, I submit, be well to 
await replies to them before taking any further steps. Presumably we shall very shortly 
receive also the replies of the Triple Alliance to our circular telegram(*) — We shall then see 
exactly what the attitude of the Triple Alliance is to be. It is not a question as to whether 
Turkey is or is not likely to go to war or whether she is or is not in a position to do so. The 
real question is that the Powers have come to cenain decisions which we trust, if loyally 
observed, will ensure a permanent settlement. In the interests of peace it is essential that the 
Powers make it clearly understood to the two litigants (Turkey and Greece) that these decisions 
must be respected — if they do so there is every probability that both litigants will bow to the 
decisions. If the Powers are not in accord on this point, then neither litigant would regard 
the ' decisions ' as more than mere " recommendations," and it would not be consistent with 
the dignity of the Powers nor conducive to peace for such an interpretation to prevail. It 
would in such circum[stan]ces be bett«r to abstain from making any commun[icatio]n at 
Athens or Const [antino]ple. 

A. N. 
E. G. 

(') [r. infra, p. 216. No. 228. and note (i).] 
(*) [v. supra, pp. 196-7. Nos. 210-1.] 



No. 224. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.{^) 

F.O. 4525 98 14 44. 

Tel. (No. 21.1 Foreign Office, February 2, 1914, 1 p.m. 

Your telegram No. 18 (of January 31 C-^ : igean Islands . 

I h.a\e fully explained my \-iew of the position to the Italian ambassador and 
recorded our conversation in a despatch which went to you by bag on Jan[uary] 80. (^) 
This will enable you to reply to the several points raised. 

As regards the Italian application for concession at Adalia,('') I was compelled to 
ask Turkish gov[emmen]t for information owing to persistent refusal of Italian Govern- 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Constantinople (No. 53).] 
(*) [v. supra, pp. 205-6. No. 220.] 
(») [r. supra, pp. 203-4, No. 217.] 

(*) Icp. supra, pp. 168-71, No. 155. The concession was for exclusive rights in connection 
with railway and harbour works.] 



214 



ment to tell me what the concession was they were pressing Turkey to grant, so that 
it was made impossible for me to know whether such concession conflicted with the 
rights of the British company or not. 

I have repeatedly stated that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] were in no way 
opposed to any Italian concessions which did not violate British rights, and I should 
have thought that by leaving Italian concessionnaires to come to an amicable 
arrangement with the British company direct, so as to eliminate any conflict of 
interests, n[i3] M[ajesty'sJ GTovernment] have given best proof of the absence from 
their mind of any intention of obstructing Italian plans. Indeed but for a desire to 
maintain friendship with Italy, I should iiave continued to oppose any concession so 
close to vested interests of Smyrna-Aidin E[ailwa]y Co[mpany], and as it is I can 
hardly inform the Turkish Gov[ernmen]t that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] have 
no objection to the Italian concession until the arrangement with the British 
Co[mpany] has been settled to their satisfaction. 

I see no reason why Minister for Foreign Affairs should not speak generally in 
above sense in answer to the interpellation. 



No. 225. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.{^) 

F.O. 4568/98/14/44. 

Tel. (No. 86.) Foreign Office, February 2, 1914, 3-45 p.m. 

Your tel[egram] No. 14 of Jan[uai-y] 31(') (So[uthern] Albania and J^gean 
Islands). 

I purposely worded sentence including ' ' aussitot que possible " so as to leave it 
open to Italy to propose a date. I thought Italy would probably want another date 
and if so would propose one herself. I could hardly propose a new date without 
consulting Italy and Austria beforehand and this would have delayed my whole reply. 

Attribution of Islands to Greece must of course be conditional upon her evacuation 
of territory assigned to Albania and I shall not object to wording to make this clear. 

To pass over Italian reply about Dodecanese without some observation might have 
given rise to misapprehension and statement that occupation of iEgean Islands by a 
Great Power is abnormal is mere statement of fact and not a reproach. I think the 
word " abnormal " must have a more offensive effect when translated than it has in 
English. 

My view on last point in your telegram is that forcible measures to make a 
decision respected involve much odium and that H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t 
would not desire to incur this either as regards Greece or Turkey unless all the Powers 
act together. 

It seems undesirable for Powers to announce further decisions unless they agree 
to enforce them. In this case international naval action in Greek waters would 
enforce decision respecting Southern frontier of Epirus and international naval action 
could easily prevent Turks from occupying islands. But we could not be a party to 
enforcing either decision in case of necessity unless Powers all agree to join in 
enforcing both decisions. 

I should raise no objection to any arrangement arrived at voluntarily between 
Greece and Turkey to modify decision of Powers by exchanging Islands. 

I approve what you have said and you can speak again to M[inister for] 
F[oreign] A [flairs] in sense of this telegram. 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to the Embassies and to Constantinople.! 

(2) [ii. supra, pp. 210-1, No. 222.] 



215 



No. 226. 

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.C) 

Constantinople, February 2, 1914. 
F.O. 4848/98/14/44. D. 9-35 p.m. 

Tel. (No. 78.) E. 11-45 p.m. 

Grand Vizier asked me to telegraph to you his great surprise on learning that His 
Majesty's Government had again taken a hostile initiative against Turkey by 
proposing a naval demonstration to compel them to accept Powers' decision, thus 
closing door on amicable solution with Greece. 

His Highness added that Germany, Italy, and Austria had fortunately saved the 
situation by refusing your proposal. 

He asked me to assure you that the Porte had no intention of going to war, and 
that they would do their best to come to a direct understanding with Greece on the 
basis of exchange of islands. 

He hoped that you would not prevent this solution by giving promises of support 
to Greece, which would make them intractable, but that, if possible, you would assist 
them in arriving at a compromise. 

He added that in Berlin M. Venizelos had not received so much encouragement as 
in other capitals. 

His Highness spoke at length of sinister change in British policy as regards 
Turkey, and I hear from my colleagues that his language is stronger to them on the 
subject than to me. I merely said that I was -ignorant of any proposal for naval 
demonstration, and promised to transmit his observations and request. 



MINUTES. 

Q[uer]y. No answer to the Grand Vizier who seems to live in a state of recurrent 
ebullition. 

R. G. V. 

Feb[ruary] 3. 

In my humble opinion the time has come for some plain speaking to the Triple Alliance 
and at Constantinople. 

It is clear from the Grand Vizier's language that he has been coached by one of the; Triple 
Alliance embassies and we are fast falling back into the old division at Constantinople. T 
think we should say that this means the end of co-operation and that we shall withdraw 
altogether, unless the Powers are going to act in real unison. 

G. R. C. 
3.ii.l4. 

I agree with Mr. Clerk's view, and submit herewith a draft telegram to the Ambassadors 
at Berlin, Vienna and Rome.(2) 

E. A. C. 

Feb[ruary] 3. 

We are telegraphing to the capitals of the Triple Alliance on the subject. We should 
await their replies or explanations and then we can consider what further communication 
should be made. 

A. N. 

I am entirely with Sir E. Crowe in spirit but I will wait now to see what comes of what 
I have alreadv said. 

E. G. 

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 42) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 60) ; to Vienna 
(as No. 23); to Rome (as No. 26); to Berlin (as No. 38).] 

(2) [Not reproduced, cp. infra, p. 217, No. 229, which was drafted by Sir Edward Grey.] 



216 



No. 227. 

Sir Edward Greij to Sir L. Mallet. C) 

F.O. 5176/98/14/44. 
(No. 66.) 

Six-^ Foreign Office, February 2, 1914. 

The Turkish Ambassador made an enquiry about the iEgean Islands to-day. 

Sir Arthur Nicolson and I informed him that the proposition we had made to the 
Powers contained nothing new, but was founded upon decisions come to at the 
Conference of Ambassadors last Summer. We wished to know whether the Powers 
still adhered to those decisions. If all of them did so, we should join with them in 
making a communication in Constantinople and Athens. But we ourselves had no 
special interests in the matter, and whether we made a communication would depend 
upon whether all the Powers were agreed. 

[I am, &c.] 

E. G[REY]. 

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] 



No. 228. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.C) 

F.O. 4848/98/14/44. 

Tel. (No. 60.) Foreign Office, February 3, 1914, 4 p.m. 

Your tel[egram] No. 78 (of February 2nd)(^) (S[outhern] Albania and ^gean 
Islands). 

My telegram No. 43('^) will enable you to inform Grand Vizier of what our actual 
proposal was and my telegram No. 36(') to Sir E. Goschen repeated to you will give 
you sufficient information to show that we have not proposed any differential action 
as between Turkey'- and Greece respecting Islands and Albanian frontier, nor have 1 
desired to prevent a direct understanding between Greece and Turkey. 

The Powers came to a certain decision about the Islands and Albanian frontier in 
the summer : I am prepared to abide by that decision, if the Powers adhere to it and 
are prepared to make it respected. I have no special interest in pressing the question 
upon the Pov/ers, but they must come to a decision one way or the other and I regard 
question of Albanian frontier and islands as inseparably connected and have treated 
both exactly alike. 

I have not yet received any official reply from the Gov[ernmen]ts of Germany, 
Italy and Austria Hungary to my Note of Jan[uary] 23(*) and am unaware whether 
they accept or refuse my proposal which relates to the southern frontier of Albania as 
well as to the Islands. (*) 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Paris (Nos. 43-4) ; to St. Petersburgh (Nos. 61-2) ; with 
instructions to "inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[fFairs]." It was repeated also to "Vienna 
(Nos. 24-5); to Rome (Nos. 27-8); to Berlin (Nos. 39-40); for "information only."] 

(2) [v. supra, p. 215, No. 226.] 

(3) \v. supra, p. 196, No. 210.] 

(■*) [v. supra, p. 214, No. 225, and note (').] 
(s) [v. supra, pp. 196-8, No. 211, and ends.] 

(«) [The final paragraph of the telegram was added as the result of the following note by 
Sir A. Nicolson:- — • 

" Sir Edward Grey, February 3, 1914. 

I would point out that the Triple Alliance have let it be known at Constantinople that 
they refuse any action in case the decision of the Powers is not respected. This has been done 
before they have even replied officially to your note and proposed declarations. 1 think, 
therefore, that we should add to your telegram to Sir L. Mallet ' I have not yet received any 
official reply from the Gov[ernmen]ts of Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary to my circular 
telegram of [January 23] and am unaware whether they accept or refuse my proposal which 
relates to the Southern frontier of Albania as well as to the Islands.' . A. N." The 
remainder of this note comprised the draft of the immediately succeeding document. It is 
minuted by Sir Edward Grey: " I approve. E. G."'] 



217 



No. 229. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.{^) 

F.O. 4848/98/14/44. 

Tel. (No. 41.) Foreign Office, February 3, 1914, 4 p.m. 

lly telegram to Eome No. 28 of Feb[rnaryi 3rd(=) : M^ean Islands. 
You should take an early opportunity of stating to M[inister for] F[oreign] 

ATffairs] the following ... ^ ^ ^ , . 

The Grand Vizier has expressed to H[is] M[ajesty s] Ambass[ado]r his great 
surprise that H[is] M[ajestv's1 Gov[ernmen]t had taken the initiative in proposing 
a naval demonstration against' Turkey to compel her to accept the decision of the 
Powers, and that the Triple Alliance had saved the situation by refusing such a 
proposal.(') As I have not yet received any official reply either negative or affirmative 
from the Triple Alliance to my note of Jan[uary] 23rd(') I do not understand whence 
the Grand Vizier has derived his information. 

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Vienna (No. 26) ; to Rome (No. 29) ; to Constantinople 
(No. 67).] 

(2) [v. immediately preceding document, and note (>).] 

(3) [v. supra, p. 215, No. 226.] 

(*) [v. supra, pp. 196-8, No. 211, and ends.] 



No. 230. 

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. 

F.O. 5562/98/14/44. 

(No. 52.) Confidential. Rome, D. February 3, 1914. 

Sir^ E. February 7, 1914. 

I have the honour to report that the Secretary General of the Italian Foreign 
Office this morning said to me that in Paris there still appeared to be some misgiving